



Security Council

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Note by the President of the Security Council

In paragraph 2 of resolution [2407 \(2018\)](#), the Security Council requested the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [1874 \(2009\)](#) to provide a final report to the Council with its findings and recommendations.

Accordingly, the President hereby circulates the report received from the Panel of Experts (see annex).

* Reissued for technical reasons on 12 March 2019.



Annex

Letter dated 21 February 2019 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 2407 (2018), the final report on its work.*

The attached report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) on 1 February 2019 and was considered by the Committee on 21 February 2019.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and its enclosure were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Hugh **Griffiths**

Coordinator

Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)

(Signed) Olaf **Andrieu**

Expert

(Signed) Dmitry **Kiku**

Expert

(Signed) Stephanie **Kleine-Ahlbrandt**

Expert

(Signed) Maiko **Takeuchi**

Expert

(Signed) Jong Kwon **Youn**

Expert

(Signed) Jiahu **Zong**

Expert

* Ms. Yvonne Yew, the eighth member of the Panel of Experts, was appointed by the Secretary-General on 18 January 2019 and took up her official functions in New York on 28 January 2019.

Enclosure**Letter dated 1 February 2019 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)**

The Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 2407 (2018), the final report on its work.*

The Panel would appreciate it if this letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006).

(Signed) Hugh **Griffiths**
Coordinator
Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)

(Signed) Olaf **Andrieu**
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Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)

Summary

The nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remain intact and the country continues to defy Security Council resolutions through a massive increase in illegal ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products and coal. These violations render the latest United Nations sanctions ineffective by flouting the caps on the import of petroleum products and crude oil by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as well as the coal ban, imposed in 2017 by the Security Council in response to the country's unprecedented nuclear and ballistic missile testing. In addition to information provided to the Panel by several Member States on ship-to-ship transfers, one Member State indicated, while queried by another, that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had already procured over 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum products in 2018. Global banks and insurance companies continue to unwittingly facilitate payments and provide coverage for vessels involved in ever-larger, multi-million-dollar, illegal ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products, as well as an increasing number of ship-to-ship coal transfers and attempted transshipments.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to violate the arms embargo and has attempted to supply small arms and light weapons and other military equipment to Houthi rebels in Yemen, as well as to Libya and the Sudan, via foreign intermediaries, including Syrian arms trafficker Hussein al-Ali in the case of the Houthi rebels. The Panel continued investigations into designated entities and individuals in Asia who clandestinely procured centrifuges for the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and attempted to sell a wide range of military equipment to armed groups and Governments in the Middle East and Africa. The Panel investigated the involvement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in gold mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the construction of a military camp in Sierra Leone and the sale of fishing rights in the waters surrounding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as well as activities of designated entities and other prohibited activities around the world. The Panel also investigated the acquisition by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of leading luxury brand goods, such as Rolls-Royce, Mercedes-Benz and Lexus vehicles. The world's largest container shipping line continued to unwittingly transport prohibited items later seized by Member States.

Financial sanctions remain some of the most poorly implemented and actively evaded measures of the sanctions regime. Individuals empowered to act as extensions of financial institutions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea operate in at least five countries with seeming impunity. The Reconnaissance General Bureau continues its international financial operations by transferring funds from accounts closed in the European Union to those held at financial institutions in Asia. The global operations of Glocom and the Malaysia-Korea Partners Group of Companies (MKP) continue despite the Panel's past reporting on their illicit activities and show the ongoing use of overseas companies and individuals to obfuscate income-generating activities for the regime of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Panel also investigated companies acting as possible cooperative entities or joint ventures, some of which are officially registered as joint ventures and others that more actively conceal the nature of their collaboration with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. A number of these entities have also violated other provisions of the resolutions, including by maintaining links to designated entities. The Panel also investigated the sophisticated cyberattacks

carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea against multiple Member States to evade financial sanctions.

Ship-to-ship transfers involve increasingly advanced evasion techniques. The disguising of vessels through ship identity theft and false Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions is not being taken into account by most global and regional commodity trading companies, banks and insurers, whose due diligence efforts fall extremely short. The manipulation of vessel AIS transmissions remains an overarching feature of illegal transfers, contrary to International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations governing safety of life at sea, which require that AIS be in operation at all times. This highlights weak monitoring by flag States. In addition, insurers do not monitor the AIS of the vessels for which they provide coverage and services. Other methods of evasion include physical disguise of tankers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the use of small, unregistered vessels, illegal name-changing and other forms of identity fraud, night transfers and the use of additional vessels for transshipment. In addition to evading sanctions, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its maritime fleet are systematically violating the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, routinely engaging in double-flagging and providing safe harbour for hijacked ships. The Panel inspected seized vessels engaged in prohibited coal trades, documenting ship identity laundering, whereby the owners had deceived IMO into providing new vessel identity numbers to avoid repeat detection. The Panel found that ports and airports in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were being used for rampant violations of the resolutions, ranging from illegal oil imports and coal exports to the smuggling of bulk cash by nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Furthermore, the Panel found that the country was using civilian facilities, including airports, for ballistic missile assembly and testing with the goal of effectively preventing "decapitation" strikes.

Diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continue to play a key role in sanctions evasion. While some Member States have limited the number of bank accounts of the country's embassies and diplomats as required by the resolutions, the latter are evading this provision by controlling accounts in multiple countries, including those to which they are not accredited. Diplomats and representatives of designated entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea also circumvent the assets freeze and the limit on the number of diplomatic bank accounts by holding accounts in the name of family members and front companies and by establishing accounts in multiple jurisdictions. Diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continue to travel under false accreditation in their passports and have also facilitated the country's efforts to illegally export large quantities of coal through transshipment to disguise the origin.

Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations have expressed concern that despite the exemption provisions in the resolutions and the Committee's efforts, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations continue to experience difficulties in meeting critical life-saving needs of vulnerable populations in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The present report offers a series of recommendations for designation and other practical measures to assist Member States and the Security Council in addressing implementation challenges and shortcomings.

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Annexes*

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 2 of resolution [2407 \(2018\)](#), the Security Council requested the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [1874 \(2009\)](#) to provide to the Committee a final report with findings and recommendations. The present report covers the period from 2 February 2018 to 1 February 2019.¹

II. Sectoral and maritime sanctions

2. Ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products by foreign-flagged vessels using flags of convenience are a primary method of sanctions evasion by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. These transfers have increased in scope, scale and sophistication, with more than 50 vessels and 160 associated companies under investigation. Reports to the Panel by Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America and the Panel's own investigations show that illegal ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products greatly accelerated in 2018. On 30 March, the Committee designated 27 vessels and 21 entities, mainly for ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum. On 16 October, the Committee designated an additional three vessels.

3. On 6 July 2018, the United States informed the Panel that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had breached the petroleum cap stipulated in resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), stating that between 1 January and 30 May 2018, tankers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had called at ports of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at least 89 times, likely to deliver refined petroleum products illegally procured via ship-to-ship transfers² and that "these sales must be halted given that, in our estimation, the UNSCR 2397 quota has been breached". On 30 July 2018, the Panel received a note verbale from the Russian Federation in which it sought clarification on the projection provided by the United States. The Russian Federation also informed the Panel that the cap had not been officially reached according to the numbers reported to the Committee and therefore there were no grounds for suspension of refined petroleum products to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. On 17 September 2018, the United States informed the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) that "at least an additional 59 tanker deliveries to the DPRK have occurred from June 1 through to August 18 bringing the 2018 total to at least 148 deliveries, all of which involved deliveries to North Korean ports to unload refined petroleum products procured through UN-prohibited STS transfers". The United States provided some imagery (see figure IX) and three scenarios to the Committee that "make clear that the DPRK has obtained far more than the 500,000 barrels it is authorized to procure in 2018" (see annex 2).³ In a communication to the Committee dated 21 September, the Russian Federation stated that "the fragmentary information provided by the US regarding the cases of alleged illegal ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum products to DPRK vessels as well as the result of the US computer modelling are insufficient for the

¹ Cyberattacks against the Panel continued to hamper its ability to report on the implementation of sanctions according to its mandate (see [S/2018/171](#)). In addition, the Panel notes that unauthorized disclosures of Committee proceedings and Panel internal reports and activities are damaging.

² Annex 1 contains a table listing ports of delivery, together with a conservative estimate of the volumes delivered.

³ With regard to the differences between data submitted by the United States of America in July and September in the column "Delivery Volume if 33% Laden", this appears to have been caused by a different formula being applied ($\div 3$ for the July submission and $\times 0.33$ for the September submission) and by limiting the figures to two digits after the decimal point.

Committee’s decision to completely cease refined petroleum export to the DPRK before the end of the year ... a full investigation and corresponding conclusions of the Panel of Experts of the Committee of 1718 are required” (see annex 3).

4. While the Panel lacks the definitive evidence to conclude that the cap has been breached, since September 2018, it has nevertheless obtained evidence of the increasing frequency of ship-to-ship transfers and of one unprecedented prohibited petroleum product transfer comprising 57,623.491 barrels alone, worth \$5,730,886. The Panel’s investigation of this transfer reveals the most sophisticated case of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-related vessel identity fraud to date, highlighting new sanction evasion techniques that defeated the due diligence efforts of the region’s leading commodity trader, as well as the United States and Singaporean banks that facilitated the fuel payments and a leading United Kingdom insurer that provided protection and indemnity cover to one of the vessels involved. The case also underlines, once again, the extremely poor reporting, oversight, monitoring and control over the vessels exercised by the flag-of-convenience States under whose jurisdiction they apparently sail. These failures further demonstrate how the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the transnational criminal networks with which they partner may operate freely within global logistics supply chains⁴ and were able to hide in plain sight in international waters for more than eight months after the owner of one of the vessels was designated for an assets freeze and travel ban.

Panama imposter

5. On 11 November 2018, a Member State reported a suspected illegal ship-to-ship transfer on 28 October 2018 involving the *Yuk Tung* (IMO No. 9030591),⁵ designated for a global port entry ban and deflagging on 30 March 2018,⁶ and the *Ocean Explorer* (IMO No. 9388792) (see figure I).

⁴ In its 2018 final report, the Panel stated that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea “is already flouting the most recent resolutions by exploiting global oil supply chains, complicit foreign nationals, offshore company registries and the international banking system”. In this regard, the Panel noted that “the profit margins involved, coupled with the offshore nature of much of the affected oil, maritime and finance sectors, necessitate far greater private sector due diligence, information-sharing and self-policing”. (S/2018/171, summary).

⁵ The name “Maika” had been painted on the *Yuk Tung* together with a false IMO number.

⁶ The vessel’s owner, Yuk Tung Energy Pte, was also designated for an assets freeze and travel ban. “Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee adds 22 Entries to its Sanctions List, Designates 27 vessels”, SC/13272, 30 March 2018. See <https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13272.doc.htm>.

Figure I
Yuk Tung and Ocean Explorer on 28 October 2018




Source: Member State.

6. The Panel’s investigation found that beginning on at least 22 May 2018 in the East China Sea, the *Yuk Tung* engaged in vessel “spoofing”, falsely transmitting its identity via its AIS as a supposedly Panama-flagged vessel named *Maika* using IMO number 9033969, as well as altering its course and destination.⁷ At the same time, the vessel legally authorized and registered with IMO number 9033969, the Comoros-flagged *Hika*,⁸ remained anchored off Lome, in the Gulf of Guinea, more than 7,000 miles away (see figure II).

⁷ Flag registries issue Maritime Mobile Service Identities (MMSI) numbers. These are not unique and may be duplicated. When a vessel changes flag, their MMSI number may be allocated to another ship. This results in “spoofing” with one or more vessels being shown in two locations at the same time. See Maritime Intelligence, “Understanding AIS (Automatic Identification System)”, 10 March 2017. Available at <https://maritimeintelligence.informa.com/resources/product-content/understanding-the-automatic-identification-system>.

⁸ On its final voyage, the *Hika*’s name was altered to the *Mahika* on AIS transmissions. This name change meant that only one letter “h” would need to be changed by the crew of the *Yuk Tung* to imply that the *Mahika* had become the “*Maika*”. The Panel is investigating possible collusion between the owners of the *Hika* and the *Yuk Tung*, which were engaged in similar trading patterns in East Africa and Asia prior to the *Yuk Tung*’s designation.

Figure II
Yuk Tung*, a.k.a. *Maika*, begins spoofing *Hika*, a.k.a. *Mahika




Source: Windward.

7. Commercial maritime intelligence platforms, ship radar, specialized maritime databases and vessel-scraping information show that the deception continued throughout the months of June to November 2018. While the *Yuk Tung* was operating under a falsely broadcast IMO number before and during the October ship-to-ship transfer, the vessel that it was impersonating, the *Hika*, made its final voyage from the Gulf of Guinea to the Chittagong scrapping yards in Bangladesh,⁹ where it was beached for scrap on 9 October 2018 (see figure III).

⁹ See annex 8 for vessel scraping information.

Figure III
False AIS broadcasting by the *Yuk Tung* from August to October; on 28 and 29 October 2018; final voyage of the *Hika* from 24 July to 9 October 2018 to Chittagong (left to right clockwise)



Sources: Sea Searcher, the Panel, Windward.

8. The above images show how the *Yuk Tung* transmitted an AIS signal, the disablement of which has been documented in previous Panel reports as a risk indicator of illegal ship-to-ship transfers and maritime-related activity of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.¹⁰ This more sophisticated subterfuge succeeded, as the *Yuk Tung*'s false broadcasting of the IMO number of the *Hika* triggered no alerts on the part of flag States, commercial maritime intelligence platforms or other maritime service providers.


Physical disguise and false documentation

9. The final element of the deception operation was physical disguise and false documentation. This activity appears to have been carefully pre-planned as the *Yuk Tung* and the *Hika* were unique in appearance: identical twin sister ships built in the same year by the same manufacturer according to the same design specifications with the exact same profile, tonnage and equipment. Imagery analysis provided by another Member State shows that after its designation in March 2018, the *Yuk Tung* was physically disguised with the abbreviation "YT" removed from the painted circle on the vessel's stack and the name and IMO number of the vessel's stern changed to that of the *Maika* (see figure IV). The *Yuk Tung* also obtained a false or fake Equatorial

¹⁰ Uninterrupted AIS transmission by contracted vessels has become a requirement for a minority of global trading commodity companies with their regional offices clustered mainly in Singapore. These companies occupy the key position in global oil and petroleum product supply chains for East Asian ship-to-ship transfer markets, primarily through free-on-board contracts.

Guinean certificate of registry (figure V).¹¹ The false registration papers¹² and fake AIS transmissions, coupled with the physical deceptions employed by the vessel, provided the cover necessary to deceive any of the current, few due diligence and active compliance measures deployed by most global and regional commodity traders. These deceptive measures triggered no alerts on the part of the global and regional banks that unwittingly facilitated the multiple financial transactions associated with this transfer or of the insurers and reinsurers that provided protection and indemnity and hull insurance.

Figure IV
Yuk Tung imagery analysis



Source: Member State.

¹¹ Equatorial Guinea's flag of convenience has a poor record of reporting ship registrations or annual tonnage to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and has not replied to the Panel's inquiries as to whether the document is a forgery or was issued under false pretenses.

¹² According to the false Equatorial Guinea registration for the "Maika", a.k.a. *Yuk Tung*, the shipowner was Virtue Base Development Ltd of the Seychelles. Virtue Base Development has a "care of" address with Vanguard Shipping Safety Management in Kaohsiung City. On 3 December, the Panel wrote to Vanguard, requesting that it account for its role in the establishment of Virtue Base Development as well as four other foreign-flagged vessels suspected of involvement in sometimes multiple illegal ship-to-ship transfers dating back to 2017. Vanguard replied that it had established Virtue Base at the request of "Mr. Lai", with whom it was no longer in contact. Regarding the other foreign-flagged vessels engaged in ship-to-ship transfers, Vanguard stated that in two cases, it was only the ship manager, not responsible for the cargo, that in others the documentation had been faked, that other cases were subject to legal dispute and that one vessel in a ship-to-ship transfer was in fact Chinese and not flagged to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see annex 6).

Figure V
False certificate of registry for the *Maika*, a.k.a. *Yuk Tung*

CERTIFICADO DE REGISTRO CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY REPUBLICA DE GUINEA ECUATORIAL			
REGISTRY No. 1805318GE		OWB / BAO No. 9033969	
El adscrito Registro Técnico Naval/Ofticial de la Marina Mercante de la República de Guinea Ecuatorial/Oficina de Transportes por vía acuática registra y concede al buque estas características en beneficio e inscripción al presente REGISTRO de MATRÍCULA de conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 10. The adscrited Technical Naval/Registry Office of the Merchant Marine of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea/Ministry of Transport does hereby issue and allow the Certificate of Registry to the vessel whose attributes stated herein the same having been authorized by MM (Order No. MM 2018/05240522/****)			
NOMBRE DEL BUQUE: MAIKA	ARMADORES: VITUC-BASE DEVELOPMENT LIMITED	SEGUNDO PISOOR CAPITAL CITY INDEPENDENCE AVENUE VICTORIA MARIH SEYCHELLES	
NAME OF VESSEL: MAIKA	OWNERS: NACIONALIDAD PREVIA: PANAMA		
NOMBRE ANTERIOR: MAHIKA	NACIONALIDAD PREVIA: PANAMA		
PREVIOUS NAME: MAHIKA	PREVIOUS NATIONALITY: PANAMA		
PUERTO DE MATRÍCULA: MALABO	TIPO DE BUQUE/MATERIAL DE CASCO: OIL TANKER		
PORT OF REGISTRY: EQUATORIAL GUINEA	TYPE OF VESSEL/MATERIAL OF HULL: OIL TANKER		
CONSTRUCTORES: GENOVA ITALY	FECHA DE CONSTRUCCION: 1994		
CONSTRUCTORS: GENOVA ITALY	DATE OF BUILD: 1994		
BUILDERS: GENOVA ITALY	DATE OF BUILD: 1994		
ARQUEO BRUTO: 20200	ESLORA: 168.50 M		
GROSS TONNAGE: 20200	LENGTH: 168.50 M		
ARQUEO NETO: 10443	MANGA: 28.03 M		
NET TONNAGE: 10443	BREADTH: 28.03 M		
PESO MUEBTE: 26487	PUNTAJE: 14.90 M		
DEADWEIGHT: 26487	DEPTH: 14.90 M		
CLASE/NÚMERO DE MÁQUINAS: DIÉSEL (1)	NÚMERO DE CILINDROS: ONE (1)		
TYPE AND NUMBER OF ENGINES: DIÉSEL (1)	NUMBER OF CYLINDERS: ONE (1)		
FABRICANTES: SULZER RTA 52	CABALLOS DE FUERZA: 910 KW		
NAME OF MANUFACTURERS: SULZER RTA 52	HORSEPOWER: 910 KW		
VELOCIDAD DEL BUQUE: 12 NÚEOS	INDICATIVAS DE LLAMADA: SSCKK		
SPEED OF THE VESSEL: 12 KNOTS	CALL SIGN: SSCKK		
VELOCIDAD DEL BUQUE: 12 NÚEOS	INDICATIVAS DE LLAMADA: SSCKK		
SPEED OF THE VESSEL: 12 KNOTS	CALL SIGN: SSCKK		
El presente Certificado de Registro puede ser otorgado y al buque matriculado de la Marina Mercante Nacional de la República de Guinea Ecuatorial en sus casos que obedezcan a la Ley Orgánica de la Marina Mercante Nacional de conformidad de lo previsto al Artículo 6 de esta Ley y sus reglamentos y disposiciones.			
EXPEDIDA EL: 05 DE MAYO DEL 2018	EN: MALABO		
ISSUED ON: 05 MAY, 2018	AT: MALABO		
FECHA EXPIRACION: 04 DE MAYO DEL 2019			
DATE OF EXPIRY: 04 MAY, 2019			
MARINA MERCANTE NACIONAL FIRMA DEL FUNCIONARIO: ALBERTO NOTREBA NGUEÑA NO. 2401805227			

Source: The Panel.

Yuk Tung commodity and brokering chains

10. The commodity trading and brokering chains involved in the \$5,700,000 transfer to the *Yuk Tung* are similar to the multi-million-dollar deals documented in previous Panel reports.¹³ The region's leading oil and petroleum trader, Hin Leong, agreed to supply petroleum products to another known customer, Yuantai Fuel Trading, also registered in Singapore. Yuantai had been approached by individuals claiming to act on behalf of Golden Luxury Corporation, a Belize-registered entity that was apparently located in Taiwan Province of China.¹⁴ Golden Luxury later provided Yuantai documentation suggesting that its client for the transfer was a United Arab Emirates-based entity, Zeeshan Building Materials Trading LLC. These papers have not been verified and no supporting banking records or other credible or independent documentation have been provided to verify actual end-use delivery of the cargo. The Panel wrote to Golden Luxury Corporation but received no response (see annex 5). Hin Leong and Yuantai have since cooperated with the Panel by providing full transparency. On 10 December 2018, Hin Leong stated that they “have ceased STS operations and withdrawn our vessels from the East China Sea” as well as another affected area.¹⁵

¹³ S/2018/171, paras. 71–73.

¹⁴ The address supplied by Golden Luxury Corporation in its documentation appears to be in the CSBC Corporation shipyard in Keelung City (see annex 4). Yuantai supplied independently verifiable financial documentation to substantiate its role and statements regarding Golden Luxury Corporation.

¹⁵ Correspondence held on file.

Sanctions implications for “free-on-board” contracts

11. Such incidents are likely to continue to occur for two reasons. The deception measures deployed by the *Yuk Tung* defeated all of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-related sanctions compliance mechanisms adopted by commodity traders as well as their associated banks, insurers and vessels. Secondly, the essence of the legal definition of “free-on-board” contracts in East Asian markets is that liability for the cargo transfers from the seller to the buyer when the product is pumped via pipe from the guardrails of one vessel to the other during the ship-to-ship transfer. However, the designations by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) of vessels for global port bans and deregistration, coupled with the designation of some of those vessel owners, mean that liability for illegal transfers does not end with their product crossing the guardrail, if the Committee or Member States determine that such transfers violated sanctions. Such free-on-board contracts specific to the East Asian market may lose their legality and the concept behind “free on board” no longer holds if the party transferring the cargo is judged to have violated the measures contained within the resolutions. For example, both the *Yuk Tung* and its owners were designated in March 2018 following a January transfer to the *Rye Song Gang 1*. While Hin Leong has demonstrated that it was an unwitting party through its full and transparent disclosure, the Panel notes that Hin Leong did not implement the Panel’s suggested end-user delivery verification clause “best practices” outlined in a letter to the company on 10 May 2018 (see annex 7). The investigation continues.

Recommendations

12. **Member States and relevant international organizations should ensure that the global and regional commodity trading companies and tanker fleets operating under their jurisdictions and in those at-risk segments of the free-on-board market and/or engaging in ship-to-ship transfer in the affected international waters adopt contractual language that includes effective end-use delivery verification.**

13. **Member States and relevant international organizations should ensure that the global and regional commodity trading companies and tanker fleets operating under their jurisdictions and those segments of the affected free-on-board markets assess the AIS history of all the vessels that they intend to supply with products banned under the resolutions.**

Frequency of illegal ship-to-ship transfers: a 66-day period snapshot

14. On 30 November 2018, a Member State provided imagery to the Panel showing that Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged and foreign-flagged tankers engaged in ship-to-ship transfers within a 66-day period between 2 June and 9 August 2018, including images of some vessels conducting illegal activities on consecutive days. Identified vessels included the *Ji Song 6*, the *Myong Ryu 1*, the *An San 1*, the *Yu Phyoung 5*, the *Sam Jong 2* and the *Nam San 8*. In a number of cases, the transfers involved smaller, unknown vessels in the East China Sea (see figure VI).

Figure VI
Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged tankers engaged in ship-to-ship transfers with unknown vessels, June to August 2018



Source: Member State.

15. Three documented transfers took place involving larger, foreign-flagged vessels, the *Shang Yuan Bao* (IMO No. 8126070), the *New Regent* (IMO No. 8312497) and the *Xing Ming Yang 888* (IMO No. 8410847) (see figure VII).

Figure VII
Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged tankers engaged in ship-to-ship transfers with foreign-flagged vessels



Source: Member State.

Flag-of-convenience registries

16. The *Shang Yuan Bao* had already been subject to Panel inquiries regarding a previous ship-to-ship transfer involving vessel identity fraud with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged tanker *Paek Ma* on 18 May 2018 (see annex 13, para. 4). In August 2018, the Panel wrote to Panama, as the flag-of-convenience State for the *Shang Yuan Bao* during the transfers on 18 May and 2 June 2018 and for the *New Regent* on 7 June 2018. In its reply of 2 November 2018, Panama stated that the

Shang Yuan Bao was “removed from the Panamanian merchant registry on 6 September” and that for the *New Regent*, “the process of removal” began “on 4 September” (see annex 9). On 16 August 2018, the Panel wrote to Sierra Leone, the flag-of-convenience State for the *Xing Ming Yang 888*. Sierra Leone has not replied to multiple inquiries from the Panel.

Owners, operators and managers

17. The Panel investigated the owners, operators and managers of the vessels. Regarding the ship-to-ship transfer on 18 May 2018 involving the *Shang Yuan Bao*, Jui Zong Shipping Management of Taiwan Province of China replied, stating that the first transfer was “a big misunderstanding” and that its vessel was providing drinking water through hoses used to transfer petroleum products (see annex 10). In its response of 15 October 2018 regarding the second ship-to-ship transfer of 2 June 2018, Jui Zong did not provide any requested documentation, simply stating that “the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau is investigating this case, we believe they shall give back our innocence” (see annex 11). With regard to the *New Regent*, neither the vessel’s operator, registered owner nor manager have replied to the Panel’s inquiries.¹⁶ Regarding the *Xing Ming Yang 888*, Hongkong Qi Hang International Shipping Management Co. Ltd replied on behalf of the Hong Kong-named owner and operator, providing the same rationale as that used by the Jui Zong Shipping Management Co. for the *Shang Yuan Bao* (see annex 12). The Panel reminded them of the prohibition on all ship-to-ship transfers with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged vessels under resolution 2375 (2017).

Vessel profiles

18. The *Shang Yuan Bao*, *Xing Ming Yang 888* and *New Regent* share a profile similar to most foreign-flagged vessels involved in illegal ship-to-ship transfers or ships from which fuel has ultimately been transferred to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. This vessel profile consists of coastal, product and general-purpose tankers operating out of ports within 600 nautical miles of previously identified zones in the East China Sea.¹⁷ These vessels typically sail under the jurisdiction of flag-of-convenience States with non-existent or poor sanctions compliance standards that were frequently used by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-controlled vessels during the period from 2011 to 2017. They are typically older ships that score poorly in port State control safety inspections or have otherwise been fined for pollution by port or coastal States. They have been insured or reinsured by protection and indemnity companies registered in Europe, North America and East Asia. Maritime industry practices that have traditionally shielded beneficial owners from potential environmental and taxation liabilities¹⁸ contribute to obscuring the identity of the foreign nationals who may have ultimately profited from prohibited transfers of fuel to Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged vessels.

¹⁶ The ship operator and manager is Ocean Grow International Shipmanagement Consultant Corporation of Taiwan Province of China. Panama stated that the registered owner, Mega Glory Holding Ltd, is registered in the British Virgin Islands (see annex 9). The company was also registered in Hong Kong, China, as the owner of the *New Regent* and three other vessels.

¹⁷ These vessels are relatively small with deadweight of between 5,000 and 20,000 tons.


¹⁸ These frequently involve allocating “registered owner” status for a single vessel to an offshore shell company established in such territories as Belize, the British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong, China, the Marshall Islands or Seychelles.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged tankers, brokering networks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and foreign-flagged vessels

19. In November 2018, a Member State informed the Panel that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was using approximately 23 of its tanker vessels for prohibited ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products. The Member State named the following six vessels as among the most active, accounting for 50 per cent of all transfers:¹⁹ the *An San 1*, the *Chon Ma San*, the *Sam Jong 2*, the *Yu Son (Yuson)*, the *Kum Un San* and the *Saebiyol (Chong Rim 2)*. In a separate submission to the Committee dated 4 October 2018, the Member State provided imagery of two Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged tankers, the *Sam Jong 2* and the *Ji Song 6*, engaging in illegal ship-to-ship transfers with unknown vessels on 12 September and 24 May 2018, respectively (see figure VIII).

Figure VIII

***Ji Song 6* (above) and *Sam Jong 2* (below) engaged in illegal ship-to-ship transfers on 12 September and 24 May 2018**



Source: Member State.

20. Other Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged tankers documented in ship-to-ship transfers include the *Myong Ryu 1*, the *Yu Phyoung 5*, the *Nam San 8* (see paras. 14–17 and figures VI–VII), the *Yu Jong 2*, the *Rye Song Gang 1* and the *Paek Ma* (see annex 13). In addition to acts of non-compliance, these vessels routinely engage in identity fraud and other activities contrary to both the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and IMO regulations.

Brokering networks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

21. In November 2018, a Member State informed the Panel that the overseas bank representative offices of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea arrange ship-to-ship transfer deals with help from third-country brokers. According to the Member State, one known individual is Ko Il Hwan²⁰ (고일환), a representative of the designated Korea Daesong Bank based in Shenyang, China. The Panel previously

¹⁹ This figure is according to number, not volume.

²⁰ Date of birth 28 August 1967, passport number PS927220424.

investigated the Korea Daesong Bank's representative office in Shenyang²¹, and Ko Il Hwan in particular, for processing payments on behalf of Daedong Credit Bank. Korea Daesong Bank has used at least two false names to disguise its identity in its shipping-related activities: 조선녹색산업무역 (朝鮮綠色產業貿易) and 조선신용투자회사 (朝鮮信用投資公司 or 朝鮮信用投資會社).²²

22. The Member State named a number of companies that are known and used by such brokers. One of these is Gudzon Shipping Company LLC, a company based in the Russian Federation. On 22 June and 18 November 2018, the Panel wrote to Gudzon and its affiliated company, Primorye Maritime Logistics Co. Ltd, relating to a ship-to-ship transfer of petroleum products from their vessel, the *Patriot*, to the *Wan Heng 11* (see annexes 13–14) as well as two 22 August 2018 reported ship-to-ship transfers to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged tankers *Chong Rim 2* and *Chon Ma San*.²³ In its letters, the Panel requested information on the brokers involved in these shipments (see annex 14). It has yet to receive a reply.

Communications methods for ship-to-ship transfers

23. The Panel's investigations showed that WeChat, a messaging, social media and mobile payment application, is the primary means of communication for ship-to-ship transfers in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea and that various techniques are used on that platform to obscure activities. In at least one case investigated by the Panel, the geographic coordinates were communicated in lieu of the identity of a vessel. Furthermore, the receiver vessel transferred to a supply ship a photograph via WeChat showing the last four digits of a renminbi banknote to authenticate the receiver vessel prior to fuel transfer. A foreign oil supplier and vessel owner involved in an attempted Democratic People's Republic of Korea-related ship-to-ship transfer in 2018 informed the Panel that brokers on WeChat had requested him to switch off his vessel's AIS on at least two occasions in 2017. The brokers were acting on behalf of fishing fleet tanker vessels seeking to avoid possible detection of illegal fishing in Chinese fishery protection zones. These attempts at secrecy are not limited to the WeChat platform, but they complicate efforts to investigate and trace brokers acting on behalf of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Ports in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: hubs for illegal activities

24. A Member State provided imagery of certain ports in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in particular Nampo, as hubs for suspected illegal activity. In addition to imagery highlighting the consistent use of Nampo port for loading prohibited exports of coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see paras. 31–34 and annex 15), a Member State provided imagery demonstrating the widespread use of the Marine Import Terminal at Nampo by tankers documented as engaged in illegal ship-to-ship transfers. The imagery shows how underwater pipelines attached to offloading buoys are used to transfer fuel from vessels to the terminals in the Nampo port complex (see figure IX).

²¹ S/2017/150, paras. 225, 227 and 230.

²² See annex 43. For more complete information on Korea Daesong Bank, including other aliases it uses, see also annex 42.

²³ The Panel was not provided with imagery evidence for these reported transfers. A Member State reported that the transfers occurred in mid-January 2018. According to a 28 September communication from the Russian Federation, "the ownership and use of the *Patriot* was transferred on 5 July 2017 to PML Co. Ltd under a standard bareboat charter agreement. Since that time the Gudzon Company LLC has had no involvement in the commercial operation of the vessel and consequently could not issue instructions in January 2018 for the loading of petroleum products and their subsequent transfer to vessels of the DPRK".

Figure IX
Marine Import Terminal at Nampo port: a hub for illegal ship-to-ship transfer offloading



Source: Member State; Map: The Panel.

Study visit to Singapore by port officials of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

25. Blatant violations such as these can occur only with the full knowledge and cooperation of Nampo port officials. On 12 October 2018, a Member State informed the Panel that “there may have been a sanction violation in Singapore” relating to a scientific or technical training project between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Singapore that included a study visit to Singapore's port by Nampo port officials. In its letter to Singapore, the Panel noted the systemic violations of the resolutions taking place at Nampo and also noted that according to a number of the Panel's previous reports, the port was also the site for the export or import of a variety of shipping containers seized by Member States and found to be containing items from or destined for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that violated the provisions of the resolutions, including the measures aimed at stemming nuclear, ballistic missile and other arms-related materials.

26. Singapore replied to the Panel on 4 December 2018, confirming that Kang Jong Gwan, the Minister of Land and Maritime Transport of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, who oversees the country's port, shipping and vessel operations, headed a delegation to Singapore. Previous Panel reports have noted that designated entities such as Ocean Maritime Management Company, Ltd are under the control of

the Ministry of Land and Maritime Transport.²⁴ In its reply, Singapore stated that it “had verified that the delegation members were not individuals designated by the UN”. The investigations into the activities at ports in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and their senior managers continue.

27. In addition to commanding vessels engaged in prohibited activities, at least one vessel captain from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been reported as having been arrested following disembarkation from a vessel of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for carrying undeclared bulk cash in October 2018 (see figure X).²⁵ In response to the Panel’s letter, the Russian Federation replied that on 2 October 2018, a citizen of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kim Kwang Il, was detained at the Pervomaisky customs post and “a large amount of cash was seized from him”. The Russian Federation noted that “a criminal case has been filed against this individual under the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation article 200.1, section 2 (a) for non-declaration of cash in the amount of 179,900 USD”. In its reply, the Russian Federation stated that the investigation was continuing and that “the involvement of North Korean individuals whose names are included in the consolidated United Nations Security Council List has not been established”.²⁶

Figure X

Bulk cash seized from a vessel captain of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea



Source: <http://dvtu.customs.ru>.

²⁴ S/2016/157, para. 136, notes: “OMM continues to operate and adapt since its designation on 28 July 2014. The Panel has confirmed that OMM works under and has been controlled by the Ministry of Land and Marine Transport of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, both before and after its designation. The Ministry has played an indispensable role in enabling OMM to evade sanctions measures.”

²⁵ See http://dvtu.customs.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24856:180-----&catid=49:press-cat&Itemid=100; Oliver Hotham, “North Korean detained by Vladivostok customs for “large scale” cash smuggling”, *NK News*, 3 October 2018.

²⁶ According to media reports, a second national of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was detained at Vladivostok International Airport for carrying \$192,300 and 1,000 euros. (Sources: http://dvtu.customs.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25205:-200-----&catid=49:press-cat&Itemid=100; “North Korean detained at Vladivostok airport for large-scale cash smuggling”, *NK News*, 26 November 2018). The Panel wrote to the Russian Federation on 10 December 2018 and the investigation continues.

Blockchain platform for vessel transactions: Marine Chain

28. In October 2018, a Member State informed the Panel that “a start-up company in the process of establishing itself as a Hong Kong-registered blockchain platform named Marine Chain has at least one DPRK individual behind it”.²⁷ The Member State expressed concern that “the platform could be used to generate money for the regime and as a potential means of evading sanctions on shipping by creating a new method of obscuring the ownership of a vessel”.


29. The Panel investigated Marine Chain’s Chief Executive Officer, Singaporean national “Captain” Jonathan Foong, on suspicion of violating paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017). The Panel requested information on a suspected national of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who had been presenting himself as a Marine Chain adviser.

30. In his replies to the Panel, Foong provided contradictory information and documentation that did not meet the Panel’s evidentiary standards. He claimed that Marine Chain had been shut down, stating that “the biz was closed because the owner/investor is not paying his bill”.²⁸ On the whereabouts of and his communications with the “owner/investor”, he stated that “although I have informed the owner to foot all outstanding bills (Owning (sic) close to 500K US\$) he remained silent and we lost communication shortly thereafter”. For information on the use by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of cyberactivity in evasion of sanctions, see paragraphs 109 to 115.

Ship-to-ship coal transfers

31. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has switched most of its maritime-related coal trade to illegal ship-to-ship transfers as the primary means of circumventing paragraph 8 of resolution 2371 (2017). Such illegal deliveries became regularized and systemic in 2018 (see annex 15), with some of the largest vessels in the fleet of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea documented as continuing to load coal at ports in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on a monthly basis before engaging in illegal ship-to-ship transfers, predominately in the Gulf of Tonkin (see figure XI).

Figure XI
Ship-to-ship transfers of coal in the Gulf of Tonkin



Source: Member State; Map: The Panel.

²⁷ The Member State also noted that Marine Chain “claimed to be an Ethereum-based block chain platform with its own crypto-currency token that will facilitate the buying and selling of marine vessels worldwide through digital tokenization”.

²⁸ Marine Chain Platform Limited was registered in Hong Kong on 12 April 2018 and closed on 17 September 2018.

32. In other cases, satellite imagery shows that previously foreign-flagged vessels, such as the *Hua Fu* (IMO No. 9020003) designated for a global port entry ban and deflagging on 30 March 2018, continued to engage in multiple illegal ship-to-ship transfers in August and September 2018 (see figure XII).


Figure XII
Hua Fu engaging in illegal coal transfers in August and September 2018



Source: Member State; Map: The Panel.

33. Other unknown foreign-flagged or now stateless vessels such as the former Panama-flagged *Forever Lucky* (IMO No. 9003653), the former Togo-flagged *Lucky Star* (IMO No. 7942843) and the former Comoros-flagged *Oriental Treasure* (IMO No. 9115028) (see figure XIII), have also been documented as aiding and abetting the illegal coal export operations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. No flag State, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, has reported these new vessel flags to IMO.

Figure XIII
Forever Lucky, *Lucky Star* and *Oriental Treasure* engaging in illegal coal operations



Source: Member State; Map: The Panel.

False-flagging of coal vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: the *Wise Honest*

34. Vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have transported large quantities of coal and other prohibited goods through deceptive practices such as "double-flagging" that have violated both the resolutions and provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, essentially rendering such vessels stateless

and vulnerable to the right of visit. One example of this trend is the vessel *Wise Honest* (IMO No. 8905490), which was transporting 25,500 tons of coal when it was detained by Indonesia around 1 April 2018. The Panel wrote to Indonesia on 14 June and again on 27 August 2018 following information and imagery supplied by a Member State (see figure XIV). Indonesia reported on 12 September 2018 that the ship had been inspected and found to be registered under two jurisdictions, one set of registration and crew documents under the flag of Sierra Leone and the other under the flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.²⁹ Common to all Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged vessels engaged in prohibited trade and contrary to IMO regulations, the vessel was reported as sailing with the AIS “turned off during the ship’s journey into Indonesian territorial waters” and that “no report was made to the destined port authority for proper ship clearance”.³⁰ Indonesia informed the Panel on 29 November 2018 that the captain of the *Wise Honest* was subject to prosecution for “knowingly hoisting a false flag”.

Figure XIV

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea vessel *Wise Honest* at Nampo loading coal on 11 March (left) and at Balikpapan Port Facility on 9 April 2018 (right)




Source: Member State.

²⁹ See annex 16.

³⁰ Indonesia also stated that that “no report was made to the destined port authority for proper ship clearance”.

Figure XV
Likely route of the *Wise Honest*



Source: Member State.

Coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: brokering and export chains

35. The Panel's investigations into coal brokering and export chains highlight the significant amounts of revenue for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as well as profit for commodity traders seeking commissions or arbitrage from such deals. The *Wise Honest* shipment was worth \$2,990,000, according to its contract (see annex 17). Regarding the shipment's export documentation and brokering chain, Indonesia stated that it had recovered "cargo documents and clearance received from a Russian cargo ship intending to conduct an STS transfer around Balikpapan waters in East Kalimantan". The Panel requested further clarification and/or documentation, which has not been received to date. Indonesia also named a company of the Republic of Korea, Enermax, as the "final destination/recipient of the coal upon the STS transfer of the coal in Balikpapan" (see annex 16). On 3 December 2018, Enermax informed the Panel that it had been investigated by its national authorities and that there was no import of coal.³¹ The contract for the shipment named the sellers as Hong Kong Nova International Trade Company, an entity selling cigarette-manufacturing machinery. The company informed the Panel that it "had no idea where the contract came from nor why it has our company's seal" (see annex 18).

36. The Panel identified a key figure in the coal shipment as Hamid Ali, an Indonesian commodity trader and broker who had regular meetings with diplomats at

³¹ Enermax stated that "we simply received an offer of Indonesia-origin coal from someone who seemed to be a local broker in Indonesia".

the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Jakarta.³² These diplomats introduced Ali to Jong Song Ho, the president of the Jinmyong Trading Group and Jinmyong Joint Bank of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in December 2017 (see annex 19) as part of “the establishment of a Korean Cultural Centre in West Java”.³³ Ali met Jong again a month later and discussed the transshipment of coal;³⁴ the cost of the service was \$760,000, which Jong arranged through a transfer to Ali’s account via a company named Huitong Minerals (see *ibid.*). According to Ali, another broker, Eko Setyatmoko, then became involved in the transshipment. Setyatmoko, who received at least some of the Huitong Minerals payment and has liaised with the *Wise Honest* and its crew since its interdiction in April, has not responded to the Panel’s inquiries. The Panel informed Indonesia, Ali and Setyatmoko that the 25,500 tons of coal should be seized, according to the resolutions, and that the broker may not sell the coal. The Panel has yet to receive any confirmation that the coal has been offloaded from the vessel. The investigation continues.

37. The Panel continued its investigation of prohibited coal exports by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2017 via transshipment³⁵ through Russian Far Eastern ports, including Kholmsk.³⁶ On 10 December 2018, the Republic of Korea indicted four of its nationals and five commodity trading companies for illegally importing coal and pig iron (see table 1). The motive reportedly cited by the Public Prosecutors’ Office was “profit from arbitrage, using the fact that the prices of North Korean coal and other materials are low due to their difficulty to be traded internationally”.³⁷

Table 1

Prohibited commodity shipments subject to prosecution: type, volume and value

<i>Commodity</i>	<i>Volume (tons)</i>	<i>Value (United States dollars)</i>
Coal	29 843	4 610 000
Coal briquettes	8 275	(coal and coal briquettes)
Pig iron	2 010	971 000
Total value of prohibited imports		5 581 000^a

^a In a reply to the Panel dated 7 January 2019, the Republic of Korea reported that according to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, 29,843 tons of coal, 8,275 tons of coal briquettes and 2,010 tons of pig iron from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were “illegally transported to the ROK – these are provisional figures, pending final judgement by the judiciary”.

³² Through the embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mr. Ali had been introduced to a number of businessmen from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who travelled through China, Indonesia and Viet Nam (see annex 19).

³³ Jong Song Ho’s local representative in Indonesia is Kwak Chol Su, phone + 62 813 803 00501 (see annex 19).

³⁴ Jong “discussed of the possibility to distribute DPRK products, he asked whether is possible to charter Vessel for Transhipment of Cargo which Coal from Russian Origin not using Korean Vessel (sic)”. (see annex 19).

³⁵ S/2018/171, para. 59.

³⁶ The shipments reportedly “never went through customs in Russia, and were shipped to South Korea after documentation about their origins had been falsified.” See Baek Kyung-Seo and Shim Kyu-Seok, “Four indicted for buying North coal”, *Korea Joongang Daily*, 11 December 2018. Available at <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3056743>.

³⁷ Joyce Lee, “South Korean prosecutors indict four for importing North Korean coal”, Reuters, 10 December 2018 Available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea-coal/south-korean-prosecutors-indict-four-for-importing-north-korean-coal-idUSKBN1O90TP>.

38. A Member State informed the Panel in September 2018 that the prohibited shipments listed above comprise only one element of much larger trades of commodities from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that involve unwitting international banks providing letters of credit to a wider, transnational trading network that operates through offshore jurisdictions such as the British Virgin Islands and in Hong Kong, China, as well as other locations. Vessel owners engaged in such trades have attempted to launder the identity of their ships, deceiving IMO into providing new IMO numbers for vessels later seized pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017) (see annex 28). These investigations continue.

Vessel hijacking and use of the flag of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

39. The Panel continued its investigation of the *Wan Heng II* (IMO No. 8791667), a former Belize-flagged vessel, which was first detected engaging in an illegal ship-to-ship transfer with the tanker of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea *Rye Song Gang I* (IMO No. 7389704) on 13 February 2018. Although deregistered by Belize on 19 February 2018, the vessel continued to occasionally transmit as a Belize-registered vessel, including around the time of a ship-to-ship transfer on 10 April with the *Patriot*, a Russian Federation-registered vessel, and until 21 June 2018, when it switched identity to that of a Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged vessel, the *Kum Jin Gang*.

40. Notably, this reregistration occurred without official notification to IMO³⁸ and without the consent of the rightful owners of the ship, Zhejiang Wanheng Shipping Company. This company cooperated with the Panel, providing evidence that on 29 November 2017, the company signed a bareboat charter agreement with Hong Kong Cosnewvi International Shipping represented by Chen Chun-han, a national of Taiwan Province of China, who also holds a Travel Permit for Resident of Taiwan to Chinese Mainland.³⁹ The bareboat charter agreement contained an "illegal trading clause", which was activated on 19 February 2018 when the owners learned from the Belize authorities of the sanctions violation through their vessel's deregistration notification. Subject to multiple investigations by the Chinese authorities, the rightful owner attempted to locate and reclaim their vessel, without success.⁴⁰ According to the business registry, Hong Kong Cosnewvi International Shipping was dissolved on 24 August 2018. Chen Chun-han did not respond to the Panel.

41. The case highlights a newly identified risk for larger shipowners in the region engaging in the frequent practice of bareboat chartering. The case shows that charterers that violate sanctions-related clauses do not return vessels following contract cancellations as a result of documented violations. Importantly, the effective 12-month hijack of the *Wan Heng II* illustrates how the flag registry and ports of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea now provide safe harbour for such ships, both in terms of resupply of fuel and provisions as well as ensuring that United Nations-designated deregistration does not render such vessels stateless and thus more vulnerable to inspection for illegal activities under the rules governing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.⁴¹ In addition, the global port ban imposed

³⁸ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, article 91 (2), requires that flag States not only register ships but issue registered vessels with documentation to prove registration and nationality.

³⁹ Both documents held on file by the Panel.

⁴⁰ According to the bareboat charter arrangement, the owners had provided neither officers or crew to the *Wan Heng II* which had switched off its AIS following the incident. The company provided evidence of their attempts to contact Chen Chun-han at his Taichung business address to demand information on the location of their vessel and its immediate return, but registered delivery letters were returned.

⁴¹ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, article 110.

on the *Wan Heng 11* and other such vessels means that these ships cannot enter ports subject to commercial courts and other tribunal jurisdictions, which would provide the rightful owner with legal recourse.

Due diligence and AIS monitoring by flag States, commodity traders, insurers and classification societies

42. With regard to the above-mentioned evasion tactics and, in particular, the consistent switching off of AIS, the Panel conducted a survey in 2018, writing to all the flag-of-convenience States and protection and indemnity insurers that had registered or provided services to foreign-flagged vessels identified as involved in violations of paragraphs 11 and 14 of resolution 2375 (2017). As part of the survey, the Panel also wrote to the leading global commodity trading companies and oil refiners operating in the relevant region, including those whose product had already been illegally channelled to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, requesting information about any due diligence and risk mitigation measures taken to ensure that the relevant vessels and cargoes under their services or contracts were not diverted to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Panel suggested a best practice "AIS switch-off clause" in the letters as well as contractual clauses to ensure end-use delivery verification of petroleum products for global commodity traders, oil refiners and producers, which it further promoted during consultations with industry and Member States between February and June 2018.

43. None of the flag-of-convenience States that replied to the Panel's letters on AIS surveillance currently monitor the AIS of the vessels that sail under their jurisdiction and are therefore unable to ensure that these vessels comply with the AIS regulations contained within the relevant international treaties, such as the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. The lack of AIS monitoring of at-risk vessels in international waters in North-East Asia means that these flag-of-convenience States are unable to detect future illegal ship-to-ship transfers signalled through an AIS switch-off or manipulation. Similarly, none of the responding Protection and Indemnity Club insurance and reinsurance companies indicated that they monitored the AIS of vessels whose cargo they insured.

44. Several entities indicated that they had adopted some form of an AIS switch-off clause, including three of the largest global commodity trading companies and a smaller number of Asia-based oil traders and refiners. While only one major global commodity trading company has previously indicated to the Panel that it instituted a full end-use delivery verification supporting documentation requirement for contracts applied to specific Asian deliveries, two other major traders included a destination restriction clause in their contracts. A major global commodity trading company's institution of both an AIS switch-off clause and the end-use delivery verification requirement demonstrates the ability of the private sector to enhance due diligence at a relatively low cost.

45. If the above measures were adopted more widely, they might significantly reduce the number of charter vessels willing to switch off or otherwise manipulate their AIS to engage in illegal ship-to-ship transfer. If the relevant flag States adopted similar measures, ship captains might understand that AIS switch-off or manipulation for illegal ship-to-ship transfer could lead to vessel deregistration, the loss of insurance and the loss of earnings through the termination of chartering and transportation contracts.

46. The Panel conducted another survey with all companies providing classification services to vessels involved in prohibited ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum as well as exports and transshipments of coal banned under the resolutions. In most cases, the Panel found that such contracts had been withdrawn and the vessels had been

“declassified”. While classification societies may inform the flag States and vessel owners of declassification, the reason (violation of the resolutions) is generally not given, making it possible that other such societies unwittingly provide services to the vessel or its owners. To ensure better information, coordination classification societies should inform the Committee, as well as flag States, vessel owners, relevant international and regional organizations and trade associations, when they declassify vessels based on violations of the resolutions.

Prohibited fishing activities

47. The Panel found that the prohibited transfer by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its fishing rights, as clarified in resolution 2397 (2017), continued throughout 2018, acting as a potential source of income for the country. The Panel analysed two Member State reports, noting that during the period from January to November 2018, they had inspected more than 15 Chinese fishing vessels that were found to be carrying fishing licences of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.⁴² Inspections and reports detailed multiple areas of operation, including fishing grounds in the seas between Japan and China, the Korean Peninsula and the Russian Federation. One fisherman stated, during an interview with a Member State, that there were around 200 Chinese fishing boats operating in the “water of North Korea”. Another interviewee stated that the monthly cost of an individual fishing licence was 50,000 yuan (approximately \$7,250⁴³). Observable evidence included fishing permit number plates attached to the boats’ bridge (see figure XVI) while in another image, the vessel flew the flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (figure XVII).

Figure XVI

Fishing vessels displaying fishing permit number plates and the flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea



Source: Member State.

48. The Panel noted two obfuscation techniques: fishing permits issued by authorities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea used by foreign fishing


⁴² Among those crewmen interviewed by a Member State, individuals were found to be serving aboard the following vessels: 福远渔 679, 福远渔 680, 合兴 88, 闽霞渔 1067, Urongyu61006(鲁荣渔 61006).

⁴³ 11 December 2018 conversion rate.

boats and false-flagging. For example, a fishing permit issued by authorities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was found aboard a boat captained by a Chinese national (see figure XVII). In a separate case, the Panel is investigating media reports based on video footage of the Russian Federation Coastguard that highlights at least one Chinese fishing boat flying a flag of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, obfuscating its nationality (see figure XVII).

Figure XVII

Fishing licence (left) and flag of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the bow of the Chinese boat (right)



Source: Member State (left); YouTube (right).

49. The Panel wrote to China and the Russian Federation to request information on its investigations. China informed the Panel that “China has always seriously implemented the Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK. After the adoption of the Security Council Resolution 2397 (2017), the Chinese competent authorities immediately published an announcement to prohibit procuring fishing rights from the DPRK, and the Chinese entities have stopped procuring fishing rights from the DPRK in accordance with the announcement. If any Chinese national or vessel is confirmed to illegally procure fishing rights from the DPRK or illegally go fishing in the DPRK sea areas without permission, China will deal with relevant issues in accordance with laws and regulations.” The Panel has not yet received a reply from the Russian Federation.

Recommendations

Recommendations to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

50. Designate the following vessels for illicit transfers of petroleum products in violation of paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017):

Myong Ryu 1, IMO number: 8532413, flag of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Song Won, IMO number: 8613360, flag of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Jin Yang 36 (金洋 36), flag unknown

Xing Ming Yang 888, IMO number: 8410847, Sierra Leone

51. Include the provision in paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017) in the vessel designation criteria and incorporate it into the existing lists of designated vessels as appropriate.

52. Amend the delisting procedure to allow Member States to request delisting on behalf of a vessel owner (for the Panel's proposal for an amended delisting procedure for vessels, see annex 20).

Recommendations to Member States

53. Flag States should inform the Committee and the Panel of vessels that they deregister.

54. Flag States should monitor the AIS of their vessels to better ensure implementation of the resolutions.

55. Member States should consider introducing a regulatory requirement for protection and indemnity insurance and reinsurance companies to include AIS screening and an "AIS switch-off" clause in their contracts for at-risk vessels operating in the relevant regions.

56. Member States should consider introducing a regulatory requirement for petroleum product trading, refining and producing companies to include end-use delivery verification measures and AIS screening as well as an "AIS switch-off" clause in their contracts.

57. IMO member States IMO should consider measures to improve information-sharing and maritime regulation enforcement by flag States and other interested parties.

58. Member States should consider introducing legislation to ensure that global and regional banks operating in their jurisdiction introduce AIS screening and vessel due diligence risk assessment clauses into letters of credit, loans and other financial instruments for global and regional commodity traders and brokers trading in oil and petroleum products in higher-risk free-on-board markets in the affected areas.

59. In order to allow more effective due diligence by flag States, other Member States and the maritime-related industries, the Committee should consider consolidating the designated vessels in one document. Information provided on the vessels should include the measures obligated under the relevant resolutions, such as asset freeze, denial of port entry and cancellation of registration or vessel services. Incidents of deregistration reported to the Committee should also be reflected to prevent inadvertent reregistration.

Imports and exports of commodities to and from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea according to trade data

60. For detailed information on imports and exports of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea during the reporting period, see annex 21.

III. Embargoes, designated entities and individuals

Algeria

61. In response to the Panel's letter of 10 August 2017 on Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies, Algeria replied during 2018 that "there are no North Korean companies or entities on Security Council sanctions lists in Algeria". However, Algeria also noted that one national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a company manager named Choe Song Il, "claimed to represent Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies". He was officially the manager of "MOP Group Algeria LLC", which was registered on 20 August 2015. The company

specialized “in major public works, construction design, mining and the manufacture of furnishings”. Furthermore, Choe’s replacement, Kim Chol Jin, arrived in Algeria on 3 February 2017, the same day that Choe departed. The Panel notes that according to Algeria, the company was officially dissolved on 8 January 2018. Kim Chol Jin departed Algeria on 18 March 2018.

Angola

62. The Panel continued its investigation of a military advisory mission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of approximately 80 individuals, which, according to a Member State, departed Angola for an unknown destination in January 2017. On 27 August 2018, Angola replied to the Panel, stating that “we are not aware of any movement or travel by military advisers from Angola to Mozambique in 2017”. Angola informed the Panel that Jon Chol Yong, a diplomat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea accredited to Angola and working on behalf of Green Pine Associated Corporation,⁴⁴ departed Angolan territory on 20 April 2017. Angola also noted that embassy staff of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had been “drastically reduced from 12 diplomats in 2016–2017 to 6 diplomats currently” and provided the Panel with lists of accredited diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see annex 22).

Botswana

63. Regarding the activity of Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies in Botswana, Botswana cooperated by replying in its letter dated 6 February 2018 that the Government had contracted Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies based in Windhoek in 2004. General manager Kang Hyo Song⁴⁵ represented the company, which designed and built “three Dikgozi Monument”, and two workers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ri Ung Si⁴⁶ and Sin Yong,⁴⁷ had visited Botswana in the last stages of the project. Botswana further informed the Panel that in 2007, Kang Hyo Song had acquired a residence permit in Botswana and registered “Korean Art and Monument (Proprietary) Limited” in Gaborone, about which the Panel is now addressing its inquiries. In its implementation report submitted on 27 October 2017,⁴⁸ Botswana noted that the three Dikgozi monument contract was the last engagement on record with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Cambodia

64. Cambodia replied to a Panel inquiry by stating that Mansudae New Tech Corporation Ltd had been incorporated as an investment company by Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies as a subsidiary at the Council for the Development of Cambodia and the Ministry of Commerce and that it had “signed an agreement with the Royal Government of Cambodia to establish the Grand Angkor Panorama Museum in Siem Reap Province”. Cambodia provided the biodata of 12 nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2 managers⁴⁹ and 10 staff) who had worked for the company but has yet to reply to the Panel’s most recent letter.

⁴⁴ [S/2017/150](#), para. 103 and [S/2018/171](#), para. 85.

⁴⁵ Date of birth (DOB): 13 October 1971, passport number 827220297 (issued on 3 May 2007, expired on 3 May 2012).

⁴⁶ Structural engineer, DOB: 28 February 1942, passport number 211130196.

⁴⁷ Architect, DOB 4 January 1964, passport number 463130133.

⁴⁸ [S/AC.49/2017/95](#).

⁴⁹ Kim Sang Gyu, DOB: 25 March 1966, passport number 563320017; Ri Kyong Il, DOB: 3 March 1981, passport number PS836220044.

China

Democratic People's Republic of Korea-designated entities engaged in clandestine nuclear procurement

65. The Panel continued its investigation into the designated entities Namchongang Trading Corporation, Namhung Trading Corporation and associated front companies and their representatives, including Kang Mun Kil, designated for nuclear procurement activities by resolution 2270 (2016). According to a Member State, Kang Mun Kil procured items used for nuclear programmes, including pressure transducers, prohibited under paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1718 (2006).⁵⁰ According to the documents obtained by the Member State, he had procured pressure transducers from a Chinese company, Shanghai Zhen Tai Instrument Corporation Limited (上海振太仪表有限公司, hereafter Shanghai Zhen Tai), at least twice in 2013 and 2016.⁵¹ Shanghai Zhen Tai has also been advertised as an exporter of vacuum equipment to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on a commercial website. According to the Member State and supporting documentation, Kang Mun Kil used a Hong Kong company, "Y Y Shun Limited" (億億順有限公司),⁵² for procurement activities. By September 2014, Kang Mun Kil had officially renamed Y Y Shun Limited as "Shunyi Limited", and this company provided a Chinese bank account for transfers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Member State informed the Panel that Kang Mun Kil's successor in China was Chong Won Ryol, a national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who is the official trade representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Dalian in addition to working on behalf of Namchongang Trading Corporation. The Panel requested information from China on Shanghai Zhen Tai's sales of vacuum equipment and end users, correspondence between YY Shun Limited⁵³ and Shanghai Zhen Tai and catalogues of the company's pressure transducers, relevant customs documents, immigration and visa record entries and exit information, and financial information. China replied to the Panel, stating that the "relevant authorities have made a comprehensive and serious investigation into this case" and that "Shanghai Zhen Tai Instrument Corporation Limited does not have the export qualification in accordance with Chinese laws and regulations. Zhen Tai has neither directly carried out any export trade nor entrusted trade agent companies to do export on behalf of it since establishment" and that "regarding the Hong Kong company Y Y Shun Company Ltd and Shunyi Limited, after an in-depth investigation by China there is no evidence proving that they are operating in China on behalf of Namchongang Trading Corporation". China also informed the Panel that "the bank account opened by the above Hong Kong companies in a Chinese bank has been closed" and that "Kang Mun Kil left China in 2016 and is not in China now".

66. As a follow-up to this investigation, the Panel is currently surveying the world's manufacturers of nuclear procurement "choke point" items such as pressure transducers to identify, determine and ultimately share good corporate internal screening systems and other examples of proactive end-use delivery verification.

⁵⁰ See S/2006/814, annex (2006); and INFCIRC/254/Rev. 8/Part 2 (2010), annex 3.A.7, for specifications of restricted pressure transducers.

⁵¹ Address: Building 1, No. 1358, Tongpu Road, Shanghai, China, Tel: 021-52707750, Fax: 021-52701844.

⁵² Address: Unit 04, 7/F, Bright Way Tower No. 33 Mong kok road, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Tel: 85-2-27935511, Fax: +85-2-35902333. He also used the fax number 04-1183-6555. The company was renamed as Hongkong Shunyi Limited in 2014 and dissolved in 2017. The director on the deregistration document was Jian Ping (蒋萍) (China ID number: 21060419730627002X).

⁵³ YY Shun Limited renamed to Shunyi Limited in 2014.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

67. The Panel is investigating the involvement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in gold mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Panel viewed letters from Medrara, a Kinshasa-registered gold mining company directed by a Lebanese citizen, Fouad Dakhlallah. A letter from Medrara dated 9 September 2017 was addressed to Kim Chol Su, a representative of the United Nations-designated entity Saeng P'il, a.k.a. Green Pine Associated Corporation. The letter outlined a proposed investment in a Medrara gold mine, noting that "the size of the territory is 16,000 hectares" and named Syrian arms trafficker Hussein al-Ali as the appointed intermediary, stating that "after your approval Mr. Hussein Al-Ali in Damascus will make all the arrangements for meeting in Beirut". The letter, sent by Dakhlallah, provides Hussein al-Ali's contact details. An earlier letter dated 15 October 2016 was addressed to "Chong Ryong", assessed by the Member State as likely to be the Chongryong Technology Corporation previously identified as active on behalf of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Sudan, together with Hussein al-Ali. The letter, inviting a geologist team from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to visit, requested the names and passport numbers of the geologists. The Panel wrote to Dakhlallah, who also controls a forestry company, Compagnie d'exploitation de bois d'Afrique, to request information concerning both the involvement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in his businesses and that of their documented intermediary in Africa, Hussein al-Ali, but has received no reply.

68. The Panel continued its investigation into military training by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the Presidential Guard of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as its provision of 9-mm firearms to the Presidential Guard and special units of the police, some of which were deployed to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.⁵⁴ The Democratic Republic of the Congo has yet to respond to the Panel's inquiries.

Egypt

69. The Panel continued its investigation of Democratic People's Republic of Korea diplomat An Jong Hyok,⁵⁵ who was certified as the general representative of the Ministry of Military Equipment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Middle East and Africa⁵⁶ and authorized to act on behalf of Saeng Pi'l Trading Corporation, an alias of Green Pine Associated Corporation.⁵⁷ According to a Member State, An had travelled to Egypt in August 2016 in an attempt to negotiate the release of the vessel *Jie Shun* and its cargo of 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades seized by the Egyptian authorities and then inspected by the Panel in November 2016.⁵⁸ Egypt cooperated with the Panel in April 2018, confirming that An Jong Hyok was still stationed at the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Cairo as the Third Secretary. Egypt also informed the Panel on 13 July 2018 that An Jong Hyok was "no longer accredited North Korean Embassy in Egypt and has left Egypt permanently". Egypt also replied to the Panel's request for information on the activities of its Defence Office in Pyongyang, the existence of which was communicated to the Panel by a Member State by stating that "it has made it absolutely clear that there is no military cooperation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea".

⁵⁴ S/2017/742, para. 24.

⁵⁵ DOB 14 March 1970, passport number 563410155.

⁵⁶ S/2017/150, annex 14–25.

⁵⁷ Ibid., para. 182.

⁵⁸ S/2018/171, para. 90; S/2017/150, paras. 61–71.

Eritrea

70. The Panel continued its investigation into Democratic People's Republic of Korea national Kim Kwang Rim; it has previously reported on this individual as the Green Pine Associated Corporation representative in Eritrea.⁵⁹ Eritrea has yet to reply to the Panel's inquiries for his full biodata, activities and whereabouts. The Panel also continued its investigation into prohibited military cooperation between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Eritech (E-tech), which operates under the authority or at the direction of the Eritrean Defence Forces, and its relationship with Glocom, a Democratic People's Republic of Korea provider of encrypted military communications equipment.⁶⁰

Germany

71. The Panel investigated a diplomat of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ri Yun Thaek (a.k.a. Ri Yun Taek) who attempted to procure a multi-gas monitor, which, according to Germany, is a prohibited dual-use item that may be used in the production of chemical weapons, while based at the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Berlin in 2012 and 2013. Germany informed the Panel that it had prevented the procurement attempt but had been unable to take any legal action against Ri owing to his diplomatic status. Germany subsequently expelled Ri and informed other European Union member States about his activities. As a result, he was refused accreditation at the Permanent Mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations in Vienna and at the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Sofia. According to a Member State, Ri was then assigned to the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Moscow. The Panel has requested information from the Russian Federation on his status.

Islamic Republic of Iran

72. A Member State informed the Panel that the Islamic Republic of Iran was one of the two most lucrative markets for Democratic People's Republic of Korea military-related cooperation⁶¹ and that both Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) and Green Pine Associated Corporation, a.k.a. Saeng Pi'l, offices in the Islamic Republic of Iran "are active". The Member State also informed the Panel that one recently observed pattern was nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea based in the Islamic Republic of Iran flying between Tehran and Dubai and boarding a return flight to Tehran within a few hours of their arrival in the United Arab Emirates. The Member State noted that this was indicative of cash couriers.⁶² The Panel wrote to the Islamic Republic of Iran requesting all information relating to activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the country. In the letter (see annex 23), the Panel noted previous correspondence with the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2015 and 2016 documenting more than 282 flights between Tehran and Dubai by Democratic People's Republic of Korea diplomats Kim Yong Chol and Jang Jong Son, who were designated in March 2016 as KOMID representatives in the Islamic Republic of Iran.⁶³ The Panel also recalled airline information showing visits to Tehran by KOMID President Kang Myong Chol in 2013 and Green Pine Associated Corporation President Ri Hak Chol in 2014 and provided evidence of at least two

⁵⁹ S/2016/157, para. 95.

⁶⁰ For previous Panel reporting on Glocom's violations of the resolutions, see S/2018/171, paras. 173–177; S/2017/150, paras. 72–87 and 232–241; and S/2017/742, para. 52. See also paras. 108–110 of the present report.

⁶¹ Two Panel members noted a lack of statistical information provided to the Panel.

⁶² Two Panel members noted a lack of evidence to support the assessment.

⁶³ S/2017/150, tables 8 and 9.

passports for each of the designated individuals as well as additional aliases. The Panel recalled Member State information indicating that previously identified designated individuals and the representatives of designated entities were now travelling under false names or with different passports and renewed its 2017 request to the Islamic Republic of Iran for the names and passport numbers of all diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea accredited in the country. The Panel also requested copies of passports and visa information on all nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea registered with the Iranian authorities. The Islamic Republic of Iran replied to the Panel on 19 December 2018, stating that "there are no DPRK nationals residing in the Islamic Republic of Iran other than its diplomats". It also stated that "DPRK diplomats accredited to the Islamic Republic of Iran have so far not been in contradiction with the provisions of relevant conventions or resolutions of the Security Council on DPRK" (see annex 24).

Libya

73. The Panel continued its investigations into multiple attempts at military cooperation between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and various Libyan authorities, as well as designated entities and foreign nationals working on their behalf in Libya. According to a Member State, O Chol Su, the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Military Equipment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, sent a letter on 23 March 2015 to Khalifa al-Ghwail, the then Chief of the Supreme Council of Defence and deputy to the Prime Minister, which noted that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was "currently in the process of preparing the sales/purchase agreement for the required defence systems and ammunition needed to maintain stability of Libya" and further noted that "Green Pine Association, a commercial establishment belonging to our ministry" would provide the draft agreement and additional documentation. The letter also mentioned the role of Consulting Bureau for Marketing, a company belonging to a Hussein al-Ali, a Syrian national described as an arms trafficker for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Libya, the Sudan and Yemen.⁶⁴ In a reply dated 5 April 2015, Khalifa al-Ghwail thanked O Chol Su and referred to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's invitation to Libyan technical teams to visit the country. A subsequent document of the Libyan Ministry of Defence dated 20 May 2015 authorized power of attorney for Syrian national Hussein al-Ali "to negotiate, correspond, exchange information, receive documents and technical and financial proposals on our behalf in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea". The Panel suspects a connection between the 2015 planned activities and meetings held later by the Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Libya with the Libyan Ministry of Defence to engage in military cooperation in March 2017.⁶⁵ Neither Libya nor Khalifa al-Ghwail have replied to the Panel's inquiries.

⁶⁴ See annex 26 for the reply from the Sudan and annex 30 for the passport.

⁶⁵ Information obtained by the Panel through media sources shows that the Office of Information for the Libyan Ministry of Defence uploaded on its Facebook page a report on a meeting between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Libyan Government officials in Tripoli on 8 February 2017. According to the Facebook page, Libyan Minister of Defence, Al-Mahdi al-Barghathi, and the new Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Libya, Ju Jin Hyok, discussed ways to develop the bilateral relations between the two countries, "particularly in the fields of military cooperation" and "agreed to develop a joint action plan to promote bilateral cooperation between Tripoli and Pyongyang in various fields, particularly in the fields of technical cooperation, information technologies and communication in military fields".

Madagascar

74. The Panel is investigating the activities of Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies in Madagascar. Madagascar replied to the Panel in its letter dated 20 November 2017⁶⁶ that no company named “Mansudae Overseas Project (MOP) Group of Companies” is conducting business in Madagascar and no “North Korean national” is registered in immigration databases.

Malaysia

75. On 22 February 2018, the United States announced that it had determined that “the Government of North Korea used the chemical warfare agent VX to assassinate Kim Jong Nam in Kuala Lumpur airport”.⁶⁷ On 14 March, during the 87th meeting of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Government of Malaysia stated that it was “the use of VX nerve agent” that had “caused the death of one North Korean national, Mr. Kim Jong Nam”. Malaysia also noted that its law enforcement authorities were “still pursuing an investigation on the four North Korean suspects who fled Malaysia on the day of the killing”.⁶⁸ During the court proceedings, a Malaysian police investigator identified Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nationals Ri Jae Nam with *Hanamori*, the suspect Hong Song Hac with *Chang* and Ri Ji Hyon as *Y*⁶⁹ and stated that Ri Jae Nam was the mastermind behind the assassination.⁷⁰ The Panel requested further information from Malaysia concerning a media report that equipment that could be used to make nerve agents had been found in the apartment of Ri Jong Chol,⁷¹ a national of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea first detained by Malaysia in the initial stages of the police investigation and subsequently expelled on 3 March 2017.

Mozambique

76. The Panel continued its investigation into six nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea working on behalf of designated entities and travelling to Mozambique. According to a letter of December 2017 from Mozambique, the six individuals (Kim Kwang Hyok, Kim Hyok Chan, Kim Song Chol, Ri Won Ho, Kim Sok Chol and Kim Jung Jong) travelled to Mozambique during the period from 2012 to 2017. Airline records show that while in Mozambique, these individuals travelled to remote civil-military airfields with nearby military bases. Mozambique has yet to respond to the Panel’s inquiries on the individuals’ activities. It also has not replied to a request for information on the status and travel movements of Ri Chang Su, a diplomat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea based in South Africa but stationed in Mozambique, who was identified as the representative of Haegeumgang

⁶⁶ The original letter was in French.

⁶⁷ Heather Nauert, Spokesperson, Department of State, United States of America, “Imposition of Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act sanctions North Korea”, press statement, 6 March 2018. Available at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/03/279079.htm.

⁶⁸ For more information on Malaysia’s statement to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the VX nerve agent attack, see OPCW, document EC-87/NAT.14, available at https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/87/en/ec87nat14_e_.pdf.

⁶⁹ Radio Free Asia, “Video shows Kim murder suspect playing prank in Hanoi, Defense says”, 20 March 2018. Available at www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/kimjongnam-trial-03202018171630.html. International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) Red Notices were issued against the three suspects as well as O Jong Gil in March 2017.

⁷⁰ Radio Free Asia, “Malaysia: male suspects in Kim Jong Nam murder changed clothes, appearance”, 26 October 2017. Available at www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/kimjongnam-trial-10262017170212.html.

⁷¹ Alastair Gale and Tom Wright, “North Korea’s secret army: how operatives abroad aid the regime”, *Wall Street Journal*, 18 May 2018. Available at www.wsj.com/articles/north-koreas-secret-army-how-operatives-abroad-aid-the-regime-1526652387.

Trading Corporation, which has been engaged in prohibited military activities in Mozambique.

77. Regarding the prohibited fishing activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Mozambique,⁷² on 15 January 2018, Mozambique provided evidence that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-Mozambique joint fishing venture EMKIP had been dissolved. On 11 April, Mozambique informed the Panel that "on 25th March 2018, 22 members of the DPRK's crew of the vessels operating under the flag of that country departed definitively from Mozambique to their country of origin" and provided the relevant tickets and passport information. Mozambique informed the Panel that "4 crew members plus a manager, all of them from DPRK [sic], still remain in Mozambique taking care of the vessels and should return to their country as soon as the necessary arrangements are concluded". On 24 April 2018, Mozambique informed the Panel that the two Democratic People's Republic of Korea-crewed fishing vessels associated with EMKIP's operations had been deregistered and reflagged to other Member States under the ownership of other companies.

Myanmar

78. The Panel continued its investigation into Democratic People's Republic of Korea-prohibited activities in Myanmar.⁷³ Myanmar informed the Panel in March that there "had been no military cooperation between Myanmar and the DPRK since October 2016" and that "no Myanmar technicians are stationed in the DPRK at present".⁷⁴ The Panel has not yet received a reply to its request of January 2018 for documentation of contracts relating to military cooperation, including ballistic missile cooperation since October 2006. The Panel also requested evidence of the return of all Myanmar technicians from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as well as the departure of all technicians of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from Myanmar.

Namibia

79. Regarding the assets of the Mansudae Overseas Project Group in Namibia,⁷⁵ the Government informed the Panel on 12 February 2018 that Mansudae Overseas Project had held a private auction on 26 June 2017 and sold off all the vehicles and equipment. Namibia provided a statement from an individual who had purchased one vehicle as evidence. The Panel notes that the payment and transfer of at least one bus was made a month following the designation of Mansudae. Namibia also stated in the above-mentioned letter that Mansudae's four tipper trucks were on site at the Suiderhof Military Base, about which the Panel requested further information, in addition to the 23 Mansudae-owned vehicles and other heavy construction equipment.

Netherlands

80. In 2016, the Netherlands interdicted a shipment of four generator units (see figure XVIII) that were en route to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea via China. The investigation highlighted the role of a diplomatic representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in a European Union member State, Kim Chol Yong⁷⁶ (see para. 120), who had procured the items by informing the European

⁷² S/2018/171, paras. 97 and 98.

⁷³ S/2018/171, paras. 101–103.

⁷⁴ In its letter of 15 March 2018 to the Panel, Myanmar also stated: "The Ministry of Defence also reaffirmed that no Myanmar technicians are stationed in the DPRK at present."

⁷⁵ S/2018/171, para. 108.

⁷⁶ DOB: 1 June 1964.

Union exporter that he was a Chinese national and that the cargo was destined for China. The intercepted shipment was the third consignment of its kind arranged by Kim. Documents obtained by the Netherlands customs authorities showed that for all shipments, Kim had relied on unwitting Chinese logistics service providers, including a trading company located in Dalian, to send the items to a trading company of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that has been associated with a designated entity, Office 39. The investigation also found that the payments for the three shipments had been made by four different entities mainly within the European Union that had played no apparent role in the actual export. This case highlights the role of diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in procuring items on behalf of entities working at the direction of designated entities and evasion techniques using a third country to ship these items to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Figure XVIII
Interdicted generators



Source: Member State.

New Zealand

81. Regarding the Panel's investigation of the aircraft flown at Wonsan in 2016,⁷⁷ on 29 May 2018, a New Zealand district court fined the aircraft manufacturer, Pacific Aerospace Ltd, 74,805 New Zealand dollars for indirectly exporting aircraft spare parts to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and 1,000 New Zealand dollars for making an "erroneous export entry". The judgement stated that Pacific Aerospace had entered into a joint venture with Beijing General Aviation Company, to which it sold the corresponding aircraft in September 2015. That same month, Beijing General Aviation informed Pacific Aerospace that the aircraft had been onsold to Freesky Aviation Company Limited, which informed Pacific Aerospace that it intended to base the aircraft in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to be used for tourism, which Freesky did without changing its ownership.⁷⁸ In an email of January 2016, Beijing General Aviation followed up with Pacific Aerospace regarding a spare part for the aircraft that had not yet been delivered, making clear that the aircraft was located in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which shows that Pacific Aerospace was aware of the final destination of the parts.⁷⁹ As a result of this case, Pacific Aerospace has adopted new export control practices. The Panel has reported multiple times on the evasion pattern of onselling items through multiple entities as a way to obscure their final destination.

⁷⁷ S/2018/171, para. 145; S/2017/150, paras. 126–128.

⁷⁸ *New Zealand Customs Service v. Pacific Aerospace Ltd* [2018] NZDC 5034.

⁷⁹ S/2017/150, annex 12–10.

Sierra Leone

82. The Panel investigated reported involvement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in a September 2018 military camp construction project in Freetown, an activity prohibited under paragraph 9 of resolution 2270 (2016). According to information provided by a European Member State, the topographic map and pilot study were led by workers from the Nam Nam Cooperative General Company, a.k.a. Namnamhupchochong Korea South-South Corporation (a.k.a. 조선남남협조총회사, Korea South-South Cooperation Corporation, Nam Nam General Corporation), designated by the United States Department of the Treasury. According to the information, this project involves Guicopres, a Guinean company. Guicopres replied to the Panel, stating that "while we commissioned the pilot study from the Koreans, the topographic mapping was carried out by Guinean and French engineers". Guicopres further stated that "at no time, therefore, has there been any form of collaboration or partnership with Nam Nam on this project". However, it admitted "that company [Nam Nam] was paid for a one-off service". The company further stated that "we have taken steps to notify the cessation of all collaboration with that company" (see annex 25). The Panel wrote to Guicopres again on 12 December 2018 requesting detailed information and documentation regarding the company's relations with Nam Nam and nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. On 20 December 2018, Guicopres replied, stating that "we only contacted the Korean workers during the preparation of the consultation file for the construction of the Freetown camp. We can confirm that they [the North Korean Nam Nam company] only worked with us for a few days in the context of the pre-feasibility studies, and then our surveyors and topographers took over." (see *ibid.*).

South Africa

83. The Panel continued its investigation into the accreditation and movements of Ri Chang Su⁸⁰ and Choe Kwang Su,⁸¹ nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reported as engaged in prohibited military cooperation in Mozambique and accredited in their diplomatic passport at the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Pretoria. Choe Kwang Su, whose passport indicates that he is Third Secretary at the Embassy in Pretoria, has returned to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The passport of his successor in Mozambique, Ri Chang Su, also identifies him as the Third Economic and Commercial Secretary at the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Pretoria.⁸² The Panel has reported on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's previous use of diplomats based at its Embassy in Pretoria⁸³ for prohibited activities in neighbouring countries during the period from 2012 to 2014.⁸⁴ In response to the Panel's request for entry and exit records and financial information on these individuals, South Africa replied that "the Department of International Relations and Cooperation has gone through the archival record of the DPRK diplomatic staff establishment in South Africa and must emphasise that there is no mechanism for DPRK diplomats accredited in neighbouring countries to be also accredited to South Africa. Doing so is a misrepresentation by the DPRK as is the case of Mr. Chung Su Ri." South Africa also stated that "as regards any bank accounts held in South Africa allegedly Mr. Kil Jong Hun, Mr. Kwang Yon, Mr. Ri Chang Su and Mr. Choe Kwang Su, this information will be verified with the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC)". The investigation continues.

⁸⁰ S/2018/171, para. 94.

⁸¹ S/2017/150, para. 102.

⁸² S/2018/171, annex 28, p. 138.

⁸³ S/2016/157, para. 173.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 173.

Sudan

84. The Panel continued its investigations into military cooperation projects between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Sudan. During the reporting period, the Panel was provided with information on additional military cooperation activities between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Sudan, including a letter dated 28 September 2016 between Syrian arms trafficker Hussein al-Ali and Chonryong Technology Trading Corporation⁸⁵ citing future technology transfers for Fagot anti-tank and man-portable air defence systems for "military manufacturing in Sudan".⁸⁶ A Member State also informed the Panel that Sudan Master Technology Engineering Company, which is associated with the Sudan's Military Industry Corporation,⁸⁷ had contacts in 2009 with Choi Chan Han, a.k.a. Solomon Choi, an Australian businessman working on behalf of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who was arrested in Australia on 16 December 2017 for brokering missile components and coal. On 26 November 2018, the Sudan informed the Committee that "the Military Industry Cooperation (sic) MIC (Sudan) has never dealt with a company named "KOMID" and it has been dealing with a company named "Future Electronic Company" (FEC)". The Sudan also informed the Committee that the "Military Industry Cooperation (sic) (MIC) Sudan has never received any shipment from North Korea. All shipments were from other countries." In response to the Panel's reporting on KOMID representatives in the Sudan, Kim Song Chol and Son Jong Hyok, the Sudan stated that "Mr. Kim Song Chol entered Sudan in 2013 and 2016, using different names and left in May 2017. He has not entered Sudan since that time due to the travel ban placed on him by the competent authorities." On the activities of Hussein al-Ali, the Sudan informed the Committee that "Mr. Hussein al-Ali had offered his services in 2008 to the MIC (Sudan) but MIC did not meet him or develop any cooperation with him." The Panel requested the names and passport details of all nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and others employed by Future Electronic Company in the Sudan whom the Sudan states it has expelled.⁸⁸ The Panel also requested copies of contracts between Future Electronic Company and the Sudan's Military Industry Corporation and Sudan Master Technology Engineering Corporation, as well as evidence of the cancellations of the projects. The Panel also requested all documentation associated with United Nations-designated entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or other entities that may have operated on their behalf in the Sudan, including KOMID, Tanchon Commercial Bank, Future Electronic Company, Chongryong Technology Trading Corporation and Chosun Keumcheong Technology General Trade Corporation, that were the subject of Panel requests to the Sudan from December 2015 until November 2018 (see annex 26).

85. On 2 January 2019, the Sudan cooperated with the Panel and provided contracts and other requested evidence, stating that "a single framework agreement was signed between the companies SMT and FEC. Two executive contracts were then signed to provide parts for the project to develop 122mm [weapons] and aerial bombs."⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Chonryong Technology Corporation has been reported as suspected of engaging in arms transfers to the Syrian Arab Republic in 2016; see [S/2018/171](#), para. 133.

⁸⁶ Information provided by a Member State.

⁸⁷ Sudan Master Technology Engineering Company was previously reported as involved in Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) rocket and missile military cooperation projects, see [S/2017/150](#), para. 106.

⁸⁸ In paragraph 4 of the national implementation report dated 14 August 2018 ([S/AC.49/2018/98](#)) sent by the Sudan to the Committee, the Sudan stated that "the Sudanese Government expelled the staff of the aforementioned company and prohibited them from entering Sudan. The last of the staff members left on 12 August 2017."

⁸⁹ [S/2017/150](#), para. 106.

Additionally, the contracts between Future Electronic Company and Sudan Master Technology Engineering Company were for various other programmes and items “in the field of rehabilitation of eastern radars, air defense systems, tactical communication, maintenance and spare parts and training” (see annex 27). The Sudan also provided the Panel with cooperation regarding the KOMID front company Future Electronic Company and KOMID representatives. Regarding KOMID representative Kim Song Chol, the Sudan stated that “Mr. Kim Song Chol visited Sudan for the first time in 2013 to follow up implementation of the contracts regarding the development of 122mm [weapons].” He then visited for a second time to oversee some groups that were working to install P-12 and P-15 radars. The Sudan noted that Kim Song Chol then “visited the Sudan a third time in 2016 under a different name and a new passport in order to request certain financial dues”. The Sudan provided the Panel with documents prohibiting Kim Song Chol’s re-entry. Regarding the KOMID front company, Future Electronic Company, the contracts stated that the company was registered in a third country and that its representative was a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea passport-holder named Hong Man Bak.⁹⁰

Syrian Arab Republic

86. The Panel continued its multiple investigations into prohibited activities between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Syrian Arab Republic, the continuing travel by technicians of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to and from the country and the presence of nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea working on behalf of designated entities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the country, as well as Syrian arms brokers attempting to sell military equipment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in multiple Middle Eastern and African Member States.

87. In 2018, a Member State informed the Panel of additional visits to the Syrian Arab Republic in 2016 and 2017 by technicians from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea tied to prohibited activities who were working for Syrian defence factories (Maamal al-Difaa). These include three nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who departed the Syrian Arab Republic in the spring of 2017⁹¹ (see table 2).

Table 2

Information on technicians of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea visiting the Syrian Arab Republic

<i>Name</i>	<i>Year of birth</i>	<i>Passport number</i>	<i>Year of issue</i>
Yang Kyong Song	1961	83632010	2016
Kim Jong Gil	1971	927120306	2017
Kim Thae Hyon	1966	927120305	2017

88. According to the Member State, three other experts of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see table 3) arrived in the Syrian Arab Republic on 3 May 2017 and were greeted by Colonel Samer Haydar, member of the air defence department of the Syrian armed forces.

⁹⁰ Democratic People’s Republic of Korea passport number 836298402.

⁹¹ The exact date of departure is held on file.

Table 3
Information on experts of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea visiting the Syrian Arab Republic

<i>Name</i>	<i>Year of birth</i>	<i>Passport number</i>	<i>Year of issue</i>
Kim Yong Chol	1970	836238472	2016
Ko Jong Myong	1974	56343410	2013
Ri Song	1960	927220125	2017

89. These three individuals were granted three-month visas issued by the Syrian embassy in Pyongyang.⁹² Their names and passport numbers differ from the groups of technicians of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea engaged in ballistic missile and other prohibited activities who previously travelled to and returned from the Syrian Arab Republic in February 2011, August 2016, November 2016 and March 2017; this shows that the prohibited military cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Syrian Arab Republic has continued unabated.⁹³

90. In addition, Syrian nationals have been reported to the Panel as being engaged in arms brokering on behalf of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for attempted sales to a range of Middle Eastern and African States, reportedly offering conventional arms and, in some cases, ballistic missiles, to armed groups in Yemen and Libya. One individual described as a Syrian arms trafficker, Hussein al-Ali,⁹⁴ has been identified by a Member State as engaging in prohibited military cooperation on behalf of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by having attempted arms sales in Libya (see para. 73), the Sudan (see para. 84) and Yemen (see para. 97). The Panel has yet to receive a reply from the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the full extent of the activities of Al-Ali and his Damascus-based company “Consulting Bureau for Marketing”⁹⁵ in these and other Member States in Africa and the Middle East. Nor has it received a reply to its request to Al-Ali for a full accounting of his past and ongoing relationship with the Ministry of Military Equipment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Saeng Pi’l and other designated entities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and their nationals working on their behalf.

91. The Panel was informed by a Member State that Ryu Jin, designated as a representative of KOMID in the Syrian Arab Republic, had left that country. The Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide confirmation and inform the Panel whether the departure was an expulsion in accordance with paragraphs 13 or 14 of resolution [2270 \(2016\)](#). The Panel was informed by a Member State that a number of designated individuals and other nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea working on behalf of designated entities, including Choe Jin Myong⁹⁶, continue to reside in the Syrian Arab Republic.

⁹² Visa numbers on file with the Panel.

⁹³ [S/2018/171](#), paras. 125–127. The names and passports of a number of these individuals are held on file by the Panel.

⁹⁴ DOB: 1 January 1942, passport number 011095903; see annex 30 for passport.

⁹⁵ Last known publicly advertised address for Consulting Bureau for Marketing is P.O. Box 33177, Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic, Tel: 963-11-3325044, 3318888, Fax: 963-11-3331000, email: alali@net.sy.

⁹⁶ Choe Jin Myong is a long-time representative of the Chilsong Trading Company, which deals in military equipment. Choe worked with Han Il, the Beijing representative of the designated Daeryonggang Trading Corporation, to broker arms-related equipment to a Syrian munitions company, Yona Star International. See [S/2018/171](#), para. 133.

92. In November 2018, the Panel was informed that the Syrian Arab Republic was one of the two most lucrative markets of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for arms-related goods and services.⁹⁷ According to the Member State, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is continuing its cooperation with both the Scientific Studies and Research Center and the Army Supply Bureau. The deputy head of KOMID in the Syrian Arab Republic is named Rim Yong Hyok, while Ryu Jin's replacement as head representative in the Syrian Arab Republic is known as "Kim". The Panel wrote to the Syrian Arab Republic (see annex 29) requesting information on all nationals and organizations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that are active in the Syrian Arab Republic, attaching an earlier response from the country (see *ibid.*). The Syrian Arab Republic replied to previous Panel inquiries, stating that "existing relations between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are in harmony with international law and the Charter of the United Nations" as well as "diplomatic representation" between the two countries (see annex 31).

Uganda

93. The Panel wrote to Uganda on 10 December 2018 following a media report alleging that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had supplied small arms and light weapons to Uganda and had trained Ugandan special forces, as well as on the continued presence of KOMID in the country through the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Kampala. In the report, it was also stated that prohibited joint ventures, such as MKP, were continuing operations in the country under new names and that these entities and affiliates had links to both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Ugandan intelligence services.⁹⁸ In its letter of 10 December 2018, the Panel requested copies of all contracts relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's military and paramilitary training in Uganda, together with evidence of their cancellation and the departure of the personnel of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Panel also requested the names and passport details of all nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Uganda, including all military advisers. Uganda has yet to reply.

94. The Panel continued its investigation into the presence and activities of KOMID in Uganda. According to a Member State, the decision by Uganda to expel two KOMID representatives⁹⁹ "prevented KOMID from transferring a substantial amount of cash believed to be the proceeds from KOMID business in Uganda out of the country. Ri Kyong Hui, the spouse of Yu Kyong Jin, and Jo Su Yong, the spouse of Jong Kuk Chol, attempted to remove this cash from Uganda." The Member State also informed the Panel: "Senior levels of Uganda's Ministry of Defense may have been witting of the relationship with KOMID. The involvement of such officials in this activity is significant and warrants close scrutiny." Uganda has yet to reply to the Panel's request for information on the amount of cash seized or otherwise prevented from transfer from Uganda by the reported KOMID representatives or their spouses as well as information on the bank accounts used.

United Arab Emirates

95. Until at least May 2018, Prime Okryu Art Gallery in Abu Dhabi advertised the works of artists affiliated with Mansudae Art Studio on its website (see figure XIX)

⁹⁷ Two Panel members noted a lack of statistical information provided to the Panel.

⁹⁸ Joe Parkinson, "Never take their photos: tracking the commandos, North Korea's secret export", *Wall Street Journal*, 9 December 2018. Available at www.wsj.com/articles/secret-workforce-funds-north-koreaand-defies-sanctions-1544379764.

⁹⁹ The Panel noted in its 2018 final report the decision by Uganda to expel two diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea acting on behalf of KOMID. See S/2018/171, para. 142.

and sold artwork of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the gallery. It was also stated on the website that the gallery was affiliated with the Okryugwan restaurant group of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see annex 32). Following the Panel’s letter to the United Arab Emirates of 9 May 2018, the restaurant and art gallery website pages became inaccessible. The Panel obtained photographs of a sign stating that “the gallery is temporarily closed for renovation, opening soon” on the door of the gallery taken in December 2018. On 2 January 2019, the United Arab Emirates replied to the Panel stating that “none of the employees of the Prime Okryu Art Gallery was a DPRK citizen (sic)” and “the Government of the United Arab Emirates has closed” the gallery. The investigation continues.

Figure XIX
Prime Okryu Gallery



Source: RFA Korean Service, Jinkuk Kim.

United Republic of Tanzania

96. The Panel continued its investigation into the activities of the Haegeumgang Trading Corporation (a.k.a. Haegumgang) in the United Republic of Tanzania and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s repair and upgrade of the surface-to-air missile Pechora (S-125) systems and its P-12 air defence radar, reportedly worth €10.49 million.¹⁰⁰ The United Republic of Tanzania has yet to respond to the Panel’s inquiries.

Yemen

97. The Panel investigated efforts by the Ministry of Military Equipment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and KOMID to supply a wide array of conventional arms and ballistic missiles to the Houthi group in Yemen through a known proxy, Syrian national Hussein al-Ali, and his Syrian-registered company Consulting Bureau for Marketing. The Panel was given access by a Member State to an invitation letter dated 13 July 2016 from Houthi leader Major General Zakaria Yahya al-Shami to the Ministry of Military Equipment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Tosong Technology Trading Corporation, a KOMID subsidiary, to meet in Damascus “to discuss the issue of the transfer of technology and other matters of mutual interest”. According to the Member State “a protocol of cooperation between Yemen and North Korea” was then negotiated involving “Naif Ahmad Al Qanis, Houthi ambassador in Damascus and Syrian arms broker Hussein Al Ali”. According to the Member State, this involved a “vast array of military equipment, including Kalahnsnikov, PKC machine guns, RPG-7, RPG-29, Fagot missiles, Iгла missiles, tanks, air defence systems, ballistic missiles”. The Panel has yet to receive replies from Major General Zakaria Yahya al-Shami, Naif Ahmad al-Qanis and Hussein al-Ali to the Panel’s request for information on their role in

¹⁰⁰ S/2018/171, para. 143.

these negotiations and attempts to broker and supply such weaponry from or on behalf of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Zimbabwe

98. On 9 June 2018, Zimbabwe provided evidence of the deregistration of the Mansudae Boka Design Company and the closure of its bank accounts in response to the Panel's inquiries about the activities of nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Mansudae-related companies in Zimbabwe.¹⁰¹

Implementation of the luxury goods ban

Rolls-Royce Phantom

99. The Panel investigated the first public appearance of a Rolls-Royce Phantom limousine in Pyongyang on 7 October 2018, an apparent violation of the luxury goods ban stipulated in paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 23 and annex IV of resolution 2094 (2013), prohibiting the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of luxury automobiles. In its letter to Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd and its parent company Bayerische Motoren Werke (BMW), the Panel noted a number of distinguishing features to assist the companies in their identification of the vehicle (see figure XX).

Figure XX

Rolls-Royce Phantom and distinguishing features observed in Pyongyang on 7 October 2018



Source: Voice of America.

100. In its reply, Rolls-Royce informed the Panel that the vehicle appeared to be a seventh generation Phantom Extended Wheelbase series II manufactured between August 2012 and February 2017 at its Goodwood manufacturing facility. Rolls-Royce

¹⁰¹ Ibid., para. 144.

stressed the importance of the vehicle's identification number in replying to the Panel's inquiries. The investigation continues.

Rolls-Royce Ghost

101. The Panel continued to investigate the transfer of a falsely declared Rolls-Royce Ghost limousine to Bangladesh by a diplomat of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea seized by the Bangladesh Customs Intelligence in January 2017.¹⁰² The Panel requested Bangladesh to provide the location of the vehicle and its investigation report on the seizure. Bangladesh has yet to reply to multiple inquiries from the Panel.

Mercedes-Benz limousines

102. The Panel continued its investigation of the Mercedes-Benz limousines shipped to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as part of efforts to determine all their vehicle identification numbers and whether any had been altered.¹⁰³ A number of these Mercedes-Benz were observed without licence plates during meetings in Singapore (see figure XXI), Beijing (see figure XXII) and Pyongyang and were utilized by at least one foreign head of State in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2018 (see *ibid.*). The Panel wrote to Singapore and China to request the vehicle identification number records following the temporary transfers of these vehicles, or checks by the Presidential Security Service of the Republic of Korea, the head of which was reported as a passenger in one of the vehicles.

Figure XXI

Images of illicitly obtained Mercedes-Benz limousines without licence plates in Singapore, June 2018




Source: YouTube.

¹⁰² [S/2017/150](#), para. 125.

¹⁰³ The Panel determined that a number of these Mercedes-Benz had been transported via shipping container from the port of Long Beach, California, United States, to Dalian, China, at the direction of George Ma, a Chinese businessman whose company, Seajet, an agent of the airline of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Air Koryo, had previously been involved in the shipment of arms-related material to Brazzaville in 2010. These vehicles were then transferred in shipping containers by the company Liaoning Danxing International Forwarding. See [S/2016/157](#), paras. 118–121 and annexes 76–85.

Figure XXII
Images of illicitly obtained Mercedes-Benz limousines without licence plates in Beijing in June 2018 (left) and March 2018 (centre) and in Pyongyang in September 2018 (right)



Source: Reuters, Pyongyang Press Corps/Pool via Reuters.

103. In its letter of 4 December 2018, Singapore informed the Panel that “it had requested for the vehicles’ chassis and engine numbers, but the DPRK officials declined to reveal this information due to national security reasons”.

Lexus LX 570

104. The Panel investigated the appearance of a number of Lexus LX 570 all-wheel drive luxury vehicles bearing number plates of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the inter-Korean summit of September 2018 (see figure XXIII) in an apparent violation of paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 23 and annex IV of resolution 2094 (2013). Toyota Motor Corporation informed the Panel that it was unable to identify the vehicle identification number and that “Toyota complies with applicable UN resolutions in relation to the DPRK and has no intention of the export of these motor vehicles to, or the manufacture of, motor vehicles in the DPRK. We can only assume that these vehicles come from back channels and are exchanged among individuals”. Toyota further cooperated with the Panel, stating that this generation of “LX 570 AWD were produced from January 2012 to July 2015”.

Figure XXIII
Lexus LX 570 vehicles observed at the inter-Korean summit of 18 to 20 September 2018, Pyongyang



Source: YouTube.

Vodka

105. In July 2018, the Netherlands informed the Panel that it had temporarily seized a consignment of vodka suspected to be en route to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. According to the Netherlands, vodka (Harmonized System code 2208.60) is considered “luxury goods” under Council regulation (EU) 2017/2062. Shipping documents accompanying the seized vodka shipment showed that the vodka, manufactured in Belarus, was destined for Liaoning Danxing International Forwarding, the company investigated by the Panel as suspected of shipping Mercedes-Benz limousines to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The other

company named in the documentation, Transit Prime International Logistics, had the same phone number and address as Liaoning Danxing International Forwarding. The Netherlands noted that Liaoning Danxing had been named in previous Panel reporting and, as a freight forwarder, would not be the final destination for the consignment. The Panel wrote to Liaoning Danxing International Forwarding, the website for which described the company as a container shipping line transporting goods to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.¹⁰⁴ The Panel requested information on the final destination of the vodka.

106. Two separately obtained contracts for the vodka shipments showed that the consignment was sold by its Belarus manufacturer to a Georgian entity named Noble House LLC, which was the buyer in both contracts. The Panel wrote to Noble House requesting all correspondence and financial transactions between Noble House, Liaoning Danxing International Forwarding Company and Transit Prime International Logistics Co. Ltd. Noble House did not provide the requested correspondence and financial transactions records but replied, stating that China was the final destination of the cargo and the vodka was to be sold "via the e-commerce channel". Noble House provided the name of an individual, a private email address and telephone number it claimed was its "trading partner" in China. Neither this individual nor Transit Prime International Logistics nor Liaoning Danxing International Forwarding have replied to the Panel's inquiries.

IV. Finance

107. Despite the strengthening of financial sanctions in 2017, their effectiveness is being systematically undermined by the deceptive practices of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the failure by Member States to recognize and prevent them. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea enjoys ongoing access to the international financial system, as its financial networks have quickly adapted to the latest sanctions, using evasive methods in ways that make it difficult to detect illicit activity. Member States also continue to fail to take measures required by the Security Council resolutions, including the assets freeze and the expulsion of bank representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea operating abroad. Individuals empowered to act as extensions of financial institutions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea abroad allow the country to evade sanctions measures such as the requirement for Member States to close all subsidiaries of these banks within their jurisdiction. Cyberattacks by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to illegally force the transfer of funds have become an important tool in the evasion of sanctions and have grown in sophistication and scale since 2016.

108. The Panel's financial investigations also show insufficient implementation by Member States of their obligation to freeze all assets controlled by designated entities or members of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that are engaged in violation or evasion of any of the sanctions measures. In several cases investigated by the Panel, Member States closed but did not freeze account balances of individuals acting on behalf of designated entities, including the Reconnaissance General Bureau, and allowed them to transfer funds to banks in other countries. Global operations of Glocom and MKP continue despite past Panel reporting on their illicit activities and recommendations to both the Committee and to Member States to designate them and freeze their assets. While some Member States have moved to limit the number of accounts of the embassies and diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea within their jurisdictions as required by the resolutions, the Panel found evidence that diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of

¹⁰⁴ The Liaoning Danxing International Forwarding website ceased to function in 2018.

Korea are evading this provision by opening and managing accounts in multiple countries, including in those to which they are not accredited, in order to engage in illicit business activities. Finally, the Panel investigated the existence of more than 200 potential cooperative entities and self-described joint ventures despite the requirement that Member States should have closed them by 9 January 2018 (i.e., within 120 days of the adoption of resolution 2375 (2017)). Furthermore, the Panel found information indicating that companies considered cooperative entities by the Panel¹⁰⁵ may have also violated other provisions of the resolutions, including the prohibition in paragraph 18 of resolution 2321 (2016) on the use of diplomatic premises of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for non-diplomatic activity. The Panel also found that a company with links to designated entities, including Mansudae and the Reconnaissance General Bureau, has formed joint ventures in another country, where it is undertaking activities.

Cyberattacks

109. The Panel notes a trend in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's evasion of financial sanctions of using cyberattacks to illegally force the transfer of funds from financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges. According to a Member State, "cyberspace is used by the DPRK as an asymmetric means to carry out illicit and undercover operations in the field of cybercrime and sanctions evasion. These operations aim to acquire funds through a variety of measures in order to circumvent the sanctions." (see annex 33). United States court documents, officials and Government statements and reports have attributed several cyberattacks by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Reconnaissance General Bureau, which plays an overarching role in cyberattacks.¹⁰⁶ In 2017, a third Member State informed the Panel that the Reconnaissance General Bureau supervised and conducted cyberattack operations not only for destroying infrastructure and intelligence-gathering but for the purposes of gaining foreign currency.¹⁰⁷ A fourth Member State sent a letter to the Panel in 2018 in which cyberattacks attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau were mentioned and in which it was stated that

¹⁰⁵ The Panel has previously considered two cases of collaborative activity in which an entity is managed, directed or owned by at least one non-national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and an individual and/or entity of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as prohibited under paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017). See S/2018/171 paras. 89 and 92.

¹⁰⁶ See annex 34. In 2017, an assessment by the U.S. National Security Agency reported in the media linked the WannaCry ransomware to the Reconnaissance General Bureau, citing as evidence IP addresses known to have been used by the Reconnaissance General Bureau, see Ellen Nakashima, "The NSA has linked the WannaCry computer worm to North Korea", *Washington Post*, 14 June 2017. Available at <https://wapo.st/2EYAVBB> (both the United States and the United Kingdom made further statements that are available at <https://bit.ly/2BK7qm6> and <https://bit.ly/2GPGUvn>). See Daniel Glaser, Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, Department of Treasury, United States, statement to Congress in January 2015, available at www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg92556/html/CHRG-114hhrg92556.htm. See James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, United States, "National intelligence, North Korea, and the national cyber discussion", remarks during the International Conference on Cyber Security in January 2015. The United States Congressional Research Service stated "most sources report that North Korean cyber operations are headquartered in the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB)", available at <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44912.pdf>. The below-mentioned criminal complaint unsealed by the United States Department of Justice on 6 September 2018 in the case of Park Jin Hyok also attributes Democratic People's Republic of Korea cyberattacks to the Reconnaissance General Bureau. In its United States designation of the Reconnaissance General Bureau in response to the Sony Pictures Entertainment attack, the United States Treasury stated that "many of the DPRK's major cyber operations run through RGB", see www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/j19733.aspx.

¹⁰⁷ The Member State informed the Panel that this is based on estimates reached by assessing coding and attributes.

reports suggest that “cyber-focused military units are directly tasked to generate income for the regime”.

110. On 28 July 2016, the National Police Agency of the Republic of Korea attributed a cyberattack against the online shopping mall, Interpark, to the Reconnaissance General Bureau, stating that the attack was an attempted “criminal acquisition of foreign currency” (see annex 35) that would have circumvented the assets freeze. The Panel considers this case as an attempt by a designated entity to evade sanctions by using a cyberattack to force the transfer of \$2.7 million.

111. On 6 September 2018, the Government of the United States indicted Park Jin Hyok, a hacker from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who worked as a member of the hacking organization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea known as the Lazarus Group,¹⁰⁸ for engaging in a “wide-ranging, multi-year conspiracy to conduct computer intrusions and commit wire fraud by co-conspirators working on behalf of the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”.¹⁰⁹ According to the United States, Park “has travelled to China in the past and conducted legitimate IT work under the front company ‘Chosun Expo’ or the Korean Expo Joint Venture in addition to activities conducted on behalf of North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau”¹¹⁰ (see annex 36). The Panel requested information from the Government of China on the activities of Chosun Expo and possible continued operation as a joint venture or cooperative entity prohibited pursuant to resolution 2375 (2017). China stated that “China has conducted an investigation based on the information provided by the Panel. Up until now, China has not found any company registered as Chosun Expo Joint Venture, and currently does not have information regarding Park Jin Hyok.”

112. According to the United States, Park Jin Hyok and his co-conspirators also “targeted and then executed the fraudulent transfer of \$81 million from Bangladesh Bank [...] and engaged in computer intrusions and cyber-heists at many more financial services victims in the United States, and in other countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, North America, and South America in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018, with attempted losses well over \$1 billion”.¹¹¹ The \$81,000,000 was successfully transferred using the SWIFT system from Bangladesh Bank’s account at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York to accounts in the Philippines, where it was “subsequently laundered through multiple bank accounts, a money remitting business, and casino junkets”.¹¹² The Philippines has provided the Panel with internal audit documents, bank correspondence, CCTV footage and other information relevant to the tracing of the stolen funds, the majority of which have not been recovered to date. The Panel continues its investigation of the case.

113. The Panel investigated two additional cases of financially motivated cyberattacks in which the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea attempted to

¹⁰⁸ The United States Government refers to the cyber actors backed by the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as “Hidden Cobra”, see www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity.

¹⁰⁹ United States District Court, Central District of California, *United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK*, Case No. MJ18-1479, Criminal Complaint, 8 June 2018, para. 6. Available at www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download.

¹¹⁰ The United States stated that Chosun Expo is “a front company affiliated with Lab 110, one of the North Korean government’s hacking organizations. That hacking group is what some private cybersecurity researchers have labeled the “Lazarus Group.” See annex 36, entitled “Wanted by the FBI, PARK JIN HYOK, Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud; Conspiracy to Commit Computer-Related Fraud (Computer Intrusion)”.

¹¹¹ United States District Court, *United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK*, para. 8.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, para. 144. The Panel notes that at the time, casinos were not considered financial institutions in the Philippines and were therefore unregulated by the anti-money-laundering law in the country.

illegally force the transfer of over \$20 million. In May 2018, a Democratic People's Republic of Korea cyberattack by an advanced persistent threat group resulted in \$10 million being transferred from Banco de Chile mainly to accounts in Hong Kong via unauthorized transactions using SWIFT. Using IP addresses and other details published by the United States Department of Justice, open-source technical analysis has linked the perpetrators with Lab 110,¹¹³ which according to the United States is part of the Reconnaissance General Bureau.¹¹⁴ Then, in August 2018, about \$13.5 million was withdrawn from Cosmos Bank in India in more than 14,000 simultaneous automatic teller machine (ATM) withdrawals in 28 countries as well as in additional transfers to an account belonging to a Hong Kong-based company using SWIFT. On 2 October 2018, the United States responded to these ATM withdrawal attacks by issuing a "FASTCash Campaign" alert for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.¹¹⁵ These more recent attacks show how the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has become an increasingly sophisticated actor in cyberattacks for financial gain, with tools and tactics steadily improving. The Cosmos attack was a more advanced, well-planned and highly coordinated operation that bypassed three main layers of defence contained in International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) banking/ATM attack mitigation guidance.¹¹⁶ Not only were the actors able to compromise the SWIFT network in the Cosmos case to transfer the funds to other accounts, but they simultaneously compromised internal bank processes to bypass transaction verification procedures and order worldwide transfers to almost 30 countries where funds were physically withdrawn by individuals in more than 10,000 separate transactions over a weekend.

114. The Panel notes that in addition to attacks on fiat currency, cyberattacks involving cryptocurrencies provide the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with more ways to evade sanctions given that they are harder to trace, can be laundered many times and are independent from government regulation. In the 2017 WannaCry attack by the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the ransom demand was made in cryptocurrency. According to one estimate, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea carried out at least five successful attacks against cryptocurrency exchanges in Asia between January 2017 and September 2018, resulting in a total loss of \$571 million¹¹⁷ (see annex 39).

115. In its most recent final report, the Panel included information showing that the Reconnaissance General Bureau agents (and family members) responsible for illegal financial activities in Europe, including large bank transfers to accounts in the European Union and Asia, were both highly trained and skilled in the field of information technology and that one of them, Kim Su Gwang, managed to obtain a position with significant responsibility for the organization's information systems.¹¹⁸

¹¹³ See annexes 37 and 38.

¹¹⁴ The Member State informed the Panel that this is based on estimates reached by assessing coding and attributes; see also annex 36.

¹¹⁵ *United States, Department of Homeland Security, Alert (TA18-275A) Hidden Cobra – FASTCash campaign, 2 October 2018*. Available at www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-275A.

¹¹⁶ See Oleg Kolesnikov, "Securonix Threat Research Report: Cosmos Bank SWIFT/ATM US\$13.5 million cyber attack detection using security analytics", 27 August 2018. Available at <http://bit.ly/2sgABa0>.

¹¹⁷ Group-IB, "14 cyberattacks on crypto exchanges resulted in a loss of \$882 million", 17 October 2018. Available at www.group-ib.com/media/gib-crypto-summary/. See also annex 39; and Priscilla Moriuchi, "North Korea turning to cryptos to counter economic sanctions", The Hill, 22 January 2018. Available at <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/370114-north-korea-turning-to-cryptos-to-counter-economic-sanctions>.

¹¹⁸ S/2018/171, annex 46.

Recommendations

116. **The Panel recommends that the Security Council, when drafting future financial sanctions measures, take account of cyberattacks carried out by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to circumvent the resolutions by illegally generating revenue for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.**

117. **Member States should enhance their ability to facilitate robust information exchange on the cyberattacks by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with other Governments and with their own financial institutions, to detect and prevent attempts by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to employ its cybercapabilities for sanctions evasion.**

118. **Information about cyberattacks conducted by the Reconnaissance General Bureau as a means to evade financial sanctions and to gain foreign currency should be added to the Reconnaissance General Bureau’s entry on the 1718 sanctions list.**

Financial activities of diplomatic personnel of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

119. The Panel investigated a diplomat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea formerly posted to Malaysia, Kim Jong Chol (a.k.a. Ri Jong Chol), who operated on behalf of Korea Ponghwa General Trading Corporation, which according to documents obtained by the Panel is associated with Korea Kumgang Bank.¹¹⁹ Owing to space constraints, information in this case is contained in annex 40. That an individual of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea accredited as a diplomat at the embassy in Kuala Lumpur did business on behalf of entities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and on behalf of financial institutions reflects patterns previously reported by the Panel.

120. The Panel investigated the banking practices of another diplomat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea accredited in a European Union country, Kim Chol Yong, who had helped to arrange an attempted shipment of four generator units to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea via China in 2016, which was interdicted by the Netherlands (see para. 80). Kim Chol Yong used more than a dozen bank accounts in European Union financial institutions to do business in the Netherlands and at least three other European Union member States.

121. In the establishment and use of his bank accounts, Kim used many of the same evasion tactics previously noted by the Panel. These included: opening accounts using several addresses; opening accounts in the name of a front company; opening multiple accounts in the name of family members, in particular his wife and son; and opening accounts in the name of the diplomatic mission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. He also used various renderings of his own name or those of his co-signors when opening bank accounts (e.g., Kim Chol, Kim Chol Yong, Kim Cholyong, Chol Yong Kim). Furthermore, Kim and his wife were the long-term owners of life insurance savings accounts (also called “cash value life insurance”), which they were

¹¹⁹ Korea Kumgang Bank (금강은행, a.k.a. Kumgang Export and Import Bank, 金剛銀行), was established as a specialized bank to settle accounts for export-import transactions of various trading corporations of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including Korea Ponghwa General Trading Corporation. Korea Ponghwa General Trading Corporation falls under the authority of the External Economic Committee of the Cabinet of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and is associated with Korea Pyongyang Trading Company.

able to cash in for a credit of more than a million euros in late 2017, more than a year after the interdicted shipment attempt.¹²⁰

122. The Panel has previously recommended that Member States include all embassy personnel within the scope of paragraph 16 of resolution 2321 (2016) and that they ensure that diplomats do not establish additional bank accounts in the names of family members or front companies. Relevant authorities should also verify that bank accounts are closed when a diplomat ends their tour in the country.

123. The Panel also investigated cases of evasion of the provision in paragraph 16 of resolution 2321 (2016) in which when diplomats' accounts were closed, they transferred funds to financial institutions in other countries to which they were not accredited. In the light of this, as well as the ongoing practice of diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea residing in one country while engaging in business in other countries, the Panel recommends that Member States issue guidance whereby one bank is chosen to serve as the only bank that may hold accounts for the embassy and diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and all other banks are advised not to open accounts for any diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or their family members. The Panel notes that the practice of diplomats holding multiple accounts in different currencies is prohibited under paragraph 16 of resolution 2321 (2016).

Bank representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea abroad

124. The Panel continued its investigation into more than 30 representatives of financial institutions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea operating abroad, including from the Tanchon Commercial Bank, Korea Kumgang Bank, Foreign Trade Bank, Cheil Credit Bank, Daesong Bank, Ilsim International Bank, Bank of East Land, Daedong Credit Bank, Unification Development Bank and Ryugyong Commercial Bank. The Panel found these banks to be operating through representatives in China, Libya, the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Emirates (see annexes 41–42). The Panel notes that payment methods previously used by bank representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to evade sanctions were used in 2018 to process payments for ship-to-ship transfers (see annex 43). The Panel notes that all of the above-mentioned Member States must expel all individuals acting on behalf of a financial institution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in accordance with paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016).

125. In its reply to the Panel, the Russian Federation informed the Panel that "Mr. Han Jang Su is the Third Secretary of the Commercial Counsellor's Section of the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Russian Federation and has been officially accredited by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He entered the Russian Federation on 23 June 2017 and is staying in the country legally. No information is available concerning activities that are inconsistent with his official status. The banking licence of the bank, Agrosoyuz, which Mr. Han Jang Su allegedly used to carry out activities linked to the FTB [...] has been revoked by the Central Bank." The Panel notes that as resolution 2371 (2017) lists Han Jang Su as "Chief Representative of the Foreign Trade Bank", Member States are required under paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016) to expel him. The Panel also notes that the registered office of the Foreign Trade Bank of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Moscow lists its director as "Han Zan Su" (Хан Зан Су) according to the Russian Federation Federal Tax Service State Registry of Accredited Branches,

¹²⁰ The balance of that account was transferred to his single, permitted account in accordance with the above European Union regulation.

Representative Offices of Foreign Legal Entities, RAEP (see annex 44).¹²¹ This case appears to be part of a pattern identified by the Panel whereby diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea use their status and embassies to violate the resolutions.¹²²

Financial operations of the Reconnaissance General Bureau

126. With regard to the financial activities and assets of Reconnaissance General Bureau agents Kim Yong Nam and Kim Su Gwang and their family members, Belarus informed the Panel that Kim Su Gwang had been accredited as Deputy Trade Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from 24 September 2015. He lived with members of his family until they departed on 16 December 2017 in a diplomatic vehicle, exiting at the Belarus-Ukraine border. Belarus stated that Kim had spent most of his time outside of the country and that his wife had purchased items in neighbouring countries for shipment back to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, using the name of a Chinese company based in Beijing and by transferring funds for the purchases through an account at a Chinese bank in Shanghai, which is consistent with the Panel's previous reporting on cash withdrawals in Beijing and Shanghai by the Reconnaissance General Bureau from accounts controlled by Kim Su Gwang.¹²³ Furthermore, when the accounts of both Kim Su Gwang and Kim Yong Nam (the latter including joint accounts with his wife, Kim (Djang) Tcheul (Hy)) were closed by another Member State, funds from one of the accounts were transferred to an account in the name of Kim Yong Nam's wife at the same Shanghai bank branch. In its reply to the Panel about this bank account, China stated that "China has not found any account opened by the [RGB] in Chinese financial institutions." The Panel notes that Member States are obligated to freeze the assets of all individuals operating on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, which includes bank accounts by Reconnaissance General Bureau agents established in the name of family members to evade sanctions.

Malaysia-Korea Partners Group of Companies

127. The Panel continued its investigation into MKP, a major joint venture of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea established in Malaysia, which the Panel has determined to have links with the Reconnaissance General Bureau, Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies and financial institutions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.¹²⁴

128. Zambia launched an investigation into the MKP network and cooperated with the Panel. Documents it provided show that Han Hun Il (the founder of MKP and a Reconnaissance General Bureau agent) made at least two trips to Zambia in 2017 using his service passport, No. 8361348791 (expiration 9 March 2021; see annex 45), violating the travel ban.¹²⁵ This travel also further calls into question earlier claims to the Panel by MKP Malaysia that Zambia operations were run independently.¹²⁶ For the

¹²¹ This is according to an official registration document dated 7 January 2019 (retrieved 8 January 2019), stating that the information was entered on 13 January 2016.

¹²² S/2018/171, paras. 84, 85, 94, 103, 132 and 142; S/2017/150, paras. 18–21, 25, 91, 103, 161, 162, 182, 189, 208 and table 8; S/2017/742, paras. 49 and 50.

¹²³ S/2018/171, paras. 169–172.

¹²⁴ The Panel has previously reported that Han Hun Il is an operative of the Reconnaissance General Bureau of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see S/2018/171, paras. 189 and 190). For the Panel's previous conclusions on Malaysia-Korean Partners Group of Companies (MKP), see S/2018/171, paras. 189–202.

¹²⁵ With regard to the travel of nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to and from Zambia to work with MKP-related companies, records indicate that Dubai is the most common transit point.

¹²⁶ The Panel already showed that this was not the case. See S/2018/171, paras. 189–202.

Panel's updated findings on its investigations of MKP activities in Zambia, see annex 46; in Malaysia, see annex 47; and in Uganda, see paragraphs 155 and 156 and annex 74.

129. Only one of the 13 MKP-linked companies in Zambia, the Korea General Corporation for External Construction (a.k.a. GENCO, a.k.a. KOGEN), lists exclusively nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as directors. From the information provided by Zambia and further investigation conducted by the Panel, it is clear that GENCO/KOGEN, like MKP, has links to Mansudae Overseas Project Group.¹²⁷ Both GENCO/KOGEN and MKP claim to have constructed several of the same sites in the past, using labour from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see annexes 46–51). Indeed, Mansudae, MKP and GENCO/KOGEN have all, in some combination, claimed to have worked on the same projects. Furthermore, according to a KOGEN brochure, its management team in Zambia comprises 11 nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in addition to Han Hun Il, Ho Un Ran and Yon Il, whom Zambia claims are connected to KOGEN through a director relationship with Yazid Merzouk (see annex 52). KOGEN directors in Zambia also registered an additional company, Chammae Construction Limited, with the same address, email contact details and directors aside from an additional director, a Zambian businessman named Sam Maurice Mbewe (National Registration Card No. 296387 /7 4/1). The company was incorporated on the same date as KOGEN/GENCO, 15 June 2012 (see annex 59).

130. Analysis of GENCO/KOGEN bank accounts in Zambia, in dollars and in local currency, showed regular cash and cheque activity and high account turnover. The accounts demonstrated similar patterns of cheque deposits, followed by incoming transfers, followed by regular cheque withdrawals. These patterns were also seen in the case of the bank accounts of MKP TMS Hospital and in the banking practices of Glocom and Reconnaissance General Bureau agents in Europe and Asia.¹²⁸

131. MKP corporate accounts in two banks in Zambia were opened in the name of two individuals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ri Kwang Song (리광송) and Han Chan Ho. Open-source information indicates that a person with the name Kwang Song Ri previously served as a Counsellor (参赞) at the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Beijing in 2013 (李光先) (see annexes 53–54). Other open-source material indicates that Kwang Song Ri has used 리광송 and the aliases Ri Kwang-Son and Ri Kwangson, with the latter two transcribed in Korean as 리광선 (see annex 53). Further open-source information shows that a person with the same name Ri Kwang Song (리광송) served as a diplomat at the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Cairo until at least November 2017 (see annexes 55–56). The Panel notes that using a diplomat of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to open these bank accounts fits with past patterns of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in establishing overseas bank accounts.

132. The Panel's ongoing investigation into GENCO/KOGEN showed that in addition to Zambia, the company has a large reach and extensive network in several countries in the Middle East, Africa and Eurasia, where it utilizes labourers, prohibited cooperative entities and joint ventures of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and earns significant revenue. According to a Member State, GENCO/KOGEN "has worked to supply North Korean laborers in the Middle East

¹²⁷ With regard to operations of MKP on behalf of Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies, see S/2018/171, paras. 189–202.

¹²⁸ See S/2018/171, paras. 156–202.

for the purpose of earning hard currency for [the] North Korea [n government]”.¹²⁹ The Panel’s investigations found evidence of KOGEN activity by a joint venture with a company of the United Arab Emirates. The Panel is continuing to investigate the company (see annexes 57–58).

133. The presence of GENCO/KOGEN in Africa covers Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea. In Nigeria, it is registered as “Korea General Company for External Construction GENCO (Nigeria)” (see annex 60) and lists “Korea General Co. for External Construction Genco” as the majority shareholder and Kim Yong Sik and Kim Yong Hwan as minority shareholders. In Côte d’Ivoire, “Korea General Construction SL (KOGEN GE SL)” was registered in 2012.¹³⁰ The website of the African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources lists KOGEN GE S.L. as its implementing partner for a project funded by Equatorial Guinea set to conclude in 2019 (see annex 61). KOGEN was separately reported as a contractor for the Rebola Municipal Stadium, completed in 2016, which documents suggest earned KOGEN approximately \$30.5 million (see annex 62). Local news claims that KOGEN opened a new, large national headquarters in Equatorial Guinea the same year.¹³¹ The Panel has not received a reply from these Governments on its inquiries.

134. According to corporate registration documents, GENCO is the partial owner of a construction cooperative entity or joint venture company in the Russian Federation, LLC “SAKORENMA”¹³², with majority ownership belonging to a Russian national (see paras. 150–151 and annexes 76–78). This cooperative entity or joint venture maintains an account with a Russian bank (see annex 79). Furthermore, the company shares addresses, contact information and shareholders with three other companies, all of which engage in construction-related activities (see annexes 63–64). In addition, corporate registry documents show that GENCO operates two official representative offices in the Russian Federation, one in Vladivostok and one in Khasan, that together formally employ 17 foreign nationals (see annex 65).¹³³

135. In addition to these companies, the Panel also wrote to the Russian Federation with regard to four companies registered in the country that use GENCO’s name in Russian, “ZENKO” (in Cyrillic script: ЗЕНКО), the same name used by GENCO’s official representations in the Russian Federation owned by nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see annexes 66–68), and that were authorized in 2018 to employ a combined total of 301 labourers from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see annex 68).

¹²⁹ United States, Department of the Treasury, “Treasury sanctions individuals and entities supporting the North Korean Government and its nuclear and weapons proliferation efforts”, press release, 2 December 2016. Available at www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0677.aspx.


¹³⁰ Corporate registration # CIYOP-12-D-221, incorporation date 25 January 2012.

¹³¹ “Guinea Ecuatorial propiedad de Rusia y Corea Del Norte”, *Diario Rombe*, 5 April 2016. Accessed on 5 November 2018 at <http://diariorombe.es/guinea-ecuatorial-propiedad-de-rusia-y-corea-del-norte/>.

¹³² The corporate paperwork lists the Russian version of the name of the company, both for its acronym GENCO, “ЗЕНКО” (Zenco), as well as for the full name (Korea General Corporation for External Construction): “КОРЕЙСКОЕ ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ “ЗЕНКО” КНДР. (КНДР is DPRK). In other fields of the registry documents, GENCO is listed as being registered and located in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. See annex 76.

¹³³ The corporate registration documents for the GENCO representative offices display in the field for “information about the number of foreign citizens that are employees of the foreign branch or office” that the number is 12 for the representative office in Vladivostok and 5 for the office in Khasan. Russian court documents reference the head of the representative office for GENCO with the initials of the name of the director of the Vladivostok GENCO office according to the corporate paperwork (Ko Yongil) (see annex 65).

Figure XXIV
GENCO network



Source: The Panel.

136. The Panel reiterates its recommendation for the designation of Han Hun II (Edward Han) and also recommends the designation of Yong Kok Yeap and Yazid Merzouk of MKP Malaysia and MKP Zambia.

Financial operations of Glocom

137. The Panel continued its investigation into Glocom, which has used an extensive network of individuals, companies and offshore bank accounts to procure, market and sell arms and related materiel for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including individuals, companies and bank accounts in China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Middle East, including through an attempted shipment of military equipment to Eritrea in 2016.¹³⁴ Unlike most front companies of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which tend to close and reappear with a new guise after being publicly investigated, Glocom has continued to actively use its brand despite previous Panel recommendations that Member States freeze bank accounts and other assets owned by all individuals and entities acting on behalf of Pan Systems or Glocom. To the Panel's knowledge, no such action has been taken.

138. Glocom reinforced its online presence in 2018 with a website redesign and descriptions of an array of new products. It describes itself as a technology-oriented company undertaking research and development, manufacturing and servicing military communications equipment and systems.¹³⁵ Glocom uploaded a new set of marketing videos to YouTube in 2018 and created and used social media presences on platforms such as Pinterest (see annex 70), LinkedIn and Instagram.¹³⁶ On Twitter,

¹³⁴ In particular, the Panel showed how Pan Systems Pyongyang made regular transfers to various facilitators with Chinese, Korean, foreign and code names working in China, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Middle East and how a series of transactions by Glocom were initiated by companies registered in Hong Kong, China, and cleared through several United States correspondent banks in New York. See S/2018/171, paras. 173–177; S/2017/150, paras. 72–87 and 232–241; and S/2017/742, para. 52.

¹³⁵ Glocom's previous webpage used to have a physical address in Malaysia, while the new website lists no physical address.

¹³⁶ Glocom used a different YouTube account ("Support Glocom") than in 2017 to upload videos in 2018 before it was removed after September 2018 pursuant to a legal complaint.

Glocom (@GlocomSupport) advertises multiple products, with posts up through the drafting of the present report, as well as various software packages for military applications (see annex 69). Glocom similarly unveiled an Android app for customers in 2018.¹³⁷ It claims that its production capacity for secure personal radios is 10,000 sets a year and for Manpack radios, mass production is 6,000 sets a year. An open-source report in August 2018 linked Glocom’s IP address through a second high-tech front company to restaurants of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Viet Nam.¹³⁸ Furthermore, in mid-2018, Glocom sought to further expand its reach by forming relationships with radio technology distribution companies in Malaysia and Indonesia. In some cases, the products advertised by these entities used other branding, including the brand “FACOM”.¹³⁹

139. Although its activities constitute activities prohibited by relevant Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its Pyongyang operations were run by a Reconnaissance General Bureau agent (Ryang Su Nyo), Glocom has not been designated, despite the Panel’s previous recommendation for such action. **The Panel therefore reiterates its previous recommendations for the designation of Pan Systems¹⁴⁰ to be accompanied by the names of all of its front companies (including Glocom, International Golden Services and International Global System) as aliases, for involvement in the financing and sales of arms and related materiel.**

Name: Pan Systems Pte Ltd (Pyongyang branch)

A.k.a: Wonbang Trading Co., Glocom, International Golden Services, International Global System

Address: Room 818, Pothonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon district, Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Director: Ryang Su Nyo

Employees: Pyon Won Gun, Pae Won Chol, Ri Sin Song, Kim Sung Su, Kim Chang Hyok and Kim Pyong Chol

Telephone: +850-218-111 (ext. 8636)

140. The Panel continued its investigation into the activities of designated financial institutions, including Korea Daesong Bank, Daedong Credit Bank (DCB) and DCB Finance Limited. It previously reported on Li Zhengang (李振刚), a Chinese national who, since 2011, has owned a 70 per cent foreign equity share in DCB, with the remaining 30 per cent owned by the designated Korea Daesong Bank.¹⁴¹ In its 2017 midterm report (S/2017/742), the Panel also mentioned Dandong Zhongrui Petrochemical Co., Ltd (丹东中瑞石油化工有限公司) as one of two companies controlled by Li Zhengang (李振刚) and his family member Li Shengda (李胜达).¹⁴² Since that time, the Panel has obtained new open-source information, according to which Li Zhengang’s company, Dandong Zhongrui Petrochemical Co., Ltd, is part of a large and currently active network of Chinese companies with a history of doing

¹³⁷ The app is available for download on the Glocom website.

¹³⁸ Jason Arterburn, *Dispatched: Mapping overseas forced labor in North Korea’s proliferation finance system* (C4ADS, 2018).

¹³⁹ However, the Glocom label remained clearly visible on several of the products.

¹⁴⁰ See S/2017/742, para. 62 and S/2018/171, recommendation 1.

¹⁴¹ See S/2017/742, para. 56.

¹⁴² See *ibid.*, annexes 24 and 25.

business with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that share contact details, buildings, office space (i.e., the same room), employees and contact persons.

141. In particular, the Panel's investigation found that Li Zhengang's company, Dandong Zhongrui Petrochemical Co., Ltd, shares addresses with an individual and entity previously identified by the Panel as associated with shipping activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that have violated the resolutions (see annex 71). The individual is Pan Weichao (潘衛朝), previously identified in a Panel report as being associated with shipping activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which violated the resolutions by acting as an emergency contact for K-Brothers, the Marshall Islands-based operator of the *Jie Shun* (IMO No. 8518780). Another designated entity shares the same address with Pan Weichao's company, the Hong Kong-based Chang An Shipping & Technology Ltd (長安海運技術有限公司). In reply to the Panel's inquiries on Li Zhengang (李振剛) and his connections with above-mentioned entities and individuals, China stated "China has conducted an in-depth investigation on this case. Through on-site investigation to Dandong Zhongrui Petrochemical Co. Ltd, China found that it is a very small company, which has only four staff members and a business volume of 300,000 USD in the past two years. Li Zhengang had stopped doing business with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since the year of 2018. China does not have relevant information on the connection between Dandong Zhongrui Co. Ltd and other three companies mentioned in the letter – Dandong Jing'ao Trading Co. Ltd, Hong Kong-registered company Jing'ao Dalin Trading Co. Ltd and Chang An Shipping and Technology Co. Ltd."

OCN Singapore and T Specialist Singapore

142. The Panel continued its investigation into the financial activities of OCN (Singapore) Pte Ltd and T Specialist International (Singapore) Pte Ltd.¹⁴³ On 19 July 2018, the director of both companies, Ng "Leo" Kheng Wah, was charged in a Singaporean court with 80 sanctions-related charges and 80 charges of cheating and conspiracy, including cheating banks out of more than \$95 million and supplying luxury goods worth about \$6 million to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In particular, Ng is accused of "engaging in a conspiracy" with Wang Zhi Guo (王志國) and T Specialist International to falsify invoices for multiple trade financing loans, resulting in payments from banks in Singapore and Malaysia to Wang Zhi Guo's company, Pinnacle Offshore Trading. The trial, however, has been delayed four times.

143. The Panel continued its investigation into these companies (see annex 72). Democratic People's Republic of Korea national Li Ik (a.k.a. Ri Ik) had worked for OCN (Singapore) until January 2018 when his employment pass was revoked, and Wang Zhi Guo, a Singaporean resident and Chinese national, is still living in Singapore but had his Chinese passport confiscated (see annex 73). Li Ik's phone records showed a wide network of global contacts across four continents and the use of evasion tactics in his communications. Using three phone numbers associated with two accounts, he made 1,840 calls to 72 unique numbers in Australia, China, the Congo, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Liberia, Malaysia, Namibia, Pakistan, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom between 15 February 2014 and 19 April 2016. At least 76 calls were made from one of Li Ik's phones to the number of the Foreign Trade Bank of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Bank of East Land. Li Ik's phone bills were paid by credit cards with credit limits of 1 million Singapore dollars (\$729,927 United States dollars) from a

¹⁴³ The Panel refers to the two companies interchangeably, as they have shared the same address and director, "Leo" Ng Kheng Wah. See S/2018/171, annexes 49 and 55.

major Singaporean bank that requires an annual income of 500,000 Singapore dollars or 3 million Singapore dollars in controlled assets in the bank. Ownership of multiple bank credit cards with high capital/income requirements by a national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea engaged in the above-mentioned activities constitutes evasion of the financial sanctions. A summary of further findings on this case since the Panel's most recent final report (S/2018/171) are contained in annex 72.

Ryugyong Commercial Bank and Koryo Commercial Bank

144. While OCN Singapore claimed to the Panel that it had no interests in either Ryugyong Commercial Bank or Koryo Commercial Bank, it admitted that Ri Ik, its long-time employee, had the authority to enter into agreement to sell Ryugyong Commercial Bank and that to this end, he received three transfers of \$499,970 each which were made into the T Specialist account in Singapore by Wang Zhi Guo's company, Pinnacle International, in addition to a transfer from Mars Rock International for \$499,935 (totalling \$1,999,845) for the purchase of shares in Ryugyong Commercial Bank. OCN also admitted knowledge of the business promotions for Ryugyong Commercial Bank at the Pyongyang Bugsae stores using the "OCN" brand (Ri Ik printed the promotional posters in Singapore). China indicated that Wang Zhi Guo last departed China in 2017 and Singapore has confirmed that he is a permanent resident.

145. The Panel reiterates its previous recommendation to designate Ri Ik (Li Ik), Wang Zhi Guo and Ri Ho Nam.¹⁴⁴

Cooperative entities and joint ventures

146. The Panel investigated companies acting as possible cooperative entities or joint ventures in Argentina, Australia, Cambodia, China, Japan, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Malta, Poland, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Uganda, Viet Nam and Zambia.¹⁴⁵ The Panel wrote to all of the above-mentioned countries with lists containing information on possible cooperative entities or joint ventures in their jurisdictions and requested information on the entities. Of the above Member States, Argentina, Japan and Singapore were able to demonstrate that the entities investigated were either non-existent, non-operational or had no ties with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Replies on the entities and measures being taken in their regard were received from Argentina, Australia, China, Japan, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Poland, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Uganda, Viet Nam and Zambia. Cambodia, Malaysia and Malta have not replied to the Panel's inquiries (see annex 74).

Australia

147. In response to the Panel's request for information on Sonbong Kost J.V. Company (a.k.a Samhung Kost J.V. Company and Sam Hung KOAST Joint Venture Pyongyang, 선봉코스트합영회사),¹⁴⁶ Australia cooperated with the Panel by providing detailed information on the company.

¹⁴⁴ S/2018/171, Recommendation 1.

¹⁴⁵ The Panel investigated entities based on multiple sources; however, only some of these ultimately met the Panel's evidentiary standards.

¹⁴⁶ The partner company is Australia Kost/Koast Group, Australia. The Chairman is Chun Yong-su, a.k.a. Yong Soo Chon. Both the "Koast" and "Kost" spellings seem to have been used by the relevant companies.

China

148. China informed the Panel of the following: “The Ministry of Commerce and former State Administration for Industry and Commerce of China issued an Announcement on September 28th, 2017 to require the closure of China-DPRK joint ventures and cooperative enterprises in accordance with the requirement of the Security Council resolution. So far, all the China-invested cooperative enterprises in the DPRK that were approved and put on records by Chinese competent authorities have been closed. All the DPRK-invested enterprises that registered in China have completed the closure and stopped business. Any China-DPRK joint venture and cooperative enterprise that is in operation now violates the Announcement issued by the relevant Chinese authorities.”

Poland

149. Poland replied to the Panel that Korean-Poland Shipping Co. Ltd (Chopol) had been closed on 19 June 2018. With regard to Wonye Ltd, Poland confirmed that the two main shareholders as well as members of the board were nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, one of whom had left the country. Nine nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had been granted temporary residence and work permits valid until 31 August 2019. In an inspection carried out at the company in 2018, inspectors found irregularities, including civil contracts instead of employment contracts and the lack of required authorization for an employment agency. With regard to the company, Redshield Ltd, Poland confirmed that it had two nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea serving as the main shareholders and board members. An inspection in 2018 found 42 nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea employed at Redshield, 20 of whom were granted European Union long-term residency status and 20 of whom were granted residency and the ability to work in Poland. At least one of the entities listed above constitutes a violation of paragraph 18 of resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#).

Russian Federation

150. The Russian Federation informed the Panel that “the case of Russian companies having a sole founder who is a citizen of the [DPRK], such companies are registered strictly as Russian limited liability companies, rather than joint ventures or cooperative entities, making them Russian legal persons with all the legal consequences that follow therefrom. Such companies are not considered subject to the restrictions imposed on the [DPRK] by the Security Council under paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#) or under current Russian law.” (annex 74). The Russian Federation also informed the Panel on 21 January 2019 that “joint ventures (in Russian law, no such form of legal person exists)”. The Panel’s investigations during the reporting period have shown that beyond violating the ban on cooperative entities contained in paragraph 18 of resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#), Member States hosting cooperative entities may have violated other provisions of the resolutions. On 13 August 2018, the Panel wrote to the Russian Federation requesting information on a company in the Russian official business registry that listed the owner as a national of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the director as a Russian national.¹⁴⁷ According to the document, the address of this entity is the same as that of the Consulate General of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in

¹⁴⁷ The Russian Federation replied on 21 January 2019 that “we can report that the investigations have revealed that the information about the location of Pioneer LLC entered in the database of the Unified State Register of Legal Entities in September 2015 is unreliable. No violations of paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution [2321\(2016\)](#) have been identified in this regard.”

Vladivostok,¹⁴⁸ which moved to the city in April 2016.¹⁴⁹ According to official business records, it is engaging in multiple economic activities, including “renting and operating of own or leased non-residential real estate”; “construction of residential and non-residential buildings”; and “operation of restaurants and bars in railway cars and on ships” (see annex 75). The Panel considers that this collaborative activity with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is prohibited under paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017). This also constitutes a violation of paragraph 18 of resolution 2321 (2016) unless the company moved out before its adoption. The Panel continues its investigation.

151. With regard to ties between cooperative entities and possible joint ventures and designated entities, the Panel’s investigations also found that the construction company of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Korea General Corporation for External Construction (GENCO or KOGEN), with ties to Mansudae and Han Hun Il (Reconnaissance General Bureau) in Zambia (see paras. 126–135), is the co-owner (along with a Russian national), of a joint venture construction company in Sakhalin Oblast, Russian Federation, LLC “SAKORENMA” (ООО “САКОРЕНМА”)¹⁵⁰ (see annexes 76–79). According to official Russian records, it bid on and won supply contracts for Russian State agencies in June 2018 (see annex 78).¹⁵¹

152. According to the company’s official registration documents, it has had Government contracts in the past year. Another joint venture co-owned by two nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and directed by a Russian national in Krasnoyarsk is registered under the Russian name for GENCO and engages in the same business (construction).¹⁵² While the majority of companies considered by the Panel as cooperative entities in the Russian Federation are owned or co-owned by individuals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (with Russian co-owners and/or directors also in the paperwork), the following companies of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (in addition to GENCO) are owners of cooperative entities on the territory of the Russian Federation and therefore in violation of paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017): Korea Kumgang General Corporation, the Ministry of Forestry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Academy of Medical Sciences of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Pugang Pharmaceutical Company, “Eighth of March” Korean Trading Company, Korea Aprokgang Technology Company and Korea Paekma Trading Corporation.

153. The Panel recommends that all Member States take the necessary measures to ensure that the use of property of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for any purposes prohibited under paragraph 18 of resolution 2321 (2016) be terminated and all related registrations or leases cancelled and that all cooperative entities or joint ventures involving nationals or entities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea be dissolved in accordance with paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017). Given the Panel’s findings regarding GENCO’s operation across multiple countries in multiple continents, it recommends that Member States encourage their corporate service

¹⁴⁸ 12A Nevskaya ul., Vladivostok, Russia, 690018.

¹⁴⁹ See <https://primamedia.ru/news/500981/>.

¹⁵⁰ Tax identification number 6501104474. The Panel notes that LLC “SAKORENMA” was known as LLC Joint Russian-Korean Enterprise “SAKO RENMA” (Russian: ООО СОБМЕСТНОЕ РОССИЙСКО-КОРЕЙСКОЕ ПРЕДПРИЯТИЕ “САКО РЕНМА”) until 29 June 2018 (see annex 77).

¹⁵¹ Information on Government contracts on at least two open-source databases with official Russian corporate registry data, see www.rusprofile.ru/gz/2893948 and www.kartoteka.ru/card/6503378623b837e00e8ff4b9bc1f9b27/#path_Main_Html.

¹⁵² According to the official registration information for this joint venture, the name of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea company GENCO is translated into Russian as Корейское генеральное общество по строительству за рубежом “ЗЕНКО” (Koreyskoye Generalnoye Obshchestvo po Stroyitelstvu za Rubezhom “ZENKO”). See annexes 65 and 76.

providers to exercise vigilance to ensure that these companies cannot operate in other countries in violation of the resolutions.

Thailand

154. In its reply to the Panel's letter regarding five joint ventures, Thailand said that its authorities were seeking further details on Pyongyang Haemaji Restaurant and Mokran Korean Restaurant. It also informed the Panel that Pyongyang Okryu Restaurant was operated by "Golden Pioneer Entertainment Company Limited", which is "entirely own by Thai citizens" (see annex 74).

Uganda

155. The Government of Uganda replied on 6 July 2018 to the Panel's request for further information on MKP operations in Uganda. It acknowledged having formed a joint venture between the National Housing and Construction Company and MKP Builders SDN BHD, called NH-MKP Builders Limited. As part of one project, the National Housing and Construction Company paid out \$3,627,762 as an advance payment to MKP Builders. Uganda claims that this business relationship ceased at the beginning of 2014, when it became clear that MKP Builders SDN BHD was unable to complete the construction contract. The Government has since been involved in a series of ongoing lawsuits with MKP and its insurance companies to recover the payment and insists that it cannot dissolve MKP Builders SDN BHD or MKP Capital Berhad while litigation continues.

156. In its reply, Uganda also included information about Vidas Engineering Services Company Limited, which it acknowledged as having been contracted for several Government-funded projects. However, it firmly denied any relationship between the firm and MKP, citing Vidas's company incorporation documents. Uganda and Vidas did not provide an explanation for the appearance of the firm's mailing address, registered office address, email address and trading name on the corporate registry documents for MKP Capital and MKP Builders in Uganda. The Panel notes that in order to mask connections with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, companies of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea commonly use foreign national facilitators to avoid putting its own nationals on incorporation paperwork, leverages business contacts to facilitate the establishment of in-country presences and embeds within foreign firms. Uganda did not respond to the Panel's inquiries pertaining to its recent promotion of foreign investment opportunities in a high-value MKP Holdings project at the Moroto Marble Mine (see *ibid.*).

Viet Nam

157. In December 2017, Viet Nam replied to the Panel that with regard to entities of the businesses and restaurants of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea operating in Viet Nam, in Hanoi, there were three entities and two restaurants, including Binh Nhuong Restaurant and Koryo Restaurant. In Ho Chi Minh City, there were seven entities and a Koryo Restaurant (formerly called Ryu Gong Restaurant). There was one entity in Hai Phong.

Zambia

158. Information on cooperative entities and joint ventures in Zambia can be found in annex 46.

Recommendations

To the Committee

159. The Panel recommends the designation of Han Hun Il (Edward Han), Yong Kok Yeap (MKP Malaysia) and Yazid Merzouk (MKP Zambia), as well as Pan Systems,¹⁵³ and the names of all of its front companies (including Glocom, International Golden Services and International Global System).

160. The Panel recommends that the Committee clarify the definition of joint ventures and cooperative entities contained in paragraph 18 of resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#).

To Member States

161. Given the pervasive use of accounts in the names of family members to evade sanctions, the Panel recommends that Governments provide their financial institutions with a list not only of accredited diplomats, but of their family members, to ensure that diplomats do not establish additional bank accounts in their names.

162. The Panel recommends that Member States issue guidance for a single bank to be identified as the only bank that may hold accounts for the embassy and diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and that all others be advised not to hold accounts for diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or their family members.

163. The Panel recommends that Member States advise their financial institutions not to open accounts for diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who are not accredited to their country and to share information on the financial activities of diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with other Member States where records show that there has been financial activity, to avoid cross-border circumvention of sanctions.

164. Member States should advise their financial institutions that only closing bank accounts (as opposed to freezing) does not meet the requirements of the resolutions, which stipulate that they must freeze all assets controlled by designated individuals or entities and those operating on their behalf, as well as of any members of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that are engaged in violating or evading any of the provisions of the resolutions.

165. Member States should offer technical assistance to other Member States to help them to strengthen their legal frameworks and related mechanisms to implement the financial provisions in the resolutions, as appropriate and in line with Article 49 of the Charter of the United Nations.

166. As part of their implementation of paragraph 18 of resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#), Member States should request their corporate registries to extract the details of all companies with a national director or shareholders of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, bearing in mind that the registration of such companies may de facto violate the ban.

167. Given that joint ventures have violated other provisions of the resolutions in addition to paragraph 18 of resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#), the names of those directors and shareholders should be shared with investigation agencies, financial intelligence units and financial institutions.

¹⁵³ [S/2017/742](#), para. 62; and [S/2018/171](#), recommendation 1.

168. **The Panel recommends that Member States clarify with their national agencies that insurance providers are financial institutions and therefore subject to all of the relevant financial provisions in the resolutions, including the need to freeze assets under the resolutions.**

V. Recent activities related to the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes

Nuclear

169. The Yongbyon nuclear complex remained active. The 5 MW (e) reactor has been in operation since December 2015 and, according to a Member State, while operations were suspended for a few days in February, March and April 2018, each period was insufficient to shut down for discharge and was likely for maintenance operations. In November 2018, a Member State informed the Panel that the reactor's operation had been suspended from September to October 2018 and that the discharge of spent fuel rods could have taken place during those two months. Satellite imagery from February to November 2018 shows the excavation of water channels. The imagery also captures the construction of a building near the reactors' water discharge facilities. A Member State observed the discharge of water through the newly built structure in mid-June 2018. The Panel also observed a new building on the west side of the light water reactor (see annex 80).

170. Satellite imagery indicates possible operation of the radiochemical laboratory and associated steam plant. Plumes of smoke and fluctuating amounts of coal reserves were seen between 27 April and 8 May 2018 (see annex 81), which was likely for maintenance work. In November 2018, a Member State reported to the Panel that it had detected a heat change within the building.

171. On 24 May 2018, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held a ceremony for the dismantling of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, followed by a statement by its Nuclear Weapons Institute.¹⁵⁴ Satellite imagery indicates several changes in the above-ground infrastructure as a result of the "dismantling" in May. The Panel observed the removal of stockpiled materials in November 2018 (see annex 82).

172. The Panel continues monitoring uranium concentration plants and mining sites. The Panel observed the removal of spoil piles in Pyongsan in 2018, which indicates that mining may be ongoing (see annex 83). The Panel observed no significant change around the possible uranium enrichment facility in Kangson during the reporting period, except for the periodic movement of oversize trucks.

Use of civilian infrastructure for ballistic missile assembly and launches

173. In April 2018, a Member State informed the Panel that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was repeatedly using civilian factories and other non-military facilities as part of a strategy to prevent any possible "decapitation" strike on the country's smaller number of identified nuclear and ballistic missile assembly and manufacturing sites. The Member State noted that these sites have all the necessary rail links, road and other infrastructure for the transport, assembly and testing of the weapons systems. One example provided to the Panel was the intercontinental ballistic missile Hwasong-15 assembly at the Pyongsong truck factory, also known as the March 16th Automotive Plant (see figure XXV), and its subsequent launch site. In November 2018, the Member State informed the Panel that the Democratic

¹⁵⁴ "Statement of Nuclear Weapons Institute of DPRK", Korean Central News Agency, 24 May 2018.

People's Republic of Korea was developing intercontinental ballistic missile bases close to its northern border.

Figure XXV

Member State example of use of civilian facilities for ballistic missile assembly (left); Chairman Kim Jong Un visiting the truck factory three weeks prior to launch (4 November 2017) (right)



Sources: Member State, Korean Central News Agency.

174. The Panel surveyed, confirmed and reported ballistic missile activity sites and found evidence of a consistent trend on the part of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to disperse its assembly, storage and testing locations. In addition to the use of civilian facilities, the Panel found that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea used previously idle or sprawling military-industrial sites as launch locations. These may be situated close by, up to 10 km from the assembly or storage sites. Examples of this trend include the test launch sites for the Hwasong-14 intercontinental launch of 4 July (Panghyon aircraft factory) and 28 July 2017 (Mupyong-ni). Pyongyang Sunan International Airport, the country's largest civil-military airfield, was used for the intermediate range Hwasong-12 launches of 29 August and 15 September 2017. See annex 84 for satellite and ballistic missile-related imagery.

VI. Unintended impact of sanctions

175. In order to strengthen the humanitarian exemption mechanism, on 6 August 2018, the Committee adopted "Implementation Assistance Notice No.7: Guidelines for Obtaining Exemptions to Deliver Humanitarian Assistance to the DPRK".¹⁵⁵ From January 2018 to January 2019, the Committee received 25 humanitarian exemption requests made by Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations.¹⁵⁶ As at the time of writing, the Committee had granted 16 approvals, while seven requests remain under consideration by the Committee (two requests were withdrawn).¹⁵⁷

176. Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations have expressed concern that despite the exemption clauses and the Committee's efforts,

¹⁵⁵ In addition, the Committee in its 24 April 2018 updated "Implementation Assistance Notice No. 2: Guidelines on the Preparation and Submission of National Implementation Reports", encouraged States, as part of their national reporting, to explain, where appropriate, their domestic laws and other relevant authorities for implementing exemptions from the measures imposed by the resolutions. See www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/implementation-notice.

¹⁵⁶ The Panel notes that some exemption requests contain items that are not listed.

¹⁵⁷ Information about the exemptions approved by the Committee are posted on the website, see www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/humanitarian-exemption-requests.

United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations continue to experience unintended consequences on their humanitarian programmes that make it impossible to operate normally in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The six main areas of concern communicated to the Panel are: delays in receiving exemptions; the collapse of the banking channel; delays in customs clearance; a decrease in willing foreign suppliers; the increased cost of humanitarian-related items and operations; and diminished funding for operations (see annexes 85–87). These are negatively affecting their ability to implement humanitarian-related programmes. In particular, the sectoral sanctions are affecting the delivery of a number of humanitarian-sensitive items (see *ibid.*). For the Panel's assessment of adverse humanitarian consequences of sanctions for the civilian population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, see annex 85.

Recommendations

177. The Panel recommends that discussions in the Committee on humanitarian exemption requests be time-bound and that focus groups within the Committee meet on a regular basis to examine humanitarian issues with a view to expediting the processing of such requests.

178. To alleviate unnecessary burdens on Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations, the Committee should publish a whitelist of certain non-sensitive items used in humanitarian operations that fall under the broad categories of items subject to the sectoral sanctions in paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017) requiring an exemption for humanitarian shipment into the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

179. The Committee should continue to seek feedback from Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations applying for exemptions under the terms of the Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7 guidelines and work to streamline and simplify the application process to the extent possible, including by providing greater flexibility regarding the technical specifications of planned shipments, the parties involved and the frequency of requests and submissions.

180. The Secretary-General should request the Secretariat to carry out an assessment of the humanitarian impact of sanctions in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

VII. National implementation reports

181. As at January 2019, 68 Member States had submitted reports on their implementation of resolution 2397 (2017); 83 Member States on resolution 2375 (2017); 84 Member States on resolution 2371 (2017); 102 Member States on resolution 2321 (2016) and 111 Member States on resolution 2270 (2016).¹⁵⁸ Despite the increase in overall reporting, the Panel notes that the number of non-reporting States (124, 6 of which served as non-permanent members of the Security Council in 2018) for resolution 2397 (2017) remains significant (see annex 88).

182. The Panel recalls that Member States are to submit their reports in a timely manner in accordance with paragraph 17 of resolution 2397 (2017).

183. For a consolidated list of recommendations, see annex 89.

¹⁵⁸ See www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/implementation-reports, accessed on 30 November 2018.

Annex 1 : Information provided to the Panel by the United States, 6 July 2018

The United States stated that if each of the below 89 port calls delivered only one third of each vessel's capacity, the associated volume would exceed the annual cap for 2018 by 30 May 2018. Fully loaded, the DPRK tankers could have exceeded the cap nearly three times over with an estimated total of 1,367,628 barrels (figure 1).

Figure 1




Figure 2: DPRK tanker deliveries to DPRK ports

Port	Ship Name *Designated	Dead Weight Tonnage	Arrival Month 2018	Delivery Volume 33% Laden	Delivery Volume 50% Laden	Delivery Volume 90% Laden
Nampo	<i>Ji Song 6*</i>	1,250.00	January	416.67	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	<i>Sam Jong 1*</i>	1,665.00	January	555.00	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	<i>Kum Un San 3</i>	3,279.00	January	1,093.00	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	<i>An San 1*</i>	3,003.00	January	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Najin	<i>Kum Un San</i>	2,070.00	January	690.00	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	<i>Yu Phyong 5*</i>	1,966.00	January	655.33	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	<i>Yu Son (Y Chun)*</i>	3,398.00	January	1,132.67	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	<i>Chon Ma San*</i>	2,750.00	January	916.67	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	<i>Paek Ma*</i>	2,250.00	January	750.00	1,125.00	2,025.00
Nampo	<i>Saebjol (Chong Rim 2)*</i>	1,150.00	January	383.33	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	<i>Sam Jong 2*</i>	2,507.00	January	835.67	1,253.50	2,256.30
Wonsan	<i>Kum Un San 3</i>	3,279.00	January	1,093.00	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	<i>Rye Song Gang 1</i>	3,003.00	January	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Najin	<i>Kum Un San</i>	2,070.00	January	690.00	1,035.00	1,863.00
Wonsan	<i>Sam Ma 2*</i>	1,731.00	January	577.00	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	<i>Ji Song 6*</i>	1,250.00	February	416.67	625.00	1,125.00

Nampo	<i>Sam Jong 1*</i>	1,665.00	February	555.00	832.50	1,498.50
Wonsan	<i>Kum Un San</i>	2,070.00	February	690.00	1,035.00	1,863.00
Wonsan	<i>Kum Un San 3</i>	3,279.00	February	1,093.00	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	<i>Chon Ma San*</i>	2,750.00	February	916.67	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	<i>Yu Phyong 5*</i>	1,966.00	February	655.33	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	<i>Saebjol (Chong Rim 2)*</i>	1,150.00	February	383.33	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	<i>An San 1*</i>	3,003.00	February	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	<i>Sam Jong 2*</i>	2,507.00	February	835.67	1,253.50	2,256.30
Nampo	<i>Rye Song Gang 1</i>	3,003.00	February	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	<i>Sam Jong 1*</i>	1,665.00	February	555.00	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	<i>Yu Son (Y Chun)*</i>	3,398.00	February	1,132.67	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	<i>Yu Phyong 5*</i>	1,966.00	February	655.33	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	<i>Yu Jong 2*</i>	1,206.00	March	402.00	603.00	1,085.40
Nampo	<i>Ji Song 6*</i>	1,250.00	March	416.67	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	<i>Sam Jong 2*</i>	2,507.00	March	835.67	1,253.50	2,256.30
Nampo	<i>Ji Song 6*</i>	1,250.00	March	416.67	625.00	1,125.00
Chongjin	<i>Un Pha 2, ex Kum Gang 3</i>	1,205.00	March	401.67	602.50	1,084.50
Nampo	<i>An San 1*</i>	3,003.00	March	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	<i>Paek Ma*</i>	2,250.00	March	750.00	1,125.00	2,025.00
Nampo	<i>Rye Song Gang 1</i>	3,003.00	March	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	<i>Sam Jong 1*</i>	1,665.00	March	555.00	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	<i>Saebjol (Chong Rim 2)*</i>	1,150.00	March	383.33	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	<i>Kum Un San 3</i>	3,279.00	March	1,093.00	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	<i>Yu Son (Y Chun)*</i>	3,398.00	March	1,132.67	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	<i>Wan Heng 11*</i>	4,983.00	March	1,661.00	2,491.50	4,484.70
Nampo	<i>Sam Jong 2*</i>	2,507.00	March	835.67	1,253.50	2,256.30
Hamhung	<i>Sam Ma 2*</i>	1,731.00	March	577.00	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	<i>Chon Ma San*</i>	2,750.00	March	916.67	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	<i>Ji Song 6*</i>	1,250.00	March	416.67	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	<i>Yu Jong 2*</i>	1,206.00	March	402.00	603.00	1,085.40
Nampo	<i>Kum Un San</i>	2,070.00	March	690.00	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	<i>Saebjol (Chong Rim 2)*</i>	1,150.00	March	383.33	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	<i>An San 1*</i>	3,003.00	March	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	<i>Yu Phyong 5*</i>	1,966.00	March	655.33	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	<i>Chon Ma San*</i>	2,750.00	April	916.67	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	<i>Ji Song 6*</i>	1,250.00	April	416.67	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	<i>Kum Pit 1</i>	1,091.00	April	363.67	545.50	981.90
Nampo	<i>Kum Un San 3</i>	3,279.00	April	1,093.00	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	<i>Paek Ma*</i>	2,250.00	April	750.00	1,125.00	2,025.00
Chongjin	<i>Sam Ma 2*</i>	1,731.00	April	577.00	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	<i>Nam San 8*</i>	3,150.00	April	1,050.00	1,575.00	2,835.00
Nampo	<i>Yu Son (Y Chun)*</i>	3,398.00	April	1,132.67	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	<i>Wan Heng 11*</i>	4,983.00	April	1,661.00	2,491.50	4,484.70

Nampo	<i>Chon Ma San*</i>	2,750.00	April	916.67	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	<i>Sam Jong 2*</i>	2,507.00	April	835.67	1,253.50	2,256.30
Hamhung	<i>Sam Ma 2*</i>	1,731.00	April	577.00	865.50	1,557.90
Wonsan	<i>Ma Du San</i>	949.00	April	316.33	474.50	854.10
Chongji	<i>Sam Ma 2*</i>	1731.00	April	577.00	865.50	1,557.90
Najin	<i>Song Won</i>	2101.00	April	700.33	1,050.50	1,890.90
Wonsan	<i>Kum Un San</i>	2070.00	April	690.00	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	<i>An San 1*</i>	3003.00	April	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	<i>Kum Jin Gang 2</i>	2100.00	April	700.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	<i>Paek Ma*</i>	2250.00	May	750.00	1,125.00	2,025.00
Chongjin	<i>Sam Ma 2*</i>	1731.00	May	577.00	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	<i>Ji Song 6*</i>	1250.00	May	416.67	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	<i>Yu Ph Yong 5*</i>	1966.00	May	655.33	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	<i>Sam Jong 2*</i>	2507.00	May	835.67	1,253.50	2,256.30
Wonsan	<i>Chon Myong 1*</i>	2750.00	May	916.67	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	<i>Myong Ryu 1</i>	900.00	May	300.00	450.00	810.00
Nampo	<i>Sam Jong 1*</i>	1665.00	May	555.00	832.50	1,498.50
Wonsan	<i>Kum Un San</i>	2070.00	May	690.00	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	<i>Saeb Yol (Chong Rim 2)*</i>	1150.00	May	383.33	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	<i>Nam San 8*</i>	3150.00	May	1,050.00	1,575.00	2,835.00
Nampo	<i>An San 1*</i>	3003.00	May	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Hamhung	<i>Sam Ma 2*</i>	1731.00	May	577.00	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	<i>Yu Jong 2*</i>	1206.00	May	402.00	603.00	1,085.40
Nampo	<i>Yu Ph Yong 5*</i>	1966.00	May	655.33	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	<i>Yu Son*</i>	3398.00	May	1,132.67	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	<i>Kum Jin Gang 2</i>	2100.00	May	700.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	<i>Ji Song 6*</i>	1250.00	May	416.67	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	<i>Paek Ma*</i>	2250.00	May	750.00	1,125.00	2,025.00
Nampo	<i>Sam Jong 2*</i>	2507.00	May	835.67	1,253.50	2,256.30
Nampo	<i>Myong Ryu 1</i>	900.00	May	300.00	450.00	810.00
Percent Laden				33%	50%	90%
Total (Metric Tons)				65,782.99	98,674.50	177,614.10
Total (Barrels)				506,529.05	759,793.65	1,367,628.57

Source: Member State

Annex 2 : United States submission to the Committee of 17 September 2018**UNITED STATES NON-PAPER TO THE UN 1718 DPRK SANCTIONS
COMMITTEE: NORTH KOREA'S BREACH OF UNSCR 2397 REFINED
PETROLEUM CAP**

- UNSCR 2397 operative paragraph 5 limits the DPRK's import of refined petroleum products to 500,000 barrels per year beginning in 2018 if those transfers are a) fully reported to the Committee within 30 days, b) do not involve any individual or entity associated with the DPRK's nuclear, ballistic missile, or other prohibited activities, and c) are used to exclusively meet the livelihood needs of DPRK nationals and not used to generate revenue for the DPRK's nuclear, ballistic missile, or other prohibited activities.
- UNSCR 2375 operative paragraph 11 prohibits ship-to-ship (STS) transfers with DPRK-flagged, owned, or operated vessels. UNSCR 2094 further makes clear that any individual or entity assisting in the evasion of sanctions are also liable for 1718 sanctions.
- These STS transfers are of great concern to the United States and in our view represent the most urgent area in need of more rigorous UN member state implementation.
- Since the United States last provided the UN 1718 Committee with a report on oil tanker deliveries to the DPRK on July 12, we have information revealing that these deliveries continue. The continuing arrival of these tankers in DPRK ports confirm that the DPRK maintains its imports of illicitly sourced refined petroleum products that expand the degree to which the DPRK is violating UNSCR 2397's annual limitation on refined product imports. Further, the 1718 Committee has not received any reporting from the DPRK or other member states about these transfers in contravention of UNSCR 2397.
- We are providing updated information showing data on each of these port calls to supplement our previous reporting and to emphasize that this problem continues due to the inaction of the 1718 Committee and the objections raised by Russia and China.
- The table provided in Tab 1 lists each of the port calls by date and associated delivery volume scenarios from 1 January 2018 to 18 August 2018, which have grown substantially since our previous submission and, in aggregation, exceed the UNSCR 2397 annual quota for refined petroleum products.
- Since our last report in July summarizing transactions observed in January through May, at least an additional 59 tanker deliveries to the DPRK have occurred from June 1 through August 18, bringing the 2018 total to at least 148 deliveries, all of which involved deliveries to North Korean ports to unload refined petroleum products procured through UN-prohibited STS transfers.
- If each of these tankers was fully laden when it made its delivery, the DPRK has imported almost six times the allowable amount under UNSCR 2397. Even if these tankers were not fully laden upon delivery, the figure found in Tab 2 show the three scenarios for how much refined petroleum products the DPRK procured in 2018 from 1 January to 18 August. All three scenarios make clear that the DPRK has obtained far more than the 500,000 barrels it is authorized to procure in 2018.

- All further transfers of refined petroleum products must be halted, period, to prevent the DPRK from procuring any additional products in violation of UNSCR 2397.
- To further underscore our confidence in the updated data on tanker deliveries, we are also providing three images—one from each of the past three months in Tabs 3 through 5—that document several of these deliveries into a DPRK port outfitted with oil unloading and storage infrastructure as well as an image of the port infrastructure more broadly in Tab 6.
- The images of these tanker ships depict DPRK-flagged vessels that are outfitted for the transport of refined petroleum products and used exclusively for that purpose when moored—or anchored—at a single point offshore mooring system. The single point mooring system consists of mooring buoys, which keep the tankers anchored in place, and an offloading buoy that connects to an underwater pipeline allowing for the physical transfer of the refined petroleum products from the tankers to onshore infrastructure.
- Specifically, this pipeline transfers the refined petroleum products to the associated onshore infrastructure including refined petroleum storage tanks, pumping equipment, a rail transfer point, and tanker truck filling station, all of which are outfitted to facilitate the unloading, storage, and transporting of the refined products to areas where the products are consumed throughout North Korea, including by the regime and military.
 - The first image in Tab 3 highlights this process by showing both marine import terminals in Nampo that are configured to import, store, and transport refined petroleum products through an offloading pier and single point mooring systems. As can be seen in the image, various DPRK tankers are at anchorage to cycle through offloading infrastructure to make individual deliveries of refined petroleum products before departing the port in search of additional, illicit STS transfer transactions.
 - The second image in Tab 4 shows the DPRK-flagged M/T MU BONG 1 anchored at an offloading buoy at the Nampo port facility in the Taedong River on June 16, 2018. The vessel is fully loaded and is in the process of delivering refined petroleum products procured via an illicit STS transfer.
 - The third image in Tab 5 shows the DPRK-flagged M/T YU JONG 2 anchored at an offloading buoy at the Nampo port facility in the Taedong River on July 21, 2018. The vessel is fully loaded and is in the process of delivering refined petroleum products procured via an illicit STS transfer.
 - The fourth image in Tab 6 shows the DPRK-flagged M/T AN SAN 1 anchored at an offloading buoy at the Nampo port facility in the Taedong River on August 17, 2018. The vessel is fully loaded and is in the process of delivering refined petroleum products procured via an illicit STS transfer.

- We are supplementing this imagery with three storyboards that demonstrate the entire process by which North Korean tankers depart North Korean ports, rendezvous with a foreign “feeder vessel” to engage in an illicit STS transfer, and return to a North Korean port to deliver refined petroleum products.
 - The first storyboard in Tab 7 shows the entire process in which the North Korea-flagged MYONG RYU 1 conducted an STS transfer with the Panama-flagged SHANG YUAN BAO.
 - The second storyboard in Tab 8 shows the entire process in which the North Korea-flagged PAEK MA conducted an STS transfer with the Panama-flagged SHANG YUAN BAO.
 - The third storyboard in Tab 9 shows the entire process in which the North Korea-flagged MU BONG 1 conducted an STS transfer with the Sierra Leone-flagged XING MING YANG 888.
- The United States has now provided two tables documenting 148 deliveries of refined petroleum products to the DPRK and 10 images and storyboards clearly demonstrating the process by which this occurs to the 1718 Committee. This body of evidence should remove any remaining doubts that the DPRK has seriously violated the refined petroleum cap and that the Committee must urgently act to halt all refined petroleum product exports to the DPRK.

ATTACHMENTS

Tab 1: Table of DPRK tanker deliveries of refined petroleum products to DPRK ports

Tab 2: Figure of estimated volumes of refined petroleum product deliveries to DPRK

Tab 3: Image of Nampo Port marine import terminals for refined petroleum products

Tab 4: M/T Mu Bong 1 delivery at Nampo Port

Tab 5: M/T Mu Bong 1 delivery at Nampo Port

Tab 6: M/T Mu Bong 1 delivery at Nampo Port

Tab 7: Storyboard of Myong Ryu 1 STS transfer with Shang Yuan Bao

Tab 8: Storyboard of Paek Ma STS transfer with Shang Yuan Bao

Tab 9: Storyboard of Mu Bong 1 STS transfer with Xing Ming Yang 888

**OBSERVED REFINED PETROLEUM DELIVERIES TO NORT KOREAN
PORTS: JANUARY 1 – AUGUST 18, 2018**

Port	Ship Name	Dead Weight Tonnage	Arrival Date	Delivery Volume if 33% Laden	Delivery Volume if 50% Laden	Delivery Volume if 90% Laden
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	1-Jan-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	1,665.00	4-Jan-18	549.45	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	8-Jan-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	An San 1	3,003.00	10-Jan-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Najin	Kum Un San	2,070.00	10-Jan-18	683.10	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	Yu Ph Yong 5	1,966.00	14-Jan-18	648.78	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Yu Son (Y Chun)	3,398.00	15-Jan-18	1,121.34	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	Chon Ma San	2,750.00	18-Jan-18	907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	Paek Ma	2,250.00	18-Jan-18	742.50	1,125.00	2,025.00
Nampo	Saeb y ol (Chong Rim 2)	1,150.00	19-Jan-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	25-Jan-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Wonsan	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	26-Jan-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	Rye Song Gang 1	3,003.00	27-Jan-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Najin	Kum Un San	2,070.00	28-Jan-18	683.10	1,035.00	1,863.00
Wonsan	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	30-Jan-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	2-Feb-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	1,665.00	2-Feb-18	549.45	832.50	1,498.50
Wonsan	Kum Un San	2,070.00	3-Feb-18	683.10	1,035.00	1,863.00
Wonsan	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	8-Feb-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	Chon Ma San	2,750.00	11-Feb-18			

				907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	1,966.00	12-Feb-18	648.78	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	SaebyoI (Chong Rim 2)	1,150.00	16-Feb-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	An San 1	3,003.00	17-Feb-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	17-Feb-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Nampo	Rye Song Gang 1	3,003.00	19-Feb-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	1,665.00	22-Feb-18	549.45	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	Yu Son (Y Chun)	3,398.00	24-Feb-18	1,121.34	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	1,966.00	28-Feb-18	648.78	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Yu Jong 2	1,206.00	3-Mar-18	397.98	603.00	1,085.40
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	5-Mar-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	8-Mar-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	10-Mar-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Chongjin	Kum Gang 3	1,205.00	10-Mar-18	397.65	602.50	1,084.50
Nampo	An San 1	3,003.00	13-Mar-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Paek Ma	2,250.00	13-Mar-18	742.50	1,125.00	2,025.00
Nampo	Rye Song Gang 1	3,003.00	13-Mar-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	1,665.00	13-Mar-18	549.45	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	SaebyoI (Chong Rim 2)	1,150.00	15-Mar-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	16-Mar-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	Yu Son (Y Chun)	3,398.00	16-Mar-18	1,121.34	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	Wan Heng 11	4,983.00	19-Mar-18	1,644.39	2,491.50	4,484.70
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	21-Mar-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Hamhung	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	21-Mar-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90


Nampo	Chon Ma San	2,750.00	22-Mar-18	907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	24-Mar-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Yu Jong 2	1,206.00	26-Mar-18	397.98	603.00	1,085.40
Nampo	Kum Un San	2,070.00	27-Mar-18	683.10	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	Saebyol (Chong Rim 2)	1,150.00	29-Mar-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	An San 1	3,003.00	30-Mar-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	1,966.00	31-Mar-18	648.78	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Chon Ma San	2,750.00	3-Apr-18	907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	3-Apr-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Kum Pit 1	1,091.00	3-Apr-18	360.03	545.50	981.90
Nampo	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	4-Apr-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	Paek Ma	2,250.00	6-Apr-18	742.50	1,125.00	2,025.00
Chongjin	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	12-Apr-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	Nam San 8	3,150.00	13-Apr-18	1,039.50	1,575.00	2,835.00
Nampo	Yu Son (Y Chun)	3,398.00	13-Apr-18	1,121.34	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	Wan Heng 11	4,983.00	14-Apr-18	1,644.39	2,491.50	4,484.70
Nampo	Chon Ma San	2,750.00	15-Apr-18	907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	21-Apr-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Hamhung	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	24-Apr-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90
Wonsan	Ma Du San	949.00	26-Apr-18	313.17	474.50	854.10
Chongjin	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	27-Apr-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90
Najin	Song Won	2,101.00	29-Apr-18	693.33	1,050.50	1,890.90
Wonsan	Kum Un San	2,070.00	30-Apr-18	683.10	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	An San 1	3,003.00	30-Apr-18			

				990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	2,100.00	30-Apr-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	Paek Ma	2,250.00	3-May-18	742.50	1,125.00	2,025.00
Chongjin	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	5-May-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	5-May-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	1,966.00	7-May-18	648.78	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	8-May-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Wonsan	Chon Myong 1	2,750.00	8-May-18	907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	900.00	9-May-18	297.00	450.00	810.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	1,665.00	9-May-18	549.45	832.50	1,498.50
Wonsan	Kum Un San	2,070.00	13-May-18	683.10	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	Saebyol	1,150.00	15-May-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	Nam San 8	3,150.00	17-May-18	1,039.50	1,575.00	2,835.00
Nampo	An San 1	3,003.00	17-May-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Hamhung	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	19-May-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	Yu Jong 2	1,206.00	21-May-18	397.98	603.00	1,085.40
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	1,966.00	22-May-18	648.78	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Yu Son	3,398.00	22-May-18	1,121.34	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	2,100.00	24-May-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	26-May-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Paek Ma	2,250.00	26-May-18	742.50	1,125.00	2,025.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	28-May-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	900.00	30-May-18	297.00	450.00	810.00
Nampo	Saebyol	1,150.00	4-Jun-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00

Chongjin	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	6-Jun-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	Chon Ma San	2,750.00	7-Jun-18	907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	8-Jun-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	9-Jun-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Mu Bong 1 (Ryong Bong 1)	2,100.00	15-Jun-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	Kum Un San	2,070.00	18-Jun-18	683.10	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	18-Jun-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	Nam San 8	3,150.00	19-Jun-18	1,039.50	1,575.00	2,835.00
Kimchaek	Yu Son	3,398.00	21-Jun-18	1,121.34	1,699.00	3,058.20
Chongjin	Wan Heng 11	4,983.00	24-Jun-18	1,644.39	2,491.50	4,484.70
Nampo	Saebyoil	1,150.00	25-Jun-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	Yu Jong 2	1,206.00	27-Jun-18	397.98	603.00	1,085.40
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	1,966.00	28-Jun-18	648.78	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Paek Ma	2,250.00	30-Jun-18	742.50	1,125.00	2,025.00
Nampo	Chon Ma San	2,750.00	2-Jul-18	907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	An San 1	3,003.00	3-Jul-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Mu Bong 1 (Ryong Bong 1)	2,100.00	3-Jul-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Chongjin	Golden	1,977.00	3-Jul-18	652.41	988.50	1,779.30
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	2,100.00	4-Jul-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	6-Jul-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Chongjin	Wan Heng 11	4,983.00	9-Jul-18	1,644.39	2,491.50	4,484.70
Wonsan	Kum Un San	2,070.00	13-Jul-18	683.10	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	2,100.00	14-Jul-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	15-Jul-18			

				412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Chongjin	Golden	1,977.00	16-Jul-18	652.41	988.50	1,779.30
Songnim	Kum Jin Gang 2	2,100.00	20-Jul-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	20-Jul-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	900.00	20-Jul-18	297.00	450.00	810.00
Nampo	Yu Jong 2	1,206.00	20-Jul-18	397.98	603.00	1,085.40
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	900.00	21-Jul-18	297.00	450.00	810.00
Najin	Song Won	2,101.00	22-Jul-18	693.33	1,050.50	1,890.90
Nampo	Chon Ma San	2,750.00	23-Jul-18	907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	Nam San 8	3,150.00	23-Jul-18	1,039.50	1,575.00	2,835.00
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	1,966.00	23-Jul-18	648.78	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Saebjol	1,150.00	25-Jul-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	Tong Hung 5	600.00	25-Jul-18	198.00	300.00	540.00
Nampo	Yu Son	3,398.00	26-Jul-18	1,121.34	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	2,100.00	27-Jul-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	28-Jul-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	1,665.00	30-Jul-18	549.45	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	900.00	2-Aug-18	297.00	450.00	810.00
Nampo	Paek Ma	2,250.00	2-Aug-18	742.50	1,125.00	2,025.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	2-Aug-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Chongjin	Wan Heng 11	4,983.00	2-Aug-18	1,644.39	2,491.50	4,484.70
Chongjin	Rye Song Gang 1	3,003.00	4-Aug-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Chongjin	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	7-Aug-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	Nam San 8	3,150.00	8-Aug-18	1,039.50	1,575.00	2,835.00

Nampo	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	9-Aug-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	Saebyol	1,150.00	9-Aug-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	2,100.00	10-Aug-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Najin	Song Won	2,101.00	12-Aug-18	693.33	1,050.50	1,890.90
Nampo	An San 1	3,003.00	15-Aug-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	900.00	15-Aug-18	297.00	450.00	810.00
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	16-Aug-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Nam San 8	3,150.00	16-Aug-18	1,039.50	1,575.00	2,835.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	1,665.00	16-Aug-18	549.45	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	15-Aug-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Nampo	Yu Jong 2	1,206.00	18-Aug-18	397.98	603.00	1,085.40
Percent Laden				33%	50%	90%
Total (Metric Tons)				108,230.43	163,985.50	295,173.90
Total (Barrels)				833,374.31	1,262,688.35	2,272,839.03



Source: Member State

Annex 3 : Communication of the Russian Federation to the Committee of 21 September 2018

From: Alexey Boguslavskiy [redacted]
 Sent: Friday, September 21, 2018 10:17 PM
 To: Sc-1718-Committee
 Cc: To: [redacted]

Subject: Re: For Action: NOP – US letter petroleum cap, draft press release and note verbale (NOTE.276)

Dear Chair, colleagues,

Russia strictly complies with the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on the DPRK and the information that is reflected in the official notifications of the 1718 Committee, including on the issue of deliveries of refined petroleum products to this country.

According to paragraph 5 of resolution 2397, the Committee notifies all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 75, 90 and 95 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts of 500 000 barrels have been reached, and only in the latter case (95 per cent), such notification is accompanied by an information about the requirement to immediately cease further deliveries of refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year.

In the absence of the aforementioned notification of the Committee, the continued export of refined petroleum products to the DPRK is fully in line with the requirements of the DPRK sanctions regime.

The fragmentary information provided by the US regarding the cases of alleged illegal ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum products to the DPRK vessels, as well as the results of the US computer modeling, are insufficient for the Committee's decision to completely cease refined petroleum export to the DPRK before the end of this year.

To take such a decision, which could have severe social, economic and humanitarian consequences for the DPRK, a full investigation and corresponding conclusions of the Panel of

Experts of the Committee of 1718 are required. Such an investigation is fully in line with the mandate of the Panel.

In this regard, we suggest that the US provide the experts with appropriate information regarding reported cases of ship-to-ship transfers and the proposed methodology of petroleum calculations for them to study it thoroughly and impartially.

Upon receiving the results of such a study we are ready to return to the consideration in the Committee of the US request with a view to eventually making an objective decision.

In the meantime Russia would like to put the US request **on hold**.

Best regards,

Alexey

Source: Member State

Annex 4 : Address location provided by Golden Luxury Corporation to Yuantai



Source: The Panel

Annex 5 : Panel letter to Golden Luxury Corporation and their associates

United Nations Nations Unies

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED
PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE: S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.382

YOUR REFERENCE

10 December 2018

Dear Messrs. Wang Wei-Kwang, Mr. Lee Chun Hun, Mr. Lee Chun Hun and Ms. Chen Su Mei,

I am writing to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions [1718 \(2006\)](#), [1874 \(2009\)](#), [2087 \(2013\)](#), [2094 \(2013\)](#), [2270 \(2016\)](#), [2321 \(2016\)](#), [2356 \(2017\)](#), [2371 \(2017\)](#), [2375 \(2017\)](#) and [2397 \(2017\)](#), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

According to paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017), "all Member States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction, entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction, and vessels flying their flag, from facilitating or engaging in ship-to-ship transfers to or from DPRK-flagged vessels of any goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or transferred to or from the DPRK". In paragraph 14 of the same resolution, the Security Council also decided that "all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all refined petroleum products" (subject to exemptions).

In this regard, the Panel is investigating possible cases of sanctions evasion involving the vessel *Ocean Explorer* (IMO:9388792) which, according to information and photographs supplied by a Member State, conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the tanker *Yuk Tung* on 28 October 2018 (see Annex 1). The *Yuk Tung* has been designated by the Security Council 1718 Committee for de-flagging and a global port entry ban for repeatedly engaging in illegal ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK tankers and the Member State has reason to believe that the transfer to the *Yuk Tung* was ultimately destined for the DPRK, in violation of the resolutions. Furthermore, the *Yuk Tung* is listed by the United Nations and registered by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as being controlled by a UN designated entity.¹

Mr. Jiang Xi Hai Lian, Mr. Wang Wei-Kwang (aka Wang Wi Jung), Mr. Lee Chun Hung and Ms. Chen Su Mei, et al.
Golden Luxury Corporation (GLC)
Email: bestgo.ship@msa.hinet.net
Fax +88624621059

¹ See "Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee Adds 22 Entries to Its Sanctions List, Designates 27 Vessels" UN Security Council press release, 30 March 2018 <https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13272.doc.htm>

The Panel notes that your Belize-registered company was directly involved in this incident and in contact with individuals acting on behalf of the *Yuk Tung* also known to you as the vessel *Maika*. The Panel would be grateful for the assistance of you, your company and all your associates in providing the following information relating to the above-mentioned ship-to-ship transfer:

- 1) Copies of all correspondence and contracts associated with the above incident, including brokering, trading, financial transfer and vessel-related information;
- 2) The identity and contact details of all persons arranging for the transfer at sea with the *Yuk Tung/Maika*;
- 3) Any information at your disposal regarding the destination of the cargo aboard the *Yuk Tung/Maika*, in particular its end user destination including dates, times and location, as well as GPS coordinates;
- 4) An email address, mobile phone number through which you may be contacted;
- 5) The full name, nationality and copies of the seaman identity card, national identity card and passport of the Master of the *Yuk Tung/Maika*;
- 6) The crew list of the *Yuk Tung/Maika*;
- 7) The AIS/GPS of the *Yuk Tung/Maika*, showing its movements from 27 October 2018 until now;
- 8) The names, addresses, emails, mobile phone numbers, and all bank account numbers of the entities and individuals listed in Annex 2;
- 9) Please inform the entities and the individuals listed in Annex 2 that they may be named in the Panel's next report to the Security Council and to contact the Panel forthwith so that the Panel may consider reflecting their views in its report.

Paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution 2407 (2018) urges all Member States and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal.


As the Panel intends to report on this case in its next report to the Security Council, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within two weeks of the date of this letter. The Panel may name Golden Luxury Corporation, your employees and any of their associates or associated individuals in our reporting and would therefore appreciate a reply from you in order to consider reflecting your views in our next report. Should you or your designated representative wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel via Mr. Hugh Griffiths [REDACTED] Mr. Jong Kwon Youn [REDACTED].

Yours faithfully,



Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex I. Images showing the Ocean Explorer conducting a ship-to-ship transfer with a UN designated vessel controlled by UN designated entity



Source: Member State

Annex 2. "Documentation"



金豪有限公司
GOLDEN LUXURY CORP.

Registered address: 60 MARKET SQUARE, P.O. BOX 164, BELIZE CITY, BELIZE
 Taiwan Office: NO.214, HE 1ST RD., ZHONGZHENG DIST.,
 KEELUNG CITY 202, TAIWAN (R.O.C.)
 TEL:+886-2-24620759 FAX:+886-2-24621059 Email:bsgo.ship@ms.hinet.net

INVOICE NO: A781030-41
 INVOICE DATE: 10/30/2018
 LOCATION: NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN
 PROJECT: SUPPLY BUNKER TO FISHING BOATS
 MESSERS: ZEESHAN BASHIR BUILDING MATERIALS TRADING LLC
 BH GALADHARI PLAZA AL RIGGA DEIRA
 DUBAI UAE, DUBAI, UAE

INVOICE

DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	UNIT PRICE	AMOUNT
MARINE GASOIL	51070.90 BBL	US\$100.054	US\$5,109,848.00
TOTAL			US\$5,109,848.00

PLEASE REMIT BY T/T REMITTANCE IMMEDIATELY FOR FULL
 INVOICE VALUE WITHOUT DEDUCTION

For and on behalf of
 GOLDEN LUXURY CORP



日期	数量	地点	名称
31/10/18	540	27/10/12250	连云港1 (6687)
"	550	27/10/12250	连云港2 (55548)
"	680	27/10/12250	连云港3 (TT28)
1/11/18	550	27/10/12250	连云港4 (3898)
"	2250	20/10/12450	MKS (1125)
"	1050	20/10/12450	MARINA (7245)
11/11/18	1800	20/10/12450	MKS (5552)
12/11/18	410	20/10/12450	连云港1 (TT17)
15/11/18	300	20/10/12450	连云港2 (8823)

Source: The Panel

江西海联石油化工有限公司

To: 金蒙有限公司

本公司委请 ZESHAN BASHIR BUILDING MATERIALS TRADING LLC 及
GRACE WAY GENERAL TRADING LLC 两家公司代支付货款给贵公司 请知照!

江西海联石油化工有限公司

2019/2019



¹⁵⁹ One Panel Member objected to the disclosure of the Panel's letter without an accompanying reply due to the sensitivity of the information. The Coordinator notes that it is standard practice to provide evidence of the Panel's activities and the evidence obtained in the annexes.

Annex 6 : Vanguard correspondence

From: vanguard [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2018 2:08 PM
To: Hugh Griffiths
Cc: 'van.guard'
Subject: RE: Outgoing Communication # 367 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Vanguard

Dear Mr.Hugh Griffiths,

Good day.

We have to affirm that Vanguard Shipping Safety Management Consultant Co. Ltd never involved in the owner's cargo operation and finance. our company only responsible for the regulation of International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS 1974) Appendix IX and Chapter X1-2 issued by International Maritime Organization (IMO).

Our company is not responsible for the management of trade operation and crew management of this Virtue Base Developments Limited (IMO No.5893594), nor involved in matters such as ownership and chartering of the ship to which this company belongs and trade operation and crew management.

So we don't know the following information from Virtue Base Developments Limited (IMO No.5893594).

names, addresses, email addresses, fax numbers and other records for the individuals responsible for Virtue Base Developments.

Our company was entrusted by Mr.Lai (phone number +886978882693) at the end of May 2017, by our employee Penny to assist the applicant company IMO number, but soon after, We also cannot contact this Mr.Lai.

Hope above mention will help your investigation.

Best Regards.

汎德船舶安全管理顧問有限公司

VANGUARD SHIPPING SAFETY MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT COMPANY LIMITED.

From: Hugh Griffiths [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, December 10, 2018 8:27 PM
To: van.guard
Subject: Re: Outgoing Communication # 367 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Vanguard

Dear Vanguard,

Thank you for your email.

Is this Penny Lee 李沛瑀(Ms.) that is replying to the United Nations?

Or another employee?

I would be grateful if you could identify yourself and provide information on an important case.

Virtue Base Developments (see attachment)

This is an entity registered in the Seychelles for which you submitted an IMO number request in 2017.

Please supply the names, addresses, email addresses, fax numbers and other records for the individuals responsible for Virtue Base Developments.

I am basing this request on the attached Equatorial Guinea registry certificate.

Virtue Base Developments are shielding their identity.

However, your company, Vanguard is named as a "care of" address with a UN international organisation for Virtue Base Developments.

Please provide us with the information on the individuals behind Virtue Base Development within 24 hours.

Best regards,

Hugh Griffiths

From: van.guard [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, December 10, 2018 9:56 AM
To: DPA-POE1874
Cc: "Vanguard(汎德公司)"; Hugh Griffiths
Subject: RE: Outgoing Communication # 367 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Vanguard

Dear Mr.HUGH GRIFFITHS,

Good day.

At beginning, we have to affirm that Vanguard Shipping Safety Management Consultant Co. Ltd never involved in the owner's cargo operation and finance. We only pay attention to ship's safety. It's most management company done at Kaohsiung. Besides, we have never received the Panel's previous notice S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.1151 of 19 December 2017, only received S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.367 on 7 December 2018.

You said our company was associated with 5 ships engaged in prohibited ship-to-ship transfers. We would like to clarify as following:

1. Lighthouse Winmore (IMO number: 9635987) — She belongs to Mr. Hsih-Shien Chen, which was never under our management. If she holds our company's DOC, then it must be a fake certificate and please provide your evidence in hand. It's easy to find out from her SMC.
2. Billions No. 18 (IMO number: 8711021) — She also belongs to Mr. Hsih-Shien Chen. It changes ship's name to "SUN CROWN". And then it was sold to other people.
3. Jin Hye (IMO number: 8518572) — In December 2017, we were informed by Investigation Bureau about the vessel was involved with illegal transfers. Then we broke the agreement with the owner immediately and accepted Investigation Bureau and prosecutor's investigation. You may check with them. The owner was in litigation now and we are clear from the investigation. After breaking the agreement, we have delivered the deletion certificate to the owner from Flag State. The ship has left us and we didn't get further information from her.
4. Wan Heng 11 (IMO number: 8688717) — This vessel was never under our management. Please provide the evidence for us to report to Investigation Bureau.
5. Heng Xing (IMO number: 8669589) on 7 May 2018 — Please check your Annex 2 and amplify stern part of the small ship, you will clearly indicate port registration of two Chinese words "舟山"(ZHOU SHAN) that is a Chinese ship. (Please see the red column)

Source: The Panel

Annex 7 : Panel letter to Hin Leong 10 May 2018

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED
PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE: S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.78

YOUR REFERENCE

10 May 2018

Dear Mr. Evan Lim,

I am writing with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions [1718 \(2006\)](#), [1874 \(2009\)](#), [2087 \(2013\)](#), [2094 \(2013\)](#), [2270 \(2016\)](#), [2321 \(2016\)](#), [2356 \(2017\)](#), [2371 \(2017\)](#), [2375 \(2017\)](#) and [2397 \(2017\)](#), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

In its 2018 final report to the UN Security Council the Panel noted the following:

“The Panel’s latest investigations show that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is already flouting the most recent resolutions by exploiting global oil supply chains, complicit foreign nationals, offshore company registries and the international banking system. The Panel investigated illicit ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum comprising a multi-million-dollar business that is driving an international network of brokers and ship charterers as well as unwitting global commodity trading companies and oil suppliers.... At the same time, the heightened sanctions have created lucrative markets for Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-backed traders seeking to procure petroleum while exporting the country’s natural resources. The profit margins involved, coupled with the offshore nature of much of the affected oil, maritime and finance sectors, necessitate *far greater private sector due diligence, information-sharing and self-policing* [emphasis added].” (Executive Summary, pg. 4)¹

Mr. Evan Lim
Project Director
Hin Leong Trading
Singapore

Email: bd@hinleong.com.sg; evanlim@hinleong.com.sg

Cc. Meng Wong See, wongseemeng@hinleong.com.sg
Seng Serene, sereneseng@hinleong.com.sg

Cc. Permanent Mission of Singapore to the United Nations

¹ The Panel’s 2018 final report to the Security Council, [S/2018/171](#), 5 March 2018, available at: https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/reports.

In preparation for its midterm report to the Security Council due on 3 August 2018, the Panel is gathering information from companies trading in oil and petroleum products, as well as their suppliers and producers in the affected supply chains and regions² to ascertain what risk-mitigation measures, if any, such companies are taking in view of the Panel's findings.

In this regard, the Panel would be grateful for your assistance in providing the following information:

- What contractual obligations have your company or your partners considered to mitigate the risk that specific Far Eastern Free On Board (FOB) deliveries are not ultimately diverted to DPRK-controlled vessels in violation of paragraphs 11 and 14 of resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#)?
- Do such risk mitigation measures include an "automatic information system (AIS) switch-off clause" to ensure that the performing vessel shall not switch off its AIS at any point whilst the cargo (or any part thereof) is on board the vessel?³
- Do such risk mitigation measures include the presentation of supporting documentation to provide evidence of full and complete delivery to the stated destination or vessel within a set number of days of delivery?

For companies still considering optimal risk mitigation measures, please find in the Annex, for your consideration, "Best Practice" contractual clauses that may be used to safeguard the integrity of global oil and petroleum product supply chains by allowing the affected sector to (a) monitor the vessels transporting their products through an "AIS switch-off clause" that guards against clandestine and prohibited ship-to-ship transfers in violation of paragraphs 11 and 14 of resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#); (b) ensure the security of the supply chain through the submission of supporting documentation to evidence actual delivery to the stated end-user or customer.

Paragraph 5 of resolution [2407 \(2018\)](#) urges all Member States and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal.

The Panel would welcome any other information that you might consider relevant to its work as mandated by the Security Council. In addition, the Panel would like to assure you that any information you may consider confidential can be handled accordingly and used solely for the information of the Security Council and the 1718 Committee.

² The Panel has identified a variety of affected companies, Member States and supply chains. A smaller number of these may be found in paras. 61-73, [S/2018/171](#).

³ In all cases of prohibited ship-to-ship transfer identified by the Panel, the foreign-flagged vessel switched off its AIS prior to the illicit supply to the DPRK tanker.

Given the importance the Panel attaches to this investigation, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within one month of the date of this letter. Should you wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel via Mr. Hugh Griffiths and Mr. Neil Watts

Yours sincerely,



Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex: "Best practice" contractual clauses

Annex: “Best practice” contractual clauses

Additional conditions for Specific Far East Free on Board (FOB) deliveries

In respect of Specific Far East FOB deliveries, the Buyer undertakes to the seller that in respect of each cargo delivered by the seller to the Buyer, the Buyer shall fulfill the following obligations:

- A) The performing vessel for that cargo shall at all times ensure that the performing vessel does not switch off its Automatic Identification System (AIS) at any point whilst that cargo (or any part thereof) is on board the performing vessel.

- B) The Buyer shall provide to the Seller within seven (7) days of completion of discharge of the Cargo from the Buyer’s performing vessel, complete supporting documents evidenced to the Seller’s satisfaction (in Seller’s reasonable discretion) a full reconciliation of the discharged quantities of such Cargo by the Buyer’s performing vessel (including, without limitation, full details of the dates of discharge (and in each case the quantity discharged) to either receiving shore facilities and/or vessels (including details of the vessel name, flag and registered owners, as applicable) against the quantities delivered by the Seller to the Buyer.

- C) Where a discharge port is specified on the bill of lading issued with respect to a Cargo, the Buyer shall provide to the seller within seven (7) days of completion of discharge of such Cargo, documentary evidence that the Cargo was delivered by the performing vessel at the specified discharge port.

Hin Leong responses to best practice clauses and Panel letter

Serene Seng

From: Serene Seng
Sent: Tuesday, 7 August, 2018 6:16 PM
To: 'Tammy Xie'
Cc: Nathanael Lin; Freddy Tan Jie Ren; Chee Li Li
Subject: RE: UN Clause

Hi Tammy,

Apologies but we really cannot accept these clauses.

Regards,
Serene

From: Tammy Xie [mailto:Tammy.Xie@trafigura.com]
Sent: Tuesday, 7 August, 2018 5:14 PM
To: Serene Seng
Cc: Tammy Xie
Subject: UN Clause

Hi Serene,

I would call you to explain this.

Evan Lim

From: Evan Lim
Sent: Thursday, July 19, 2018 11:42 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: Serene Seng; Wong See Meng; Nathanael Lin
Subject: RE: Outgoing Communication #78 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Hin Leong

Dear Sirs,

We refer to your emails of 10 May 2018 and 6 July 2018.

Having taken the time to review our contractual position, we are afraid that confidentiality requirements preclude us from providing the feedback sought by the Panel. We trust that the Panel will appreciate the position that we have been placed in.

Regards,
[REDACTED]
evan

From: DPA-POE1874 [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, 6 July, 2018 12:29 AM
To: BD; Evan Lim; Wong See Meng; Serene Seng
Subject: FW: Outgoing Communication #78 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Hin Leong

Dear Mr. Evan Lim,

Grateful if you can provide us a feedback on the aforementioned Outgoing Communication. We are trying to consolidate the replies on our log and we could not find any from your end. Please do not hesitate to call us or resend to us the reply if this request has already been addressed.

Thank you very much.

Best regards,
[REDACTED]

 [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, 10 May, 2018 3:34 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: Outgoing Communication #78 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Hin Leong

Dear Mr. Evan Lim,

Source: The Panel

Annex 8 : Hika scrapping documentation

Total Tonnage		82,718		
CHITTAGONG - Port Position as o October 12, 2018				
No.	VESSEL NAME	LDT	TYPE	STATUS
1	Al Anbariah	15,933	Tanker	Beached October 11
2	Danum 156	2,650	Container	Beached October 09
3	Dawn Kanchipuram (Under Tow)	9,756	Tanker	Beached October 10
4	Giant	24,491	Crane Ship	Beached October 08
5	Hika	7,211	Tanker	Beached October 09
6	ISA Winter	2,878	General Cargo	Arrived October 09
7	Nir	6,043	Tanker	Beached October 08
8	Ocean Pride	7,639	Bulk Carrier	Arrived June 13
9	PTAP One (Under Tow)	7,548	Floating Storage	Beached October 11
10	Rongdhonu	680	Hospital Ship	Arrived September 14
11	Touyou Gou	3,549	Conveyor Reclaimer	Beached October 09
Total Tonnage		88,378		
GADANI - Port Position as of October 12, 2018				
No.	VESSEL NAME	LDT	TYPE	STATUS
No new vessels reported this week.				

VESSELS DUE AT OUTER ANCHORAGE:
DATED: 02/10/2018:



THE CHITTAGONG PORT AUTHORITY
MARINE DEPARTMENT

LIST OF VESSELS AS PER DECLARATION MADE BY LOCAL AGENT:

SL. NO.	NAME OF VESSELS	LENGTH	DRAFT	DATE OF ARRIVAL	L.PORT CALL	FLAG	LOCAL AGENT	LINE BELONG TO	CARGO CARRIED	TYPE OF CARGO	LOADING PORTS
27	AMITY(IMO:9427517)	-	176.20	UREA	FUJIE	LIBE	S5L	26/09 AT 1409	A	8.8	27500(8000CTG)
28	TAN BINH 236(IMO:9198379)	-	150.00	FELDSPAR	P.KEL	PANA	AMBL	26/09 AT 1206	B	9.7	22000
29	ATLANTIC MONTEREY(IMO:9782326)	-	199.99	SOYABEAN	CONV	SING	USL	26/09 AT 1312	A	16.5	66182
30	TIRON LEGACY(IMO:9618513)	-	189.99	C.CLINK	SING	MARSH	ASLL	26/09 AT 1330	A	11.31	54230
31	CROWN VICTORY(IMO:9072202)	-	190.00	LIMESTONE	SING	BD	CMSS	26/09 AT 1530	A	11.5	43000
32	DENSA TRIGER(IMO:9432476)	-	185.90	SLAG	SING	MALY	ZEBRA	23/09 AT 1340	A	18.9	41825
33	HONY FUTURE(IMO:9583823)	-	189.99	C.CLINK	CAMPA	HONG	LITMOND	27/09 AT 1612	B	11.5	54100
34	BULK PATAOGNA(IMO:950184)	-	197.00	WHEAT	P.SAD	PANA	SEACOM	28/09 AT 1142	A	11.4	5670
35	HELAN JOURNEY(IMO:9686778)	-	189.99	SLAG	COCHI	PANA	BASHUND	28/09 AT 1435	A	11.2	26400(28400MONO)
36	OCEAN ROSE(IMO:9351725)	-	189.99	C.CLINK	KRABI	MARSH	USL	28/09 AT 1616	A	10.5	54800
37	PIONEER C(IMO:9225509)	-	99.90	COAL	MAIS	TUPA	FMS	29/09 AT 0950	C	7.3	7500
38	AGERIM(IMO:958874)	-	185.99	WHEAT	P.SAD	LIBE	BASHUND	29/09 AT 1630	A	11.3	54400
39	WESTERN CALLAG(IMO:9594717)	-	177.85	MCP	KLAIP	SING	SULTAN	30/09 AT 0412	A	11.4	35300(21300MONO)
40	YTB BRAYE(IMO:9554676)	-	100.00	SHAL CLAY	P.KEL	PANA	FMS	30/09 AT 0145	C	9.5	8000
41	ARIADNE(IMO:9554676)	-	189.99	STONE	MINA	LIBE	RADIANT	30/09 AT 0505	A	10.1	36600
42	DENSA EAGLE(IMO:9432488)	-	189.90	COAL	RICH	MALY	UMI	30/09 AT 1620	A	12.52	51625
43	MERIDIAN EXPRSS(IMO:9594272)	-	193.00	COSCO	S.LOSE	PANA	USL	01/10 AT 0400	A	10.8	41817
44	CROWN VIRTUE(IMO:9216876)	-	189.99	C.CLINK	CAMPA	BD	CMSS	30/09 AT 1642	A	12.15	50100
45	OCEAN RAMBAR(IMO:9293105)	-	185.94	C.CLINK	KRABI	PANA	S5L	30/09 AT 1817	A	11.8	52200
46	FOUR EMERALD(IMO:941456)	-	185.00	TSP	FUJIE	MALY	ASCO	01/10 AT 1138	B	8.8	26250(7600CTG)
47	RICKMERS DALLAN(IMO:9292022)	-	192.90	P.CARGO	CHEMN	MARSH	HSR	01/10 AT 1430	A	8.7	2100
48	EM CORAL(IMO:9585708)	-	189.99	COAL	SING	PANA	UNIOCEAN	01/10 AT 1830	A	11.5	55000(25000MONO)
49	BASHUNDHARA 60(IMO:9119971)	-	189.99	C.CLINK	KASABI	BD	BASHUND	01/10 AT 1535	A	11.95	26500(13450MONO)
50	HAI DUONG 36(IMO:9317042)	-	121.10	WOOD PULP	FUTON	PANA	USL	01/10 AT 2330	C	7.8	7045
51	NAVROS ULYSSES(IMO:9317484)	-	189.99	AGORE GATE	FUJIA	MALY	UNIOCEAN	02/10 AT 0718	A	11.47	54000
52	ASSISTANT	-	18.00	SCRAPPING	YON	BD	YON	12/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
53	ROSEBUD(IMO:930049)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
54	ROSEBUD 2(IMO:930050)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
55	WINNIE LINDA(IMO:9104850)	-	180.00	SCRAPPING	ORINA	PANA	FESTOP	28/09 AT 0718	C	7.88	500
56	INDOYUNGA 13	-	127.00	SCRAPPING	ORINA	LIBE	INDOYUNGA	29/09 AT 0815	C	8.0	47 FOR BEACHING
57	BANGA LARPA	-	183.00	SCRAPPING	TMO	BD	BARDON	30/09 AT 0814	C	8.0	2 FOR TAILWIP 10000 WIPG DAMAGE CARGO
58	OCEAN PRIDE	-	182.00	SCRAPPING	TMO	BD	TRIPPA	14/09 AT 0815	C	8.0	47 FOR BEACHING
59	ROSEBUD 3(IMO:930051)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
60	HIFI(IMO:9033888)	-	166.77	SCRAPPING	TUNJ	PANA	FABT	31/10 AT 1140	C	4.8	500
61	ROSEBUD 4(IMO:930052)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
62	ROSEBUD 5(IMO:930053)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
63	ROSEBUD 6(IMO:930054)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
64	ROSEBUD 7(IMO:930055)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
65	ROSEBUD 8(IMO:930056)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
66	ROSEBUD 9(IMO:930057)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
67	ROSEBUD 10(IMO:930058)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
68	ROSEBUD 11(IMO:930059)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
69	ROSEBUD 12(IMO:930060)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
70	ROSEBUD 13(IMO:930061)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
71	ROSEBUD 14(IMO:930062)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
72	ROSEBUD 15(IMO:930063)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
73	ROSEBUD 16(IMO:930064)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
74	ROSEBUD 17(IMO:930065)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
75	ROSEBUD 18(IMO:930066)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
76	ROSEBUD 19(IMO:930067)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
77	ROSEBUD 20(IMO:930068)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
78	ROSEBUD 21(IMO:930069)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
79	ROSEBUD 22(IMO:930070)	-	42.40	SCRAPPING	ONS	BD	MBT	18/04 AT 080	-	44	FOR BEACHING
80	HIFI(IMO:9033888)	-	166.77	SCRAPPING	TUNJ	PANA	FABT	31/10 AT 1140	C	4.8	500

Source: The Panel

Annex 9 : Panama's reply to the Panel



MPP NY 1288/18

La Misión Permanente de la República de Panamá saluda atentamente a la Secretaría del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas establecido en virtud de la Resolución 1718 (2006), y tiene el honor de informar las medidas adoptadas por la República de Panamá en respuesta a las notas No. S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.147 de 18 de junio de 2018 y notas No. S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.223 de 16 de agosto de 2018.

La Misión Permanente de la República de Panamá, a solicitud de autoridad superior, remite al Panel de Expertos el informe nacional que la Secretaría Ejecutiva del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional en coordinación con la Autoridad Marítima de Panamá comunicó al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, en los casos relativos a las naves Shang Yuan Bao y New Regent, respectivamente.

La Misión Permanente de la República de Panamá aprovecha la ocasión para reiterar a la Secretaría del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas establecido en virtud de la Resolución 1718 (2006), las seguridades de su distinguida consideración.

02 de noviembre de 2018

Al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad
En virtud de la Resolución 1718 (2006)
Naciones Unidas
Nueva York



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República Dominicana, por la cantidad de \$619.25. Recibo de Impuestos y Tasas Anuales del 04 enero de 2017 a través del propietario Jui Chen Shipping Co., Limited, Nápoles Italia, por la cantidad de \$3,968.06.

- **Detalles sobre los accionistas:** Según nuestras constancias la embarcación era operada por una sociedad que no está constituida en la jurisdicción panameña, por lo que dicha información no constan en registros.
- **Copia de la más reciente tripulación:** No consta. Una vez que es cancelada una nave del Registro Mercante Panameño, no se tiene acceso a la más reciente lista de tripulación ya que la relación entre Estado de Pabellón y la nave desapareció una vez fue cancelada.

NEW REGENT

IMO: 8312497 y Distintivo de Llamada 3F CR5; año de construcción: 1983; tonelaje bruto: 2,998.00; tonelaje neto: 1,600.00; eslora: 104 mts.; manga: 119 X 30 mts.

- **CANCELACIÓN:** Tanquero con registro oficial N°46483-15. El proceso de cancelación del Registro Mercante Panameño se inició el 4 de septiembre con un pliego de cargos por denuncia presentada a la Administración de la Autoridad Marítima de Panamá, consistente que la misma estaba incurriendo en actividades que violan las Resoluciones emanadas del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas emitidas en contra de la República Popular Democrática de Corea del Norte. Sin embargo, la cancelación fue efectiva con posterioridad al inicio del proceso, a solicitud de parte interesada.
- **Propietario Registrado:** Mega Glory Holding Limited, dirección 2nd floor, Abbott Road Town, tortola British Virgin Islands, teléfono 88-7-2696301, Facsimile 86-7-2696313, correo electrónico lcn.crewing@gmail.co.
- **Operador Registrado:** Ocean Grow International Shipmanagement Consultant Corporation, Company IMO 5096871; dirección 4F-1, No.380, Ming Quan 2nd RD, Quianzhen Dist., Kaoshiung City 806. Taiwan; teléfono 886-7-9659989, facsimile 886-7-9660366, correo ogisco@oceangrow.com.tw, telex 051-94074828.
- **Persona de contacto responsable para responder a requerimientos de Autoridad:** Sung, Chao-Chen, Ocean Grow International Shipmanagement Consultant Corporation; 4F-1, No.380, Ming Quan 2nd RD, Quianzhen Dist., Kaoshiung City 806 Taiwan; teléfono 886-7-9659989, facsimile 886-7-9660366, correo ogisco@oceangrow.com.tw, telex 051-94074828.
- **Compañía Aseguradora para Cobertura de Daños:** Maritime Mutual, Blue Card No.3149 15A, a partir del 15 de julio de 2015 al 14 de julio de 2016, responsable Maritime Pacific R&I Services Ltd.
Arsenal Insurance Company, Policy Reference 18/PII12/000487, con fecha de 18 de julio de 2018, responsable Yury Makhovoy, Head of Marine Insurance Department.
- **Historial de Pagos para Registro:** pago por abanderamiento (adjunto), pago efectuado por los propietarios No. Recibo 10127030A, mediante cheque No. REC-138184/14-12-2017, banco Ofic. Del Reg. Aux en Tokio, fecha 26 de abril de 2018, por la cantidad de \$3,708.00. Recibo No.1218407 efectuado por Ocean Grow International Shipmanagement Consultant Corporation, en el consulado de Tokyo,

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en 03 de agosto de 2017, por la cantidad de \$1,500.00. Recibo No10089959A, efectuado por los propietarios, cheque No.REC.125295/24/12/2015, en la Embajada de Panamá en Taipei, el 20 de abril de 2016 por la cantidad de \$3,708.00.

- **Detalles sobre los accionistas:** Según nuestras constancias la embarcación era operada por una sociedad que no está constituida en la jurisdicción panameña, por lo que dicha información no constan en registros.
- **Copia de la más reciente tripulación:** No consta. Una vez que es cancelada una nave del Registro Mercante Panameño, no se tiene acceso a la más reciente lista de tripulación.

Acciones Preventivas tomadas a nivel nacional en torno a estas embarcaciones

Con motivo de las acciones preventivas y de protección del sistema financiero nacional, el registro mercante panameño y de las actividades relacionadas el Estado panameño adoptó las siguientes acciones en torno a estas embarcaciones:

- Se informó a los sujetos obligados financieros y no financieros acerca de los riesgos para el sistema financiero nacional representan las personas y empresas relacionadas;
- Se dio curso al congelamiento Preventivo de activos;
- Se hizo la búsqueda en la base de datos de inteligencia financiera;
- Notificó a los países interesados, sobre la medida tomada por Panamá respecto a las naves.
- De conformidad al párrafo cuarto del Artículo 51 de la Ley No. 57 de 6 de agosto de 2008 "General de Marina Mercante", una vez es iniciado el proceso de cancelación se suspende la Patente de Navegación de Servicio Internacional y por tanto, no se autorizarán prórrogas a dicho documento hasta que culmine el mencionado proceso.
- Se suspendió la emisión y/o la renovación de Certificados Técnicos, a favor de las naves SHANG YUAN BAO y NEW REGENT.
- Se notificó a los agentes residentes y a la Organización Reconocida ¹que ha efectuado los reconocimientos o ha emitido los correspondientes Certificados Técnicos, para que se abstengan de prestar tales servicios.
- A través de la Autoridad Marítima de Panamá se está trabajando en una serie de acciones que involucran el desarrollo e implementación de capacidades para el seguimiento y monitoreo de las naves que se crean pueden estar realizando actividades violatorias de las Resoluciones de la ONU.

Estás acciones incluyen:

¹De acuerdo a la Resolución J.D. 019-2005 de 24 de noviembre de 2005, Organizaciones Reconocidas son todas aquellas organizaciones nacionales e internacionales debidamente reconocidas por la Dirección General de Marina Mercante de la Autoridad Marítima de Panamá para hacer reconocimientos y expedir certificados estatutarios a las naves de la Marina Mercante Nacional, de acuerdo a las leyes nacionales y a los convenios internacionales ratificados por Panamá.

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- La revisión en el Sistema PurpleTRAC, de todas las naves que soliciten la inscripción en el Registro Mercante Panameño, así como, naves a las cuales se les tenga que emitir un certificado técnico, lo que permite observar cuando la nave mantiene algún tipo de restricción impuesta por un tercer Estado o por el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas.
- A través del equipo en el cual está programado el Sistema de Identificación y Seguimiento de Largo Alcance (LIRIT por sus siglas en inglés) que portan las naves de bandera panameña, administrado, por la compañía Pole Star, la cual lo adquirió luego de una licitación pública, se establecerá un polígono de vigilancia sobre las zonas que se consideren de mayor riesgo según la información que ha proporcionado previamente un tercer Estado.
- La Autoridad Marítima de Panamá, como medida preventiva el nombre del operador fue incluido en los procesos de cancelación para que el mismo sea del conocimiento de los funcionarios y agentes residentes, a fin de activar las alertas correspondientes y evitar la ejecución de actos que afecten los intereses nacionales y de la comunidad internacional.

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Annex 10 : Jui Zong's reply to the Panel



瑞榮船舶管理有限公司

JUI ZONG SHIP MANAGEMENT CO., LTD.

5FL-2 NO.551 JIOURU 1ST ROAD, SANMIN DIST, KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 80764
80764 高雄市三民區九如一路 551 號 5 樓之 2 TEL: 07-3974257 FAX: 07-3974258

DATE : 6TH, July, 2018
TO : United Nations and the Security Council Panel of Experts
established pursuant to resolution 1874(2009)
ATTN : Hugh Griffiths
TEL : +1 212 963 1055
FAX : +1 212 963 2013
FROM : Jui Zong Ship Management Co., Ltd.

SUBJECT :

Re: Reference : S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.147 , Panama-flagged Shang Yuan Bao (IMO number: 8126070)
involved in a ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK vessel Paek Ma (IMO number: 9066978).

Dear Mr. Hugh Griffiths,

We are the ship's agency 'Jui Zong Ship Management Co., Ltd.' of the Panama-flagged Shang Yuan Bao (IMO number: 8126070). We received a letter from you on 19th-June-2018, regarding sanctions measures imposed in relation to the DPRK in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).

We have contact with the ship owner 'Jui Cheng Shipping Co., Ltd.' for reply the Panel's problem. The owner indicates the vessel *Shang Yuan Bao* is too old to operation, therefore they decided to sell the vessel several months ago, and they are looking for the buyer until now. *Shang Yuan Bao* was drifting at sea and waiting for the owner's instruction because the potential buyer would like to visit the vessel. However, the DPRK vessel Paek Ma (IMO number: 9066978) seemed to took *Shang Yuan Bao* for oil supplier and closed to *Shang Yuan Bao*, that was a big misunderstanding. The DPRK vessel Paek Ma realized she had misunderstood but still asks *Shang Yuan Bao* could provide fresh water to them based on humanitarian aid, and *Shang Yuan Bao* agreed.

As above-mentioned, the vessel *Shang Yuan Bao* did not transfer bunker to the DPRK vessel Paek Ma, therefore we can not provide the information that you need.

Sincerely yours


Sophia Huang
JUI ZONG SHIP MANAGEMENT CO., LTD.



Source: The Panel

Annex 11 : Jui Zong correspondence to the Panel

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, October 15, 2018 10:22 PM
To: Hugh Griffiths
Cc: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Outgoing Communication #147 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Jui Pang Shipping

Dear Mr. Hugh Griffiths,

Please note the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau is investigating this case, we believe they shall give back our innocence, thank you.

B.R.G.D.S

Jui Zong Ship Management Co., Ltd.

----- Original Message -----

From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, October 15, 2018 11:51 PM
Subject: RE: Outgoing Communication #147 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Jui Pang Shipping

Dear Sir/Madame,

I would ask that you please identify yourself for the purposes of our report. Please give your name, position and affiliation.

I would note for the record that you have provided no documentation to substantiate your claims that the prohibited ship to ship transfers "was a big misunderstanding"

Nor have you provided the contact details – email, telephone numbers, names and addresses of the entities you refer to both in your letter of 6 July 2018 nor in your email of Monday 15 October.

Your level of involvement with the Panama-flagged Shang Yuan Bao is clear. Your excuse that the ship was transferring fresh water to the Paek Ma is not credible. Even if it were true, off ship to ship transfers are prohibited under the resolutions.

I take this opportunity to inform you that should documentation and information from you and your company are not forthcoming in the coming days, it is likely that the Panel may recommend you and your company for an assets freeze and travel ban in our next report to the Security Council.

Sincerely,

Hugh Griffiths

Coordinator, Panel of Experts

Established pursuant to UNSCR 1874

From: shipping <[REDACTED]>

Sent: Monday, 15 October, 2018 2:02 AM

To: Hugh Griffiths <[REDACTED]>

Subject: RE: Outgoing Communication #147 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Jui Pang Shipping

Dear Mr. Hugh Griffiths,

Good day. We are sorry to reply you so lately because we missed this e-mail and noted this e-mail when Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau came to our office last week.

Please note we are just a port agent at Kaohsiung port, not the actual operator or shipowner. We should not suffer any unrighted wrong.

The Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau is investigating the illegal action to the vessel, we believe we are innocence, thank you.

B.R.G.D.S

Jui Zong Ship Management Co., Ltd.

Source: The Panel

Annex 12 : Qihang International Shipping Management's reply to the Panel

Dear Mr.Hugh Griffiths & Mr.Jong Kwon Youn :

We received your message. We Hongkong Qi Hang International Shipping Management Co., Ltd as a ISM Management company attaches great importance to the matter. And we inquired the owner in no time, gotten the details as follows:

The registered owner of Sierra Leone's flag vessel "XING MING YANG 888" is Xing Ming Yang Hong Kong Shipping Company Co., they rented the vessel to XIAGANG HONG KONG MARITIME CO., LIMITED. And the vessel "XING MING YANG 888" is actually operated by XIAGANG HONG KONG MARITIME CO..

At early morning 11 Jun 2018, "XING MING YANG 888" was on the way to port of NingDe for repairing by the order of the charterer, and she had no any cargo on board. The duty officer received a calling on VHF Ch16 from a nearby vessel which you call vessel "MU BONG 1", they claimed to be rescued because they were no food and fresh water any more on board, and our duty officer reported to the captain immediately. Our captain considered the sake of humanitarian and in accordance with the provisions of Article 98 of the United Nations Convention on the Oceans on the obligation of rescue, so our captain allowed the vessel keeping alongside our vessel for supplying some food and fresh water in half an hour. Our captain claimed that all operations were no illegal activities, and all supplies during the period were lifesaving and humanitarian requirement.

All the above facts were confirmed by the owner and our crew. We request you to check all the facts in kindly, and give our vessel an unprejudiced treatment.

Best regards !

HK QIHANG INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING MANAGEMENT

For and on behalf of 2018.8.23
HK QIHANG INT'L SHIPPING MANAGEMENT LIMITED
香港啟航國際船舶管理有限公司
Qihang
Authorized Signature(s)

Source: The Panel

Annex 13 : Ship-to-ship transfers and coal vessels

1. Unsurprisingly, the transfers have continued to occur in international waters where there is weak or nonexistent monitoring by flag states, insurers and most traders. In the context of these transfers, the Panel notes the use of increasingly sophisticated evasion in addition to AIS manipulation which remains an overarching feature of the transfers. Other methods of evasion include physical disguise of DPRK tankers, the use of small, un-registered vessels, illegal name-changing and other forms of identity fraud, night transfers and use of other vessels for transshipment. The below text and figures show examples of each type of evasion.

2. The DPRK has been disguising tankers as cargo ships through the construction of fake cargo hatches¹⁶⁰ (see figure I) and the false reporting of these ships as cargo ships when AIS is switched on.

Figure I: Fake cargo hatches



Source: Member State

3. The below figures show the use of small, nondescript vessels not requiring an IMO number, making nationality and identity more difficult to determine, especially when the vessels obscure or paint false names (see figure II -IV for examples).

Figure II: Small ship transfer to tanker *Yu Phyang 5* of 19 June 2018



Source: Member State

Figure III: Small ship transfer to *Ji Song* of 19 May 2018



Source: Member State

¹⁶⁰ Made of wood and lashed with canvas.

Figure IV: Small ship transfer to *Yu Jong 2* of 16 February 2018



Source: Member State

Vessel identity fraud

4. Larger, internationally-registered, foreign-flagged vessels are also engaging in name falsification and other forms of identity fraud along with their DPRK counterparts. On 18 May 2018, the Panama-flagged *Shang Yuan Bao* (IMO number: 8126070) obscured the name on its bow and stern before engaging in a ship-to-ship transfer with the designated DPRK tanker *Paek Ma* (IMO number: 9066978) as the “*Puma*” which was painted on the vessel’s bow. (see figure V). The vessel also engaged in the now-common practice of switching off its AIS.¹⁶¹ (figure VI)


Figure V: *Shang Yuan Bao* ship-to-ship transfer and disguise of name



Source: Member State

¹⁶¹ The vessel’s operator, Jui Zong Ship Management Co., Ltd., in Taiwan Province of China, claimed to the Panel that the vessels did not “transfer bunker to the DPRK vessel” and that DPRK tanker had requested “fresh water to them based on humanitarian aid”. See annex 10.

Figure VI: Shang Yuan Bao AIS transmission record



Source: Windward

5. Taking advantage of the lack of monitoring, oversight and regulation by flag of convenience states, DPRK vessels have falsified their ports of registry and name to give the impression of being under a non-DPRK jurisdiction. This was seen when on 29 June the DPRK tanker *An San 1* disguised itself as the “*Hope Sea*”, of Freetown, Sierra Leone (figure VII).

Figure VII: An San 1 disguised as “Hope Sea” during 29 June illicit transfer



Source: Member State

6. In a new technique involving only non-DPRK-flagged vessels, one of which was later used to deliver petroleum to the DPRK, the former Belize-registered designated tanker *Wan Heng 11* (IMO

number: 8791667)¹⁶² conducted a daytime ship-to-ship transfer on 10 April with the *Patriot* (IMO number: 9003550) a Russian Federation-flagged vessel.


Figure VIII: Ship-to-ship transfer between *Wan Heng 11* and *Patriot*



Source: Member State

7. Both vessels' AIS transponders appeared to be switched off at the time of the transfer although the *Patriot*'s AIS appeared later that day, registering a draft change which indicated that a cargo had been discharged. (see figure IX)

Figure IX: *Patriot* AIS transmission record



Source: Windward

¹⁶² The *Wan Heng 11* had already been designated (for de-flagging pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 2321 (2016) and prohibited from port entry pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2371 (2017) on 30 March 2018 after it was observed engaging in a ship to ship transfer with the DPRK tanker *Rye Song Gang 1* on 13 February.

8. While the *Wan Heng 11* kept its AIS transponder off following the transfer, the vessel was observed delivering cargo to Nampo, DPRK, on 15 April (figure X).

Figure X: Wan Heng 11 in Nampo, 15 April




Source: Member State, Map: Panel

9. The Panel notes that while the *Wan Heng 11* violated paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017), the *Patriot* did not violate either this provision or paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017). The *Wan Heng 11* was designated for de-registration and a port call ban (and not for ship-to-ship transfer). In this context, **the Panel recommends that the Committee incorporate paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017) to the designation list in order to prohibit designated vessels from conducting ship-to-ship transfers with other foreign-flagged vessels.**

10. Since 30 May 2018, Member States have continued to report further transfers. For example, a Member State reported that the designated DPRK vessel *Chon Ma San* (IMO 8660313)¹⁶³ engaged in ship-to-ship transfers with and received fuel from the *Myong Ryu 1* and the *Jin Yang 36* (金洋 36) (figure II), both of unknown nationality, on 4 June and 25 June 2018, respectively. On 29 June, the designated *An San 1* received product from another tanker of unknown nationality in the same area.

¹⁶³ Designated on 30 March 2018. The Panel previously reported that this tanker attempted to disguise its identity as the “Whale”.

Figure XI: *Jin Yang 36* transfer to the *Chon Ma San* on 25 June 2018



Source: Member State

Coal vessel identity fraud and AIS manipulation

11. In 2018, the DPRK continued to violate the ban on coal exports through vessel identity fraud in order to deliver coal to Chinese ports as well as numerous, large-scale transfers of coal in international waters to small, unidentified vessels. These new strategies seem to be a response to the relatively successful curbing of the sale of coal by China and Vietnam following the adoption of resolution 2371 (2017).

12. The DPRK vessel *Kal Ma* (IMO number: 8503228) loaded coal at Nampo on 19 May and eight days later loitered off the Chinese port of Xiongyuo where it discharged its cargo before returning empty to Nampo on 9 June (figure I).

FigureXII: Kal Ma observed through satellite imagery May-June 2018




Source: Member State, Map: Panel

13. In so doing the *Kal Ma* concealed its identity and manipulated its AIS to portray itself as the “*K Ma*” and later the “*KM*”¹⁶⁴ both falsely broadcast as Cambodia registered. Under its false identity the *Kal Ma* indicated that its final destination was the port of Bayuquan, China, before it diverted to Xiongyuo (figures II and III). China informed the Panel that “based on the disguised name *KM* and the fictitious IMO number 9603128 of the vessel indicted by the Panel, the Chinese authority cannot find the record data of the vessel as well as any information showing the vessel discharging cargoes in the relevant sea area in China between 27 May and 1 June 2018. China also stated that the “Chinese Customs authority has not found any entry or exit border information for this vessel after 1 January 2018 or any record information on the vessel with the disguised IMO number. China will closely monitor the vessel *Kal Ma*, and prevent the vessel from conducting activities violating the Security Council resolutions in China.”

¹⁶⁴ The *Kal Ma*'s AIS transponder provided a fictitious IMO number 9603128 while broadcasting as the *KM*.

Figure XIII: Kal Ma reports false identity in AIS transmission on entering Chinese waters



Source: Windward

Annex 14 : Panel letters to Primorye/Gudzon

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED
PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE: S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.357

YOUR REFERENCE

28 November 2018

Dear Mr. Voitenko,

I am writing to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established by United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions [1718 \(2006\)](#), [1874 \(2009\)](#), [2087 \(2013\)](#), [2094 \(2013\)](#), [2270 \(2016\)](#), [2321 \(2016\)](#), [2356 \(2017\)](#), [2371 \(2017\)](#), [2375 \(2017\)](#) and [2397 \(2017\)](#), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The Panel would like to follow up on its letter dated 22 June 2018 (ref. S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.162) (see Annex 1), to which the Panel has not received a response to date. As Primorye Maritime Logistics is described publicly as a subsidiary of Gudzon Shipping by IHS Maritime and was registered for an International Maritime Organization (IMO) company number in June 2017 by Gudzon Shipping staff, who described Primorye Maritime Logistics as “an affiliated company” of Gudzon. As Gudzon senior management were assigned responsibilities for the departments of both companies¹, the Panel is continuing to send correspondence to the Gudzon email addresses associated with Primorye Maritime Logistics concerning the vessel *Patriot*.

The Panel kindly requests answers to questions 1 – 8 in our previous correspondence regarding the ship-to-ship transfers involving the *Patriot* and the vessel *Wan Heng 11* in order to reflect the reply of Primorye/Gudzon in the Panel's forthcoming report to the Security Council.

Mr. Alexey V. Voitenko
Director General and other responsible parties
Primorye Maritime Logistics Co Ltd (PML Co Ltd)
ul Ovchinnikova 12, Vladivostok, Primorskiy kray, 690048, Russian Federation
Emails: operator@sk-gudzon.ru; agshipping@mail.ru; logistika@sk-gudzon.ru; fleet@sk-gudzon.ru

cc: Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations

¹ Confidential correspondence held on file by the Panel.

In addition, according to a Member State (see Annex 2), the *Patriot* engaged in two ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK tankers in early January 2018. The Panel is conducting an independent investigation into this matter.

According to AIS data viewed on a commercial maritime platform, the *Patriot* did not transmit AIS for the period 7-8 January and 11-16 January 2018 (see Annex 3). The Panel has noted in previous reports that vessels engaging in ship-to-ship transfers switch off their AIS prior to such transfers. In the case of the documented *Patriot* ship-to-ship transfer with the *Wan Heng 11*, annex 5 of the Panel's 22 June 2018 letter noted an AIS switch off by the *Patriot* for this ship-to ship transfer.

In particular, the Panel would be grateful for your response to:

- (a) the statement of the Member State (see Annex 2) and;
- (b) your explanation for the AIS switch-off for the time periods 7-8 January and 11 -16 January 2018 (see Annex 3).

In addition, another Member State informed the Panel that Gudzon/Primorye is among the companies known and used by brokers who are operating outside of the DPRK and who are themselves aware of the nature and legal status of ship-to-ship transfers to DPRK-controlled vessels with whom they assist.²

In light of the above, the Panel would be grateful for any information on the measures your company has taken regarding **vigilance, due diligence and risk assessment** regarding the *Patriot* or any other vessels it owns, operates, manages or controls directly or through subsidiary or affiliated companies in matters relating to the United Nations Security Council's resolutions pertaining to DPRK-related ship-to-ship transfers.

In this regard, the Panel would like to also draw your attention to certain "best practice clauses" already sent to many global and regional commodity trading companies, brokers and refiners to assist them in reducing the risk that vessels under their control may wittingly or unwittingly engage in ship-to-ship transfers with vessels controlled by the DPRK (see Annex 4).

If Gudzon/Primorye decides to adapt and adopt the most relevant measures pertinent to your company, as a transporter of petroleum products, such as an AIS "switch off" undertaking, we would be grateful to receive information on this matter. Vessels that maintain their AIS at all times are statistically less likely to engage in ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK-controlled vessels, wittingly or unwittingly. In addition, such measures are simple to verify as the AIS of many vessels is being monitored by the Panel.

² Information held on file by the Panel.

As the Panel intends to provide its findings in its next final report to the Security Council, your timely response is important to ensure that your reply can be taken into consideration. In the absence of any response on your part, the Panel will publish its findings based on available evidence to the Panel.

Given the importance the Panel attaches to this investigation, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within one month of the date of this letter. Should you or your designated representative wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel via Mr. Hugh Griffiths (email: [REDACTED] and Mr. Jong Kwon Youn [REDACTED]

Yours sincerely,



Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annexes

1. Panel letter dated 22 June 2018 (ref: S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.162)
2. Extract from United States Department of Treasury statement, 21 August 2018
3. *Patriot* AIS data viewed through specialized maritime database for the period January 2018
4. Examples of "best practice" clauses provided to many leading global and regional commodity traders, brokers and insurers in May – June 2018

Annex 1. Panel letter dated 22 June 2018 (ref: S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.162)

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED
PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE: S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.162

YOUR REFERENCE

22 June 2018

Dear Sir/Madame,

I am writing to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established by United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions [1718 \(2006\)](#), [1874 \(2009\)](#), [2087 \(2013\)](#), [2094 \(2013\)](#), [2270 \(2016\)](#), [2321 \(2016\)](#), [2356 \(2017\)](#), [2371 \(2017\)](#), [2375 \(2017\)](#) and [2397 \(2017\)](#), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

According to paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017), "all Member States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction, entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction, and vessels flying their flag, from facilitating or engaging in ship-to-ship transfers to or from DPRK-flagged vessels of any goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or transferred to or from the DPRK". In paragraph 14 of the same resolution, the Security Council also decided that "all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all refined petroleum products" (subject to exemptions).

According to specialized maritime databases, your company, **Primorye Maritime Logistics Co Ltd (PML Co Ltd)**, a subsidiary of Gudzon shipping Co. Ltd., is the owner and operator for the Russian-flagged *Patriot* (IMO number: 9003550) which conducted a ship-to-ship transfer at sea with the designated tanker *Wan Heng 11* (IMO number: 8791667) on 10 April 2018, which then transhipped the refined petroleum to the DPRK (Annex 1).

Director General
Primorye Maritime Logistics Co Ltd (PML Co Ltd)
ul Tigrovaya 20A, Vladivostok, Primorskiy kray, 690091
Russian Federation
Email: office@sk-gudzon.ru; operator@sk-gudzon.ru
CC: Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations

The *Wan Heng 11* had previously been involved in prohibited ship-to-ship transfer at sea of petroleum products to the designated DPRK-flagged tanker *Rye Song Gang 1* (IMO number: 7389704) in the East China Sea on 13 February 2018.³ After departing the port of Nampo, DPRK, on 31 March 2018 (Annex 2), the tanker subsequently conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the *Patriot* on 10 April 2018 (Annex 3). The *Wan Heng 11* then returned to Nampo on 15 April 2018 (Annex 4). Specialized maritime tracking data shows that both tankers had switched off their AIS to hide the transfer but the *Patriot* later transmitted a draft change indicating a discharge had taken place on 10 April 2018 (Annex 5).

In its efforts to monitor the implementation of the relevant provisions of resolutions 2321 (2016) and 2371 (2017), and in order to gather reliable and verifiable information in this regard, the Panel would be grateful for the assistance of your company in providing the following information in connection with *Patriot*:

- 1) Explanation as to why there was a ship-to-ship transfer at sea between the *Patriot* and the designated tanker *Wan Heng 11*;
- 2) The type and amount of petroleum product transferred to the DPRK vessel *Wan Heng 11* on 10 April 2018;
- 3) Copies of the bills of lading and certificates of origin for the petroleum product carried aboard the *Patriot* prior to the transfer to the *Wan Heng 11*;
- 4) The identity and contact details of the point of contact or persons acting on their behalf to arrange the transfer to the *Wan Heng 11*;
- 5) Copies of the documents, emails and/or screenshots of mobile messages related to the transfer and its transfer confirmation sent to the buyer;
- 6) Copies of the invoices, remittances and bank account details for the payment for the transaction; and
- 7) Details of the means of communication with the *Wan Heng 11*; and
- 8) A copy of the crew list.

Paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution 2407 (2018) urges all Member States and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal.

In addition to the information above related to the ongoing investigation, the Panel would be grateful for any information on the measures your company has taken regarding vigilance, due diligence and risk assessment regarding involvement of the *Patriot* or any other vessels that it owns in violations of relevant Security Council resolutions.

As the Panel intends to provide its findings in its next mid-term report to the Security Council, your timely response is important to ensure that your reply can be taken into consideration. In the absence of any response on your part, the Panel will publish its findings based on available evidence to the Panel. The Panel would like to assure you that

³ The formerly Belize-flagged *Wan Heng 11* was subsequently designated pursuant to paragraphs 12 of resolution 2321 (2016), 6 of resolution 2371 (2017) and 6 of resolution 2375 (2017) on 30 March 2018.

any information that you may consider confidential can be handled accordingly and used solely for the information of the Security Council and the Committee.

Given the importance the Panel attaches to this investigation, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within one month of the date of this letter. Should you or your designated representative wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel via Mr. Neil Watts (email: [REDACTED]) or Mr. Hugh Griffiths (email: [REDACTED]).

Yours sincerely,



Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annexes

1. *Patriot's* registration details
2. Images showing the tanker *Wan Heng 11* in the port of Nampo on 31 March 2018
3. Image showing the tanker *Patriot* conducting a ship-to-ship transfer to the *Wan Heng 11* on 10 April 2018 in the East China Sea
4. Images showing the tanker *Wan Heng 11* returning to the port of Nampo on 15 April 2018
5. Extract from a specialized maritime database showing that the *Patriot* switched off its AIS during transfer but later transmitted a draft change indicating a discharge on 10 April 2018

Annex 15 : Vessels documented through imagery as loading and transporting DPRK coal

#	Date	Location	Vessel	Status
1	10 December 2017	Taeon, DPRK	<i>Forever Lucky</i> IMO: 9003653 Current flag: unknown Former flag: Panama until 11 December 2017	Loading coal
2	30 September 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	<i>Forever Lucky</i> IMO: 9003653 Current flag: unknown Former flag: Panama until 11 December 2017	At anchor
3	1 February 2018	Near Qinzhou, China	<i>Hua Fu</i> IMO: 9020003 Current flag: unknown Former flag: Panama until May 2017	At pier
4	22 August 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	<i>Hua Fu</i> IMO: 9020003 Current flag: unknown Former flag: Panama until May 2017	Conducting STS transfer of coal
5	24 April 2018	Nampo, DPRK	<i>Jang Un</i> IMO: 8822260 Current flag: DPRK	Loading coal
6	22 May 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	<i>Jang Un</i> IMO: 8822260 Current flag: DPRK	Conducting STS transfer of coal
7	24 July 2018	Nampo, DPRK	<i>Jang Un</i> IMO: 8822260 Current flag: DPRK	Loading coal
8	5 September 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	<i>Jang Un</i> IMO: 8822260 Current flag: DPRK	Conducting STS transfer of coal
9	15 August 2018	Nampo, DPRK	<i>Ka Rim Chon</i> IMO: 8314811 Current flag: DPRK	Loading coal
10	21 September 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	<i>Ka Rim Chon</i> IMO: 8314811 Current flag: DPRK	Conducting STS transfer of coal
11	21 September 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	<i>Pho Phyong</i> IMO: 8314811 Current flag: DPRK	Conducting STS transfer of coal
12	25 May 2018	Nampo, DPRK	<i>Nam Dae Chon</i> IMO:9138680 Current flag: DPRK	Loading coal
13	10 June 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	<i>Nam Dae Chon</i> IMO:9138680 Current flag: DPRK	Conducting STS transfer of coal
14	24 July 2018	Nampo, DPRK	<i>Nam Dae Chon</i> IMO:9138680 Current flag: DPRK	Loading coal

15	2 August 2018	Posan Ni, DPRK	<i>Paek Yang San</i> IMO: 9020534 Current flag: DPRK		Loading bagged coal
16	5 September 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	<i>Hua Fu</i> IMO: 9020003 Current flag: unknown	<i>Paek Yang San</i> IMO: 9020534 Current flag: DPRK	Conducting STS transfer of coal
17	27 October 2018	Songnim, DPRK	<i>Lucky Star</i> (formerly <i>Asia Bridge 3</i>) IMO: 9015278 Flag: Togo		Loading coal
18	20 November 2018	Near Dao Bach Long Vi Island, Vietnam	<i>Lucky Star</i> (formerly <i>Asia Bridge 3</i>) IMO: 9015278 Flag: Togo		At anchor
19	16 December 2017	Nampo, DPRK	<i>Oriental Treasure</i> (renamed <i>Dong Pang</i>) IMO: 9115028 Current flag: unknown / Former flag: Comoros		Loading coal
20	6 December 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	<i>Oriental Treasure</i> (renamed <i>Dong Pang</i>) IMO: 9115028 Current flag: unknown / Former flag: Comoros		Conducting STS transfer of coal
21	27 March 2018	Nampo, DPRK	<i>Tae Yang</i> IMO: 9115028 Current flag: DPRK		Loading coal
22	18 April 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	<i>Tae Yang</i> IMO: 9115028 Current flag: DPRK		Conducting STS transfer of coal
23	27 August 2018	Songnim, DPRK	<i>Tae Yang</i> IMO: 9115028 Current flag: DPRK		Loading coal
24	25 October 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	<i>Tae Yang</i> IMO: 9115028 Current flag: DPRK		Conducting STS transfer of coal
25	6 December 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	<i>Ho Chon Gang</i> IMO: 8415287 Current flag: DPRK		At anchor

Source: Member State

Annex 16 : Indonesia's reply to the Panel



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

No. 633/POL-202/IX/18

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006) and has the honor to inform the investigation and legal process conducted by the Government of Indonesia on the shipment of DPRK cargo vessel *Wise Honest* (see Annex).

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006) the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 12 September 2018



Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel Experts
Established Pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006)
New York

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**Investigation and Legal Process for DPRK Ship Wise Honest
Pursuant to relevant UNSC Resolutions and National Laws and Regulations
of the Republic of Indonesia**

Background

1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia has received initial informal information regarding the possible movement of DPRK flagged ship towards Indonesian waters on 31 March 2018. The ship was identified as *Wise Honest* (WH) with IMO number 8905490. The Ministry took coordinated steps to verify the information received with related government institutions on 1 April 2018.

Measures Taken

2. Verification measures were taken in Balikpapan as a response to the aforesaid coordination and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia has managed to gather information as follows:

- The Automatic Identification System (AIS) of WH was turned off during the ship's journey into Indonesian territorial waters and no report was made to the destined port authority for proper ship clearance;
- During the initial identification process, the ship was noted to be sailing without hoisting the ship's nationality flag. The ship was initially reported as Sierra Leone flagged ship manned by 25 crew members of DPRK nationality;

Note: during the further detailed inspection, Indonesian authorities found 2 documents of ship particular and crew list with different nationality, namely: Sierra Leone and DPRK.

- WH was loaded with approximately 26.500 MT of coal with cargo documents and port clearance received from a ship-to-ship transfer (STS) from a Russian cargo ship intending to conduct STS transfer around Balikpapan waters in East Kalimantan, Indonesia, was identified to be without proper export/import documents;
- Based on information received from another member state, the final destination/recipient of the coal upon the STS transfer in Balikpapan is to a company called Enermax, based in Goyang, South Korea;
- Indonesian Navy decided to detain the aforesaid ship along with its crews and cargo off the Port of Semayang, Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, Indonesia, on 4 April 2018 to this date for further legal process according to relevant national laws and regulations.

Recent Developments

3. During the detainment and inspection process, on 21 July 2018 a crew member of the ship passed away due to existing pre-conditions (heart failure due to diabetic related complications) and his remains is currently attended at the local hospital morgue in Balikpapan. On 28 July 2018, a crew member is being referred by doctor in Balikpapan for treatment in a hospital in Jakarta due to loss of eye sight (traumatic optic neuropathy) and is accompanied by another crew member under the consular care of the DPRK Embassy in Jakarta. Three other crews of the ship have been deported due to acute health problems (brain tumor). Currently there are a total of 19 crew members still detained on the ship, excluding the two in Jakarta.

4. On 20 July 2018, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia received a request for Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLA) from the Embassy of United States of America in Jakarta. The request is currently being processed, including the requirement to submit a list of documents as stipulated in Article 28 of Law No.1 (2006) on MLA.
5. Based on the abovementioned measures, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia reiterates its continued commitment to the implementation of relevant UNSC resolutions on DPRK. The ship *Wise Honest* is currently still detained in Balikpapan for further thorough investigation and judicial process in accordance to relevant national laws and regulations, namely Law No. 17 (2008) on Sea Voyage, particularly related to sea worthiness due to ambiguous legal status of ship's nationality.

Jakarta, 5 September 2018

Annex 17 : Contract for coal aboard the *Wise Honest***CONTRACT**

Contract No. : EK-AC-A-180301

Date of Issue : March 15, 2018.

The Buyers : ENERMAXKOREA CO., LTD.

Add.:

Kyeonggi-do, Korea

TEL: [REDACTED]

FAX: [REDACTED]

The Sellers : Hong Kong Nova International Trade Co., Limited

Add. : Rooms UNIT A9 . 9/F SILVERCJRP INTERNATIONAL TOWER, 707-713

NATHAN ROAD, MONGKOK, HONG KONG

TEL: +852-96669759

Bank Name : Hang Seng Bank Limited

Account Name : Hong Kong Nova International Trade Co., Limited

Account Number : 788-496925-883

Beneficiary Bank Address : 83 Des Voeux Road Central, HK

Beneficiary Bank Code : 024

Swift Code : HASEHKHH

The Buyer agrees to buy and The Seller agrees to sell the under mentioned goods subject to the terms and conditions stated below:

1. Description of Commodity, Specifications and technical demand:

(1) Commodity : Anthracite Coal

(2) Quality and Chemistry (Refer to the under-mentioned sample typical data):

- Size: 0 - 30mm, MAX 30mm
- Volatile Matter 5.50% MAX (Dry Basis)
- Ash 12.00% MAX (Dry Basis)
- Fixed Carbon 80.00% MIN (Dry Basis)
- Total Sulfur 0.5% MAX (Dry Basis)
- Total Moisture 8.00% MAX (As Received Basis)

(3) Packing : IN BULK

- 2. Total Weight : 26,000 MT ± 10%
- 3. Unit Price : CIF/POHANG PORT, KOREA 115.00 USD/MT
- 4. Total value : 2,990,000 USD
- 5. Shipment time : Before April 10, 2018.
- 6. Port of loading : EAST KALIMANTAN PORT, INDONESIA
- 7. Port of discharging : POHANG PORT, KOREA
- 8. Terms of payment : T/T Remittance

For and on behalf of
Danyang Korea International Trade Co., Limited
丹陽科亞國際貿易有限公司
Authorized Signature



- (1) When the custom clearance is completed, the Buyer shall pay the goods for the weight of 5,000MT immediately.
- (2) Within 7 days after the custom clearance is completed, the Buyer shall pay the goods for the weight of 5,000MT
- (3) Within 25 days, the Buyer shall pay the goods for the weight of 16,000MT and the Buyer shall try to pay quickly as soon as possible.

9. Loading Terms :

- (1) Within 3 working days after shipment, the seller shall notify the buyer by email name of the commodity, quantity, the shipment date and expected date of arrival of the goods at the port of destination.
- (2) Partial shipment : Not Allowed

10. Price Adjustment of Anthracite Coal (Ash) :

At the rate of \$1.00/MT for each 1% in excess of 12%(Ash)
the excess shall be deducted from the total price of goods after the report of SGS is issued.

11. Force Majeure: Either party shall not be held responsible for failure or delay to perform all or any part of this agreement due to flood, fire, earthquake, draught, war or any other events which could not be predicted, controlled, avoided or overcome by the relative party. However, the party affected by the event of Force Majeure shall inform the other party of its occurrence in writing as soon as possible and thereafter send a certificate of the event issued by the relevant authorities to the other party within 15 days after its occurrence.

12. **Arbitration:** All disputes arising from the execution of this agreement shall be settled through friendly consultations. In case no settlement can be reached, the case in dispute shall then be submitted to the Korea Commercial Arbitration Board for arbitration in accordance with its Provisional Rules of Procedure. The decision made by this commission shall be regarded as final and binding upon both parties. Arbitration fees shall be borne by the losing party, unless otherwise awarded. The arbitration is to be held in Korea.

13. **Liability for breach of contract:** Should all or part of the contract and its appendices be unable to be fulfilled owing to the fault of one party, the party in breach shall bear the liability therefore. Should it be the fault of both parties, they shall bear their respective liabilities according to actual situations.

14. **Others:** The contract is made out in English, one for each party, both versions being equally authentic. Contract signed via facsimile is valid.


THE SELLERS

Hong Kong Nova
International Trade Co., Limited

For and on behalf of
Hong Kong Nova International Trade Co., Limited
香港諾瓦國際貿易有限公司

Authorized Signature

THE BUYERS



Source: The Panel

Annex 18 : Correspondence with Novatobacco

On 12/20/2018 00:00, [REDACTED] wrote:

Dear Sir,

That is an interesting way of looking at things.

The problem with your hypothesis about someone else "stealing your bank account information is as follows:

If they deposit money in your bank account, that is your bank account. So it becomes your money.

So please explain to me why anyone would wish to have money sent to your bank account unless you were going to pass it on to them?

Sincerely,

Hugh Griffiths

From: novatobacco [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, December 19, 2018 1:58 PM

To: Hugh Griffiths

Cc: NOVATOBACCO

Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Sir

When we make commercial offer and payment forms for customers, we will write down the bank account information of our company, so I think someone has stolen the information of our company and passed to mentioned company.

Liu ChaoFeng



novatobacco

邮箱: [REDACTED]

Signature is customized by [Netscape Mail Master](#)

On 12/19/2018 20:24, [REDACTED] wrote:

Dear Sir,

Thank you for your email.

Why does the contract list your bank account number?

Sincerely,

Hugh Griffiths

From: NOVATOBACCO [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, December 19, 2018 10:56 AM

To: Hugh Griffiths

Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Hugh Griffith,

Thank you for your email and the notice.

We have no idea where this contract came from, nor why it has our company's seal.

The company's legal person signature does not conform to the signature on the contract.

The signature in the formal trade contract is as follows
Please see the attachment for details of the company's legal person signature.
Attached contract has not been covered by the official seal of the unit.
Upon enquiry, our company has never had any dealings with the company mentioned in the contract.
We will further protect our own interests through legal channels.
If there is any follow-up, please keep in touch, thank you.
Liu ChaoFeng General manager
Hong Kong Nova International Trade Co., Ltd

HK Nova International Trade Co. limited

Mobile: [REDACTED]

Skype: [REDACTED]

Viber: +8615810777861 Сайт: www.novatobacco.com

At 2018-12-18 18:54:48, "Hugh Griffiths" [REDACTED] wrote:

Dear Hong Kong Nova International Trade,

My name is Hugh Griffiths and I am Coordinator of the United Nations Panel of Experts monitoring the sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Attached is a contract that bears your company's name.

The signature on the contract appears identical to the signature that appears on your website (please see the second attachment for example).

This contract was for 25,500 (MT) tonnes of DPRK origin coal that has been seized by a Member State.

Please explain why your company with your bank account is named in this documentation.

Please provide correspondence and documentation to substantiate any response you may give, including:

- 1) Email correspondence and contracts to substantiate why your company is named in this contract;
- 2) Email correspondence and contracts to substantiate who were the other parties involved;
- 3) Bank account records relating to the above and to this contract.
- 4) Any additional background you wish to provide.

Please note that the Panel may name your company in its next report to the Security Council. We therefore invite you to provide your views so that we may consider them for inclusion in our next report to the Security Council.

Please reply within 14 days.

Sincerely,

Hugh Griffiths

О КОМПАНИИ

HONG KONG NOVA INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO., LIMITED

Мы являемся высокотехнологичным предприятием, занимающимся разработкой, производством и реализацией оборудования для табачной промышленности.

Наше оборудование в первую очередь предназначено для малых и средних табачных предприятий. "Малые" фабрики, неважно, что и в каком количестве - вот наша основная специализация. А благодаря своим богатым ресурсам, опыту, и тесной инновационной работе с клиентами мы помогаем малым и средним табачным предприятиям перейти на новый уровень, обеспечить современную технологию и информационную поддержку, а также качественную работу и обслуживание клиентов в самых неблагоприятных условиях.

Такой образом мы способны не только обеспечить вас надежным оборудованием, но и проконсультировать в выборе и покупке расходных материалов, запчастей и вспомогательных агрегатов, помочь вам подобрать средства и повысить эффективность производства.

Наша продукция - это сотрудничество с клиентами на протяжении всего срока службы, предоставляющее в дружбу. Ведь мы понимаем, что помимо тех денег, которые вы получаете, будет принесена не только прибыль, но и удовольствие!

The Buyers : ENERMAXKOREA CO., LTD.
Add: Room 1014 Yuguk Tower, 200 Jangbaek-ro, Bbandong-gu, Goyang-si, Kyeonggi-do, Korea
TEL: +82-31-901-5414. FAX: +82-31-902-5416

The Sellers : Hong Kong Nova International Trade Co., Limited
Add: Rooms UNIT A9, 9/F SILVERCIRP INTERNATIONAL TOWER, 707-713 NATHAN ROAD, MONGKOK, HONG KONG
TEL: +852-96869759

Bank Name : Hang Seng Bank Limited
Account Name : Hong Kong Nova International Trade Co., Limited
Account Number : 788-496925-883
Beneficiary Bank Address : 83 Des Voeux Road Central, HK
Beneficiary Bank Code : 024
Swift Code : HASEHKHH

THE SELLERS
Hong Kong Nova International Trade Co., Limited
Do and on behalf of Hong Kong Nova International Trade Co., Limited
[Signature]

THE BUYERS
ENERMAXKOREA CO., LTD.
[Redacted]

Source: The Panel

Annex 19 : Panel correspondence with Hamid Ali

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, December 23, 2018 1:59 AM
To: Hugh Griffiths
Subject: RE: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Mr. Griffiths,

Thanks for your today email.

Regret to inform we have never did any communications with Huitong Company sothat we do not have the PIC/CEO, office/email address or other company dsta"s .Mr Jong arrange for the TT of funds which we did received only part of the agreed amount for the transshipment cost.

Best regards,

Hamid Ali

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

----- Original message -----

From: Hugh Griffiths [REDACTED]
Date: 12/23/18 2:15 AM (GMT+07:00)
To: Ery Riza [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Mr. Hamid Ali,

Thank you for this information.

Please forward any correspondence you may have had with Huitong Minerals.

Please also provide an email address and the name of someone at Huitong Minerals, together with their physical address.

Best regards,

Hugh

Hugh Griffiths

Coordinator, Panel of Experts

Established pursuant to UNSCR 1874

Mob [REDACTED]

Tel [REDACTED]

From: Ery Riza [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, 21 December, 2018 9:20 PM
To: Hugh Griffiths [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Yes, Huitong was the only company sending funds for the transshipment process

Best regards,

Hamid Ali

On Fri, Dec 21, 2018, 10:34 PM Hugh Griffiths [REDACTED] wrote:

Dear Mr. Hamid Ali,

Thank you for the documentation, it is much appreciated.

From the banking documentation you have provided to us, it appears that an account in the name of "Huitong Minerals" made the payments to you in connection with the Wise Honest?

Please confirm if this was the only company.

Best regards,

Hugh

From: Ery Riza [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, December 21, 2018 8:12 AM
To: Hugh Griffiths
Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Mr. Griffiths,

Following our yesterday conversation and email exchange :

1. Mr. Eko Setyatmoko

He reconfirmed email : [REDACTED]

He informed being many discussion with Mr.Jong without our present and currently

follow by Mr. Park station in China but traveling regularly to Vietnam and now to Indonesia.

2. US Dollar transfer

Attached are copy of TT of received at our Bank which we have passed to Mr.Eko for his further activities.

3. Mr.Jong

Company Name : Korea Yin Myong Trading Company

ph : 850 218111 / 3818161

Representative (?) of Mr Jong in Indonesia is :

Mr. Kwak Chol Su, Hp : + [REDACTED]

Regret we do not other data like address etc.

We do hope these info will be useful if you need more data kindly advise me at your earliest convenience time.

Thank you

Kind regards,

Hamid Ali

On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 6:41 PM eryriza <[REDACTED]> wrote:

OK, will check with thr right one.

Brgds

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

----- Original message -----

From: Hugh Griffiths <[REDACTED]>

Date: 12/20/18 6:21 PM (GMT+07:00)

To: Ery Riza <[REDACTED]>

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Sir,

You provided an email address for Mr. Eko Setyatmoko: esetiatmoko@yahoo.com in your earlier email today

This email address does not work. Please provide the correct email address.

Sincerely,

Hugh Griffiths

From: Ery Riza [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2018 9:48 AM
To: Hugh Griffiths
[REDACTED]

Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear [Mr.Griffiths](#) ,

Your email of today [refers](#) :

1. Mr. Eko [email](#) : [REDACTED]
2. Mr. [Jong](#) ; we never have email exchange nor phone contact from our side to him ,

also not receiving email. We will try to locate address and phone/email as you requested will take time as getting info most difficult.

Thank you.

Kind [regards](#) ,

Hamid Ali

From: Ery Riza <eryriza@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2018 11:06 AM
To: Hugh Griffiths

Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Mr Griffiths,

As per your email request :

1. I will check with Mr Eko the current person in charge who being follow up for MV Wise Honest issue.
2. Funds was transfer by Telegrafic Transfer/TT to Mandiri Bank in Jakarta
3. We are more than happy to receive the latest info of product which are subject for sanction, however our main activities are worldwide exporting of Processed Palm Oil product like Oleochemicals etc., to DPRK limited to only Consumer Items like Detetrgent, Soap & Cooking Oil.

Hope this info will usefull for your further activities.

Thank you

Best regards,

Hamid Ali

On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 5:17 PM Hugh Griffiths [REDACTED] wrote:

Dear Sir,

Thank you for your telephone call earlier. Unfortunately the connection was not so good and I did not hear all of what you were saying.

I'd be grateful if you can write an email providing the important information.

- 1) Information on the subordinate of Mr. Jong, the North Korean gentleman who you said travels and may be based in China?
- 2) Information on how the North Koreans transferred the 760,000 USD to you by TT - you said TT was short for "telegram transfer"?
- 3) As to your regular meetings with a gentleman from the DPRK Embassy in Jakarta, this is your own private affair, however, there are now many business activities involving North Korea that are not allowed according to the United Nations Security Council resolutions. The Panel is happy to provide you with more information on this, should you be interested.

Best regards,

Hugh Griffiths

From: Hugh Griffiths
Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2018 9:51 AM
To: Ery Riza
[REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Sir,

Thank you for the email address.

We understand your difficulties in contacting Mr. Jong. Do you normally go through the DPRK Embassy to send messages to him?

Best regards,

Hugh Griffiths

On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 4:31 PM Hugh Griffiths [REDACTED] wrote:

Dear Sir,

Thank you for your email.

- 1) Please provide an email address for Mr. Eko Setyatmoko.
- 2) We understand that you may not have Mr. Jong's passport but please provide additional information on the DPRK entity "Yingmyong", such as telephone and fax numbers, scanned copy of business card, email address, physical address, company logo etc.

Sincerely,

Hugh Griffiths

From: Ery Riza [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2018 8:35 AM
To: Hugh Griffiths
[REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Mr. Griffiths,

Thanks for your email 20/12, below are our response for your few questions :

1. Mr. Jong Song Ho,

As informed previously we were introduce by Embassy who informed that Mr. Jong through the company Yinmyong are running big activities and representative biz in DPRK which we have never been in touch with this gentleman. As you might aware most Korean DPRK are very close and confidential among each other which never inform their Identity and nor their biz in details and impossible that we could have their personal profile/ name card or passport whatsoever

2. Mr. Eko Setyatmoko + [REDACTED]

We introduce to Mr. Jong which therefore we are not aware about the progress.

Company name ; PT. Bara Makmur Sadayana

Website not available.

3. Funds were transfer to Mr. Eko through cash /TT via Bank Mandiri

For further information of Mr. Eko kindly contact Mr. Eko directly as to overcome we make some mistake on his bis/private activities.

However if you need more info kindly contact me at your earliest convenience time

Looking forward for your favourable response we remain.

Thank you.

Best regards,

A.Hamid Ali

On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 12:47 AM Hugh Griffiths [REDACTED] wrote:

Dear A. Hamid Ali,

Thank you for your email and the explanations contained therein.

We have a few questions to ask you to further clarify matters:

1. On the gentleman that you met at the DPRK Embassy in Indonesia, Mr. Jong Song Ho. What government agency or business company did Mr. Jong Song Ho say he was working for? Please provide all this gentleman's contact details – phone numbers, email addresses, mobile number and please scan and send us a copy of his business card. If you have a copy of his passport, please send that too.
2. Did you introduce Mr. Eko Setyatmoko to Mr. Jong?
3. Please provide us with all contact details for Mr. Eko Setyatmoko together with the name of his company and its website.
4. Regarding the payment of USD 760,000, please provide us with more information. To which person and bank account did you make this payment?

Best regards,

Hugh Griffiths

Coordinator, Panel of Experts

Established pursuant to UNSCR 1874

Mob: + [REDACTED]

Tel: +1 [REDACTED]

From: Ery Riza [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, 19 December, 2018 1:37 AM
To: Hugh Griffiths [REDACTED]

Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Mr. Hugh Griffiths,

Your both email of Dec 18, 2018 are well received and noted, thanks for the information stated on your email.

First of all I would inform that we are not involved as a broker nor trade of the Coal being available in MV. Wise Honest.

Let me clearly inform the chronological of MV. Wise Honest calling Indonesian Territory:

1. In December 2017 we are approach by Embassy of DPRK to meet Delegation from DPRK named Mr. Jong Song Ho claim representing a famous and well established companies in many lines of Business. Their aim of visit is to explore business opportunities in Indonesia and first activity to open Korean Culture Centre in Tanjung Lesung , West Java.
2. For short term biz they offer Old Vessel to be scrapped and sell the scrapped Iron In Jakarta. The biz will be followed after Mr Jong back to DPRK and will bring all data and all vessel condition and terms during his 2nd visit to Jakarta soonest.
3. In January/February 2018 Mr. Jong was again visiting Jakarta however he was not ready for the vessel to be scrapped instead he discussed of the possibility to distribute DPRK products, he asked whether is possible to charter Vessel for Transhipment of Cargo which Coal from Russian Origin not using Korean Vessel. We agreed to find out the possibility as we are not and never involved in Vessel chartering.
4. Mr Jong were back in Jakarta in March 2018 and we have introduce Mr Eko Setyatmoko as the person who might be able to arrange for transhipment and agreed for the cost involved of this transhipment. Mr Jong start to TT for payment of the transhipment total USD 760,000.-
5. Without any sales contract nor transhipment agreement and without prior notice MV. Wise Honest has entering Indonesian Territory. The Vessel was hold by Indonesian Navy because of license nor notice to Indonesian Authorities.
6. Mr Eko is working to release the Vessel and Cargo and he is working very hard, upon court decission Coal Cargo were belong and responsibility of Mr. EKO.
7. During this process we were called by South Korean person, Mr. Jaewon Jeon from Enermax Company who claim he has bought and paid this coal which they asked our assistancy to do quickly the transhipment and send the Vessel to Pohang Port, South Korea.

We are not involved and do not know this buyer as the transaction were done by the owner of Coal not in Indonesia.

As matter of fact we are not Broker of the previous sales to Pohang Port and we are not selling this cargo to whatever party, this cargo due to court decission is belong to Mr Eko.

For your information most of the KOREAN never have Contract with us and exchange information all are done through face to face meeting.

However if you need more data and info please do not hesitate to contact me at your earliest convenience.

You could freely call me through my mobile + XXXXXXXXXX

Looking forward for your favourable response we remain.

Thank you.

Best regards,

A.Hamid Ali

On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:14 PM Hugh Griffiths [REDACTED] wrote:

Dear Sirs, Mr. Ali,

Further to my earlier email, I should stress again that the coal aboard the vessel Wise Honest cannot be sold and that it should be seized.

The Panel will be naming your company, PT Nur Kencana Lestari Inti in our next report to the Security Council.

I would advise you to reply quickly to the email below.

My colleague Jong Kwon Youn may provide advice on what the Security Council resolutions say about prohibited goods, such as DPRK coal, and their seizure.

Sincerely,

Hugh Griffiths

From: Hugh Griffiths

Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2018 11:01 AM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Mr. Ali,

My name is Hugh Griffiths and I am Coordinator of the United Nations Panel of Experts monitoring the sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

You have been named as the broker responsible for organizing a trade of 25,500 (MT) tonnes of DPRK origin coal that has been seized by Indonesia aboard the vessel Wise Honest in April 2018.

Please explain how you became involved in this prohibited trade.

Please provide correspondence and documentation to substantiate any response you may give, including:

- 1) Email correspondence and contracts to substantiate your role and the role of others;
- 2) Email correspondence and contracts to substantiate who were the other parties involved;
- 3) Bank account records relating to the above and to this contract.
- 4) Any additional background you wish to provide on previous trades with the parties concerned.


Please note that the Panel may name you and your company in its next report to the Security Council. We therefore invite you to provide your views so that we may consider them for inclusion in our next report to the Security Council.

Please reply within 14 days.

Sincerely,

Hugh Griffiths

Email attachment provided by Mr. Hamid Ali



Source: The Panel

Email attachment provided by Mr. Hamid Ali



**Rekening Koran
(Account Statement)**

Periode : From 01 March 2018
 To 31 March 2018
 Account No : 1260007369969 - ARBAA ENERGY RESOURC
 Currency : USD
 Branch : KCP Jkt Permata
 Opening Balance : 972.79

Date & Time	Value Date	Description	Reference No.	Debit	Credit	Balance
27/03/2018 14:44:29	27/03/2018	SWIFT CODE. BMRIIDJAXXX Debit InTTSusp HUITONG MINERALS CO LTDJP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NEW YORK, USA		0.00	149,958.00	150,930.79
28/03/2018 15:58:28	28/03/2018	SWIFT CODE. BMRIIDJAXXX Debit InTTSusp HUITONG MINERALS CO LTDJP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NEW YORK, USA		0.00	159,958.00	310,888.79
31/03/2018 23:59:00	31/03/2018	Biaya Adm		5.00	0.00	310,883.79
31/03/2018 23:59:00	31/03/2018	Bunga		0.00	3.82	310,887.61
31/03/2018 23:59:00	31/03/2018	Pajak		0.76	0.00	310,886.85
31/03/2018 23:59:00	31/03/2018	Biaya Meteral		0.44	0.00	310,886.41
No of Credit			3			
Total Amount Credited			309,919.82			
No of Debit			3			
Total Amount Debited			6.20			
Closing Balance			310,886.41			



**Rekening Koran
(Account Statement)**

Periode : From 01 April 2018
To 30 April 2018
Account No : 1260007369969 - ARBAA ENERGY RESOURC
Currency : USD
Branch : KCP Jkt Permata
Opening Balance : 310,886.41

Date & Time	Value Date	Description	Reference No.	Debit	Credit	Balance
				50,000.00	0.00	260,886.41
02/04/2018 10:30:18	02/04/2018	BG 383751- Transfer 20383751				
03/04/2018 08:28:34	03/04/2018	SWIFT CODE BMRIDJXXX Debit InTTSusp HUITONG MINERALS CO LTD,P MORGAN CHASE BANK, NEW YORK, USA		0.00	219,998.00	480,844.41
06/04/2018 11:12:05	06/04/2018	BG 383752- Transfer 20383752		10,000.00	0.00	470,844.41
10/04/2018 12:11:52	10/04/2018	BG 383754- Transfer 20383754		30,000.00	0.00	440,844.41
10/04/2018 12:13:30	10/04/2018	BG 383753- Transfer 20383753		20,000.00	0.00	420,844.41
12/04/2018 12:19:54	12/04/2018	BG 383756- Transfer 20383756		90,000.00	0.00	330,844.41
12/04/2018 12:22:59	12/04/2018	BG 383755- Transfer 20383755 KE ERY THURSINA		30,000.00	0.00	300,844.41
12/04/2018 19:58:23	12/04/2018	IRFB/ST13011804120222 Debit InTTSusp HUANG HE MINERALS (HONG KONG) CO STANDARD CHARTERED BANK		0.00	119,409.36	420,253.77
13/04/2018 10:32:31	13/04/2018	PAYMENTS FOR GOODS Debit Nostro - TRADE PIONEER LIMITEDFIRST COMMERCIAL BANK		0.00	74,585.00	494,838.77
13/04/2018 11:19:42	13/04/2018	BG 383758- Transfer 20383758		100,000.00	0.00	394,838.77
13/04/2018 16:14:23	13/04/2018	IRFB/ST13011804130288 Debit InTTSusp HUANG HE MINERALS CO, LIMITEDSTANDARD CHARTERED BANK		0.00	39,391.83	434,230.60
16/04/2018 10:15:21	16/04/2018	BG 383757- Transfer 20383757		150,000.00	0.00	284,230.60
17/04/2018 11:18:15	17/04/2018	BG 383759- Transfer 20383759		60,000.00	0.00	224,230.60
18/04/2018 11:10:48	18/04/2018	SWIFT CODE BMRIDJXXX Debit InTTSusp HUITONG MINERALS CO LTD,P MORGAN CHASE BANK, NEW YORK, USA		0.00	4,814.00	229,044.60
27/04/2018 10:06:47	27/04/2018	BG 383760-PAYMENT INV NO QGS- 180424-1 Transfer TT 20383760 QINGDAO GLOBAL SHIPPING CO., LIMITED		20,054.00	0.00	208,990.60
27/04/2018 11:00:32	27/04/2018	BG 383761- Transfer 20383761		40,000.00	0.00	168,990.60
30/04/2018 23:59:00	30/04/2018	Biaya Adm		5.00	0.00	168,985.60
30/04/2018 23:59:00	30/04/2018	Bunga		0.00	28.80	169,012.20
30/04/2018 23:59:00	30/04/2018	Pajak		5.32	0.00	169,006.88

Source: The Panel

Annex 20 : The Panel’s proposal for an amended delisting procedure for vessels

Paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017) encourages Member States to consult with the flag States of relevant vessels once they are seized, inspected, and frozen (impounded). Six months after such vessels were frozen (impounded), the Committee may decide upon request of a flag State to release the vessel if adequate arrangements have been made to prevent the vessel from contributing to future violations of the resolutions. However, once the vessel has been de-registered by a flag State in compliance with the resolutions (and therefore no longer under its jurisdiction), and since it would be a violation for flag States to re-register any such vessel that has been de-registered by another Member State, it is unlikely that a flag State will submit a request to the Committee to re-register the vessel and then submit a request for a seized or impounded vessel to be released.

To resolve this conundrum and to lessen the burden on Member States seizing or impounding a vessel in compliance with the resolutions, the Panel recommends that the Committee introduce a procedure whereby:

- 1) After a six-month period the vessel owner¹⁶⁵ may be permitted to make representation to the Committee for approval to have the vessel de-listed and released, provided that:
 - a) proof of ownership of the vessel is provided; and
 - b) adequate arrangements have been made to prevent the vessel from contributing to future violations of the resolutions.
- 2) If approved, the vessel is then de-listed from the Committee’s list of designated vessels and the re-registration of the vessel approved.¹⁶⁶
- 3) Once a period of six months has elapsed and no request for de-listing has been tendered within 31 days from that date, the Member State may approach the Committee for approval to submit the vessel for public auction to defray costs incurred.

In addition, this procedure should be published on the Committee’s website under “Procedures for delisting” at <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/materials>.

¹⁶⁵ A vessel’s beneficial owner is in the best position to ensure that adequate arrangements have been made to prevent the vessel from contributing to future violations of the resolutions since they are directly impacted by loss of trade.

¹⁶⁶ The Committee’s website should not remove the vessel’s name, but rather indicate the date that the vessel has been de-listed in order to provide verification for flag States and companies providing vessel services.

Annex 21 : Imports from and exports to the DPRK of commodities according to trade data

Table 1

States importing zinc and articles thereof and zinc ores and concentrates (HS codes 79 and 26) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, October 2017 to March 2018

(United States dollars)

Importing State	October 2017	November 2017	December 2017	January 2018	February 2018	March 2018	Total
India	20 950	7 901					28 851
Total	20 950	7 901					28 851

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

1. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of \$28,851 in zinc and articles thereof and zinc ores and concentrates (HS codes 79 and 26) to India in October and November 2017. All exports constituted violations of paragraph 28 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#).

Imports from the DPRK of commodities with exemption provisions (iron and steel and articles of iron and steel, textiles, food and agricultural products, machinery, electrical equipment, earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia, and wood)

Table 2

States importing iron and steel and articles of iron and steel (HS codes 72 and 73) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, October 2017 to March 2018

(United States dollars)

Importing State	October 2017	November 2017	December 2017	January 2018	February 2018	March 2018	Total
China	1 796 752	2 411 042	2 725 465	2 393 996	1 839 505	1 846 788	13 013 548
El Salvador			7 507	18 994			26 501
Ghana	20 868		9 532	283 146			313 546
India	65 189	3 194					68 383
Nicaragua	12 405	64 873	38 890	8 611	107 920	47 250	279 949
Serbia	3 186	29 981					33 167
Thailand				25 143	9 083		34 226
Total	1 898 400	2 509 090	2 781 394	2 729 890	1 956 508	1 894 038	13 769 320

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

2. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea violated paragraph 8 of resolution [2371 \(2017\)](#) by exporting a total of \$13,769,320 in iron and steel and articles of iron and steel (HS codes 72 and 73) to China, El Salvador, Ghana, India, Nicaragua, Serbia and Thailand from October 2017 to March 2018. China replied to the Panel that the "relevant data don't indicate the commodities under the items of HS code 7201", and that, under Chinese law and regulations, only items with HS codes 7201 are considered as constituting iron and steel and articles of iron and steel prohibited by the relevant resolutions.

Table 3
States importing textiles (HS codes 50–63) from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, October 2017 to March 2018

(United States dollars)

<i>Importing State</i>	<i>October 2017</i>	<i>November 2017</i>	<i>December 2017</i>	<i>January 2018</i>	<i>February 2018</i>	<i>Total</i>
China ^a	47 105 525	40 825 592	12 780 948	16 799		100 728 864
Ghana		14 173	85 040	64 985		164 198
India	234 163	15 497	5 929			255 589
Mexico		15 438				15 438
Russian Federation ^b		76 537	11 815			88 352
Thailand		26 617			3 486	30 103
Total	47 339 688	40 973 854	12 883 732	81 784	3 486	101 282 544

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

^a In a note verbale to the Committee dated 12 January 2018, China stipulated that the total value of its imports from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of textiles from 11 September 2017 to 10 December 2017 was \$5,139,300.

^b In a note verbale to the Committee dated 6 December 2017, the Russian Federation stated that, on 18 October 2017, 14,340 items of men’s apparel were imported from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in fulfilment of two contracts.

3. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea violated the textiles import ban stipulated in paragraph 16 of resolution 2375 (2017) by exporting a total of \$101,282,544 in textiles (HS codes 50–63) to China, Ghana, India, Mexico and Thailand, from October 2017 to February 2018. Only China and the Russian Federation reported to the Committee pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution 2375 (2017). With regard to China, the figure reported by China to the Committee of its imports from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is lower than indicated in Global Trade Atlas trade data, by \$95,589,564. In order to benefit from the reporting exemption in paragraph 16 of resolution 2375 (2017), these two figures should have been comparable. In addition to its reporting of \$5,139,300 worth of textiles imported during the period, China further replied to the Panel that all its imports “went through the customs formalities within 90 days” from the adoption of resolution 2375 (2017). With regard to the Russian Federation, the Panel notes that the unit of measurement (items of textile) is different from that reflected in table 3 (United States dollars) and **recommends that future Security Council resolutions stipulate the unit of measurement to be used by Member States in their reporting to the Committee.**

Table 4
States importing food and agricultural products (HS codes 07, 08 and 12) from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, January to March 2018

(United States dollars)

<i>Importing State</i>	<i>January 2018</i>	<i>February 2018</i>	<i>March 2018</i>	<i>Total</i>
China ^a	10 158 965			10 158 965
Total	10 158 965			10 158 965

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

^a In a note verbale to the Committee dated 5 February 2018, China stipulated that the value of its imports from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of food and agricultural products from 22 December 2017 to 21 January 2018 was \$16,872,600 (14,900 tons).

4. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of \$10,158,965 in food and agricultural products (HS codes 07, 08 and 12) to China in January 2018. China further replied to the Panel that all of its imports "went through the customs formalities within 30 days" from the adoption of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#).

Table 5
States importing machinery (HS code 84) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to March 2018

(United States dollars)

<i>Importing State</i>	<i>January 2018</i>	<i>February 2018</i>	<i>March 2018</i>	<i>Total</i>
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	11 736	1 296		13 032
China ^a	29 395			29 395
Costa Rica	21 053	5 017		26 070
El Salvador	73 711	1 444		75 155
India	12 961			12 961
Malaysia ^c	16 387			16 387
Total	165 243	7 757		173 000

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

^a In its note verbale to the Committee dated 5 February 2018, China stipulated that the value of its imports of machinery from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from 22 December 2017 to 21 January 2018 was \$43,000.

^b Malaysia replied to the Panel that "based on the statistics from Department of Statistics Malaysia (DOSM), there is no product under the HS codes of 84–85 being imported by Malaysia from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from January 2018 to February 2018".

5. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of \$173,000 in machinery (HS code 84) to Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Costa Rica, El Salvador, India and Malaysia in January and February 2018. All exports by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea after 21 January 2018 without notification to the Committee of those imports by 5 February 2018 violated paragraph 6 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#). Of the above-mentioned Member States, only China provided notification to the Committee, and China further replied to the Panel that all of its imports "went through the customs formalities within 30 days" from the adoption of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#).

Table 6
States importing electrical equipment (HS code 85) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to March 2018

(United States dollars)

<i>Importing State</i>	<i>January 2018</i>	<i>February 2018</i>	<i>March 2018</i>	<i>Total</i>
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	5 045	6 489		11 534
China ^a	990 919			990 919
Thailand	17 584	7 596		25 180
Total	1 013 548	14 085		1 027 633

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

^a In its note verbale to the Committee dated 5 February 2018, China stipulated that the value of its imports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of electrical equipment from 22 December 2017 to 21 January 2018 was \$1,346,300.

6. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of \$1,027,633 in electrical equipment (HS code 85) to the Plurinational State of Bolivia, China and Thailand in January and February 2018. All exports after 21 January 2018 without notification to the Committee of those imports by 5 February 2018 violated paragraph 6 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#). Of the above-mentioned Member States, only China provided notification to the Committee in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#).

Table 7

States importing earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia (HS code 25) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to March 2018

(United States dollars)

<i>Importing State</i>	<i>January 2018</i>	<i>February 2018</i>	<i>March 2018</i>	<i>Total</i>
China ^a	10 070 444			10 070 444
Total	10 070 444			10 070 444

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

^a In its note verbale to the Committee dated 5 February 2018, China stipulated that the value of its imports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia from 22 December 2017 to 21 January 2018 was \$10,434,800 (106,700 tons).

7. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of \$10,070,444 in earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia (HS code 25) to China in January 2018. China provided notification to the Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), and further replied to the Panel that all of its imports "went through the customs formalities within 30 days" of the adoption of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#).

Table 8

States importing wood (HS code 44) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to March 2018

(United States dollars)

<i>Importing State</i>	<i>January 2018</i>	<i>February 2018</i>	<i>March 2018</i>	<i>Total</i>
China ^a	2 405 718			2 405 718
Total	2 405 718			2 405 718

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

^a In its note verbale to the Committee dated 5 February 2018, China stipulated that the value of its imports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of wood from 22 December 2017 to 21 January 2018 was \$2,858,500 (16,200 tons).

8. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of \$2,405,718 in wood (HS code 44) to China in January 2018. China provided notification to the Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), and further replied to the Panel that all of its imports "went through the customs formalities within 30 days" from the adoption of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#).

Table 9
States exporting iron, steel and other metals (HS codes 72–83) to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, January to March 2018

(United States dollars)

<i>Exporting State</i>	<i>January 2018</i>	<i>February 2018</i>	<i>March 2018</i>	<i>Total</i>
China ^a	1 889 683	28 791		1 918 474
Honduras		11 461		11 461
Malaysia	93 407			93 407
Total	1 983 090	40 252		2 023 342

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

^a China replied to the Panel that, while all of its exports in iron, steel and other metals, all industrial machinery and transportation vehicles had been processed and released before 6 January 2018, for technical reasons relating to its customs system, the clearance operations were completed when “means of transport actually left the Chinese territory”. China also replied that all exports after the date are “self-use materials for diplomatic mission in the DPRK or humanitarian aids to the DPRK”, for which their “export formalities are completed and in line with the requirement” of the relevant resolutions.

9. According to Global Trade Atlas data, China, Honduras and Malaysia exported a total of \$2,023,342 in iron, steel and other metals (HS codes 72–83) in January and February 2018 to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea which violated paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017). China replied to the Panel on the precise nature of the exports during this period (see table 9, footnote a).

Table 10
States exporting all industrial machinery (HS codes 84 and 85) to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, January–March 2018

(United States dollars)

<i>Exporting State</i>	<i>January 2018</i>	<i>February 2018</i>	<i>March 2018</i>	<i>Total</i>
China ^a	14 215 799	218 602	28 674	14 463 075
Honduras	38 254	16 322		54 576
India	19 412			19 412
Total	14 273 465	234 924	28 674	14 537 063

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

^a See table 9, footnote a.

10. According to Global Trade Atlas data, China, Honduras and India exported a total of \$14,537,063 in all industrial machinery (HS codes 84 and 85) from January to March 2018 to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea which violated paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017). China replied to the Panel on the precise nature of the exports in this period (see table 9, footnote a).

Table 11
States exporting transportation vehicles (HS codes 86–89) to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, January to March 2018
 (United States dollars)

<i>Exporting State</i>	<i>January 2018</i>	<i>February 2018</i>	<i>March 2018</i>	<i>Total</i>
China ^a	1 803 351		55 094	1 858 445
Thailand			9 176	9 176
Total	1 803 351		64 270	867 621

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

^a See table 9, footnote a.

11. According to Global Trade Atlas data, China and Thailand exported a total of \$1,867,621 in transportation vehicles (HS codes 86–89) between January and February 2018 to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea which violated paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017). China replied to the Panel on the precise nature of the exports for the period (see table 9, footnote a).

Exports of commodities to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with exemptions (refined petroleum products and crude oil)

Table 12
States exporting petroleum (HS code 2710) to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, October 2017 to March 2018
 (United States dollars)

<i>Exporting State</i>	<i>October 2017</i>	<i>November 2017</i>	<i>December 2017</i>	<i>January 2018</i>	<i>February 2018</i>	<i>March 2018</i>	<i>Total</i>
China ^a	245 279	484 206	480 382	115 553	261 210	473 979	2 060 609
India	16 513 783						16 513 783
Russian Federation ^b	238 173	220 632	447 774	584 783			1 491 362
South Africa			275 639	66 852	138 306		480 797
Total	16 997 235	704 838	1 203 795	767 188	399 516	473 979	20 546 551

Source: Global Trade Atlas collated as of June 2018.

^a In five notes verbales from 2 January to 30 April 2018, China notified the Committee of the transfer of 2,165.1 tons of refined petroleum products to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for October 2017; 497.6 tons for November 2017; 463.214 tons for December 2017; and the further transfer of 4,032.72 tons of such products from January to March 2018. The corresponding values in United States dollars of the transfers made each month have been reported as: 1,188,000 (October 2017), 527,000 (November 2017), 490,000 (December 2017), 130,300 (January 2018), 835,800 (February 2018), and 1,592,400 (March 2018).

^b In three notes verbales from 27 December 2017 to 31 May 2018, the Russian Federation notified the Committee of its exports of 212.54 tons of petroleum products to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for November 2017; 589.664 tons for December 2017; and 4,148.381 tons from January to March 2018.

Table 13
States exporting other petroleum (HS codes 2711–2713)^a to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, October 2017 to March 2018

(United States dollars)

<i>Exporting State</i>	<i>October 2017</i>	<i>November 2017</i>	<i>December 2017</i>	<i>January 2018</i>	<i>February 2018</i>	<i>March 2018</i>	<i>Total</i>
China ^b	1 174 266	453 852	228 645	672 618	814 742	1 318 450	4 662 573
Russian Federation ^c			184 286	216 129			400 415
Total	1 174 266	453 852	412 931	888 747	814 742	1 318 450	5 062 988

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

^a China informed the Panel that it uses HS Codes 2710, 2712 and 2713 as HS Codes for refined petroleum products. China also informed the Panel that its Ministry of Commerce considers HS Code 2711.11 as “liquefied natural gas”, whereas the Panel uses HS Code 2711 as a part of “condensates and natural gas liquids”, prohibited by paragraph 13 of resolution 2375 (2017). The Panel has previously recommended that all Security Council resolutions on sectoral sanctions specify the HS codes (see S/2018/171, paras. 31 and 74).

^b See table 12, footnote a.

^c See table 12, footnote b.

12. Based upon the International Trade Centre (ITC) Trade Map, the Panel sent letters to South Africa (March-June 2018) and Turkey (March-July 2018) regarding the reported export of petroleum products (HS 2710) of 322,000 USD and 2.29 million USD respectively. Turkey clarified with supporting documentation to show that the export was made to the Republic of Korea. South Africa informed the Panel that “the letter has been forwarded to Pretoria for action.”

13. The Panel sent a letter to the Republic of Korea regarding August media reports of a transfer of petroleum products to Kaesong for a planned inter-Korean liaison office. The ROK replied, “in the process of carrying out the [inter-Korean] projects, the ROK personnel used the petroleum products exclusively for the implementation of the projects, while ensuring that no transfer of economic values to the DPRK occurs.” The ROK explained that “among 338,737 kg of petroleum products used for the implementation of the joint projects from January 2018 to November 2018, 4,039 kg were unused and brought back to the ROK.” The Panel notes that the specific language of paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017) requiring Member States to notify the Committee of any transfer to the DPRK of refined petroleum products is by territory as opposed to possession and does not differentiate between temporary and permanent transfers, or under whose control the items will be after transfer.

14. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea imported \$20,946,917 of refined petroleum products during the last three months of 2017. Starting from 2018, pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017), all Member States are prohibited from supplying, selling or transferring refined petroleum products to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea over 500,000 barrels in total. Since January 2018, China and the Russian Federation have notified to the Committee on their supply, sale or transfer of refined petroleum products to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although in paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017) the cap was set using barrels as the unit of measurement, the unit to be used by Member States in their required notifications was not stipulated. The figures in table 14 from China after April are based solely on Member State reporting to the Committee.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁷ According to the General Administration of Customs database centre, China Customs ceased reporting trade data on individual countries as from 1 April 2018 and Chinese Customs information web pages issued three web announcements on 23 May, 20 June and 20 July, each stating that the publication of customs statistics for [each month] has been temporarily suspended owing to technical reasons. See <http://haiguan.info/noted395.aspx>, <http://haiguan.info/noted396.aspx> and <http://haiguan.info/noted397.aspx>. See also <http://english.customs.gov.cn/newsroom/statistics> (accessed 30 July 2018).

Table 14
Data from Member States' notifications to the Committee pursuant to paragraph 5 (a) of resolution 2397 (2017)

(Tons)

<i>Month in 2018</i>	<i>China</i>	<i>Russian Federation</i>	<i>Total</i>
January	201.380	368.240	569.620
February	1 392.350	1 882.562	3 274.912
March	2 438.990	1 897.579	4 336.569
April	437.460	4 293.472	4 730.932
May	1 451.410	1 286.138	2 737.548
June	1 507.900	1 570.444	3 078.344
July	903.870	576.126	1 479.996
August	2 725.810	1 369.497	4 095.307
September	1 814.600	1 859.283	3 673.883
October	1 886.890	3 777.731	5 664.621
November	2 928.870	3 377.243	6 306.113
December	1 510.870	-	1 510.870
Total	19 200.400	22 258.315	41 458.715

Source: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/supply-sale-or-transfer-of-all-refined-petroleum>,

Crude oil

16. In Paragraph 4 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Security Council decided that all Member States should prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of crude oil to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exceeding 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons, unless the Committee approves in advance on a case-by-case basis for a 12-month period after the date of adoption of the resolution, 22 December 2017. Pursuant to the reporting clause contained therein, the Russian Federation reported that there were no declarations or exports of crude oil to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from January to June 2018, and China reported that the amount of the supply of crude oil by China to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was 150,500 tons from December 2017 to February 2018; 147,900 tons from March to May 2018; 108,500 tons from June to August 2018; and 118,100 tons from September to November 2018.

Recommendation

17. **The Panel recommends that the Committee agree upon a single conversion rate between tons and barrels for all refined petroleum products and specify the ton measurement referred to in the resolutions.**

Annex 22 : Angola's reply to the Panel



**Permanent Mission of
The Republic of Angola to the United Nations**

820 Second Avenue, 12th Floor, New York, NY 10017
Tel: (212) 861-5656 / Fax: (212) 861-9295

Ref. No. 8/2018-159

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Angola to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) and has the honor to submit herewith the additional information to the Republic of Angola's report on the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution on Democratic People's of Korea (DPRK).

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Angola to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be a stylized 'A' or similar character.

New York, 27 August 2018



Mr. HUGH GRIFFITHS
COORDINATOR
PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT
TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

NEW YORK

Republic of Angola
Ministry of External Relations
Office of the Minister

**ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA'S REPORT ON
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTIONS ON NORTH KOREA**

- 1) This presentation aims to provide additional information to the Republic of Angola's October 2017 report on the 'Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 2321 (2016); 2356 (2017); 2371 (2017) and 2375 (2017), monitored by the Panel of Experts of the 1718 Sanctions Committee.
- 2) We recall that the President of the Security Council Sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) acknowledged reception of the aforementioned report through N.V. Ref. S/AC.49/2017/OC.278 of 26 December 2017, addressed to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Angola.
- 3) Regarding the additional information requested, we would like to put forward the following observations:
 - a) Regarding the additional information requested by the United Nations Security Council's Panel of Experts on the situation of the DPRK diplomat, Mr. JON YONG CHOL, Third Secretary at the Embassy of the Democratic Popular Republic of Korea Embassy, we inform that he left the Angolan territory on April 20 2017 on an Emirates Airlines flight EK792 (See in Annex).
 - b) Regarding the reduction of diplomatic and administrative staff at the DPRK Embassy in Angola, we would like to inform that the staff was drastically reduced from 12 diplomats in 2016–2017 to 6 diplomats currently.
 - c) Administrative and technical staff was reduced from 13 in 2016–2017 to 3 members of staff currently (See the list from the State Protocol Directorate in Annex).
 - d) Regarding the supposed delegation of military advisers composed by 80 advisers from the DPRK which traveled from Angola to Mozambique, we are not aware of any movement or travel by military advisers from the DPRK from Angola to Mozambique in 2017.

- e) As notified in Angola's report on the implementation of resolutions to 2321(2016); 2356(2017); 2371(2017); and 2375(2018), a total of 152 citizens from the DPRK left the Angolan territory on November 18, 2017, among whom were the Board of Directors, cadres and employees of the Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies—the latter under sanctions imposed by the UN and listed in Annex II of Resolution 2371(2017).

It should be mentioned that the Republic of Angola has rigorously fulfilled its responsibility regarding the exit of DPRK citizens from national territory. In this context, the responsibility of the Angolan authorities in relation to foreign nationals ends the moment they leave national territory.

We are certain that the answers presented will help enlighten the Security Council Sanctions Committee's Panel of Experts on the DPRK about any pending questions from Angola's second report on the implementation of Resolutions 2321(2016); 2356(2017); 2371(2017) and 2375(2018), submitted on 21 December 2017. Angola defends the importance of maintaining Peace, Security, Stability and Prosperity in the Korean Peninsula region and has strictly abided the decisions and resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council on the matter.

MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS, Luanda, August 16, 2018.



REPÚBLICA DE ANGOLA
MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES
DIRECÇÃO GERAL DO PROTOCOLO DO ESTADO

**LISTA ACTUALIZADA DOS AGENTES DIPLOMÁTICOS E
 FUNCIONÁRIOS ADMINISTRATIVOS, CONJUGES E FILHOS DA
 EMBAIXADA DA R. P. D. DA COREIA ACREDITADA EM
 ANGOLA.**

**DE: DIRECÇÃO GERAL DO PROTOCOLO DO ESTADO
 CADASTRO**

1. KIM HYON IL -EMBAIXADOR.
2. KANG MYONG OK -EMBAIXATRIZ.
3. KIM CHOL SU -CONSELHEIRO.
4. KIM SUN YONG – ESPOSA DO CONSELHEIRO.
5. KIM JUNG HYON – FILHO DO CONSELHEIRO.
6. KIM JUNG GYONG – FILHO DO CONSELHEIRO.
7. MA KYONG HO – CONSELHEIRO.
8. KIM CHUN HYE – ESPOSA DO CONSELHEIRO.
9. MA JU MYONG – FILHO DO CONSELHEIRO.
10. RI KWANG CHAE - 1º SECRETÁRIO.
11. RI OK -ESPOSA DO 1º SECRETÁRIO.
12. JON KI HO -2º SECRETÁRIO.
13. KIM RYON JONG –ESPOSA DO 2º SECRETÁRIO.
14. JO SONG CHOL - 2º SECRETÁRIO.
15. KIM KUM HUI - ESPOSA DO 2º SECRETÁRIO.
16. JO WON RYONG – FILHO DO 2º SECRETÁRIO.
17. SONG CHOL – FUNCIONÁRIO ADMINISTRATIVO.
18. RI YONG GWAN - FUNCIONÁRIO ADMINISTRATIVO.
19. RI YONG IL - FUNCIONÁRIO ADMINISTRATIVO.
20. SO SU OK – ESPOSA DO FUNCIONÁRIO ADMINISTRATIVO.
21. RI JU RYON –FILHA DO FUNCIONÁRIO ADMINISTRATIVO.
22. JANG KUM SUK - ESPOSA DO FUNCIONÁRIO ADMINISTRATIVO.

Luanda aos 27 de Novembro de 2017



REPÚBLICA DE ANGOLA
 MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES
 Direcção Geral do Protocolo do Estado

EMBAIXADA DA REPÚBLICA POPULAR E DEMOCRÁTICA DA COREIA (NORTE)

N.	TITULAR	CATEGORIA	TIPO DE CARTAO	1. MISSAO	2. VIA	PRORROGACAO	DEVOLUCAO
01	KIM HYON IL	EMBAIXADOR	D	03/10/2013			
02	KANG MYONG OK	EMBAIXATRIZ	D	03/10/2013			
03	KIM CHOL SU	CONSELHEIRO	D	06/10/2016			
04	KIM SUN YONG	ESP. CONSELHEIRO	D	06/10/2016			
05	KIM JUNG HYON	FIL. CONSELHEIRO	D	06/10/2016			
06	KIM JUNG GYONG	FIL. CONSELHEIRO	D	06/10/2016			
07	MA KYONG HO	CONSELHEIRO	D	20/10/2016			
08	KIM CHUN HYE	ESP. CONSELHEIRO	D	20/10/2016			
09	MA JU MYONG	FIL. CONSELHEIRO	D	20/10/2016			
10	RI KWANG CHAE	1º SECRETÁRIO	D	12/09/2015			
11	RI OK	ESP. 1º SECRETÁRIO	D	12/09/2015			
12	JON KI HO	2º SECRETÁRIO	D	08/07/2015			
13	KIM RYON JONG	ESP. 2º SECRETÁRIO	D	08/07/2015			
14	JO SONG CHOL	2º SECRETÁRIO	D	23/08/2017			
15	KIM KUM HUI	ESP. 2º SECRETÁRIO	D	23/08/2017			
16	JO WON RYONG	FIL. 2º SECRETÁRIO	D	23/08/2017			

Source: Member State

Annex 23 : The Panel's letter to Iran

United Nations Nations Unies

HEADQUARTERS • SIEGE NEW YORK, NY 10017
 TEL. : +1 212 963 1055 • FAX : +1 212 963 2013

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED
 PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE : S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.359

IR REFERENCE

29 November 2018

Excellency,

I have the honour to write to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions [1718 \(2006\)](#), [1874 \(2009\)](#), [2087 \(2013\)](#), [2094 \(2013\)](#), [2270 \(2016\)](#), [2321 \(2016\)](#) and [2356 \(2017\)](#), [2371 \(2017\)](#), [2375 \(2017\)](#) and [2397 \(2017\)](#), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

According to a Member State, the DPRK has its most lucrative arms-related trade with the Syrian Arab Republic and Iran. The Member State has informed the Panel that two United Nations designated entities, the Korea Mining Development Technology Corporation and Saeng Pi'l (aka Green Pine Associated Corporation) maintain offices in Iran and that these offices are active.

In addition, the Member State informed the Panel that one pattern recently observed is of DPRK nationals on flights between Tehran and Dubai whereby these individuals return to Tehran within 24 hours. The assessment is that these individuals are cash couriers.

In this regard, the Panel recalls the evidence and information derived from airline companies, various Member States and the United Nations Security Council regarding KOMID officials Mr. Kim Yong Chol (passport number 472310168) and Mr. Jang Jong Son (passport number 563110024)¹⁶⁸ (see Annex 1) resident in Iran and accredited as diplomats at the DPRK embassy in Tehran until their removal in 2016, and their frequent visits to Dubai as well as various locations in Pakistan.¹⁶⁹ The Panel's letter to Iran dated 25 November 2015 (S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.791) noted that these two individuals flew Tehran-Dubai more than 282 times between 21 October 2012 and 5 October 2015, a pattern that continued into 2016.

¹⁶⁸ See Table 8, S/2017/150, p.68-69

¹⁶⁹ See Tables 8 and 9, S/2017/150, p.68-69

The Panel also notes as indications of previous cooperation between Iran and the designated entities KOMID and Green Pine Associated Corporation the visits by KOMID President Kang Myong Chol (see Annex 1 for passport) to Iran from Dubai from 16 to 25 December 2013¹⁷⁰ and Green Pine Association Corporation President Ri Hak Chol between 6 and 10 October 2014.¹⁷¹

As a number of the individuals listed above and featured in Annex 1 together with other KOMID and Green Pine Associated Corporation representatives are known to have acquired new passports and/or false identities, the Panel:

- Kindly reiterates its request contained in its letter of 31 October 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.918) (see Annex 2) requesting names and passport numbers of DPRK diplomats accredited in Iran;
- Kindly reiterates its request contained in its letter of 12 October 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.678) (see Annex 3) requesting immigration and visa checks and information on 78 DPRK nationals and others under investigation by the Panel;
- In light of the lack of a substantive response from Iran on the above matters for more than 12 months and in light of the recent information provided by a Member State, the Panel is now requesting copies of the relevant passport pages of all DPRK diplomats accredited in Iran;
- A full list of all other DPRK nationals residing in, or working in Iran, together with copies of their passports, and
- A full list of DPRK entities and companies operating in Iran, their contracts with Iranian military and/or civilian institutions and entities, para-statal companies and private institutions.

As the Panel intends to report on this case in its next report to the Security Council, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within **one month** of the date of this letter. **The Panel may name your country in our reporting and would therefore appreciate a reply from your country in order to consider reflecting your views in our next report.**

Should you wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel via Mr. Hugh Griffiths (email: [REDACTED]) and Mr. Olaf Andrieu ([REDACTED]).

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

¹⁷⁰ Flight and ticket records held on file by the Panel


¹⁷¹ In our letter dated 29 August 2016, reference number S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.659, the Panel wrote to Iran requesting information on Mr. Ri Hak Chol's activities in Tehran between 6-10 October 2014 but received no substantive response.

Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex 1: Copies of multiple DPRK diplomatic passports previously used by KOMID and Green Pine Associated Corporation officials while accredited in Iran, travelling to Iran or travelling between Tehran and Dubai

Annex 2: Panel letter of 31 October 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.918), requesting names and passport numbers of DPRK diplomats accredited in Iran

Annex 3: Panel letter of 12 October 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.678), requesting immigration and visa checks and information on 78 DPRK nationals and others under investigation by the Panel.



Annex 24 : Iran's reply to the Panel



Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations

622 Third Ave New York, NY 10017 www.Iran-UN.org Tel:+1(212)687-2020 Fax:+1(212)867-7086 E-mail: Iran@un.int

In the name of God, the most Compassionate, the most Merciful

No. 106192

19 December 2018

Dear Sir,

I am writing in response to your letter dated 29 November 2018 (S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.359) with regard to the information submitted by a Member State to the Panel against the Islamic Republic of Iran in relation to the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).

Contrary to claim of the above-mentioned Member State, there is no military cooperation or arms trade between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the DPRK. In fact, such a baseless allegation is a desperate politically motivated attempt against a founding Member of the Organization, abusing a United Nations mechanism that ought to be impartial and professional.

According to the latest available data and a recently held review, no entity or individual, designated pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council on the DPRK, is present or active in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Accordingly, the Korea Mining Development Technology Corporation and Saeng Pi'l (aka Green Pine Associated Corporation) have no office or activity in Iran.

Furthermore, there are no DPRK nationals residing in the Islamic Republic of Iran other than its diplomats.

The activities of the DPRK diplomats accredited to the Islamic Republic of Iran have so far not been in contradiction with the provisions of relevant conventions or resolutions of the Security Council on DPRK.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran strongly advises the Panel of Experts to avoid the inclusion of such unfounded accusations in its report. The Panel, in line with its mandate and the principle of professionalism, is expected to reject any unsubstantiated claim.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Eshagh Al Habib

Ambassador
and Charge d'Affaires

Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations New York

Annex 25 : Guicopres correspondence



Conakry, le 10 Décembre 2018

A

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

NEW YORK

A l'attention de Monsieur Hugh Griffiths

N° 120/PDG/GUICO/2018

Objet : Votre Courrier Réf S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.362

Monsieur,

Nous avons l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre courrier cité en objet et vous remercions pour les informations. A cet égard, nous vous informons que les coréens ont été sollicités par nous pour l'étude d'avant-projet mais que les travaux de levées topographiques ont été réalisés par les ingénieurs guinéens et français.

Il n'a jamais été question donc d'une collaboration ou d'un partenariat avec Nam Nam sur ce projet, mais plutôt d'une prestation ponctuelle de service payable à la tâche.

Dans le souci du respect de l'embargo des Nations Unies contre la République Démocratique et Populaire de Corée, nous avons pris des dispositions notifiant l'arrêt de toute collaboration avec NAM NAM.

L'entreprise Guicopres respectueuse des Accords internationaux ratifiés par le Gouvernement guinéen, ne dérogera pas aux décisions des Nations Unies auxquelles nous adhérons pleinement.

En vous souhaitant par avance bonne réception du présent courrier, le Groupe Guicopres reste à votre disposition pour toute information complémentaire utile à votre compréhension.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur, l'expression de notre considération distinguée.

Kerfalla CAMARA

Président Directeur Général



GROUPE GUICOPRES, Société Anonyme au Capital de 505 000 000 GNF RCCM/GC KAL M2/027105/2009
Siège Social : Rue KA003, Almamiyah - Commune de Kalouré - BP 4063 Conakry - République de Guinée
Tél : +224 655 44 00 00 - E-mail : info@groupe-guicopres.com site web : www.groupe-guicopres.com

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Translated from French

Groupe Guicopres
Conakry, 10 December 2018
No. 120/PDG/GUICO/2018

Re: Your letter S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.362

Sir,

We have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter and thank you for the information contained therein. In that regard, we wish to inform you that while we commissioned the pilot study from the Koreans, the topographic mapping was carried out by Guinean and French engineers.

At no time, therefore, has there been any form of collaboration or partnership with Nam Nam on this project. Rather, that company was paid for a one-off service.

With a view to ensuring compliance with the United Nations embargo on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, we have taken steps to notify the cessation of all collaboration with that company.

Guicopres respects the international agreements ratified by the Government of Guinea and has no intention of contravening United Nations decisions, to which we fully subscribe.

Trusting that this letter finds you well, Groupe Guicopres stands ready to provide any further information you may require.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Kerfalla Camara
Chief Executive

Mr. Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874
(2009)
New York

De: Olaf-Charles-Robert Andrieu [mailto: [REDACTED]]

Date: mercredi, 12 décembre 2018, 16:14

À: Bangoura Djiibril <info@groupe-guicopres.com>

Cc: Sierra Leone Mission [mailto: [REDACTED]], Guinea < [REDACTED]>, Hugh Griffiths [mailto: [REDACTED]]

Objet: RE: Outgoing Communication # 362 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to GUICOPRES

A l'intention de Monsieur Kerfalla Camara

Président-Directeur-Général

Groupe Guicopres

¶

Monsieur

¶

Le panel d'expert rattaché au comité 1718 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies vous remercie pour votre réponse (No-120/PDG/GUICO/2018) à sa lettre du 03 décembre 2018 (S/AC.49/2018/oc.362).

¶

J'ai l'honneur de poursuivre cette correspondance comme expert de ce panel que j'ai rejoint au mois de mai 2018 après une longue carrière, pour prendre en charge les problématiques liées à la prolifération des armes et en particulier les Armes de Destruction Massive (Missile, Nucléaire, Biologique, Chimique).

¶

Je vous exprime notre reconnaissance pour les mesures prises par le groupe que vous dirigez pour se mettre en conformité avec les résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité.

¶

Afin de compléter nos informations sur la compagnie Nam Nam Cooperative General Company, nous vous serions aussi reconnaissant de sonder votre personnel sur les questions suivantes et de bien vouloir nous en transmettre les réponses dans la mesure du possible d'ici 14 jours.

¶

1. → Comment, où et quand vos employés ont-ils sollicité la partie coréenne? En particulier cela s'est-il passé à Conakry ou en Sierra Leone?
2. → Pouvez-vous nous communiquer les noms, adresses, numéros de téléphones des Nord-Coréens contactés ainsi que ceux de la société Nam Nam?
3. → Vous mentionnez dans votre réponse que les attentes de votre groupe vis-à-vis de Nam Nam auraient été plutôt « des prestations ponctuelles de service payable à la tâche ». En l'occurrence, serait-il possible de nous transmettre les copies des documents relatifs aux offres, contrats éventuels, emails, et autres correspondances en relation avec la partie Nord-Coréenne.

¶

Au nom du coordinateur du Panel Hugh Griffiths, je vous remercie pour votre coopération et vous prie Monsieur le Président-Directeur-General, d'agréer l'expression de ma considération distinguée.

¶

Olaf Andrieu

Member, Panel of Experts

Established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)

United Nations Security Council

Tel.: [REDACTED]



https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/work_mandate



Conakry, le 20 Décembre 2018

A

MONSIEUR OLAF CHARLES ROBERT ANDRIEU
Member, Panel of Experts
Established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations Security Council

N° 121/PDG/GUICO/2018

Objet : Votre Courrier du 12 Décembre 2018

Monsieur,

Nous avons l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre courrier daté du 12 / 12/2018 sollicitant des détails sur les questions que vous y avez indiquées et vous remercions de bien vouloir noter que :

Nous n'avons contacté les travailleurs coréens qu'à l'occasion de la préparation du dossier de consultation pour la construction du camp de Freetown.

Nous confirmons que ceux-ci n'ont travaillé avec nous que quelques jours dans le cadre des études d'avant-projet puis nos ingénieurs géomètres et topographes ont pris le relai.

Nous réitérons que notre collaboration a pris fin à ce stade.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur, l'expression de notre considération distinguée.

Kerfalla CAMARA

Président Directeur Général



GROUPE GUICOPRES Société Anonyme au Capital de 500 000 000 GNF (CCM/GC/RAL/M2/027.195/2009)
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 Tél : +224 655 44 00 00 - E-mail : info@groupe-guicopres.com site web : www.groupe-guicopres.com

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Translated from French

Groupe Guicopres
Société Anonyme au Capital de 500 000 000 GNF RCCM/GC-KAL-M2/027.105/2009
Headquarters: Rue KA003 Almamiyah – Commune of Kaloum, 4063 Conakry, Republic of
Guinea
Tel: +224 655 440000 - E-mail: info@groupe.guicopres.com Website: www.groupe-guicopres.com

Conakry, 20 December 2018

No. 121/PDG/GUICO/2018

Subject: Your letter of 12 December 2018

Sir,

We have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 12 December 2018, in which you requested details on various issues, and we ask that you kindly note the following.

We only contacted the Korean workers during the preparation of the consultation file for the construction of the Freetown camp.

We can confirm that they only worked with us for a few days in the context of the pre-feasibility studies, and then our surveyors and topographers took over.

We reiterate that our collaboration ended at that stage.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of our highest consideration.

(Signed) Kerfalla Camara
Chief Executive Officer

Mr. Olaf Charles Robert Andrieu
Member, Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations Security Council

Source: The Panel

Annex 26 : The Panel's letter to Sudan

United Nations Nations Unies

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED
PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE : S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.305

REFERENCE

28 November 2018

Excellency,

I have the honor to write to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyze information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions [1718 \(2006\)](#), [1874 \(2009\)](#), [2087 \(2013\)](#), [2094 \(2013\)](#), [2270 \(2016\)](#), [2321 \(2016\)](#), [2356 \(2017\)](#), [2371 \(2017\)](#), [2375 \(2017\)](#) and [2397 \(2017\)](#), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The Panel is requesting additional information and documentation from Sudan based on the information supplied by Sudan in its 26 November 2018 letter to the 1718 Committee (see Annex 1) and in its National Implementation Report to the Committee dated 27 June 2018 and published on 14 August 2018 (see Annex 2).

In your 26 November 2018 letter to the Committee you state that:

“The Military Industry Cooperation (sic) has never dealt with a company named “KOMID” and has been dealing with a company named “Future Electronic Company (FEC). All deals with the latter were signed and paid in Sudan. The Military Industry Cooperation (MIC) has never received any shipment from North Korea. All shipments were from other countries” (see Annex 1).

In your annex to your 27 June 2018 letter (National Implementation Report) you state:

“Further to inspection and verification, the Government of the Sudan has cancelled the contract between the Future Electronic Company and Sudan Master Technology and brought an end to the companies' cooperation as of 15 July 2017.”

His Excellency
Mr. Omer Dahab Fadl Mohamed
Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Sudan
to the United Nations
New York

In this regard, the Panel kindly requests the following documentation:

- 1) A copy of the contract(s) between the “Future Electronic Company” and “Sudan Master Technology” aka Sudan Master Technology Engineering Corporation;
- 2) A copy of the contract(s) between the “Future Electronic Company (FEC)” and the “Military Industrial Cooperation MIC Sudan” aka Military Industrial Corporation (MIC) of Sudan¹⁷²;
- 3) A copy of the order(s)/decrees/correspondence nullifying the contract(s) with the above-mentioned Sudanese and DPRK entities;
- 4) A list of the staff of the” Future Electronic Company” that includes their names, all known aliases, passport numbers (all passport numbers used by each individual) and copies of their passports (all passports used by each individual together with departure evidence of these persons showing expulsion and final departure from the territory of Sudan¹⁷³;
- 5) Details of the bank account(s) of Future Electronic Company in Sudan together with a list of transfers to and from that bank account for the period 2013 – 2018, including data on foreign account numbers to which funds were transferred;
- 6) All documentation associated with UN designated DPRK entities, or other entities that may have operated as front companies on their behalf, including: Korea Mining Trading Development Corporation (KOMID), Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB), Future Electronic Company, Chongryong Technology Trading Corporation and Chosun Keumcheong Technology General Trade Corporation that have been the subject of Panel requests to Sudan from December 2015 until November 2018 (see Annex 3);
- 7) Your 26 November 2018 letter states that regarding Future Electronic Corporation “Sudan never received shipments from North Korea. All shipments came from other countries.” The Panel notes that DPRK arms brokering activities, whether the arms originate from the DPRK or not, is prohibited under resolutions 1874 (2009) and clarified further in paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 2270 (2016). The Panel kindly requests copies of all documentation for shipments of arms-related goods prohibited by the resolutions that were brokered or transferred to Sudan as part of contracts with Future Electronic Company (FEC) and any other DPRK-related entity irrespective of whether such goods originated from the DPRK or “other countries”.

¹⁷² The spelling of this entity in the 29 November 2018 letter is incorrect. The correct name of the Sudanese military company that has cooperated with the DPRK is the Military Industrial Corporation (MIC) of Sudan with the following website: <http://mic.sd/en/home/homepage>. Please see Panel letters Panel of 2 January 2018 (ref. S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.01) for additional information on MIC.

¹⁷³ According to the National Implementation Report (NIR) dated 14 August 2018 sent by Sudan to the Security Council 1718 Committee, Sudan stated that “In the light of paragraph 3 above, the Sudanese Government expelled the staff of the aforementioned company and prohibited them from entering the Sudan. The last of the staff members left on 12 August 2017.”

Please note that the Panel is investigating all of the above in an effort to better identify the overseas DPRK-related networks that continue to violate the Security Council resolutions with regard to the DPRK in African and Middle Eastern Member States;

Thank you for clarifying the situation with regard to Mr. Hussein Al-Ali's attempt to offer his services to Military Industry Corporation (MIC). His failed attempt is noted and your information on this individual will be reflected in our next report.

Regarding questions 1-7, as the Panel intends to report on these matters in its next final report to the Security Council, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within one month of the date of this letter.

Should you or your designated representative wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel via Mr. Hugh Griffiths (email: [REDACTED]) and Mr. Olaf Andrieu (email: [REDACTED]).

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex 1: Letter from Sudan to the 1718 Committee of 26 November 2018

Annex 2: Extract from Sudan National Implementation Report

Annex 3: Letters from the Panel to Sudan of

- 13 June 2018 (ref. S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.140)
- 2 January 2018 (ref. S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.01)
- 17 July 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.324)
- 11 November 2016 (ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.950)
- 29 September 2016 (ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.852) and
- 4 December 2015 (ref. S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.815)

Annex 1: Letter from Sudan to the 1718 Committee of 26 November 2018

Republic of the Sudan

Permanent Mission to the United Nations
New York



جمهورية السودان
البعثة الدائمة لدى الأمم المتحدة
نيويورك

No: SUN/552/18

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan to the United Nations presents its compliments to the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006) and has the honour to refer to paragraph (75) of the report of the Panel of Experts issued on August 2018, which included a number of inquiries concerning alleged Sudan's dealing with North Korean companies and citizens. In this respect, the Mission has the honour to convey the following:

1. The Military Industry Cooperation MIC (Sudan) has never dealt with a company named "KOMID", and it has been dealing with company named "Future Electronic Company (FEC)". All deals with the latter were signed and paid in Sudan. The Military Industry Cooperation (MIC) Sudan has never received any shipment from North Korea. All shipments were from other countries.

2. Mr. Kim Song Chol entered Sudan in 2013 and in 2016, using different names, and left in May 2017. He has not entered the Sudan since that date due to the travel ban imposed on him by the competent authorities.

3. Mr. Hussein Al-Ali had offered his services in 2008 to MIC (Sudan) but MIC did not meet him or develop any cooperation with him.

4. No documents were found about the name Mr. Kotai Hun and verification is ongoing.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006) the assurances of its highest consideration.



26 November, 2018

305 EAST 47TH STREET, 4TH FLOOR, NEW YORK, NY 10017 TEL: (212) 573-6033 FAX: (212) 573-6160

Annex 2: Extract from Sudan National Implementation Report

S/AC.49/2018/98

Annex to the letter dated 27 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

[Original: Arabic]

Report of the Sudan on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017)

Further to the resolutions of the Security Council concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, namely, resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), the Government of the Sudan wishes to provide the following information:

1. In its note verbale dated 19 June 2017 addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) (S/AC.49/2017/73), the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations stated that the Government of the Sudan had informed all relevant governmental authorities and individuals of the provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, placing particular emphasis on paragraph 40 of Security Council resolution 2270 (2016) and subsequent resolutions prohibiting commercial or military interaction with any entities or bodies affiliated with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

2. The Government of the Sudan has established a national team comprising all relevant agencies to follow up on implementation of the Security Council resolutions concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and prepare national implementation reports for submission to the Committee.

3. Following investigation and verification, the Government of the Sudan cancelled the contract between the Future Electronic Company and Sudan Master Technology, and brought an end to the companies' cooperation as of 15 July 2017.

4. In the light of paragraph 3 above, the Sudanese Government expelled the staff of the aforementioned company and prohibited them from entering the Sudan. The last of the staff members left on 12 August 2017.

5. The Government has added the list of banned individuals compiled by the Committee to its no-entry lists. It has circulated those lists to Sudanese embassies and points of entry into the country.

6. The countries do not have resident diplomatic representation. The Sudan covers the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from its embassy in Beijing, while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea covers the Sudan from Addis Ababa.

Annex 27 : Sudan's reply to the Panel

Republic of the Sudan
Permanent Mission to the United Nations
New York



جمهورية السودان
البعثة الدائمة لدى الأمم المتحدة
نيويورك

الرقم : س س ن/٥٦/٢١/١

التاريخ : ٢٠١٩/٠١/٠٢ م

تهدي البعثة الدائمة لجمهورية السودان لدى الأمم المتحدة تحياتها إلى لجنة مجلس الأمن المنشأة عملاً بالقرار ١٧١٨ (٢٠٠٦) الخاص بجمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية وتشير إلى مذكرة اللجنة بالرقم S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.305 بتاريخ ٢٨ نوفمبر ٢٠١٨ و التي تطلب فيها اللجنة معلومات حول تعامل هيئة التصنيع الحربي السودانية مع شركة Future Electronic Company وترجو الافادة بالاتي:

١. تم توقيع عقد اطاري واحد بين شركة سمت SMT وشركة (FEC) أعقبه توقيع عقدين تنفيذيين لتكريب مكملات لمشروع تطوير I22m وقنابل الطيران ، وقد تم ابطال هذا العقد و توابعه بتاريخ ١٥ يونيو ٢٠١٧ (مرفق صورة من العقد). ولا توجد اي عقود بين هيئة التصنيع الحربي (MIC) و.(FEC)
٢. تؤكد حكومة السودان على انه تم إيقاف كافة الانشطة مع جمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية بموجب القرار الصادر عن رئاسة الجمهورية السودانية بتاريخ ٣١ مايو ٢٠١٧ (مرفق) ، كما قامت هيئة التصنيع الحربي السودانية (MIC) و شركة سمت الهندسية(SMT) باصدار اوامر ادارية تجمد اي أنشطة مع جمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية وتلغي كافة العقود المبرمة معها في مطلع يونيو ٢٠١٧ (مرفق). كما صدر خطاب انذار و ابعاد للسيد KIM CHOL(مرفق).

٣. تم تكوين لجنة وطنية من الجهات ذات الصلة في السودان بتاريخ ٢٩ مايو ٢٠١٧ لمتابعة تنفيذ التزامات الحكومة السودانية بقرارات مجلس الامن المتعلقة بالعقوبات على جمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية.

٤. زار السيد KIM SONG CHOL السودان اول مرة في العام ٢٠١٣ لمتابعة تنفيذ العود الخاصة بتطوير 122m ثم في المرة الثانية ليشراف على بعض المجموعات التي كانت تعمل في تأهيل الرادارات الروسية P15/P12. ثم زار السودان مرة ثالثة في العام ٢٠١٦ باسم مختلف وجواز سفر جديد وذلك للمطالبة ببعض المستحقات المالية و غادر في مايو ٢٠١٧ و لم يدخل السودان بعدها حيث تم وضع اسمه في قائمة المحظورين من دخول البلاد.

٥. لم يتم اي تعامل بنكي ولم يتم اجراء اي تحويل من خلال حسابات بنكية داخل السودان او خارجة و كانت المعاملات المالية تتم مع FEC عبر الدفع المباشر محليا.

٦. لم تستلم شركة سمت الهندسية SMT اي شحنة من موانئ كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية وقد كانت الشحنات المستلمة وفقا لاجراءات التخليص العادية عبارة عن مكملات ومدخلات انتاج وليس هناك منتجات كاملة.

وتغتزم البعثة الدائمة لجمهورية السودان لدى الأمم المتحدة هذه الفرصة لتجدد تحيتها للجنة مجلس الأمن التابعة للأمم المتحدة المنشأة عملا بالقرار ١٧١٨ (٢٠٠٦).





بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

Date: 26/4/2017

Dear Mr. Hong ..

We have been instructed by our high authority to tell you that you are blocked to enter Sudan. This means that you cannot travel to Sudan by using your name or any other name.

This letter will be as official WORKING, accordingly you are asked to leave Sudan within one week.

With best regards

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Amir A. Abdalla", is written over a horizontal line.

Amir A. Abdalla





From : SMT
To : FEC Co.
Date : 15/06/2017

Total Pages: 1/1

Dear Sir,

Subject: Termination of Cooperation

According to the instructions given to us from our high authority we would like to inform you the following:

1. All cooperation between SMT and FEC should be terminated by the 01st of August 2017.
2. All the personnel from your side should quit the country by this date.
We shall be ready to give any assistance for the departure of your staff.
3. The contracts which are now running should be concluded before that date or otherwise should be stopped and a situation report should be made.
4. We are ready to discuss and settle all outstanding issues between us including financial issues.

We are sure that you appreciate our situation and you will cooperate with us to settle down all issues arise from this unexpected termination necessitated by circumstances completely out of our control.

Best regards,

Amir A. Abdalla



Frame contact

This frame contract (contract) is concluded in Khartoum on 27th of January 2013 by and between:

1. Sudan Master Technology Co. Ltd.
A company incorporated under Sudanese law, having its address in SMT Building, Gamhuria Street, Khartoum, Sudan and represented by Eng. Hasan Talha Hasan, hereinafter called (Employer) as First Part.
2. Future Electronic Company (FEC), a company registered under law of P.R. of China, having its address Haidian District, Beijing, China And represented by Mr. Hong Man Bok, passport no. 836288402, hereinafter called (contractor) as the Second Part.

First part and second part collectively called (parties)

The contractor offer his services to Employer in the field of rehabilitation, upgrade, maintenance of eastern Radars, air defense systems, tactical communication, maintenance and spare parts and training.

The Employer accepted the said offer.

Parties agreed their dealings to be governed by terms and conditions of this contract.

1. Subject- matter of the contract:

- a) The parties agreed that detailed services and/or supply in each field will be performed by purchase orders and/or contracts made by the parties.
- a) The price of each service/ good will be agreed upon on the relevant contract/purchase order according to man-hour or cost-plus for services and goods respectively.
- b) All payments will be made inside Sudan by the currency agreed upon between parties.

2. Obligation of the Employer:

The Employer will be responsible for reception of the personnel of the contractor and their stay, visas, accommodation, local (in land) and medical services during their say.

3. Obligation of the Contractor:

- a) The contractor will undertake to sell, supply, assemble, educate and train (collectively called technical assistance) according to the requirements and conditions of each contract.
- b) The contractor will be responsible for shipping the goods to Sudanese Sea/Air ports and will be responsible for them throughout duration of the contract until final Acceptance by Employer, the Employer will only be responsible for clearance and transportation of goods to the site.

4. Force Majeure:

1. Either party shall be released from the discharge of his obligations towards the other if, by reason of force majeure, he faces such circumstances that make the discharge of his obligations as specified in the contract impossible, provided that this should be not due to his omission.
2. When it becomes impossible to implement the contract within the stated schedule by reason of force majeure, the party, who is under the influence of force majeure, shall have the right to postpone his contractual obligations for a period specified in the contract; in this case the delay in the contract execution shall be deemed to be justified.
3. The party, who is under the influence of force majeure, shall obtain within a maximum period of 15 days as from the occurrence of force majeure an official document issued by the competent authorities in his country and legalized by the Embassy of the other party and the legal Chamber of Commerce, certifying the occurrence and the date of force majeure.
He shall send this document to the other party by registered mail within the stated period, and he has to notify him of the termination of force majeure by the same procedure and within the same periods.
The dates given in the legalized official documents shall be adopted for the determination of the start and end of force majeure.

4. There shall be considered as force majeure sudden circumstances, earthquakes, flood, war, whether declared or not, revolutions, civil war, riots, strikes, insurrection, industrial strike and strike in transport sector if they entail impossibility of execution of the contract or delay in the execution of the contract.
5. Fluctuation in the prices of raw goods, labor, and foreign currency shall not be considered as force majeure.

5. Confidentiality:

Parties undertake to keep absolute secrecy as regards the execution of this contract and not to release or give any information on it.

All documents in connection with this contract should be classified as confidential.

6. Dispute resolution:

All disputes arising out of interpretation or execution of this contract or detailed contracts shall be settled amicably. failing this within one month recourse should be made to arbitration under Sudanese laws.



For Employer
Eng. Hasan Talha Hasan



For contractor
Mr. Hong Man Bok

Republic of the Sudan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Undersecretary



جمهورية السودان
وزارة الخارجية
الوكيل

التاريخ: 2018/5/29م

الرقم: و/ت/د/عمومي

أم تشكيل لجنة تنفيذ التزامات السودان تجاه قرارات مجلس الأمن المتعلقة
بالتحديات المفروضة على جمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية

أخذاً في الاعتبار إلزامية قرارات مجلس الأمن على الدول الأعضاء بالأمم المتحدة واتساقاً مع مواقف السودان فيما يتصل بمناهضة إنتشار الأسلحة النووية وأسلحة الدمار الشامل، بهذا تقرر تشكيل لجنة لمتابعة تنفيذ السودان لقرارات مجلس الأمن المتصلة بجمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية، وتشكل اللجنة على النحو التالي :-

1. السيد السفير/ عمر صديق - مدير عام التعاون الدولي والقضايا الدولية - رئيساً
2. السيد السفير/ محمد عيسى إيدام - مدير عام الشؤون الأمريكية والأوروبية - عضواً
3. السيد السفير/ أنس الطيب - مدير إدارة القانون الدولي والمعاهدات - عضواً
4. السيد السفير/ صديق محمد عبد الله - مدير إدارة الشؤون الأمريكية - عضواً
5. السيد السفير/ كمال بشير - مدير إدارة المنظمات الدولية - عضواً ومقرراً
6. السيد ممثل وزارة الدفاع - عضواً
7. السيد ممثل وزارة المالية - عضواً
8. السيد ممثل وزارة الداخلية - عضواً
9. السيد ممثل وزارة التجارة - عضواً
10. السيد ممثل وزارة التعليم العالي - عضواً
11. السيد ممثل وزارة النقل - عضواً
12. السيد ممثل جهاز الأمن والمخابرات الوطني - عضواً
13. السيد ممثل بنك السودان المركزي - عضواً
14. السيد ممثل منظومة الصناعات الدفاعية - عضواً

أ. تختص اللجنة بمتابعة تنفيذ إلتزامات السودان تجاه قرارات مجلس الأمن ذات الصلة بالموضوع.

ب. تتولى اللجنة إعداد التقرير الوطني السنوي الذي يُقدم إلى مجلس الأمن.

ج. للجنة الحق في الإستعانة بمن تراه مناسباً.

د. ترفع اللجنة تقاريرها بصفة دورية لوكيل وزارة الخارجية.

صدرت تحت توقيعى في اليوم ٢٠١٢/٥/٢٩ الموافق ١٣/١٣/١٤٣٩



عبد الغني النعيم عوض الكريم

وكيل وزارة الخارجية

معنون إلى :

- السيد رئيس اللجنة.
- السادة أعضاء اللجنة.

صورة إلى :

- السيد مدير مكتب السيد الوزير.
- السادة مديري مكاتب السادة وزراء الدولة.

Translated from Arabic

[Pages 1 and 2]

Republic of the Sudan

Permanent Mission to the United Nations

New York

Ref.: *sin sin nun/56/21/1*

2 January 2019

The Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1817 (2006) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and refers to its note S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.305 of 28 November 2018, by which the Committee requested information regarding the interactions of the Sudanese Military Industry Corporation (MIC) with the Future Electronic Company (FEC). The Permanent Mission of the Sudan wishes to provide the following information:

1. A single framework agreement was signed between the companies SMT and FEC. Two executive contracts were then signed to provide parts for the project to develop 122mm [weapons] and aerial bombs. The contract and its effects were terminated on 15 June 2017. A copy of the contract is enclosed. There are no contracts between MIC and FEC.
2. The Government of the Sudan wishes to state that all activities involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have been suspended pursuant to an order issued by the President of the Republic of the Sudan on 31 May 2017 (see enclosure). In early June 2017 (see enclosure), MIC and the engineering company SMT issued administrative orders freezing all activities with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and cancelled all contracts concluded with that country. A letter giving a warning and notice of expulsion was sent to Mr. Kim Chol (see enclosure).

3. On 29 May 2017, a national committee comprising the competent agencies in the Sudan was established with a view to following up implementation of the Sudanese Government's obligations under the Security Council resolutions concerning sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
4. Mr. Kim Song Chol visited the Sudan for the first time in 2013 to follow up implementation of the contracts regarding the development of 122mm [weapons]. He then visited a second time to oversee some groups that were working to install Russian P12 and P15 radars. He visited the Sudan a third time in 2016 under a different name and a new passport in order to request certain financial dues. He left in May 2017 and has not entered the Sudan since; his name has been placed on a no-entry list.
5. There have been no banking transactions, and no transfers have been processed, through bank accounts within or outside the Sudan. The financial transactions involving FEC consisted of direct payments made locally.
6. SMT did not receive any shipments from ports in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The shipments received through regular clearance procedures consisted of components and production parts, not of complete products.

The Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations takes this opportunity to convey to the Committee the renewed assurances of its highest consideration.

[Pages 8 and 9]

Republic of the Sudan

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Under-Secretary

Ref./*waw-kha'ta'-dal*/public

29 May 2018

Order establishing a committee on implementation of the obligations of the Sudan under the Security Council resolutions concerning the sanctions imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Given that Security Council resolutions are binding on States Members of the United Nations, and in view of the Sudan's position against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, a committee is hereby established with a view to following up implementation of the obligations of the Sudan under the Security Council resolutions concerning the sanctions imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Its composition shall be as follows:

1. H.E. Umar Siddiq, Director-General for International Cooperation and International Affairs – chair.
2. H.E. Muhammad Isa Idam, Director-General for American and European Affairs – member.
3. H.E. Anas al-Tayyib, Director of the Department of International Law and Treaties – member.
4. H.E. Siddiq Muhammad Abdullah, Director of the Department of American Affairs – member.

5. H.E. Kamal Bashir, Director of the Department for International Organizations – member and rapporteur.
 6. The representative of the Ministry of Defence – member.
 7. The representative of the Ministry of Finance – member.
 8. The representative of the Ministry of the Interior – member.
 9. The representative of the Ministry of Commerce – member.
 10. The representative of the Ministry of Higher Education – member.
 11. The representative of the Ministry of Transport – member.
 12. The representative of the National Intelligence and Security Service– member.
 13. The representative of the Central Bank of the Sudan– member.
 14. The representative of the defence industry network – member.
-
- (a) The committee shall follow up implementation of the obligations of the Sudan under the relevant Security Council resolutions.
 - (b) The committee shall prepare a national annual report for submission to the Security Council.
 - (c) The committee shall have the right to consult whomever it deems appropriate.
 - (d) The committee shall submit periodic reports to the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This order was issued and signed by me today, on 29 May A.D. 2018 (13 Ramadan A.H. 1439).

(Signed) Abdulghani al-Na'im Awad al-Karim

Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Annex 28 : Panel’s vessel inspection: ship identity laundering to deceive the IMO

1.The Panel investigated a case of ship identity laundering whereby a flag of convenience vessel previously identified by the Panel as having transported prohibited coal shipments removed all identifiers, was provided with new documentation and ships’ books for classification and inspection purposes and then applied for and obtained a new, legal vessel number from the International Maritime Organization. The ship in question is the Togo-flagged *Talent Ace* (IMO number: 8793873) which was previously the *Xin Sheng Hai* (IMO number: 9485617). It entered the port of Gunsan on 18 January 2018 and was subsequently detained by the Republic of Korea pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017).

2.Inspection of the vessel revealed that a new IMO number had been inserted into the vessel’s super-structure (figure I) and a complete set of ship documents had been provided to allow the vessel to appear as a first-time applicant to legally obtain the number. The *Talent Ace*’s engine and generator serial numbers still matched those of the *Xin Sheng Hai*’s (figure II).

Figure I: New legal IMO number



Source: The Panel

Figure II: Engine serial number



Source: The Panel

3.Inspection of the ship’s bow revealed that the name “*Talent Ace*” was painted over its former identity (figure III). When informed of the fraud, the International Maritime Organization cancelled the IMO number and merged the false identity with that of the *Xin Sheng Hai*.


Figure III: “Talent Ace” blacked out and painted over former names



Source: The Panel

4. The *Talent Ace*'s operator Wooheng (Hongkong) Shipping appears to be acting on behalf of the operator of the *Xin Sheng Hai*, Liberty Shipping.¹⁷⁴ The Panel has identified Liberty Shipping as the operator of other designated vessels as well as DPRK-flagged ships, and was itself designated by the United States on 23 February 2018.¹⁷⁵ The Panel found that the IMO registration address for the vessel's owner, Wynn East Import & Export Trading Pte. Ltd., is the same as that of Wooheng (Hongkong) Shipping.¹⁷⁶ The Panel is continuing its investigation.

Figure IV: Document recovered aboard the Talent Ace showing Wooheng using email address of Liberty Shipping, the operator of the Xin Shen Hai



¹⁷⁴ Wooheng (Hongkong) Shipping Co. Ltd uses the email of Liberty Shipping (Libertyshipping@163.com) (see figure IV), which has been identified as the operator of other designated vessels, as well as DPRK-flagged ships.

¹⁷⁵ Liberty Shipping was also the operator of the previously designated *Karo Bright* and the DPRK vessel *Sai Nal 2*

¹⁷⁶ Registered in Singapore (ID: 201412213D) at: 2 Venture Drive, #11-30 Vision Exchange, Singapore (608526)

Annex 29 : The Panel's letter to the Syrian Arab Republic

United Nations Nations Unies

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED
 PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE : S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.361

REFERENCE

3 December 2018

Excellency,

I have the honor to write to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyze information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions [1718 \(2006\)](#), [1874 \(2009\)](#), [2087 \(2013\)](#), [2094 \(2013\)](#), [2270 \(2016\)](#), [2321 \(2016\)](#), [2356 \(2017\)](#), [2371 \(2017\)](#), [2375 \(2017\)](#) and [2397 \(2017\)](#), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The Panel is following up on its letter of 28 June 2018 (ref. S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.172) (see Annex) to which it has received no reply to date. In addition, the Panel has received information from a Member State that:

- The DPRK is continuing prohibited cooperation with the Scientific Studies Research Centre (SSRC) and the Army Supply Bureau (ASB);
- The DPRK national who replaced Ryu Jin as KOMID representative in the Syrian Arab Republic is known as "Kim". Mr. "Kim" has as his deputy a Mr. Rim Yong Hyok and both these individuals work together with Pak Kwang Il.

In addition, the Panel wishes to follow up on its letters of 1 September 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.378), 5 July 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.308), 21 October 2016 (ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.904 and 905), 9 June 2016 (ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.185) and 5 May 2016 (S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.117) as well as your response letter of 17 August 2017 (see Annex).

His Excellency
 Mr. Bashar Ja'afari
 Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic
 to the United Nations
 New York

The Panel wishes to reiterate its request for **a full list of the activities undertaken by these individuals and all other DPRK nationals in the Syrian Arab Republic, their contracts with Syrian companies and institutions, together with copies of their passports, and other relevant information as requested in our previous communications.**

The Panel would welcome any other information that you might consider relevant to its work as mandated by the Security Council. In addition, the Panel would like to assure you that any information you may consider confidential can be handled accordingly and used solely for the information of the Security Council and the 1718 Committee.

As the Panel intends to report on this matter in its next Final report to the Security Council, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within one month of the date of this letter.

Should you or your designated representative wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel via Mr. Hugh Griffiths (email: [REDACTED]) and Mr. Olaf Andrieu (email: [REDACTED]).

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex:

Panel letters of 23 November 2018 (ref: S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.172), 1 September 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.378), 5 July 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.308), 21 October 2016 (ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.904 and 905), 9 June 2016 (ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.185) and 5 May 2016 (S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC/117) and Syrian Arab Republic letter of 17 August 2017



**PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC TO THE
UNITED NATIONS**

820 Second Ave., 15th Floor, New York, N. Y. 10017
Tel: (212) 661-1313
Fax: (212) 983-4439

MOST URGENT

PM/2017/324

New York, 17 August 2017

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to Coordinator of Panel Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and with reference to the letter no. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.308 dated 5 July 2017, has the honor to inform the following:

1. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has no inter-action with the two entities or individuals whose names are mentioned in the letter.
2. There are no DPRK technical companies in Syria, and the only presence of some DPRK individuals are confined in the field of sports under private individual contracts for training in athletics and gymnastics.

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations avails itself of its opportunity to renew to Coordinator of Panel Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), the assurances of its highest consideration.

H.E. Hughs Griffiths
Coordinator of Panel Experts established pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)



Annex 31 : Reply of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Panel**PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC TO THE
UNITED NATIONS**

820 Second Ave., 15th Floor, New York, N. Y. 10017
Tel: (212) 661-1313
Fax: (212) 983-4439

MOST URGENT

PM/2019/09

New York, 11 Jan 2019

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to Coordinator of Panel Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and with reference to its letter, has the honor to inform the following:

1. The existing relations between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are in harmony with international law and the Charter of the United Nations and, therefore, do not violate Syria's international obligations.
2. Syria believes that the information presented to the Panel of Experts is not objective and cannot be examined, scrutinized or verified by the Syrian Government because it is superficial and based on sources that have no credibility.
3. The diplomatic representation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Syrian Arab Republic is in conformity with the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and the provisions of these Conventions.

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations avails itself of its opportunity to renew to Coordinator of Panel Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), the assurances of its highest consideration.

H.E. Mr. Hughs Griffiths

Coordinator of Panel Experts established pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

CC. H.E. Mr. Christoph Heusgen

1718 Committee Chair




Annex 32 : Prime Okryu Gallery website

(1) Example of Mansudae Art Studio works advertised on the website (right: Ri Gyong Nam “Winter in thick forest”. left: An Chang Nam “Thick forest”) (top)



Source: <https://www.okryugwan.net/artgallery> (accessed on 3 May 2018)

(2) Contents showing the affiliation of the gallery (bottom)



Source: <https://www.okryugwan.net/?lang=en> (accessed on 3 May 2018)

Annex 33 : Information on DPRK cyberattacks provided to the Panel by a Member State in November 2018 (excerpt)

- Cyberspace is used by the DPRK as an asymmetric means to carry out illicit and undercover operations in the field of cybercrime and sanctions evasion. These operations aim at to acquire funds through a variety of measures in order to circumvent the sanctions.
- • The illicit activities of the DPRK rely on a particular cyber composite ecosystem. Among these well identified illicit activities are online scams and the hacking of the global SWIFT messaging system. The DPRK relies on the expertise of at least four groups of hackers specialized in espionage and sabotage, who carry out, “Advanced Persistent Threats (APT)”.

Annex 34 : Excerpt on DPRK cyberwarfare capabilities from “Military and Security Developments involving the DPRK 2017”, a report to Congress pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act, Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense

a variety of anti-ship cruise missiles, torpedoes, and guns. The NKN maintains one of the world's largest, albeit aging, submarine forces, with around 70 attack-, coastal-, and midget-type submarines. In addition, the NKN operates a large fleet of air-cushioned hovercraft and conventional landing craft to support amphibious operations and SOF insertion. The force is divided into East and West Coast Fleets, each operating a variety of patrol craft, guided-missile patrol boats, submarines, and landing craft.

The NKN has displayed some modernization efforts, highlighted by upgrades to selected surface ships and a small-scale program to produce modern, surface, missile-armed patrol boats and corvettes.

North Korea continues to operate and test its GORAE-class ballistic missile-capable submarine as part of its larger high-priority ballistic missile program.

SOF. North Korean SOF personnel are among the most highly trained, well-equipped, best-fed, and highly motivated forces in the KPA.

Strategic SOF units dispersed across North Korea appear designed for rapid offensive operations, internal defense against foreign attacks, or limited attacks against vulnerable targets in the ROK. They operate in specialized units, such as reconnaissance, airborne and seaborne insertion, commando, and other specialty units. All emphasize speed of movement and surprise attack to accomplish their missions. SOF may be airlifted by An-2 Colts or helicopters

(and possibly Civil Air Administration transports), moved by maritime insertion platforms, or travel on foot over land or via suspected underground cross-DMZ tunnels to attack high-value targets, such as command and control nodes or airbases in the ROK.

In 2016, Kim Jong Un publicly unveiled a possible new SOF battalion of KPA Unit 525 that may be tasked with decapitation missions. During a publicized exercise in December 2016, the SOF battalion assaulted a full-scale mockup of the Blue House, the official residence of the President of the Republic of Korea, practicing helicopter insertion, probable abduction of the ROK President, and eventual destruction of the building.

Cyberwarfare Capabilities. North Korea possesses increasingly sophisticated cyber warfare capabilities, including offensive capabilities, which are capable of damaging and disruptive cyberattacks. North Korean cyber effects operations have been implicated in malicious cyber activity since 2009 and challenge widely recognized norms of state behavior in cyberspace. North Korea has invested in developing its cyber capabilities and probably views cyber operations as an appealing, cost-effective, and deniable means by which to collect intelligence and cause disruption against its highly networked adversaries, notably the ROK, Japan, and the United States. North Korea likely believes it can conduct cyber effects operations with little risk of reprisal, in part because its networks are largely separated

from the Internet and disruption of Internet access would have minimal impact on its economy. In November 2014, North Korean cyber actors using the nom de guerre "Guardians of Peace" attacked Sony Pictures Entertainment, shutting down employee access and deleting data. For these types of attacks, North Korea likely uses Internet infrastructure from third-party nations.

Pyongyang probably is increasingly using cybercrime to offset financial losses resulting from international sanctions, especially given stricter Chinese enforcement of these sanctions. For example, North Korea probably was involved in the theft of \$81 million from the Central Bank of Bangladesh in February 2016. North Korean cyber actors also are using malware to blackmail individuals and companies into paying large fees to keep sensitive information (such as personally identifiable information) from being publicly released. In 2017, North Korea carried out the malicious "WannaCry" ransomware attack that spread across the world damaging civilian infrastructure, including the United Kingdom's National Health Service and Chinese firms. North Korea exploited an existing vulnerability that allowed it to encrypt a target's hard drive, then demanded payment in cryptocurrency within a set time period or else the users' data would be wiped. Even individuals and firms which paid the ransom did not recover their data.

Intelligence Services. North Korean intelligence and security services collect

political, military, economic, and technical information through open sources, human intelligence, cyber intrusions, and signals intelligence capabilities. North Korea's primary intelligence collection targets remain the ROK, the United States, and Japan. They likely operate anywhere North Korea has a diplomatic or sizable economic overseas presence.

The **Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB)** is North Korea's primary foreign intelligence service, responsible for collection and clandestine operations. The RGB comprises six bureaus with compartmented functions, including operations, reconnaissance, technology and cyber capabilities, overseas intelligence, inter-Korean talks, and service support.

The **Ministry of State Security (MSS)** is North Korea's primary counterintelligence service and is an autonomous agency of the North Korean Government reporting directly to Kim Jong Un. The MSS is responsible for operating North Korean prison camps, investigating cases of domestic espionage, repatriating defectors, and conducting overseas counterespionage activities in North Korea's foreign missions.

The **United Front Department (UFD)** overtly attempts to establish pro-North Korean groups in the ROK, such as the Korean Asia-Pacific Committee and the Ethnic Reconciliation Council. The UFD is also the primary department involved in managing inter-Korean dialogue and North Korea's policy toward the ROK.

Source: <https://fas.org/irp/world/dprk/dod-2017.pdf>

Annex 35 : Republic of Korea National Police Agency News Release: Results of the Joint Investigation Team of the Republic of Korea Police and Government -- Hacking of Consumer Information of Interpark determined to have be done by DPRK

[Unofficial translation (excerpt); Original follows]

The National Police Agency (Cyber Security Bureau) and the Government Joint Investigation Team, after an initial investigation on the recent hacking of customer information of InterPark and the blackmail to the company, state their assessment that the hacking was conducted by the DPRK's Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB).¹⁷⁷

As evidence, the joint team pointed out to three main factors:

- 1) the IP addressed used for hacking emails and hacking commands (systematically used before by the DPRK RGB)
- 2) the malware used in the attack (as well as decoding and methods to remove traces of the attack) were similar to those that the DPRK used in past cyber-attacks
- 3) DPRK- style expressions used in black mail/cyber threat emails

This incident shows that North Korea is going beyond attacking basic infrastructure and is now trying to steal national wealth through the criminal acquisition of foreign currency. Considering the seriousness of the issue, the Government of the ROK is closely monitoring the changes in the cyberattack tactics of the DPRK.¹⁷⁸

Source:<http://www.korea.kr/policy/pressReleaseView.do;jsessionid=gyhqXhbdjxKTGwcXCNCQ2BVbcCWKJfVBdKGLGhyMR1cQG4kYq9DB!-1655938029?newsId=156144599&pageIndex=1>

¹⁷⁷경찰청(사이버안전국)과 정부합동조사팀은 인터파크 고객정보 해킹 및 협박 사건 초동수사·조사 결과, 이번 사건이 **북정찰총국** 소행인 것으로 판단하고 있다고 밝혔다.

¹⁷⁸이 사건은 북한이 우리의 기반시설 공격을 넘어, 국민의 재산을 탈취하려는 **범죄적 외화벌이에까지 해킹기술을 이용**하고 있는 것이 확인된 최초 사례로서, 정부차원에서 그 심각성을 인식하고 북한의 사이버공격 전술 변화를 예의 주시하고 있다고 밝혔다.



정부 3.0

국민행복

보도일시: 2016. 7. 28.(목) 15:30 이후 사용해 주시기 바랍니다

국민에게 책임을 다하는 희망의 새 경찰

경찰청 브리핑

www.police.go.kr



KOREAN NATIONAL
POLICE AGENCY

사이버수사과장 총경 이재승

담당 경정 정석화

2016년 7월 28일

일반 02-3150-1605, 경비 1605

일반 02-3150-1459, 경비 1459

인터파크 개인정보 해킹·공갈, 복 소행으로 판단

- 경찰과 정부 합동조사팀 중간 수사 결과 -

- 경찰청(사이버안전국)과 정부합동조사팀은 인터파크 고객정보 해킹 및 협박 사건 초동수사·조사 결과, 이번 사건이 북 정찰총국 소행인 것으로 판단하고 있다고 밝혔다.
- 경찰청(사이버안전국)과 정부합동조사팀은,
 - 이번 사건이 북 해킹소행이라는 판단 근거로
 - ① 해킹메일을 발송하거나 해커지령을 수신하기 위한 공격경유지의 IP 등이 북 정찰총국이 대남 사이버공격을 위해 구축·사용해 온 것이며,
 - ② 해킹에 이용된 악성코드를 분석한 결과, 디코딩·흔적을 삭제하는 수법이 과거 북한이 사이버테러에 사용했던 악성코드와 상당부분 유사하고,
 - ③ 협박메일에는 ‘총적으로 쥐어짜면’ 등의 북한식 표현이 사용된 점을 들었다.

* “총적”은 북한어로 “총체적이며 총괄적인, 또는 그런 것”이라는 의미


- 이 사건은 북한이 우리의 기반시설 공격을 넘어, 국민의 재산을 탈취하려는 범죄적 외화벌이에까지 해킹기술을 이용하고 있는 것이 확인된 최초 사례로서, 정부차원에서도 그 심각성을 인식하고 북한의 사이버공격 전술 변화를 예의 주시하고 있다고 밝혔다.
- 정부는 이번 사고를 계기로 유사한 협박에 대처함은 물론, 북한이 절취한 개인정보를 이용하여 제2, 제3의 또 다른 해킹 및 대국민 심리전을 자행할 것에 대비하여,
 - 국민들께 협박성 메일 수신이나 해킹 징후를 인지한 경우에는 초기에 즉각 대응할 수 있도록 관계기관에 신속히 알려주고 정부차원 합동 대응에 적극적으로 협조해 줄 것을 요청하는 한편,
 - 개인정보를 취급하는 모든 기관과 업체는 개인정보 유출로 국민들이 피해를 받지 않도록 물리적 망분리나 악성코드에 대한 상시적 점검(모니터링) 등으로 개인정보보호 및 사이버보안 대책 강화에 만전을 기해 줄 것을 당부하였으며,
 - 북한의 사이버공격에 대응하기 위해 사이버안보 관련 법률 제정을 서두르겠다고 밝혔다.
- 경찰은 정부 합동조사팀과 긴밀한 공조수사를 진행하고 있으며, 보다 상세한 사항은 수사가 진행되는 대로 추가 발표하겠다고 밝혔다.



이 보도자료와 관련하여 보다 자세한 내용이나 취재를 원하시면 경찰청 사이버수사과 경정 정석화(☎ 02-3150-1459)에게 연락주시기 바랍니다.

Source: <http://www.korea.kr/policy/pressReleaseView.do;jsessionid=gyhqXhbdjxKTGwcXCNCQ2BVbcCWKJfVBdKGLGhyMR1cQG4kYq9DB!-1655938029?newsId=156144599&pageIndex=1>

**Annex 36 : Wanted by the FBI, PARK JIN HYOK, Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud;
Conspiracy to Commit Computer-Related Fraud (Computer Intrusion)**

 <h1 style="margin: 0;">WANTED BY THE FBI</h1>	
<h2 style="margin: 0;">PARK JIN HYOK</h2> <p style="margin: 0;">Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud; Conspiracy to Commit Computer-Related Fraud (Computer Intrusion)</p>	
	
<p>DESCRIPTION</p>	
<p>Aliases: Pak Jin Hek, Jin Hyok Park</p>	
<p>Place of Birth: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)</p>	<p>Hair: Black</p>
<p>Eyes: Brown</p>	<p>Sex: Male</p>
<p>Race: Asian</p>	<p>Languages: English, Korean</p>
<p>REMARKS</p>	
<p>Park attended the Kim Chaek University of Technology in Pyongyang, North Korea. He is a North Korean citizen last known to be in North Korea. Park has traveled to China in the past and conducted legitimate IT work under the front company "Chosun Expo" or the Korean Expo Joint Venture in addition to activities conducted on behalf of North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau.</p>	
<p>CAUTION</p>	
<p>Park Jin Hyok is allegedly a North Korean computer programmer who is part of a state-sponsored hacking organization responsible for some of the costliest computer intrusions in history, including the cyber attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, a series of attacks targeting banks across the world that collectively attempted to steal more than one billion dollars, and the WannaCry ransomware attack that affected tens of thousands of computer systems across the globe.</p>	
<p>Park was alleged to be a participant in a wide-ranging criminal conspiracy undertaken by a group of hackers employed by a company that was operated by the North Korean government. The front company - Chosun Expo Joint Venture, also known as Korea Expo Joint Venture - was affiliated with Lab 110, one of the North Korean government's hacking organizations. That hacking group is what some private cybersecurity researchers have labeled the "Lazarus Group." On June 8, 2018, a federal arrest warrant was issued for Park Jin Hyok in the United States District Court, Central District of California, after he was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit computer-related fraud (computer intrusion).</p>	
<p>If you have any information concerning this person, please contact your local FBI office or the nearest American Embassy or Consulate.</p>	
<p>Field Office: Los Angeles</p>	

Source: <https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/park-jin-hyok>

Annex 37 : Open source technical analysis of DPRK state-sponsored cyber activity (FireEye, 3 October 2018)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

APT38 is a financially motivated North Korean regime-backed group responsible for conducting destructive attacks against financial institutions, as well as some of the world's largest cyber heists. Based on widely publicized operations alone, the group has attempted to steal more than \$1.1 billion.

Instead of simply obtaining accesses and moving to transfer funds as quickly as possible, APT38 is believed to operate more similarly to an espionage operation, carefully conducting reconnaissance within compromised financial institutions and balancing financially motivated objectives with learning about internal systems.

APT38 shares malware code and other development resources with TEMP.Hermit North Korean cyber espionage activity, although we consider APT38's operations more global and highly specialized for targeting the financial sector.

The group has compromised more than 16 organizations in at least 13 different countries, sometimes simultaneously, since at least 2014.

Since the first observed activity, the group's operations have become increasingly complex and destructive. APT38 has adopted a calculated approach, allowing them to sharpen their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) over time while evading detection.



Targeting and Mission

Based on observed activity, we judge that APT38's primary mission is targeting financial institutions and manipulating inter-bank financial systems to raise large sums of money for the North Korean regime. Increasingly heavy and pointed international sanctions have been levied on North Korea following the regime's continued weapons development and testing. The pace of APT38 activity probably reflects increasingly desperate efforts to steal funds to pursue state interests, despite growing economic pressure on Pyongyang. Since 2015, APT38 has attempted to steal hundreds of millions of dollars from financial institutions. Some of the publicly reported attempted heists attributable to APT38 include:

- Vietnam TP Bank in December 2015
- Bangladesh Bank in February 2016
- Far Eastern International Bank in Taiwan in October 2017
- Bancomext in January 2018
- Banco de Chile in May 2018

Shared Resources, Motivation

Malware overlaps between APT38 and TEMP.Hermit highlight the shared development resources accessible by multiple operational groups linked to North Korean state-sponsored activity. Although these are disparate operations against different targets and rely on distinct TTPs, the malware tools being used either overlap or exhibit shared characteristics indicating a shared developer or access to the same code repositories. Although APT38 is distinct from other TEMP.Hermit activity, both groups operate consistently within the interests of the North Korean state.

- Malware similarities, including code overlap and shared functions, are a primary connection between APT38 and other operations still attributed to TEMP.Hermit. For additional malware similarity details, please see the preceding section.
- APT38's increasingly aggressive targeting against banks and other financial institutions has paralleled North Korea's worsening financial condition (Figure 4). Similarly, TEMP.Hermit campaigns against U.S. defense contractors and South Korean government offices and companies is consistent with other North Korean objectives.
- The DOJ complaint and open sources report that Lab 110 operates out of front companies typically based in northeast China. Identified fronts include Chosun Expo Joint Venture in Dalian and Chosun Baeksul Trading Company in Shenyang.
- Firsthand accounts, information provided by a foreign investigative agency, and common IP addresses used to access the company website and associated accounts while connecting to and from North Korea corroborate reports that Chosun Expo was a front company operated by authorities in Pyongyang.
- Similar units reportedly operate in other regions around the world, including Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and other parts of China.
- Malware developers and other adversary actors are believed to be recruited out of North Korea's universities and directly into military units, such as Lab 110. Schools reportedly feeding into these units include Kim Chaek University of Technology and Kim Il Sung Military Science University.

Links to North Korean Military Units


Based on details published in the DOJ complaint against North Korean programmer Park Jin Hyok, we know that APT38 and other cyber operators linked to TEMP.Hermit are associated with Lab 110, an organization subordinate to or synonymous with the 6th Technical Bureau in North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). The organization is believed to leverage front organizations to mask their activities, including infiltrating networks and gathering intelligence. These relationships are outlined in Figure 3.



Figure 10. Archived website for Chosun Expo Joint Venture (Source: archive.fo)

Source: URL: <https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38>

Annex 38 : Depiction of connection between advanced persistent threat (APT) group responsible for cyberattacks on Banco de Chile and Cosmos bank in India to the Reconnaissance General Bureau



Source: <https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38>.

Annex 39 : Open source report on attacks on Crypto Exchanges, January 2017-September 2018

SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS ON CRYPTO EXCHANGES 2017-2018

Date	Name of Project	Country	Criminal group	Stolen in cryptocurrency	Stolen in USD
Feb 2017	Bithumb	South Korea	Unknown	-	\$7 mln
Apr 2017	YouBit	South Korea	Unknown	-	\$5,6 mln
Apr 2017	Yapizon	South Korea	Lazarus	3,816 BTC	\$5,3 mln
Apr 2017	Ether Delta	-	Unknown	-	\$266 k
Aug 2017	OKEx	Hong Kong	Unknown	-	\$3 mln
Sept 2017	Coinis	South Korea	Lazarus	-	-
Dec 2017	YouBit	South Korea	Lazarus	17% of assets	-
Jan 2018	Bitstamp	Luxemburg	Unknown	18,000 BTC	\$5 mln
Jan 2018	Coincheck	Japan	Lazarus	523,000,000 NEM	\$534 mln
Feb 2018	Bitgrail	Italy	Unknown	17,000,000 NANO	\$170 mln
Jun 2018	Bithumb	South Korea	Lazarus	-	\$32 mln
Jun 2018	Coinrail	South Korea	Unknown	-	\$37 mln
Jun 2018	Bancor	-	Unknown	-	\$23 mln
Sept 2018	Zaif	Japan	Unknown	-	\$60 mln

TOTAL \$882 mln

Last year we warned that hackers competent enough to carry out a targeted attack might have a new target — cryptocurrency exchanges. In the last couple of years crypto exchanges suffered many attacks. Some of the exchanges went bankrupt after the hacks, i.e. Bitcurex, YouBit, Bitgrail. At the beginning of 2018 hackers' interest in cryptocurrency exchanges ramped up. The most likely cryptocurrency exchange attackers now are Silence, MoneyTaker, and Cobalt.



Dmitry Volkov
Chief Technology Officer and Head of Threat Intelligence at Group-IB

ICO: more than 56% of funds was stolen through phishing attacks

Source: <https://www.group-ib.com/media/gib-crypto-summary/>

Annex 40 : Information on the Panel’s investigation of DPRK diplomat formerly posted to Malaysia and supporting documentation

1. The Panel investigated a DPRK diplomat formerly posted to Malaysia, Kim Jong Chol (aka Ri Jong Chol), who operated on behalf of the Korea PongHwa General Trading Company, which according to documents obtained by the Panel is associated with Korea Kumgang Bank.¹⁷⁹
2. The Panel obtained documentation showing that purchases made by PongHwa were being transferred to an account at Kumgang Bank in the name of the Korea General Insurance Company, an alias for the designated Korea National Insurance Company; and that payment for a shipment in 2016 was to be sent by Korea Ponghwa to the North East Asia Bank. The bills of lading for 14 shipments to Korea PongHwa General Trading Company in 2016 and 2017 indicated the shipper as Complant International Transport (Dalian) Co., Ltd, a company mentioned in previous Panel reports as the transhipper for attempted sales of luxury goods (i.e. S-class Mercedes automobiles)¹⁸⁰ (see below). The company’s affiliation to Complant/Comtrans also links it to Hong Kong Complant International Trans, which previously owned the DPRK vessel, the Kum Sung.¹⁸¹
3. The Malaysian company with which Kim Jong Chol conducted some of his business on behalf of Korea PongHwa General Trading Company, provided the Panel with information showing that he operated under the alias Ri Jong Chol and was Deputy Director for another company, “Sinkwang Economic and Trading Group” (see below). That a DPRK individual accredited as a diplomat at the DPRK Embassy in Kuala Lumpur was doing business on behalf of at least two DPRK entities, one of which was affiliated with a DPRK financial institution, reflects patterns previously reported by the Panel.¹⁸² Kim/Ri’s daughter, Ri Yugyong, often served as Ri’s translator and another DPRK individual, Yu Song Chol (aka “Mr. Brighton”), started to make payments to the company by check on behalf of Korea Ponghwa in late 2016. The Panel notes that this practice helped to obscure in bank transaction records starting in late 2016 the origin of the funds, which had previously been transferred into the account by front companies in Hong Kong and China mainland through large, well-known banks.


¹⁷⁹ See S/2018/171, annex 44.

¹⁸⁰ See Doc. S/2017/147, para 177, and page 127, footnote 36; and Doc. S/2012/422 paras. 84-85.

¹⁸¹ See Doc. S/2017/147, page 127, footnote 36.

¹⁸² The Panel has previously reported on the use of embassies of the DPRK for the country’s financial operations.

Business cards of Ri Jong Chol (aka Kim Jong Chol) and Yu Song Chol



Source: The Panel

Invitation letter by Malaysian Company to the President of Korea Ponghwa General Trading Corp C-8 Company



Invitation Letter

Date : 01/02/2017


To : Korea Ponghwa General Trading Corp.

C-8 Company, Mr Pak Chol Ung

Address : Jungsongdong, Jung District, Pyongyang City, DPR of Korea



We, [REDACTED] would like to invite Mr Pak Chol Ung, president of Korea Ponghwa General Trading Corp. C-8 Company, and 1 more person in the convenient session of March, 2017 to discuss about the contract of soap noodle and purchases of some palm oil products between [REDACTED] and Korea PongHwa General Trading Corp.

Yours sincerely.





Source: The Panel

Bills of Lading for shipments from Malaysia to Korea Ponghwa General Trading Corp via Complant International Transportation (Dalian) Co. Ltd

BILL OF LADING (Not negotiable unless consigned to order)				
Shipper 		Bill of Lading No. BLWDL1703074/1756	Number of Original B(s)/L (0) ZERO	
Consignee (if 'To Order' so indicate) KOREA PONGHWA GENERAL TRADING CORP C-8 COMPANY JUNGSONGDONG, JUNG DISTRICT, PYONGYANG CITY DPR OF KOREA ATTN: MR. PAK CHOL UNG TEL: +85 02 18652				
Notify Party (No claim shall attach for failure to notify) COMPLANT INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION (DALIAN) CO., LTD. ROOM 1907, TIMES BULD, NO.7, GANGWAN STREET, DALIAN, CHINA PIC: MS. SUNNY TEL: 0086-411-82798179		Destination Delivery Agent: MASTER INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING AGENCY CO., LTD. (DALIAN BRANCH) RM 2601, 26/F, CHINA LIFE INSURANCE MANSION, NO.26, RENMIN ROAD DALIAN, 116001, LIAONING, CHINA TEL:86-411-39858676 FAX:86-411-39858698 EMAIL:dlibiz@master-agency.com.cn		
Pre-Carriage by UNI-PERFECT V.0311-379N	Place of Receipt BELAWAN, INDONESIA			
Ocean Vessel/ Voy. No. EVER URBAN V.0358-132N	Port of Loading BELAWAN, INDONESIA			
Port of Discharge DALIAN, CHINA	Place of Delivery DALIAN, CHINA		Final Destination	
Marks & Numbers	No. of Pkgs. or Shipping Units.	Description of Goods & Pkgs.	Gross Weight	Measurement
SOAP NOODLES G2000 TEMU4518760 / EMCCVR3856 DFSU1449514 / EMCCVR3825 DRYU2725935 / EMCCVR3846 TEMU4149209 / EMCCVR3836	3200 BAGS	SHIPPER LOAD, COUNT AND SEAL 4X20'GP STC: 80MT SOAP NOODLES G2000 PACKED IN 3200 BAGS X 25KG	80,240.000 KGS	100.000 CBM
		FREIGHT COLLECT SHIPPED ON BOARD DATED : 08/03/2017	BL SURRENDERED AT POL	
Total Number of Containers or Packages (in Words) FOUR TWENTY FOOTER CONTAINER(S) ONLY				
Excess Value Declaration: Refer to Clause 6 (4) (B) + (C) on reverse side		RECEIVED by the Carrier the Goods as specified above in apparent good order and condition unless otherwise stated, to be transported to such place as agreed, authorized or permitted herein and subject to all the terms and conditions appearing on the front and reverse of this Bill of Lading to which the Merchant agrees by accepting this Bill of Lading, any local privileges and customs notwithstanding. The particulars given above as stated by the shipper and the weight, measure, quantity, condition, contents and value of the goods are unknown to the carrier. IN WITNESS whereof one (1) original Bill of Lading has been signed. If not otherwise stated above, the same being accomplished the other(s), if any, to be void. If required by the Carrier on (1) original Bill of Lading must be surrendered duly endorsed in exchange for the goods or delivery order.		
Freight/petrols, charges etc:		PORT KLANG, 08/03/2017 Place and date of issue _____		
		By <u>AS AGENTS FOR THE CARRIER</u>		
JURISDICTION AND LAW CLAUSE MALAYSIA				

Source: The Panel

BILL OF LADING (Not negotiable, unless consigned to order)

Shipper 		Bill of Lading No. PTPDL1703110/1768	Number of Original B(s)/L (0) ZERO	
Consignee (if "To Order" so indicate) KOREA PONGHWA GENERAL TRADING CORP C-8 COMPANY JUNGSONGDONG, JUNG DISTRICT, PYONGYANG CITY DPR OF KOREA ATTN: MR. PAK CHOL UNG TEL: +85 02 13652		 LINKER LOGISTICS (M) SDN BHD (Company No.: 704634-P) E-mail: info@linker-logistics.com		
Notify Party (No claim shall attach for failure to notify) COMPLANT INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION (DALLIAN) CO., LTD. ROOM 1907, TIMES BULD, NO.7, GANGWAN STREET, DALLIAN, CHINA PIC: MS. SUNNY TEL: 0086-411-82798179		Destination Delivery Agent: MASTER INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING AGENCY CO., LTD. (DALLIAN BRANCH) RM 2601, 26/F, CHINA LIFE INSURANCE MANSION, NO.26, RENMIN ROAD DALLIAN, 116001, LIAONING, CHINA TEL:86-411-39858676 FAX:86-411-39858698 EMAIL:dlibiz@master-agency.com.cn		
Pre-Carriage by THALASSA MANA V.0914-014E	Place of Receipt TANJUNG PELEPAS, MALAYSIA			
Ocean Vessel/ Voy. No. UNI-PROBITY V.0432-240A	Port of Loading TANJUNG PELEPAS, MALAYSIA CY			
Port of Discharge DALLIAN, CHINA	Place of Delivery DALLIAN, CHINA CY			
		Final Destination		
Marks & Numbers	No. of Pkgs. or Shipping Units.	Description of Goods & Pkgs.	Gross Weight	Measurement
SOAP NOODLES G2000 BEAU2108809 / EMCDYJ9626 EISU2080854 / EMCDYJ9646 DRYU2669390 / EMCDYJ9656 DRYU2447520 / EMCDYJ8666	3200 BAGS	SHIPPER LOAD, COUNT AND SEAL 4X20'GP STC: 80MT SOAP NOODLES G2000 PACKED IN 3200 BAGS X 25KG	80.640.000 KGS	100.000 CBM
		FREIGHT COLLECT SHIPPED ON BOARD DATED: 27/03/2017	BL SURRENDERED AT POL	
Total Number of Containers or Packages (in Words)		FOUR TWENTY FOOTER CONTAINER(S) ONLY		
Excess Value Declaration: Refer to Clause 6 (4) (B) + (C) on reverse side		RECEIVED by the Carrier the Goods as specified above in apparent good order and condition unless otherwise stated, to be transported to such place as agreed, authorized or permitted herein and subject to all the terms and conditions appearing on the front and reverse of this Bill of Lading to which the Merchant agrees by accepting this Bill of Lading, any local privileges and customs notwithstanding. The particulars given above as stated by the shipper and the weight, measure, quantity, condition, contents and value of the goods are unknown to the carrier. In WITNESS whereof one (1) original Bill of Lading has been signed if not otherwise stated above, the same being accomplished the other(s), if any, to be void. If required by the Carrier on (1) original Bill of Lading must be surrendered duly endorsed in exchange for the goods or delivery order. TANJUNG PELEPAS, 27/03/2017 Place and date of issue _____ By _____ AS AGENTS FOR THE CARRIER		
Freight prelois, charges etc:				
JURISDICTION AND LAW CLAUSE MALAYSIA				

Source: The Panel


EVERGREEN LINE

A Joint Service Agreement

**BILL OF LADING
PROOFREAD
NON-NEGOTIABLE**

(3) Consignee (complete name and address) KOREA PONGHWA GENERAL TRADING CORP C-8 COMPANY JUNGSONGDONG, JUNG DISTRICT, PYONGYANG CITY DPR OF KOREA ATTN : MR. PAK CHOL UNG **		(5) Document No. 093700018581	
(4) Notify Party (complete name and address) COMPLANT INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION (DALIAN) CO., LTD. ROOM 1907, TIMES BULD, NO.7, GANGWAN STREET, DALIAN, CHINA PIC : MS. RUBY KIM *		(6) Export References	
(12) Pre-carriage by WAN HAI 305 N185		(13) Place of Receipt/Date PASIR GUDANG, MALAYSIA	
(14) Ocean Vessel/Voy. No. EVER URSULA 0351-129N		(15) Port of Loading PASIR GUDANG, MALAYSIA	
(16) Port of Discharge DALIAN, CHINA		(17) Place of Delivery DALIAN, CHINA	
(10) Onward Inland Routing/Export Instructions (which are contracted separately by Merchants entirely for their own account and risk)			
Particulars furnished by the Merchant			
(18) Container No. And Seal No. Marks & Nos.	(19) Quantity And Kind of Packages	(20) Description of Goods	(21) Measurement (M ³) Gross Weight (KGS)
CONTAINER NO./SEAL NO.			
HMCU3005897/20' /EMCDYH8056/ EITU0539568/20' /EMCDYG5946/ EITU0537098/20' /EMCDYG5956/ EITU0535351/20' /EMCDYG5956/ 4 X 20'	800 BAGS 800 BAGS 800 BAGS 800 BAGS	20160.000 KGS 25.0000 CBM 20160.000 KGS 25.0000 CBM 20160.000 KGS 25.0000 CBM 20160.000 KGS 25.0000 CBM	100.0000 CBM 80,640.000 KGS
SOAP NOODLES G2000			
SHIPPER LOAD, COUNT AND SEAL 4X20' GP: 80MT SOAP NOODLES G2000 PACKED IN 3200 BAGS X 25KG * TEL:0086-411-82798179 * THE BALANCE OF BILL OF LADING SEE ATTACHED LIST * TOTAL NUMBER OF ATTACHED 1 PAGE "OCEAN FREIGHT COLLECT" SHIPPER'S LOAD & COUNT 3200 BAGS			
(22) TOTAL NUMBER OF CONTAINERS OR PACKAGES (IN WORDS) FOUR(4) CONTAINERS ONLY			
(24) FREIGHT & CHARGES			
Revenue Tons	Rate	Per	Prepaid
	AS	ARRANGED	Collect
(25) B/L NO. EGLV 093700018581			
(27) Number of Original B(s)/L THREE (3)		(29) Prepaid at	
(28) Place of B(s)/L Issue/Date PASIR GUDANG, MALAYSIA		(30) Collect at	
(26) Service Type/Mode FCL/FCL O/O		(31) Exchange Rate	
(33) Laden on Board ** NOT FINAL **		(32) Exchange Rate	
EVERGREEN MARINE CORP.(MALAYSIA) SDN BHD Please confirm OK within 24 hours. TEL: (07)223-1559 FAX: (07)223-1532/221-5762			

Source: The Panel

Annex 41 : DPRK bank representatives subject to expulsion under paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016)

Names	Title and activities **	Location **	Passport number / expiry UN Security Council designations where applicable
Jang Bom Su (aka Jang Pom Su, Jang Hyon U) 장범수	Tanchon Commercial Bank (hereafter TCB) Representative. Also operates in and travels to Lebanon under various aliases	Syria	22 Feb 1958; Dip PP no. 836110034, exp 1 Jan 2020 UN res 2270 (2016) designated him as “Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Syria” on 2 March 2016 (amended 5 Aug. 2017) KPi.016
Jon Myung Guk (a.k.a. Cho'n Myo'ng-kuk, Jon Yong Sang) 전명국 (전영상)	Tanchon Commercial Bank (hereafter TCB) Representative in Syria. Also travels to and operates in Lebanon under various aliases.	Syria	25 Aug. 1976 with dip PP number 836110035, expires 1 January 2020
Ryom Huibong (aka Ryo'M Hu'I-Pong) 럼희봉	Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank (aka KKG bank, 금강은행 Kumgang Export and Import Bank, 金刚银行)	Dubai, UAE	18 September 1961 PP No.: 745120026 (expires 20 January 2020)
Ri Sun Chol (Aka Ri Song Chol) 리선철 (리성철)	Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank Transported money of DPRK laborers in the Middle East to the DPRK	Dubai, UAE	28 March 1964 PP No.:836132137
Kwak Chongchol (Aka Kwak Jong-Chol) 곽정철	Deputy Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank	Dubai, UAE	1 January 1975 PP No.: 563220533
Ro Il Gwang 노일광	Korea Kumgang Group Bank	UAE	26 May 1983 PP No.: 836434467
Kim Kyong Il (Aka Kim Kyo'ng-il) 김경일	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. The office opened at least 5 accounts at Banque Internationale Arabe Tunisie (BIAT) in Tunisia. Two of them are in the name of a front company, Kartos. Kim Kyong Il has also been involved in transactions undertaken by Daedong Credit Bank in China.	Libya	1 August 1979; PP No. 836210029 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “FTB deputy chief representative in Libya” on 22 December (KPi.067)

Choe, Un Hyok 최은혁	Unification Development Bank (or Korea Unification Development Bank, UDB or KUDB) representative. Replaced Ri Un’So’ng. Choe Un Hyok’s KUDB business card with his title of “Representative of KUDB, Moscow Russia” with the same address as the Embassy in Moscow is available in the Panel’s 2017 Final Report, S/2017/150 p. 251. <i>Russia replied in a letter of 25 January 2018, “We will inform you accordingly in case we receive additional information on the whereabouts of Choe Un Hyok.” The Panel has not received any additional information in reply to its two follow-up letters. .</i>	Moscow, Russia	19 October 1985 PP No.: 83612287 (expires March 2021)
Chu Hyo’k (Aka Ju Hyok) 주혁	Foreign Trade Bank Representative <i>Russia replied Chu Hyo’k is not currently residing in Russia. (see below)</i>		23 Nov. 1986; PP No. 836420186, issued 28 Oct. 2016 (expires 28 Oct 2021) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as an “overseas FTB Representative” on 22 December (KPi.065)
Ri U’n-so’ng (aka Ri Eun Song; Ri Un Song) 리은성	Korea Unification Development Bank representative <i>Russia replied that Ri U’n-so’ng is not currently residing in Russia.</i>		23 July 1969 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas Korean Unification Development Bank representative” on 22 December (KPi.078)
Han Jang Su (aka Chang-Su Han) 한장수	Chief Representative of the Foreign Trade Bank The Russian Federation replied, Mr. Han Jang Su is the Third Secretary of the Commercial Counsellor’s Section of the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the Russian Federation and has been officially accredited by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He entered the Russian Federation on 23 June 2017 and is staying in the country legally. No information is available concerning activities that are inconsistent with his official status.	Russian Federation	8 Nov. 1969; PP No.: 745420176 (expires 19 Oct 2020) Designated by Resolution 2371 (2017) as “Chief Representative of the Foreign Trade Bank”
Ku Ja Hyong (aka Ku Cha-hyo’ng) 구자형	Foreign Trade Bank Representative	Libya (also travelled to Tunisia, UAE, and Saudi Arabia 2015-2017)	8 September 1957; PP No.: 563220533; Another PP No.: 654210218 (expires 27 June 2019 - used in July 2016) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “FTB chief representative in Libya” on 22 December 2017 (Kpi.070)

Ch'oe So'k-min 최석민	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. In 2016, Ch'oe So'k-min was the deputy representative at the FTB branch office in Shenyang. He has been associated with cash transfers from that FTB office to banks affiliated with DPRK special organizations and RGB located overseas. <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Shenyang China	25 July 1978 Res 2397(2017) designated him as "overseas FTB Representative" on 22 December (KPi.064)
Kim Tong Chol (aka: Kim Tong-ch'o'l) 김동철	Foreign Trade Bank Representative <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Shenyang, China	28 Jan 1966; PP No.: 381337404 (expires 26 Sept 2016) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas FTB representative" on 22 December (KPi.068)
Ko Chol Man (aka Ko Ch'o'l-man) 고철만	Foreign Trade Bank Representative <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Shenyang, China	30 September 1967; PP No. 472420180 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas FTB representative" on 22 December (KPi.069)
Mun Kyong Hwan (aka Mun Kyo'ng-hwan) 문경환	Bank of East Land Representative <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Dandong, China	22 August 1967; PP No. 381120660 exp. 25 March 2016 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas Bank of East Land representative" on 22 December (KPi.071)
Pae Won Uk (aka Pae Wo'n-uk) 배원욱	Korea Daesong Bank Representative <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Beijing, China	22 August 1969; PP No.: 472120208 exp 22 Feb 2017 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas Daesong Bank representative" on 22 December (KPi.072)
Pak Bong Nam (aka Lui Wai Ming; Pak Pong Nam; Pak Pong-nam) 박봉남	Ilsim International Bank representative <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Shenyang, China	06 May 1969 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas Ilsim International Bank representative" on 22 December 2017 (KPi.073)
Pak Mun Il 박문일	Korea Daesong Bank Representative	Yanji, China	DPRK / 1 January 1965; PP No.: 563335509 (expires 27/8/2018)

	<i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>		Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas official of Korea Daesong Bank" on 22 December 2017 (KPi.079)
Ri Chun Hwan (Aka Ri Ch'un-hwan) 리춘환	Foreign Trade Bank Representative <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Zhuhai, China	21 August 1957' PP No: 563233049 (expires 9 May 2018); PP No.: 563233049 (expires 9 May 2018) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas FTB representative" on 22 December (KPi.074)
Ri Chun Song (Aka Ri Ch'un-so'ng) 리춘성	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. Opened a Euro account at International Arab Bank of Tunisia (BAIT) on 18 July 2012 in the name of "Secretary's Delegate of the DPRK's Mission to Tripoli" (closed on 22 August 2013). <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Beijing, China	30 October 1965; PP No. 654133553 (expires 11 March 2019) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas FTB representative" on 22 December (KPi.075)
Ri Song-hyok (Aka Li Cheng He) 리성혁	Representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank. Reportedly established front companies to procure items and conduct financial transactions on behalf of DPRK <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Beijing, China	19 March 1965 PP No. 654234735 (expires 19 May 2019) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank" on 22 December (KPi.077)
Pang Su Nam (Aka Pang So-Nam, Pang Sunam) 방수남	IlSIM (ILSIM) International Bank Representative <i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."</i>	Zhuhai, China	1 October 1964; PP No.: 472110138
Cha Sung Jun (Aka Ch'a Su'ng-chun) 차승준	Korea Kumgang Group Bank Representative. Has held several accounts in his name at Chinese banks and is suspected of operating a cover company. <i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."</i>	Beijing, China	4 June 1966; PP No.: 472434355

Kim Kyong Hyok (Aka Kim Kyo'ng-hyo'k) 김경혁	Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First Credit Bank <i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."</i>	Shanghai, China	5 November 1985; PP No.: 381335989 (expires 14 September 2016)
Pak Ch'o'l-Nam 박철남	Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First Credit Ban. Opened 6 bank accounts in the name "Great Prince Limited (崇王有限公司)" in banks in Hong Kong and Shenzhen, China" <i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."</i>	Beijing, China	16 June 1971 PP No.: 745420413 (expires 19 November 2020)
Jo Chol Song (Aka Cho Ch'o'l-So'ng) 조철성	Deputy Representative for the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC) Uses false entity names for the KKBC, such as "Good Field Trading Limited (城豐貿易有限公司)" and "Golden Tiger Investment Group (金虎(香港)國際投資集團有限公司)", both registered in Hong Kong. <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Dandong, China	25 September 1984 PP: 654320502 (expires 16 September 2019) Res 2371(2017) designated him as "Representative for Korea United Development Bank" on 5 Aug (KPi.058)
Ho Young Il (Aka Ho' Yo'ng-il) 허영일	Hana Bank Representative In 2016, Ho Young Il was associated with a high volume of USD transactions for the FTB. <i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."</i>	Dandong China	DPRK/ DOB: 9 September 1968
Kim Mun Chol (Aka Kim Mun-ch'o'l) 김문철	Representative for Korea United Development Bank. Uses false entity names including "Chongryu Technical Company" or "Kyong Un Trading Company" China replied "that as a designated individual he has been blocked from entry and Chinese banks requested the freeze of his assets."	Dandong, China	DOB 25 March 1957 Res 2371(2017) designated him as "Representative for Korea United Development Bank" on 5 Aug (KPi.060)

Choe Chun Yong (Aka Ch'oe Ch'un- yo'ng) 최천영	Ilsim International Bank Representative		PP no: 654410078 Res 2371(2017) designated him as "Representative for Ilsim International Bank" on 5 Aug (KPi.054)
Ko Tae Hun (Aka Kim Myong Gi) 고태훈 (or 고대훈) (aka 김명기)	Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative	Transited China, Ethiopia, UAE, visited Sudan ¹⁸³	25 May 1972; PP 563120630 (expires 20 March 2018) UN Res 2270 (2016) designated him as "Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official" on 2 March (KPi.025)
Kang Min 강민	Daesong Bank representative who, in late 2016, held Chinese bank accounts. <i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."</i>	Beijing, China	07 May 1980; PP 563132918 (expires 04 February 2018)
Kim Sang Ho 김상호	Representative, Korea Daesong Bank As of 2015, Kim Sangho was an Office 39 official posted as a Korea Daesong Trading Company representative in Yanji, China. <i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."</i>	Yanji, China	16 May 1957 PP No.: 563337601 (expires: 26 September 2018)
Kim Jong Man (Aka Kim Cho'ng Man) 김정만	Representative, Korea Unification Development Bank. In 2015, he was an Office 39 official posted to Hong Kong. <i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."</i>	Zhuhai, China	16 July 1956; PP No.: 918320780
Kim Hyok Chol (Aka Kim Hyo'k-Cho'l,	Deputy Representative, Korea Unification Development Bank	Zhuhai, China	9 July 1978; PP No.: 472235761 (expires 6 June 2017)

¹⁸³ See S/2017/150, p. 64

Hyok Chol Kim) 김혁철	<i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."</i>		
Ri Ho Nam (aka Ri Ho-nam) 리호남	Ryugyong Commercial Bank branch representative (2014 to present) <i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."</i>	Beijing, China	DOB: 3 January 1967; PP No.: 654120210 (expires 21 February 2019)
Ms. Kim Su Gyong 김수경	Korea United Development Bank (KUDB) Representative. Since 2011 made multiple trips around Europe, especially in France and Italy, with the assistance of her father, Kim Yong Nam, and brother, Kim Su-Gwang, RGB agents who used their status as staff members of international organizations to help her obtain visas. Kim Su-Gwang (Kim Sou Kwang) recently departed Belarus. See: S/2017/742 para 50 and S/2016/15, para 187.	Europe, also transited UAE and the Russian Federation ¹⁸⁴	DOB: 16 Jan 1973; PP 745120374
Mun Cho'ng-Ch'o'l 문정철	Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative. Has facilitated transactions for TCB.		Res 2094 (2013) designated him as "Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official" on 7 March (KPi.012)
Choe Song Nam CHOE, Song Nam (aka CH'OE, So'ng- nam) 최성남	Representative of Daesong Bank		DOB: 07 Jan 1979; Passport 563320192 expires 09 Aug 2018
Kim Chol KIM, Chol (a.k.a. KIM, Ch'o'l) 김철	Representative of Korea United Development Bank		DOB 27 Sep 1964

¹⁸⁴ The Russian Federation informed the Panel that unilateral sanctions were "not an argument for suspicion of unlawful activities on Russian territory".

Paek Jong Sam PAEK, Jong Sam (a.k.a. PAEK, Chong-sam) 백중삼	Representative of Kungang Bank		DOB 17 Jan 1964; nationality Korea, North
Ko Il Hwan KO, Il Hwan (a.k.a. KO, Il-hwan) 고일환	Representative of Korea Daesong Bank. According to a Member State, he engaged in transactions for ship-to-ship transfers in 2018 while acting as representative of Daesong Bank in Shenyang.		DOB 28 August 1967 Passport 927220424 expires 12 Jun 2022
Ri Myong Hun RI, Myong Hun (a.k.a. RI, Myo'ng-hun) 리명훈	Representative of Foreign Trade Bank		DOB 14 Mar 1969; Gender Male; Passport 381420089 expires 11 Oct 2016
Kim Nam Ung 김남웅	Representative for Ilsim International Bank, which is affiliated with the DPRK military and has a close relationship with the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation. Ilsim International Bank has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.		Passport no.: 654110043 Res 2371(2017) designated him as Representative for Ilsim International Bank
RI, Jong Won (a.k.a. RI, Cho'ng-Wo'n; a.k.a. RI, Jung Won)	The Russian Federation replied, <i>Mr. Ri Jong Won arrived in Russia on 5 February 2018 as an officially accredited member of the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Russian Federation. It is not known what information was used to determine that he is the Moscow-based deputy representative of the Foreign Trade Bank. Moreover, according to the available information, he returned to the DPRK on 8 October 2018.</i>		DOB: 22 Apr 1971; Passport no 654320421 expires 11 Mar 2019

Source: The Panel, Member States, UN documents

Annex 42 : Information on DPRK financial institutions with overseas representatives

Names, alias, Korean and Chinese spelling	HQ address / phone / fax/ SWIFT	Security Council designations and information provided to Panel by Member States and United Nations resolutions
<p>Bank of East Land 동방은행</p> <p>aka: Haedong Bank (해동은행), Dongbang Bank, Tongbang U’Nhaeng, Tongbang Bank, 朝鲜) 东方银行</p>	<p>BEL Building, Jonsung-Dong, Pyongyang Tel: +850 2 18111 Fax: +850 2 3814410</p>	<p>Res 2087 (2013) on 22 January 2013 (KPe.013) Info in UN Panel reports: S/2017/150; pp 76-77 and S/2017/742, para 61. Facilitates weapons-related transactions for, and other support to, arms manufacturer and exporter Green Pine Associated Corporation. Has actively worked with Green Pine to transfer funds in a manner that circumvents sanctions.</p>
<p>Credit Bank of Korea 조선신용은행</p> <p>aka Korea Credit Bank, International Credit Bank, 朝鲜信用银行</p>	<p>Munsu Street, Central District, Pyongyang +850 2 3818285 +850 2 3817806</p>	
<p>Daedong Credit Bank [JV] 대동신용은행 大同信用银行</p> <p>Aka Taedong Credit Bank, Dae-Dong Credit Bank, DCB Finance Ltd, Perigrine-Daesong Development Bank</p>	<p>Suite 401, Potonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, (b) Ansan-dong, Botonggang Hotel, Pongchon, Pyongyang, +850 2 3814866 SWIFT: DCBK KPPY</p>	<p>Res 2270 (2016) on 2 March 2016 (KPe.023) Representative offices and front companies in China according to Panel: S/2017/150, paras 225-230 and S/2017/742, paras 51-56. Clients include: T Specialist International (Singapore) Ltd, OCN (Singapore) International Distribution Ptd Ltd; Pan Systems; Dalian Daxin Electron Co Ltd, Hongdae International, Yueda International Trading Co, Hing Heng, Korea Sinheung Trading Co, Hana Electronics. Joint venture with Korea Daesong Bank; majority stake acquired by a Chinese company. See current report, paragraphs XX.</p>

<p>Daesong Credit Development Bank [JV] 대성신용개발은행 Koryo Credit Development Bank (고려글로벌신용은행), Koryo Global Trust Bank, Koryo-Global Credit Bank, Korea Credit Investment Company (조선신용투자회사)</p>	<p>Daesong Credit Development Bank [Joint Venture] +850 2 381 4100 +850 2 341 4013</p>	
<p>First Eastern Bank</p>	<p>Rason, DPRK</p>	<p>Affiliated with Cetnral Bank and Unaforte (Italy, Hong Kong). See Panel report S/2017/150 para 221.</p>
<p>Foreign Trade Bank (FTB) 조선무역은행 朝鮮貿易銀行 aka: Mooyokbank, Korea Trade Bank, Mooyokbank</p>	<p>FTB Building, Jungsong dong, Central District, Pyongyang Tel: +850 2 18111 Fax: +850 2 3814467 SWIFT/BIC FTBD KP PY</p>	<p>Res 2371 (2017) on 5 Aug 2017 (KPe.047) State-owned bank which acts as the DPRK's primary foreign exchange bank and has provided key financial support to the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation. See para X on registered office abroad.</p>
<p>International Consortium Bank (ICB) 국제합영은행 Hi-Fund Bank International Consortium Bank (ICB), Sungri Hi-Fund International Bank, Sungri Economic Group</p>	<p>Sungri Exhibition Hall, Pyongyang</p>	<p>Panel reporting:</p>
<p>Koryo Bank 고려은행 高麗銀行</p>	<p>Koryo Bank Building, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea</p>	<p>Res 2356 (2017) on 2 June 2017 (KPe.045) Associated with Office 38 and Office 39 of the KWP. Operated by Korea Myohyang Economic Group; joint venture partner in Koryo-Global Bank.</p>
<p>Koryo Credit Development Bank / Daesong Credit Development Bank [JV] (Aka. Koryo-Global Credit Bank, Koryo Global Trust Bank) 고려신용개발은행 대성신용개발은행 (aka 고려글로벌신용은행)</p>	<p>Yanggakdo International Hotel, Pyongyang Tel: +850 2 381 4100 Fax: +850 2 341 4013</p>	<p>Res 2371 (2017) on 5 August 2017 (KPe.049) Joint venture with Koryo Bank</p>

<p>Korea Daesong Bank 대성은행 / 조선 대성은행 大成銀行 aka: Chosun Taesong Unhaeng, Daesong Bank, Taesong Bank According to a Member State, in 2018 the bank has used the following false names when processing transactions for ship-to-ship transfers: 조선녹색산업무역 (<i>Chosun Noksaek Sanop Muyok</i>, Korea Green Industry Trading Company/Corporation 朝鮮綠色產業貿易) and 조선신용투자회사(<i>Chosun Sinyong Tuja Hoesa</i>, Korea Credit Investment Company/Corporation 朝鮮信用投資公司 or 朝鮮信用投資會社).</p>	<p>Segori-dong, Gyongheung Street, Pyongyang Tel +850 2 818221 Fax +850 2 814576 SWIFT/BIC: KDBKKPPY</p>	<p>Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November 2016 (KPe.035) Owned and controlled by Office 39 of the Korea Workers' Party According to a Member State, Ko Il Hwan engaged in transactions on behalf of Korea Daesong Bank from Shenyang for ship-to-ship transfers in 2018.</p>
<p>Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation 조선광선은행 朝鮮光鮮銀行, Korea Kwangson Finance Company, 朝鮮 蔡鮮金金朝朝, Korea Kwangson Finance Company</p>	<p>Jungsong-dong, Sungri Street, Central District, Pyongyang</p>	<p>Res 2370 (2016) on 2 March 2016 Provides financial services in support to Tanchon Commercial Bank and Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation, a subordinate of the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation. Tanchon has used KKBC to facilitate funds transfers likely amounting to millions of dollars, including transfers involving KOMID-related funds. For more info see PoE report S/2017/150, p. 63.</p>

<p>Korea National Insurance Corporation 조선민족보험총회사 Korea Foreign Insurance Company, 朝鲜民族保险总会社</p>	<p>KNIC Building, Central District Pyongyang +850 2 18111/222 Ext:3418024 +850 2 3814410</p>	<p>See current report paras XX.</p>
<p>Korea Joint Venture Bank 조선합영은행 Korea Joint Bank, Korea Joint Operation Bank, Chosun Joint Operation Bank, Habyong Bank, 朝鲜合营银行</p>	<p>KJB Building, Ryugyong 1 dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang +850 2 381-8151, 850-2-18111-381-8151 +850 2 381-4410</p>	
<p>Ryugyong Commerical Bank (RCB) 류경상업은행/류상은행 Ryusang Bank, 柳京商业银行, 柳商银行</p>	<p>Changgwang Hotel, 5th Floor; Beijing, China; Dandong, China</p>	<p>Two ATMs at Pyongyang Airport and one in the lobby of Changgwang Inn. <i>Ryugyong Commercial Bank ATM lists an address in the Changgwang Foreign House, Suite #05-24</i> Joint Venture with OCN Pyongyang Office and Koryo Commerical Bank</p>
<p>Korea Unification (United) Development Bank (조선) 통일발전은행 (朝鲜)统一发展银行 aka: Myohyangsan Bank, Unification Development Bank, T'ongil Palchon Bank, Korea Tongil Paljon Bank, Korea Reunification Development Bank</p>	<p>KUDB Building, Pyongyang SWIFT/BIC: KUDBKPPY</p>	<p>Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November 2016 (KPe.033) USA on 16 March 2016 See Panel of Experts report (S/2017/150, p 62)</p>
<p>Hana Banking Corporation 하나은행 aka Korea Kumsong Bank, Kumsong Bank, Single-Minded International Bank,</p>	<p>ISB Building, Pyongyang; Haebangsan Hotel, Jungsong-Dong, Sungri Street, Central District, Pyongyang, Dandong, China</p>	<p>Partial Ownership by Central Bank. Overseas several Bank Card product lines for domestic use</p>

	SWIFT/BIC BRBKKPPIXXX	
Ilsim International Bank 일심국제은행 日心国际银行 aka. Korea Kumsong Bank, Kumsong Bank, Single-Minded International Bank, 日心国 际银行	ISB Building, Pyongyang Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea SWIFT: ILSIKPPY	Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November (KPe.034) Affiliated with the DPRK military and has close relationship with Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC) and has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.
First Credit Bank. (JV) or Cheil Credit Bank 제일신용은행 第一信用银行 aka: First Trust Bank Corporation, Jeil Credit Bank, Kyongyong Credit Bank	a) 3-18 Pyongyang Information Center, Potonggang District (as of 2016). b) i Rakrang District, Jongbaek 1-dong Tel: +850 2 433-1575 (02- 433-1575) SWIFT: KYCBKPPYXXX Rakrang Tel: 961-3331, 961-0003	Belongs to Workers Party of Korea. It was established in 2008 as JV venture with Singapore's Miracle Commerce Pte. Ltd., and its CEO William Toh (aka Toh Hwee Howe) who has been involved in trade with the DPRK using his other two companies, I-Tech Intelligence Resources and Sinsar Trading Ltd.
Koryo Commercial Bank 고려상업은행 高丽商业银行 aka Korea Commercial Bank	KCB Building, Taedonggang District, Pyongyang; ; Beijing, China; Shenyang, China; SWIFT/BIC KCBKKPP1	Joint Venture with OCN and Ryugyong Commerical Bank
Tanchon Commercial Bank 단천상업은행 端川商业银行 AKA: Changgwang Credit Bank, (창광신용은행) Korea Changgwang Credit Bank (조선창광신용은행); Yongaksan	Saemul 1-Dong Pyongchon District, Pyongyang	Designated by UN on 24 Apr. 2009 (KPe.003) Main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. Under Second Economic Committee; financial arm of KOMID.

Bank (용악산은행), Lyongaksan Bank (룡악산은행)		
Korea United Development Bank (KUDB) 조선통일발전은행 (朝鮮) 統一發展銀行 aka: Myohyangsan Bank, Unification Development Bank, T'ongil Palchon Bank, Korea Tongil Paljon Bank, Korea Reunification Development Bank	KUDB Building, Pyongyang SWIFT/BIC: KUDBKPPY	Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November (KPe.033) Information in UN POE report: S/2017/742, p. 22
Kumgang Group Bank / Kumgang Bank (KKG) Korea Kumgang Bank (조선) 금강은행 金剛銀行 aka: Kumgang Export and Import Bank	Kumgang Bank Building, Central District, Pyongyang (The North East Asia Bank building in Pyongyang became the KKG Bank building)	Associated with Korea Ponghwa General Corporation (under External Economic Committee of the Cabinet) and Korea Pyongyang Trading Company
Kumgyo International Commercial Bank 금교국제상업은행		Affiliated with Korean Chongsong Mining Company and Changgwang Shop. See Panel report S/2017/150 para 220.
Tanchon Commercial Bank 단천상업은행 端川商業銀行 AKA: Changgwang Credit Bank, (창광신용은행) Korea Changgwang Credit Bank (조선창광신용은행); Yongaksan Bank (용악산은행), Lyongaksan Bank (룡악산은행)	Saemul 1-Dong Pyongchon District, Pyongyang	Designated by UN on 24 Apr. 2009 (KPe.003) Main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. Under Second Economic Committee; financial arm of KOMID.

Source: The Panel, Member States, UN documents

Annex 43 : Payment process used in ship-to-ship transfers in 2018

First, foreign national brokers outside the DPRK arranged imports to be facilitated by ship-to-ship transfer. Once the deal was agreed, the DPRK end recipients of the imported products transferred funds internally to a DPRK bank with representatives operating overseas. The bank then instructed one of its overseas representatives to use foreign bank accounts it controls (often attached to front companies), to pay relevant suppliers for the product and shipping costs. The balance between the DPRK bank and the foreign accounts debited was then rectified virtually by ledger. When the actual balance of the accounts at the DPRK bank and those of its overseas representatives diverges too substantially as a result of the regular use of the ledger system, cash couriers address the imbalance by carrying bulk cash across the DPRK border. The Panel notes that this method for processing payments is almost identical to the ledger system used by Glocom for its financial transactions (S/2017/150, para. 225) as well as other DPRK front companies.

Source: Member State

Annex 44 : Official registration documents for DPRK Foreign Trade Bank Official Representative Office in Moscow

ВЫПИСКА ИЗ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО РЕЕСТРА АККРЕДИТОВАННЫХ ФИЛИАЛОВ, ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВ ИНОСТРАННЫХ ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ЛИЦ

08.01.2019

№ 99651900000023

Настоящая выписка содержит сведения о филиале (представительстве)

ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО БАНКА ВНЕШНЕЙ ТОРГОВЛИ КНДР

(полное наименование филиала, представительства)

иностранного юридического лица

БАНК ВНЕШНЕЙ ТОРГОВЛИ КНДР

(полное наименование иностранного юридического лица)

НЗА 20150032826

включенные в государственный реестр аккредитованных филиалов, представительств иностранных юридических лиц по состоянию на 07.01.2019

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
Сведения об иностранном юридическом лице		
Наименование		
1	Полное наименование	БАНК ВНЕШНЕЙ ТОРГОВЛИ КНДР
2	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	13.01.2016
Адрес в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)		
3	Код и наименование страны регистрации (инкорпорации)	408, Корейская Народно-Демократическая Республика
4	Адрес в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)	Г. ПХЕНЬЯН, ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ РАЙОН, КВАРТАЛ ЗУНСОН, ЗДАНИЕ БАНКА ВНЕШНЕЙ ТОРГОВЛИ КНДР КНДР, Г. ПХЕНЬЯН, ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ РАЙОН, КВАРТАЛ ЗУНСОН, ЗДАНИЕ БАНКА ВНЕШНЕЙ ТОРГОВЛИ КНДР
5	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	13.01.2016
Сведения о регистрации в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)		
6	Наименование регистрирующего органа	ТОРГОВАЯ ПАЛАТА КНДР
7	Регистрационный номер	46
8	Особенности режима регистрации	в специальной экономической зоне

Representation of the Foreign Trade Bank of the DPRK

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

25	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	17.11.2017
Сведения о руководителе филиала, представительства в Российской Федерации		
26	Фамилия	ХАН
27	Имя	ЗАН СУ
28	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	13.01.2016
Сведения о численности иностранных граждан, являющихся работниками филиала, представительства		
29	Численность иностранных работников	2
30	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	31.03.2015
Сведения о принятом решении об аккредитации представительства иностранного юридического лица		
31	Дата принятия решения об аккредитации представительства	30.11.2007
32	Срок действия аккредитации представительства, согласно принятому решению (срок действия документа об аккредитации представительства)	29.11.2016
33	Наименование органа, представившего сведения	ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ БАНК РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ (БАНК РОССИИ)
34	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	31.03.2015
Сведения о видах экономической деятельности филиала, представительства в Российской Федерации по Общероссийскому классификатору видов экономической деятельности (ОКВЭД ОК 029-2014 КДЕС. Ред. 2)		
Сведения об основном виде экономической деятельности		
35	Код и наименование вида деятельности	70.22 Консультирование по вопросам коммерческой деятельности и управления
36	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	31.03.2015

Number of foreign workers; 2

Information about the head of the branch, representation in the Russian Federation

Surname: Han
First name: Zan Su

Date information changed. Han Zang Su was likely appointed head of the representation in January 2016. Were someone else to take the position, that field would be updated and the effective date entered in the corresponding box. This does not mean that we don't know anything about the entity from that date and more that we know that they haven't changed those fields since that date.

Выписка сформирована с использованием интерактивного сервиса «Государственный реестр аккредитованных филиалов и представительств иностранных юридических лиц», размещенного на официальном сайте ФНС России в сети Интернет по адресу: <https://service.nalog.ru/rafp>

Source: Russian Federation Federal Tax Service State Registry of Accredited Branches, Representative Offices of Foreign Legal Entities (RAFP), extracted from <https://service.nalog.ru/rafp/#> (The webportal can be searched by name, INN, or even just the Russian word for DPRK – КНДР and then scrolling to the FTB entry).

Дата последней актуализации реестра на сайте: 04.09.2018

РАОП ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ РЕЕСТР АККРЕДИТОВАННЫХ ФИЛИАЛОВ,
ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВ ИНОСТРАННЫХ ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ЛИЦ

Поиск О сервисе Вопросы и ответы Открытые данные

ВЫ ИСКАЛИ:

Поисковый запрос: 20150032826

ИЗМЕНИТЬ ПАРАМЕТРЫ ПОИСКА

РЕЗУЛЬТАТЫ ПОИСКА Найдено записей: 1 (за 0.01 секунд)

Страница: 1 Элементов на странице: 5 10 25 50 100 ВЫГРУЗИТЬ

Сведения о филиале, представительстве иностранного юридического лица

Идентификационные характеристики	Адрес (место нахождения) на территории РФ	Дата аккредитации	Дата прекращения действия аккредитации	
<p>ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО БАНКА ВНЕШНЕЙ ТОРГОВЛИ КНДР</p> <p>NZA: 20150032826 ИНН: 9909086019 КПП: 774751001</p>	111123, МОСКВА ГОРОД, ЭНТУЗИАСТОВ ШОССЕ, ДОМ 31, КОРПУС 2, КВАРТИРА 37	31.03.2015	-	Посмотреть все обособленные подразделения ЮП →

Страница: 1 Элементов на странице: 5 10 25 50 100 ВЫГРУЗИТЬ

NZA: 20150032826
INN: 9909086019
KPP: 774751001

Apartment 37, Building 2
31 Entuziastov Highway,
Moscow, 111123

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Версия 1.7.37

Контакт-центр 8-800-222-2222

Техническая поддержка

По данному телефону можно получить информацию справочного характера о работе физических и юридических лиц, о порядке рассмотрения обращений, а также о работе интерактивных сервисов.

Создать новое обращение или просмотреть статус направленного обращения в службу технической поддержки.

Source: Russian Federation Federal Tax Service State Registry of Accredited Branches, Representative Offices of Foreign Legal Entities (RAFP), extracted from <https://service.nalog.ru/rafp/#> (The webportal can be searched by name, INN, or even just the Russian word for DPRK – КНДР and then scrolling to the FTB entry).

Summary of relevant information in English:

Name of Russian Branch in English and Russian; Tax ID No. (INN)	Name of Branch English & Russian; Short Name(s) of Foreign Branch	Location Address (English)	Full Names of Associated Individuals; Date Accredited	KPP #; NZA #; and Tax Organ ID	Date of Initial Registration	Document ID; Date of Document	# Foreign Citizens Working
REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE OF THE BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE DPRK	BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE DPRK БАНК ВНЕШНЕЙ ТОРГОВЛИ КНДР	Apartment 37, Building 2 31 Entuziastov Highway, Moscow, 111123	Han Zan Su XAH ЗАХ СУ 2015-03-31	KPP: 774751001 NZA: 20150032826	2008-06-26	Doc. ID: 90716	2

S/2019/171

ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО БАНКА ВНЕШНЕЙ ТОРГОВЛИ КНДР <u>Tax ID: 9909086019</u>				Tax Organ ID: 7747		Date: 2018- 10-17	
--	--	--	--	-----------------------	--	-------------------------	--

Former Address:	MKP Capital LLC Berhd Registered address: 24-B Jalan Landak Off Jalan Pudu KL Business address: Lot 5, Jalan Satu Kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jaya 43200 Balakong; Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia
Travels	Traveled to Zambia at least twice in 2017
Telephone:	Tel : 603 9076 9678; Fax : 603 9075 9678
Email	enquiries@mkpholdings.com.my
Website :	www.mkpholdings.com.my

Travel Information:

Phone Information

Phone Type	Phone Number	Extension
------------	--------------	-----------

E-Mail Information

Address	ISP Name	ISP Country
---------	----------	-------------

Travel Summary

Travel Date	Processing User	Location	Event Type	Flight/Travel Number	Offloaded/Deportee
01/10/2017	WKMOSES	LUSAKA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT	Departing	EK714	
16/09/2017	BAARON	LUSAKA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT	Arriving	EK713	
01/09/2017	PKAFUKANYA	LUSAKA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT	Departing	EK714	

Vehicles

Vehicle Type	Year	Make	Model	VIN	Color	Country Registered	State/Province Registered	Registration Number	Tag	Flag Country	Radio Frequency (mHz)	Length (meters)
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Cargos

Date	Cargo Type	Weight (kg)	Origin	Destination	Description
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Deportee

Reason for Deportation	Action Taken	Deported From/To
------------------------	--------------	------------------

Fingerprint Identity

Forename	Surname	Birth Date
HUNIL	HAN	02/04/1957

Image

Source: Member States

Annex 46 : Updated information on the Panel’s investigation into MKP activities in Zambia

The Zambian investigation into MKP confirmed that 13 companies incorporated in the country have been linked to MKP Holdings (see section below entitled, Information on MKP companies in Zambia). Information provided by Zambia showed that MKP relies on a semi-devolved corporate model outside of Malaysia; and makes widespread use of foreign facilitators in its corporate structures to create deniability of the control relationship between Han Hun Il and other MKP companies. In particular, an Algerian national, Mohamed Yazid Merzouk, served as a director in most of the MKP Zambia entities, playing a key central management role for the network alongside several Algerian nationals sharing his last name and a small number of Zambian nationals.

Although the Panel was unable to establish the amount being paid to each individual labourer of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, documents provided by Zambia showed that only 15 per cent of the total amount for each project was paid to the labourers for that project as a whole. MKP indicated to the Panel that, for its earlier projects overseas, labourers from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were paid 300 dollars a month. Zambia provided the monetary values for a selection of KOGEN/GENCO projects from 2013 to 2015, valued at a total of \$25 million. It did not provide a comprehensive list of the company’s activities, nor did it disclose KOGEN/ GENCO contracts post-2015.

Information on MKP companies in Zambia

(For further details and a network chart, see S/2018/171, page. 72. For the most up-to-date registration information, see the end of this Annex)

NHA - MKP ESTATES DEVELOPMENT

Registration number: 120050058683

Incorporated on 29 April 2005.

Registered address: 4668, Annex National Housing Authority

Ownership:

Name	Sex	Nationality	Address
Yazid Mohamed Merzouk	M	Algerian	Villa No. 3Millenium Village, Longacres, Lusaka
Donovan Webster Zyambo	M	Zambian	Plot 9620, Churdleigh. Lusaka
Saviour Konie	M	Zambian	Stand 7351, Nangwenya Rd, Rhodespark, Lusaka
National Housing Authority			

Note: The Panel also notes that NHA-MKP Estate Development Ltd was still active in May 2018, when a court of appeals judge ruled on its lawsuit against the compensation board:

<http://www.judiciaryzambia.com/2018/05/16/appeal-no-44-2017-nha-mkp-estate-development-ltd-v-workers-compensation-fund-control-board-may-2018-justice-makunguja/> In March 2018, a newspaper article quoted a representative of the National Housing Authority as saying that more developments would be coming from MKP: <https://www.dailynation.info/mkp-znbs-offloads-250-housing-units/>

KOREA GENERAL COMPANY FOR EXTERNAL CONSTRUCTION (KOGEN)

Incorporated 15 June 2012

Address: Plot no. 6556, Mumana Road, Olympia, Lusaka.

Nature of business: construction services.

Directors:

Name	Sex	Nationality	Address
Hang Chan Ho	M	Korean	Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka
Ri Kwanga Song	M	Korean	Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka
Ri Chun IL	M	Korean	Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka

The management team of the company comprises eleven (11) DPRK nationals including:

1. Mr. JIN H YOK RI - is on the Board of Directors of KOCEN. He has 10 years of experience in civil engineering.
2. KUM JUN TAE holds a degree in structural engineering from PYONGYANG UNIVERSITY. He has more than 13 years' experience in building industry
3. KIM I SONG - holds a degree in structural engineering from PYONGYANG UNIVERSITY. He has more than 13 years' experience in building industry
4. HONG JONG SON and KIM HAK CHOL — the two hold degrees and diploma in structural design and construction from Pyongyang University
5. JANG YONG NAM and CHA SUN CHOC — the duo hold degree in construction material engineering from Pyongyang University
6. KIM SU JON' RI RYONC HONG IN HO, KIM TAE HWAN they hold degrees in building and civil engineering from Pyongyang University with 16 years' experience in building industry

The above-mentioned directors of Korean General Construction (Z) Ltd registered another company called **CHAMMAE CONSTRUCTION LIMITED** whose address and directors are the same as those in Korean General Construction (Z) Ltd, with the addition of one director, Mr. Sam Maurice. The company, whose registration number is 1201 20102839 was also incorporated on 15th June 2012.

CHAMMAE CONSTRUCTION LIMITED

Incorporated 15 June 2012

Address: Plot no. 6556, Mumana Road, Olympia, Lusaka.

Registration: 1201 20102839

Directors:

Name	Sex	Nationality	Address
Hang Chan Ho	M	Korean	Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka
Ri Kwanga Song	M	Korean	Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka
Ri Chun IL	M	Korean	Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka
Mr. Sam Maurice	M	Zambian	

MKP TMS HOSPITAL LTDIncorporated 20th April 2006

Address: Plot No. 05, Reed Buck road, Kabulonga, Lusaka

Registration: 120060062028

Chief Executive Officer is a Mr. Han Nun.

Directors:

Name	Sex	Nationality	No. of shares	Address
Yazid Mohamed Merzouk	M	Algerian	2,750	Villa No.3, Millenium village, Longacres, Lusaka
Abdeldjallil Merzouk	M	Algerian		Plot No. 5591, Lusemfwa road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Han Yong	F	Korean	1,500	Hse No. MC72, PHI Chainama, Lusaka

Ho Un Ran	M	Korean	500	Plot No. 5, off Reedbuck road, Kabulonga, Lusaka
Betty Mulongoti	F	Zambian	250	Plot 325, Independence avenue, Lusaka

MKP MOTORS ZAMB'A LTD

Company incorporated on 22nd August 2002. Its registered business address is 2nd Floor Indeco House, Cairo Road, Lusaka. Directors of the company are in the following table:

Name	Sex	Nationality	Address
Han Hun IL	M	Korean	Malungushi Village, Kalundu
Siew KIN Wai	M	Malaysian	Malungushi Village, Kalundu, Lusaka
Yong KOK Yeap	M	Malaysian	Malungushi Village, Kalundu, Lusaka
Philip S.C Mumba	M	Zambian	Plot No.377a?12B, Kabulonga, Lusaka

MKP HOLDINGS LTD

Address: Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road. Kaiundu
 Registration: 12004005417
 Nature of business: construction
 Ownership:

Name	Sex	Nationality	Address
Yazid Mohamed Merzouk	M	Algerian	Villa No. 3, Millenium village, Longacres, Lusaka
Yon IL	M	Korean	Villa No. 3, Millenium village, Longacres, Lusaka

MKP MINING CORPORATION LTD

Incorporated: 16 August 2006
 Registration: 1 20060063279
 Address: Plot 7393 Chainda Place, South End, Cairo Road, Lusaka
 Ownership:

Name	Sex	Nationality	No. of shares	Address
Yazid Mohamed Merzouk	M	Algerian	125,000	Plot 5591, Lusemfwa road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Dr. Stephen M Kambani	M	Zambian	125,000	A2 Handsworth UNZA, Lusaka
Derrick Munsele	M	Zambian	125,000	Plot No. 2, Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe Road, Avondale, Lusaka
Charles Victor Holland	M	Zambian	125,000	Plot No. 4258 Mbeleshi, Northrise, Ndola Zambia

MKP SECURITY SYSTEMS LTD

Incorporated: 7th November 2006
 Registration :1 20060000641 68
 Address: Plot No. 7393, Chainda Place, "Jairo Road, Lusaka.
 Ownership:

Name	Sex	Nationality	No. of shares	Address
Samson Sakala	M	Zambian	100,000	Godfrey Kangwa road, Nyumba Yanga, Lusaka
Timothy Mazembe	M	Zambian	100,000	Plot 12243, Woodlands, Ext, Chalala, Lusaka

Ngonga Oswald M Goodson Bwalya	M	Zambian	100.000	Plot 16520/1080, Kamwala, South Lusaka
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MKP**BUILDERS ZAMBIA LTD**

Address: plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka.

Directors:

Name	Sex	Nationality	No. of Shares	Address
Yazid Mohamed Merzouk	M	Algerian	99.750,000	Villa No.3, Millennium Village, Longacres, Lusaka
Abdeldjallil Merzouk	M	Algerian	5,250,000	Plot No. 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka

MKP CAPITAL ZAMBIA LTD

Address is plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road Kaiundu, Lusaka

Incorporated: 4th February 2011.

Business: construction.

Directors:

Name	Sex	Nationality	No. of Shares	Address
Abdelghani Merzouk	M	Zambian	55,000	Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Abdeldjallil Mezouk	M	Algerian	11000000	Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Mohamed Yazid Merzouk	M	Algerian	87250000	Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Farid Merzouk	M	Algerian	11000000	Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Timothy Kazembe	M	Zambian		

MK IREHAB ZAMBIA LTD

Incorporated : 13 November 2011

Business: supplies of medical labs and pharmacy equipment

Address: Plot No. 5 Reed Buck Road, Kabulonga (address for MKP TMS Hospital)

Directors:

Name	Sex	Nationality	No. of Shares	Address
Abdeldjallil Merzouk	M	Algerian		Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Mohamed Yazid Merzouk	M	Algerian	2550000	Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Dr. Zelilah Binti Salleh Ghany	M	Zambian	2450000	Plot No. 5, Reed Buck Road, Kabulonga

OMEGA-MKP ZAMBIA LTD

Address: Stand No. 7241, Mukatasha road, industrial area, Lusaka.

Nature of business: security services

Directors:

Name	Sex	Address
Victor Etienne Janse Van Rensbur	M	Plot 7241, Mukatasha Road, Light Industrial Area, Lusaka
Christoffel Ohhanes Roelosfe	M	157 Ezra Road, Die Wilgers, Pretoria, South Africa
Philius Jacobus	M	Lynwoodridge, Pretoria, South Africa, 301, Minesota street
Christoffel Smit	M	Faerie Glen Pretoria, South Africa
Timothy Jim Kazembe	M	No. Tl Los Ageles Road, Lusaka
Christoffel Ohhanes Roelosfe	M	16520/1080, Kamwala South Lusaka

Motor vehicles registered in the names of Chang H Han and Korea General Company for External Construction (Z)

Owner	Registration Mark	Make
Korea General Company for External Construction	ALK9605	DAF Tipper
Korea General Company for External Construction	ALK2843	Volvo Tipper
Korea General Company for External Construction	ABF3391	Volvo
Korea General Company for External Construction	AAX5978	Toyota Dyna
Korea General Company for External Construction	ALJ1391	Toyota Regius
Korea General Company for External Construction	ACH9579ZM	Landcruiser Prado
Chan H Han	ALE7996	Toyota Noah
Chan H Han	ABE321	Toyota Camry
Chan H Han	ABD1517	Toyota Lucida

*Source: Member State***Updated information from Patents and Companies Registration Agency –December 2018**

NHA-MKP Estates Development, #120050058683 is shown as registered and compliant.

Chammae Construction Limited, #120120102839: is shown as registered and compliant.

MKP TMS Hospital, #120060062028: is shown as registered and compliant.

MKP Motors (Zambia) Ltd, #120010047965: shown as registered, but has some issues with timely paperwork filing....

MKP Holdings Ltd, #120040054717: shown as registered, but doesn't seem to have filed in a while.

MKP Mining Corporation, #120060063279: shown as registered, compliant.

MKP Security Systems Zambia, #120060064168: shown as registered, compliant.

MKP Capital Zambia, #120110090060: shown as registered, compliant.

MKP Builders Zambia, #120070068265: registered, partially compliant.

MKP-Irehab, #120110095546: still registered, partially compliant.

Omega-MKP Zambia, #120100086671: changed its name to Omega Risk Solutions Zambia. Still registered, compliant.

Source: Company Registry

Annex 47 : MKP companies in Malaysia as of November 2018

The Panel notes that while Han Hun II's name has been removed from the registration of one company and two other companies on which he served have been dissolved, many MKP companies appear to remain open and active in Malaysia despite the Panel's previous determination that their activity was prohibited.

(This updates the previous table of "MKP companies in Malaysia as of 15 December 2017", S/2018/171 pp. 229-232, Annex 67)

Company Name	Corporate Number	Status	Address	Directors	Shareholders	Start	Notes
M.K.P. PROJECTS SDN. BHD.	1994 48-D	Dissolved	Rm.1 1st. Floor, Lee Rubber Bldg 145, Jalan Tun H.S. Lee Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan	Abdul kodus bin datuk; Lee Kung Wah; Chong ah Kow @ Chong Ching Che; Yong Kok Yeap;	Abdul Kudus Bin Datuk; Yong Kok Yeap; Chong Ah Kow @ Chong Ching Che; Lee Kung Wah	15-Jun-90	
MKP BUILDERS SDN. BHD	3862 07-P	Existing	2-3-11 (3rd Floor)Menara Klh Business Centre 2, Jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shahkuala Lumpurwilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11 cheras, selangor	Han Hun II; Fang Chee Peng; Yong Kok Yeap;	Yong Kok Yeap, Fang Chee Peng	6-May-96	Han Hun II no longer listed as shareholder (11 May 2018 registration documents listed him as shareholder)

MKP CAPITAL BERHAD	7383 26-V	Winding Up	24-B, Jalan Landakoff Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur Wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1 kawasan Perindustrian Cheras Jayabatu 11, Batu 9 cheras, selangor	Han Hun II; Yong Kok Yeap;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun II	20 June 2006	
MKP CAPITAL LLC BERHAD	9808 01-M	Existing	24-B Jalan Landakoff Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan	Han Hun II; Yong Kok Yeap;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun II	2 March 2012	
MKP CORPORATION BERHAD	6197 41-U	Existing	24-B Jalan Landakoff Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1 kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11batu 9 Cherasselangor	Han Hun II; Karnail Singh Nijhar Tansri Dato'dr Amar Singh; Yong Kok Yeap; Ramanan Ramakrishnan, Dato';	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun II	26 June 2003	Previously listed as "winding up" (in 13 Nov 2017 documents)
MKP DYNAMIC ENGINEERING SDN. BHD	7359 10 - W	Existing	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1 Kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor	Karnail Singh Nijhar Tansri Dato'dr Amar Singh; Fang Chee Peng; Yong Kok Yeap; Muhammad Danial Bin Osman;	Karnail Singh Nijhar Amar Singh, Tansri Dato'dr; Yong Kok Yeap; Soh Pui Hoon; Han Hun II; Ramanan Ramakrishnan	31 May 2006	
MKP DYNAMIC SDN. BHD	7799 80 - A	Existing	2-3-11 (3rd Floor), Menara Klhbusiness Centre, 2, Jalan Kasipillayoff Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11 cheras selangor	Karnail Singh Nijhar Tansri Dato'dr Amar Singh; Fang Chee Peng; Yong Kok Yeap; Ramanan Ramakrishnan; Muhammad Danial Bin Osman @ Mddaud;	Yong Kok Yeap; Soh Pui Hoon; Ramanan Ramakrishnan; Karnail Singh Nijhar Tansri Dato'dr Amar Singh	7 July 2012	Han Hun II was never on the paperwork to begin

MKP HOLDINGS SDN. BHD	4644 92 - W	Existin g	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1 kaw. Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11 batu 9 Cheras Selangor	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun II;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun II	23 June 1998	
MKP SUPPLIES SDN. BHD	1210 818 - M	Existin g	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan	Fang Chee Peng; Yong Kok Yeap;	Yong Kok Yeap; Fang Chee Peng	30 Nov 2016	Address change (11 Nov 2017 docs listed address in Puchong Selangor)
MKP -WUI LOONG SYSTEM SCAFFOLDS SDN. BHD	5774 18 - H	Dissolv ed	24 -B Jalan Landakoff Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutua Lot 5 Jalan 1kawasan Perindustrian Cheras Jayabatu 11 Batu 9 Cheras, Selangor	Kong Kam Wang; Han Hun II; Yong Kok Yeap; So Yu Shing;	Wui Loong System Scaffolds Co.Ltd; Mkp Holdings Sdn. Bhd.	17 April 2002	

Nekad Ziple SDN. BHD	6143 59 - U	Existin g	52 a, Jalan Landak off Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan C/O Lot 5, Jalan 1 kawasan Perindustrian Cheras Jayabatu 11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor)	Han Hun II; Yong Kok Yeap;	Jusoh Bin Awang; Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun II; Sumairi Bin Hashim	7-May- 03	
ELEMENT FLASH (M) SDN. BHD.	6585 73 - V	Existin g	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 Jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shahkuala Lumpur Wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5 Jalan Satu kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabalakong Selangor	Yong Kok Yeap; Chua Boon Lain; Tee Eng Soon;	Chua Boon Lain; Yong Kok Yeap; Tee Eng Soon; Fang Chee Peng	6-Jul-04	Han was never on paperwork to begin; new Fang Chee Peng (added sometime after Nov 2018)
SOSIT SDN. BHD.	7493 41-K	Dissolv ed	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1 Kaw. Perusahaan Cheras Jaya Batu 11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun II;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun II	3-Oct- 06	

Source: Malaysian corporate registry

Annex 48 : Korea General Corporation for External Construction (GENCO)'s page on the DPRK's official online portal, Naenara, compared with MKP's website showing same completed projects (red boxes added to highlight construction projects claimed by both organizations)

1116081011/http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/periodic/f_trade/index.php?contents+1645+2011-01+47+3

trade/index.php?contents+1645+2011-01+47+3 OCT NOV APR
 2010 16 2011 2014

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Korea General Corporation for External Construction

The Korea General Corporation for External Construction (GENCO) is a professional enterprise for overseas construction.

GENCO has gained a good reputation from many countries around the world as a credible constructor with a long history of 50 years since its inauguration in January 1961.

It has scores of affiliated building enterprises involving a number of designers, building operators and skilled workers as well as foreign languages and other experts.

GENCO has built lots of dwellings and public establishments in Kuwait, and recently completed the 64-storied Al-Fardan Tower, an ordered project, in a short span of time in Qatar.

GENCO is looking forward to contracts for construction projects such as dwelling houses, public buildings, metros, tunnels, bridges, airports, harbours and stadiums in different countries in diverse forms such as the whole construction work and dispatch of skilled workers.

Add: Taedonggang District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea
 Tel: 850-2-18111-8090
 Fax: 850-2-381-4427/4410
 E-mail: gen122@co.chesin.com

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Source:

https://web.archive.org/web/20111116081011/http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/periodic/f_trade/index.php?contents+1645+2011-01+47+3

https://archive.li/82wX1

COMMERCE EXTERIEUR

No. 4 (291) year 93 of Juche 2005

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Korean General Company for Overseas Construction

Founded in January of year 50 of Juche (1961), it remains always a reliable company in the construction.

With its tens of thousands of engineers, specialists and skilled workers, it is responsible for all construction work abroad since the development of plans and the start of the project until its completion .

In addition to subcontracting, she is responsible for technical services, including assistance or cooperation in this area.

In the past, she has built innumerable buildings such as public institutions, hospitals, schools, gymnasiums, housing, underground structures and dikes in many countries including Russia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Yemen, Libya and Mongolia.

Renowned under the name of Genco, this company is equipped with state-of-the-art equipment and construction machinery.

Those who want to trade with her, please contact :

Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK
 Phone : 850-2-18111-381-8090
 Fax : 850-2-381-4611
 E-mail : gen122@co.chesin.com

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Foreign Trade Editions

Sources: <https://archive.li/82wX1> and https://web.archive.org/web/20051119182017/http://www.kcckp.net/fr/periodic/f_trade/index.php?contents+234+2004-04+8+24

https://archive.li/82wX1

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
Those who want to trade with her, please contact :

Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK
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 Fax : 850-2-381-4611
 E-mail : gen122@co.chesin.com

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Foreign Trade Editions

Annex 49 : MKP website showing same completed projects (red boxes added to highlight construction projects claimed by both organizations)



Source: <http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/construction.php> accessed on 9 January 2019. Red box highlights the shared claim.

Construction Projects

Completed Project
Ongoing Project
Proposed Project

Projects in Malaysia

- Pedawan, Sarawak
- Mines Wonderland Theme Park
- Paddy Museum, Kedah
- GET Road, Banting

Central and South African Projects

- Zambia Lusaka Millennium City
- Zambia International Convention Center
- Zimbabwe: Harare
- Madagascar
- Angola Luanda
- Hotel Ritz (On Going)

North Africa, Middle East , Russia Projects

- Libya
- Sudan
- Yemen
- Russia

Hong Kong Project

- Artificial Lake & Tree House
- Four Season Hotel
- Harbour Green
- New Town Tower
- Robinso
- The Arch
- Cheung Sha Wan Commercial Building
- Kwun Tong 502
- Scaffolding


Irrigation & Dam

- Waterway
- Water Pipes
- Irrigation Tunnel
- Dam Project in Africa


Venue: Tarabuls, Susya of Libya.

Status: Main contractor

Duration: 1982 Year



Apartments in Tarabuls



Recreation Center in Susya

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[ABOUT US](#)
[CONSTRUCTION](#)
[SHIP BUILDING](#)
[TECHNOLOGY](#)
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[CONTACT US](#)

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Source: www.mkphodings.com.my/construction.php

Annex 50 : Archived page for GENCO/KOGEN (originally in French; Google-translated) showing images of buildings which it claims to have constructed which are also listed on the MKP website as buildings which MKP claims to have constructed.

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Korea General Corporation for External Construction

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GENCO is looking forward to contracts for construction projects such as dwelling houses, public buildings, metros, tunnels, bridges, airports, harbours and stadiums in different countries in diverse forms such as the whole construction work and dispatch of skilled workers.

Add: Taedonggang District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea

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 Tel : 850-2-18111EXP8456 Fax : 850-2-3814598

Source:

https://web.archive.org/web/20111116081011/http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/periodic/f_trade/index.php?contents+1645+2011-01+47+3

Compagnie Générale Coréenne pour la Construction d'outre-mer



Fondée en janvier de l'an 50 du Juche (1961), elle reste toujours une société digne de confiance dans la construction.

Avec ses dizaines de milliers d'ingénieurs, de spécialistes et d'ouvriers qualifiés, elle se charge de l'ensemble des travaux de construction à l'étranger depuis l'élaboration des plans et la mise en chantier du projet jusqu'à son achèvement.



Outre la sous-traitance, elle s'occupe des services techniques, notamment l'aide ou la coopération en la matière.



Dans le passé, elle a réalisé d'innombrables constructions telles que , établissements publics, hôpitaux, écoles, gymnases, logements, ouvrages sous-terrains et digues dans de nombreux pays dont la Russie, l'Etat des Emirats Arabes Unis, le Koweït, l'Yémen, la Libye et la Mongolie.

Renommée sous l'appellation de Genco, cette compagnie est munie d'équipements et machines de construction ultramodernes.



Ceux qui veulent commercer avec elle, sont priés de s'adresser à:

Arrondissement Central, Pyongyang, RPDC

Tél.: 850-2-18111-381-8090

Fax: 850-2-381-4611

E-mail: gen122@co.chesin.com

Source:

https://web.archive.org/web/20070930050305/http://www.kcckp.net/fr/periodic/f_trade/index.php?contents+234+2004-04+8+24

Annex 51 : MKP claim to a construction project which a Member State informed the Panel was constructed by KOGEN (Mulungushi International Convention Center)

Not secure | www.mkpholdings.com.my/construction.php

Construction Projects

Completed Project Ongoing Project Proposed Project

Projects in Malaysia

- Padawan, Sarawak
- Mines Wonderland Theme Park
- Paddy Museum, Kedah
- GET Road, Banting

Central and South African Projects

- Zambia Lusaka Millennium City
- Zambia International Convention Center
- Zimbabwe: Harare
- Madagascar
- Angola Luanda
- Hotel Ritz (On Going)

North Africa, Middle East , Russia Projects

- Libya
- Sudan
- Yemen
- Russia

Hong Kong Project

- Artificial Lake & Tree House
- Four Season Hotel
- Harbour Green
- New Town Tower
- Robinso
- The Arch
- Cheung Sha Wan Commercial Building
- Kwun Tong 502
- Scaffolding


Irrigation & Dam

- Waterway
- Water Pipes
- Irrigation Tunnel
- Dam Project in Africa


Venue: Mulungushi International Convention Center, Zambia

Status: Main contractor


Duration: January 2001 - July 2001




Front View



Auditorium



Monument of AU Unity



Interior

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Accessed at <http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/construction.php> on 9 January 2019

Annex 52 : List of DPRK workers working in Zambia, including Han Hun Il (RGB) and Yazid Merzouk (Algerian national)

**NORTH KOREANS WORKING IN ZAMBIA
AT KOREA GENERAL COMPANY FOR EXTERNAL CONSTRUCTION**

NAME	PASSPORT NO.	PROJECT
1. KWANG MYONG CHOE	65413075	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
2. CHANG JUN RI	836131680	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
3. CHOL MIN KIM	472434386	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
4. JIN HYON JU	563434859	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
5. KIM CHOL KIM	472336384	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
6. SONG GUK KIM	472237752	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
7. JON WON R	563431653	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
8. SONG NAM JANG	563335550	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
9. CHON KANG	745334987	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
10. SONG ILJONG	654130233	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
11. KIM RYUL	745334957	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
12. KIM HAK CHOL	745231548	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
13. JO JONG SIK	5633331039	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
14. PAK KYONG NAM	563335551	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
15. CHA SONG HWAN	563337914	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
16. HAM YONG NAM	563433402	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
17. OM SONGHO	472334756	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
18. KIM YONG CHUN	563436057	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
19. RI SONG IL	563430759	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
20. KIM MYONG JIM	5633436035	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
1. HANHUN IL	836134879	MKP CAPITAL/TMS HOSPITAL
2. YAZID MERZOUK	02141496	MKP CAPITAL/TMS HOSPITAL
3. SONGHUI JI	381335622	MKP CAPITAL/TMS HOSPITAL
4. YONG GWON KIM	927132832	MKP CAPITAL/TMS HOSPITAL
5. KIM IL KYONG	654133930	MKP CAPITAL/TMS HOSPITAL
6. KIM AE MYONG	745230207	MKP CAPITAL/TMS HOSPITAL
7. KWANG CHOL JONG	745234558	MKP CAPITAL/TMS HOSPITAL

Source: Member State

**Annex 53 : Information showing that Kwang Song Ri served as the DPRK Counsellor in China
(리광선 aliases: RI, Kwang-Son, RI, Kwangson)**

THOMSON REUTERS

WORLD-CHECK ONE

WORLD-CHECK MATCH DETAILS REPORT

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

CASE AND COMPARISON DATA

	Client/Submitted Data	World-Check Data
Name	× Kwang Song Ri	Kwang Son RI
Gender	✓ Male	Male
Nationality	×	KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
Country Location	×	CHINA
Place of Birth		

KEY DATA

Source Type	PEP OB	
Category	Diplomat	
Name	Kwang Son RI	
Gender	Male	
Nationality	KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	
Country Location(s)	CHINA (CHN)	
	Location 1	
	City	Beijing
	Region	Beijing
	KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (PRK)	
	Location 1	
	City	Pyongyang



THOMSON REUTERS™

Source: Thomson Reuters World Check

	Region	Pyongyang
Position	Embassy or Consular Staff	
Entered Date	02-Mar-2018	
Updated Date	22-Mar-2018	
Update Categorization	C2	

ALIASES

Aliases	RI,Kwang-Son RI,Kwangson
Native Character Names	리광선

KEYWORDS

World-Check Keyword(s)

Keyword	Description	Country
PEP N	PEP - National Government	
DPRK-WC	INTERNATIONAL - DPRK-WC - North Korea - Relevant World-Check Data	UNKNOWN

BIOGRAPHY

Details	<p>BIOGRAPHY Counsellor to China (reported Sep 2013).</p> <p>REPORTS Mar 2018 - no further information reported.</p> <p>IDENTIFICATION Song Sun Rim (spouse).</p>
Sub-Category	PEP N

CONNECTIONS / RELATIONSHIPS

Linked companies

Linked individuals	Song Sun RIM	Individual
--------------------	--------------	------------

Source: Thomson Reuters World Check

Annex 54 : Open source information showing that Kwang Song Ri served as a Counsellor (参赞) at the DPRK Embassy in Beijing under the name 李光先 (리광선 aliases: RI, Kwang-Son, RI, Kwangson)



检索 高级 首页 > 服务 > 礼宾服务 > 驻华外交官名单

驻华使馆礼宾指南(中、英、法三种文本)
电子政务
证件办理
免税退税
通信管理
车辆管理
其它外交特权与豁免
驻华外交官名单
外国驻华领事官名单
国际组织驻华官员名单
相关资料

(DPRK)朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆

(最近更新时间: 2013年9月22日)

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻华大使馆
Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic Of Korea

办公处及住宅: 建国门外日坛北路
Chancery and Residence: Ri Tan Bei Lu, Jian Guo Men Wai
电话: 65321186 (值班) 65321154 (政务处) 65325018 (经济处) 65324308 (商务处)

李光先 参赞
李光先夫人 (林成顺)
Mr.Ri Kwang Son ,Counsellor
Mrs.Rim Song Sun

English translation

Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in China
Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(Last updated: September 22, 2013)
Office and Residence: Ritan North Road, Jianguomenwai
Chancery and Residence: Ri Tan Bei Lu, Jian Guo Men Wai
Tel: 65321186 (on duty) 65321154 (Government Office)
65325018 (Economic Office) 65324308 (Business Office)

Counsellor Li Guangxian
Mrs. Li Guangxian (Lin Chengshun)
Mr. Ri Kwang Son, Counsellor
Mrs. Rim Song Sun

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China website
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn//pds/fw/lbfw/zhwjgmd_lbfw/t527236.htm; archived version: <https://archive.fo/CDCwJ>.

Annex 55 : Information showing that Kwang Song Ri served as a diplomat in Cairo, Egypt

THOMSON REUTERS

WORLD-CHECK ONE

WORLD-CHECK MATCH DETAILS REPORT

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

CASE AND COMPARISON DATA

	Client/Submitted Data	World-Check Data
Name	✓ Kwang Song Ri	Kwang Song RI
Gender	✓ Male	Male
Nationality	×	KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
Country Location	×	EGYPT
Place of Birth		

KEY DATA

Source Type	PEP OB	
Category	Diplomat	
Name	Kwang Song RI	
Gender	Male	
Nationality	KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	
Country Location(s)	EGYPT (EGY)	
	Location 1	
	City	Cairo
	Region	Al Qahirah
	KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (PRK)	
	Location 1	
	City	Pyongyang



THOMSON REUTERS™

Source: Thomson Reuters World Check

	Region	Pyongyang
Position	Embassy or Consular Staff	
Entered Date	21-Feb-2018	
Updated Date	23-Mar-2018	
Update Categorization	C2	

ALIASES

Aliases	RI,Kwang-Song RI,Kwangsong
Native Character Names	리광송

KEYWORDS

World-Check Keyword(s)

Keyword	Description	Country
PEP N	PEP - National Government	
DPRK-WC	INTERNATIONAL - DPRK-WC - North Korea - Relevant World-Check Data	UNKNOWN

BIOGRAPHY

Details

BIOGRAPHY

First Secretary of North Korea Embassy in Egypt (reported Dec 2017).

REPORTS

To be determined.

IDENTIFICATION

To be determined.

Sub-Category PEP N

Information/External Sources

<http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/pblicitn/pblicitnList.do?originCd=OC0003>

Source: Thomson Reuters World Check

Annex 56 : Information from a 26 January 2018 report by the Republic of Korea Ministry of Unification on key DPRK personnel figures (2018 북한 주요인사 인물정보) which includes DPRK diplomatic personnel worldwide.

In a publication by the Republic of Korea on key DPRK personnel, pages 809-831 contain a list of DPRK diplomatic personnel worldwide. In the original Korean document, Kwang Song Ri's name can be found under "Egypt" on page 814, item number 13, third line, first name (Egypt's entire entry listed here in the original)

Entry in Korean:

(13) 이집트(에집트)

대 사 마동희

참 사 관 박성도

1 등서기관 리광송 최 강 최기영

Entry translated into English:

13. Egypt

- a. Ambassador- Ma Dong Hee
- b. Councilor- Park Sung Do
- c. First Office- Ri Kwang Song, Choi Kang, Choi Gee Yong



Source: <http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/pblicitn/pblicitnList.do?originCd=OC0003#>

Annex 57 : UAE Company 1 Website on establishment of KOGEN UAE JV

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the address bar displaying "Not Secure" and ".html". The website header includes a navigation menu with links for "Home", "Corporate Information", "Group Divisions", "Career", and "Contact Us". A banner image shows construction workers in hard hats and safety vests. Below the banner is a section titled "Construction & Transport" with a small image of a yellow bulldozer. To the right is a "Quick Links" sidebar with links for "Construction & Transport", "Retail", and "Services". The main content area contains several lines of text, with a red box highlighting a paragraph: "[redacted] was established in 2001. It is a joint venture between [redacted] and GENCO, a Korean Government company. [redacted] was set up to manage and execute major construction projects such as highrise buildings, dams and bridges requiring sophisticated engineering techniques and technology." The footer shows "Copyright © 2012 [redacted]".

Source: UAE Company 1 website, accessed 9 November 2018.

Annex 58 : Page from UAE Company 1 brochure outlining project work

Engineering & Construction

is enjoying significant growth in the UAE market as a result of the overall expansion of the real estate sector and construction industry in the region. Robust growth is taking place in the UAE and other Gulf countries, as seen by numerous key indicators and research studies. The transactions in real estate are reaching trillion dollars with number of building permits continuously increasing due to the continued commitment from the international community in terms of their investment in the region.

Our structural engineering projects include Residential Buildings and Estates, Commercial and Industrial Facilities, Shopping Centers and Business Parks, Office and Commercial Buildings, Hotels, Banks, Multi-storey Car Parks, Cinema Complexes, Sports Facilities, Sheds, Warehouses and Production Facilities, Public Buildings, Hospitals and large housing developments.

Dubai Recent Projects: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meydan Business Park - Nakheel Waterfront Villas - Al Mushrif Reservoir - Cube Tower - Falcon Training Building - HH Sheikh Hamdan Bin Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Stadium, Nad Al Sheba 	Abu Dhabi Recent Projects: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 488 Royal Group Villas in Yas Island - 48 Royal Group Villas in Mohamed Bin Zayed City - Landmark 4-Star Hotel - Civil Defence Training Academy - Hamad Al Mansouri Tower - Mubarak Al Mansouri Tower - Al Wadha Mall Extension
--	---

Our Mission

Our mission is to contribute to the evolution of the fast-growing construction industry in the region and the welfare of customers through the performance of its business.

10

Source: UAE Company 1 website, accessed 13 December 2018.

Annex 59 : Corporate information on Chammae Construction Limited

		120120102839
Patents and Companies Registration Agency		
Computer Printout - Local Company		
Local Company	CHAMMAE CONSTRUCTION LIMITED	Registration Number 120120102839
Date of Incorporation	15 day of June 2012	Date of FY End 29/12/2018
Registered Office	378a/b/3774, ALONG SIMON MWANSA KAPWEPWE, AVONDALE, LUSAKA, LUSAKA PROVINCE, ZAMBIA	
Postal Address	LUSAKA, LUSAKA PROVINCE, ZAMBIA	
Town / City	AVONDALE	
Country	ZAMBIA	
Certificate Signed By	Lloyd Thole	
Phone	+260973314930	
Email	kogen@yahoo.com	
Struck off/Ceased on		
Nominal capital	K 10000	
Number of Shares	10000	
Liability	Normal Company	
Articles Filed Date	15/06/2012	
Amended Articles Filed Date	04/02/2013	
Adopted Articles Filed Date		
Company Liquidated Date		
Company in Receivership Date		
Nature of Business		
Sector	4799. Other retail sale not in stores, stalls or markets	



* - Information in this report can change any time.

7490. Other professional, scientific and technical activities n.e.c.		
4100. Construction of buildings		

Annual return

Year	Date Delivered	
2017	05/01/2018	
2016	01/02/2017	
2015	21/01/2016	
2014	15/01/2015	
2013	14/08/2013	
Class of Shares	Number authorised	Par value Per share
Ordinary	10,000.00	1.00

Individuals

Present forenames and surnames	Address	Nationality & NRC/ Passport No	Occupation	Director/ Partner	Secretary	Shareholder / Member	Amount	Share Class
KWANG CHON		745334987 KOREA	BUSINESSMAN		Yes			
KIM YONG SIK		836232923 KOREA	BUSINESSMAN	Yes				
HAN CHANG HO		381337615 KOREA	DIRECTOR			Yes	4,500.00	Ordinary
SAM MAURICE MBEWE		296387/74/1 ZAMBIAN	BUSINESSMAN	Yes				
RI KWANGA SONG		381131855 KOREA	DIRECTOR			Yes	1,000.00	Ordinary
RI CHUN IL		472436302 KOREA	DIRECTOR	Yes		Yes	4,500.00	Ordinary

* - Information in this report can change any time.

Source: Patents and Companies Registration Agency, Zambia


Annex 60 : Corporate information on GENCO Nigeria

Not Secure | publicsearch.cac.gov.ng/comsearch/index.php

Corporate Affairs Commission

Company Search

Search Record by Name:

I'm not a robot  reCAPTCHA
Privacy - Terms

Search

RC NUMBER	COMPANY NAME	ADDRESS	DATE OF REGISTRATION
334702	KOREA GENERAL COMPANY FOR EXTERNAL CONSTR.GENCO(NIG)L	OPP.AP FILLING STATION NEAR APO VILLAGE, ABUJA, F.C.T.	1998-05-05

Source: Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission, <http://publicsearch.cac.gov.ng/comsearch/index.php>

NAME OF COMPANY: KOREA GEN. CO. FOR EXT. CONSTRUCTION
GENCO (NIG) LIMITED
TYPE OF COMPANY: Limited Liability
COMPANY REGISTRATION NO: 334702
DATE OF INCORPORATION: 5/5/1998
BORROWING POWER: CAMA 1990 adopted
COMPANY SECRETARY: Nil
SHARE CAPITAL AT INCORP: 20,000,000.00
CURRENT SHARE CAPITAL: 20,000,000.00
CLASS OF SHARE: Ordinary Share
PAID UP SHARE CAPITAL: 20,000,000.00
REG. ADDRESS OF COMPANY: Opposite AP filling Station, near APO Village.
Abuja FCT.

1. FIRST NATURE OF BUSINESS:

To carry on the business of construction services of every description.

2. LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS OF KOREA GENERAL COMPANY FOR EXTERNAL CONSTRUCTION GENCO (NIGERIA) LIMITED 5/5/1998

NAMES	ADDRESS	NO. OF SHARES TAKEN
Korea General Co. for External Construction Genco	Opposite AP filling station, near Apo Village, Abuja FCT	19,900,000.00
Kim Yong Sik	Opposite AP filling station, near Apo Village, Abuja FCT	50,000.00
Kim Yong Hwan	Opposite AP filling station, near Apo Village, Abuja FCT	50,000.00

4. LIST OF DIRECTORS OF KOREA GENERAL COMPANY FOR EXTERNAL CONSTRUCTION GENCO (NIGERIA) LIMITED 5/5/1998

NAMES	ADDRESS
Kim Yong Sik	Opposite AP filling station, near Apo Village, Abuja FCT
Kim Yong Hwan	Opposite AP filling station, near Apo Village, Abuja FCT

Source: Nigerian corporate registry

Annex 61 : African Union's InterAfrican Bureau for Animal Resources lists KOGEN GE S.L. as its implementing partner for a project

**AFRICAN UNION
INTERAFRICAN BUREAU
FOR ANIMAL RESOURCES**

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African Union Member States > Central Africa Region

Current Programmes and Projects

2014 - 2017 **FishTRADE** 2018 - 2019 **RAFIP**

Central Africa Region
On 20 September 2015

Congo Brazaville

Project Title	Main Objectives/Scope	Timelines	Coverage	Financial Partners	Implementing Agencies/Partners
Programme d'appui au développement des filières agricoles	Améliorer durablement la sécurité alimentaire, les revenus des petits producteurs (agriculteurs, éleveurs, pêcheurs et pisciculteurs) et créer des emplois durables ou les ruraux, en particulier les jeunes et les femmes, à travers un appui au développement des filières porteuses	2012-2016	Nationale	F I D A	Pour les activités de pêche et de pisciculture, la mise en oeuvre est faite par le Ministère de la Pêche et de l'Aquaculture (MPA)
Projet d'appui à l'amélioration de la gestion des pêcheries crevettières en République du Congo	Mettre en place de manière participative un plan de gestion de la pêche crevette au Congo, en prenant en compte non seulement les ressources ciblées et les ressources accessoires, mais aussi l'écosystème dans son ensemble	12 mois à compter de Juin 2015	Nationale	FAO	Direction générale de la pêche maritime

Republique Democratique du Congo

Project Title	Main Objectives/Scope	Timelines	Coverage	Financial Partners	Implementing Agencies/Partners
PRODAP	Gestion durable des ressources halieutiques Protection de l'écosystème du Lac Tanganyika	2009-2014 et 2015 début du PRODAP II	Régionale	BAD	ALT
Lakes Edouard and Albert Fisheries (LEAF)	Protection de l'écosystème des Lacs Edouard et Albert Gestion durable des ressources halieutiques des deux lacs	5 ans 2015-2020	Régionale	BAD	NELSAP
Pêche crevette	Planification et Aménagement des pêcheries crevettières dans l'estuaire et l'embouchure du fleuve Congo	16 mois Début juillet 2015	Nationale	EAF-NANSEN	FAO
Projet des Pêches et de L'Aquaculture au Katanga (PRODEPAK)	Production et amélioration des alevins	Clôturé en 2014, attente phase 2	Nationale	CTB	CTB

Guinée Equatoriale

Project Title	Main Objectives/Scope	Timelines	Coverage	Financial Partners	Implementing Agencies/Partners
Propuesta para la Implementación de la Producción Avanzada de la Piscicultura en la Región Continental Provincia de Kie-Ntem (Ebibeyin)	Cubrir la gran demanda de consumo de pescado fresco entre la población y generar otra actividad de apoyo a la pesca artesanal.	2015-2019	EI Proyecto tiene una cobertura Nacional.	EI Gobierno de Guinea Ecuatorial	Corea General Construcción S.L. (KOGEN GE S.L.)

Funded by the European Union

L4LP Menu

- Background
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Opportunities

- Jobs
- Consultancies
- Procurement

Source: InterAfrican Bureau for Animal Resources, African Union, <http://www.au-ibar.org/2012-10-01-13-08-42/news/450-en/programmes-and-projects/current-programmes-and-projects/fish/inventory-projects/820-african-union-member-states-by-region>

Annex 62 : Funding documentation for the Rebola Municipal Stadium in Equatorial Guinea

Not Secure | www.minhacienda.gob.gq/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/LPGE_-2017.pdf

Linea	Nombre del Proyecto	Costo Total	Total Pagos	Saldo por Pagar	PIP 2017	Recursos Externos
907	Salud para todos	266.307	145.206	121.104	31.716	12.309
908	Juventud y Deportes	47.169	41.131	6.038	2.134	0
909	Infraestructuras	47.169	41.131	6.038	2.134	0
910	2919011-0 Remodelación y adaptación del estadio de fútbol de Mongomo	6.000	5.400	600	172	0
911	2919011-1 Control y supervisión nuevo estadio de Mongomo	460	405	55	8	0
912	2919012-0 Remodelación y adaptación del estadio de fútbol de Ebebiyin	6.000	5.400	600	172	0
913	2919012-1 Control y supervisión del nuevo estadio de Ebebiyin	460	428	32	32	0
914	2919014-0 Construcción de dos Campos de entrenamiento de 500 plazas para la CAN 2012 en la comunidad de Bikuy II (Bata) y en el municipio de Machinda	3.500	3.150	350	100	0
915	2919016-0 Construcción de un campo de entrenamiento de 500 plazas para la CAN 2012 en el municipio de Bidjabidjan	1.750	1.575	175	50	0
916	2919017-0 Construcción de un campo de entrenamiento de 500 plazas para la CAN 2012 en la ciudad de Ebebiyin	1.750	1.575	175	50	0
917	2919018-0 Construcción de un campo de entrenamiento de 500 plazas para la CAN 2012 en el municipio de Megomeyen	1.750	1.575	175	50	0
918	2919020-0 Construcción del vallado del campo de fútbol del antiguo estadio de Bata	324	292	32	32	0
919	2919024-0 Obra de rehabilitación del Estadio de Libertad de Bata	711	604	107	31	0
920	2919033-0 Rehabilitación del estadio de Bidjabidjan	898	509	389	111	0
921	2919041-0 Complemento sistema de imagen, video, marcadores, voz, etc. estadios Malabo y Bata	1.848	1.830	18	18	0
922	2919008-0 Construcción del estadio municipal de Rebola	11.000	9.900	1.100	632	0
923	2919025-0 Construcción vallado, parking VIP e instalación ascensor en el estadio Mkuantoma y acceso provisional al estadio de Atep	2.199	2.166	33	29	0
924	2919021-0 Instalación de luz en el antiguo estadio de Bata	275	248	28	28	0
925	2919005-0 Urbanización y construcción de edificios anexos del estadio de Rebola: sala de maquinas y control, agua potable, acceso parking, etc.	8.249	6.074	2.175	622	0

Source: Ministry of Treasury, Economy, and Planning, http://www.minhacienda.gob.gq/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/LPGE_-2017.pdf

Not Secure | www.diariorombe.es/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Lista-de-Obras-Primera-Parte.pdf

NUM			
592	INGENIERIA Y CONSTRUCCION SA(empresa cubana)	Construcción del Centro de Reeduación de Menores de Riaba.	9.786.646.155
593	INGENIERIA Y CONSTRUCCION SA(empresa cubana)	Construcción del Centro de Reeduación de Menores de Atom (Teguete)	8.605.366.535
594	INPROSA	Control y supervisión de las obras de ampliación del Cuartel Central de Bata.	194.600.000
595	INPROSA	Control y supervisión de las obras de ampliación del Cuartel 3 de Agosto de Bata.	298.941.744
596	INSTITUTO CALDERON DE FORMACION PROFESIONAL (ICAF)	Obras de rehabilitación, mobiliario, equipamiento de talleres e informática y gestión del profesorado durante 10 años y una formación técnica profesional de 2 años	21.129.426.349
597	INTERCOMIVES	Rehabilitación y ampliación de la casa Sacerdotal del Obispado de Bata	3.500.000.000
598	INTERCOMIVES	Rehabilitación de la Iglesia, casa Sacerdotal y la urbanización de la iglesia de Ayene	3.124.470.088
599	INTERCOMIVES	Rehabilitación y ampliación de la Iglesia y Colegio Claret de Luba	7.040.478.931
600	INTERCOMIVES	Rehabilitación de la Cámara de los Representantes de Pueblo en la Ciudad de Bata.	1.349.843.393
601	IPX GE	Control de entrada, barreras y suervisión de acceso al ministerio de defensa nacional	1.375.457.323
602	Jacinta Mbang Nguema Obono.	Rehabilitación del Instituto de Enseñanza Secundaria Básica José NSUGA ANGUE de Bidjabidjan.	177.807.812
603	JLD FINANCIAR SERVICES	Construcción de un inmueble de tres plantas destinados para aulas de estudios del colegio de las misioneras de la Inmaculada Concepción en Sampaca.	441.119.114
604	JOLL GE	Construcción de 46 viviendas sociales tipo A pareadas de 76m2 útiles en la fase 2A de Buena Esperanza, incluido el saneamiento, fontanería y electricidad de cada edificación	1.196.000.000
605	JPC	Control y Supervisión de las obras de ampliación del edificio del Parlamento en Malabo (Makinen)	240.000.000
606	JPC	Control y supervisión de las obras de rehabilitación de las calles de Malabo, ejecutada por Sogeco	578.669.818
607	JUBROCO	Suministro de mobiliario y equipamiento en la residencia del Delegado de Gobierno de Mbini.	55.000.000
608	JUBROCO	Proyecto de construcción de la residencia del Delegado de Gobierno del distrito de Mbini	132.090.750
609	JUBROCO	Urbanización de la residencia del Delegado de Gobierno de Mbini	300.000.000
610	JUMMA WORK	Control y supervisión de la red de abastecimiento de agua potable, saneamiento y acometidas domiciliarias de la Ciudad de Mbini	55.000.000
611	K WATER	Mantenimiento de la planta de tratamiento y abastecimiento de agua potable de la Ciudad de Mongomo	4.401.471.472
612	KOGEN	Construcción del Estadio de Rebola	11.000.000.000
613	KOGEN	Construcción de edificios anexos del estadio de Rebola	6.749.401.148
614	LA COSTA S.L.	Canalización y acondicionamiento del Río Andomo de 3,0 Km en la Ciudad de Mongomo.	13.550.000.000
615	LIMAYCONS	Mantenimiento periódico del Paseo Marítimo desde la entrada del hospital La Paz- Sala de recepción "Domo"	600.000.000
616	LIMPSI G.E	Instalación de contenedores soterrados para el servicio de limpieza y recogida de basura en Sipopo y Malabo II	1.583.225.500
617	LYNX-INTER	Construcción de la Delegación de Gobierno de Niefang.	520.357.500
618	LYNX-INTER	Urbanización de la Delegación de Gobierno de Niefang	300.000.000
619	M.K.H	Construcción y ampliación de las aulas del Colegio Internado de Basile	1.466.032.903
620	M.K.H	Construcción del Colegio Internado de Basile	3.000.000.000
621	MACONSA	Urbanización de la Residencia del Delegado de Gobierno adjunto del Distrito Urbano nº1 de Bata	300.000.000
622	MACONSA	Proyecto de construcción de la residencia del Delegado de Gobierno Adjunto del distrito urbano nº1 de Bata	112.077.000
623	MAECI (Americano de Origen Camerunés, amigo personal de OBIANG)	Electrificación de la Isla de Annobon mediante tecnología solar fotovoltaica de 5 MVA. Incluyendo las acometidas y contadores.	23.155.282.100

Source: Rombe Diary, GE Proyectos, <http://www.diariorombe.es/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Lista-de-Obras-Primera-Parte.pdf>

Annex 63 : Registry documents for LLC "VITAL", LLC "PRESTIZHSTROI", and LLC "SAKO KONTRAKSHN"

ЕДИНЫЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ РЕЕСТР ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ЛИЦ

Сведения о юридическом лице

ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ВИТАЛ"

ОГРН 1036500601213

ИНН/КПП 6501038711/650101001

по состоянию на 01.11.2018

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
Наименование		
1	Полное наименование	ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ВИТАЛ"
2	Сокращенное наименование	ООО "ВИТАЛ"
3	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1036500601213 05.01.2003
Адрес (место нахождения)		
4	Почтовый индекс	693000
5	Субъект Российской Федерации	ОБЛАСТЬ САХАЛИНСКАЯ
6	Город (волость и т.п.)	ГОРОД ЮЖНО-САХАЛИНСК
7	Улица (проспект, переулок и т.д.)	УЛИЦА ПОЛЕВАЯ
8	Дом (владение и т.п.)	8
9	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2036500609055 24.04.2003
Сведения о регистрации		
10	Способ образования	Создание юридического лица до 01.07.2002
11	ОГРН	1036500601213
12	Дата присвоения ОГРН	05.01.2003
13	Регистрационный номер, присвоенный до 1 июля 2002 года	350
14	Дата регистрации до 1 июля 2002 года	03.08.1995
15	Наименование органа, зарегистрировавшего юридическое лицо до 1 июля 2002 года	Администрация г.Южно-Сахалинска
16	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1036500601213 05.01.2003
Сведения о регистрирующем органе по месту нахождения юридического лица		
17	Наименование регистрирующего органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области
18	Адрес регистрирующего органа	,693020,,Южно-Сахалинск г,,Ленина ул,105,А,
19	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1036500601213 05.01.2003
Сведения об учете в налоговом органе		
20	ИНН	6501038711
21	КПП	650101001

LLC "Vital"

693000,
Oblast
Sakhalinskaya,
City of Yuzhno-
Sakhalinsk,
Ulitsa Polevaya
8

22	Дата постановки на учет	08.08.1995
23	Наименование налогового органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области
24	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2056500685272 26.09.2005
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в территориальном органе Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации		
25	Регистрационный номер	074001002912
26	Дата регистрации	08.08.1995
27	Наименование территориального органа Пенсионного фонда	Государственное учреждение - Управление Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации в г. Южно-Сахалинске Сахалинской области
28	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2066501073440 10.05.2006
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в исполнительном органе Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации		
29	Регистрационный номер	650017018665001
30	Дата регистрации	01.01.2001
31	Наименование исполнительного органа Фонда социального страхования	Государственное учреждение - Сахалинское региональное отделение Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации
32	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	01.10.2004
Сведения о лице, имеющем право без доверенности действовать от имени юридического лица		
33	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	1036500601213 05.01.2003
34	Фамилия	СОН
35	Имя	ЕН СУК
36	ИНН	650101058679
37	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2116501040467 16.05.2011
38	Должность	ДИРЕКТОР
39	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2116501040467 16.05.2011
Сведения об учредителях (участниках) юридического лица		
40	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	2036500609055 24.04.2003
41	Фамилия	СОН
42	Имя	ЕН СУК
43	ИНН	650101058679
44	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2116501040467 16.05.2011
45	Номинальная стоимость доли (в рублях)	25000

46	Размер доли (в процентах)	100
47	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2116501040467 16.05.2011
Сведения о видах экономической деятельности по Общероссийскому классификатору видов экономической деятельности (ОКВЭД ОК 029-2014 КДЕС. Ред. 2)		
<i>Сведения об основном виде деятельности</i>		
48	Код и наименование вида деятельности	41.20 Строительство жилых и нежилых зданий
49	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2066501083548 02.06.2006
<i>Сведения о дополнительных видах деятельности</i>		
1		
50	Код и наименование вида деятельности	01.13.1 Выращивание овощей
51	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2146501062190 21.07.2014
2		
52	Код и наименование вида деятельности	01.13.3 Выращивание столовых корнеплодных и клубнеплодных культур с высоким содержанием крахмала или инулина
53	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2146501062190 21.07.2014
3		
54	Код и наименование вида деятельности	10.13 Производство продукции из мяса убойных животных и мяса птицы
55	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2166501120300 17.03.2016
4		
56	Код и наименование вида деятельности	10.39.1 Переработка и консервирование овощей (кроме картофеля) и грибов
57	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2146501062190 21.07.2014
5		
58	Код и наименование вида деятельности	10.71 Производство хлеба и мучных кондитерских изделий, тортов и пирожных недлительного хранения
59	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2166501120300 17.03.2016
6		
60	Код и наименование вида деятельности	10.72 Производство сухарей, печенья и прочих сухарных хлебобулочных изделий, производство мучных кондитерских изделий, тортов, пирожных, пирогов и бисквитов, предназначенных для длительного хранения
61	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2166501120300 17.03.2016
7		
62	Код и наименование вида деятельности	10.89 Производство прочих пищевых продуктов, не включенных в другие группировки

ЕДИНЫЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ РЕЕСТР ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ЛИЦ

Сведения о юридическом лице

ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ПРЕСТИЖСТРОЙ"

ОГРН 1106501003730

ИНН/КПП 6501218344/650101001

по состоянию на 01.11.2018

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
Наименование		
1	Полное наименование	ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ПРЕСТИЖСТРОЙ"
2	Сокращенное наименование	ООО "ПРЕСТИЖСТРОЙ"
3	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
Адрес (место нахождения)		
4	Почтовый индекс	693000
5	Субъект Российской Федерации	ОБЛАСТЬ САХАЛИНСКАЯ
6	Город (волость и т.п.)	ГОРОД ЮЖНО-САХАЛИНСК
7	Улица (проспект, переулок и т.д.)	УЛИЦА ПОЛЕВАЯ
8	Дом (владение и т.п.)	10
9	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
Сведения о регистрации		
10	Способ образования	Создание юридического лица
11	ОГРН	1106501003730
12	Дата регистрации	14.05.2010
13	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
Сведения о регистрирующем органе по месту нахождения юридического лица		
14	Наименование регистрирующего органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области
15	Адрес регистрирующего органа	,693020,,Южно-Сахалинск г.,Ленина ул,105,А,
16	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
Сведения об учете в налоговом органе		
17	ИНН	6501218344
18	КПП	650101001
19	Дата постановки на учет	14.05.2010
20	Наименование налогового органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области

LLC "PrestizhStroi"

693000,
Oblast
Sakhalinskaya,
City of Yuzhno-
Sakhalinsk,
Ulitsa Polevaya
10

21	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2106501069607 14.05.2010
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в территориальном органе Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации		
22	Регистрационный номер	074001056976
23	Дата регистрации	19.05.2010
24	Наименование территориального органа Пенсионного фонда	Государственное учреждение - Управление Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации в г. Южно-Сахалинске Сахалинской области
25	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2106501076890 24.05.2010
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в исполнительном органе Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации		
26	Регистрационный номер	650020240765001
27	Дата регистрации	18.05.2010
28	Наименование исполнительного органа Фонда социального страхования	Государственное учреждение - Сахалинское региональное отделение фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации
29	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2106501077087 24.05.2010
Сведения об уставном капитале (складочном капитале, уставном фонде, паевых взносах)		
30	Вид	УСТАВНЫЙ КАПИТАЛ
31	Размер (в рублях)	10000
32	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
Сведения о лице, имеющем право без доверенности действовать от имени юридического лица		
33	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	1106501003730 14.05.2010
34	Фамилия	СИН
35	Имя	ВАЛЕРИЙ
36	Отчество	СЕОКУВИЧ
37	ИНН	650301082950
38	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
39	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи об исправлении технической ошибки в указанных сведениях	2106501084370 07.06.2010
40	Должность	Директор
41	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
Сведения об учредителях (участниках) юридического лица		
42	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	2166501138461 07.04.2016
43	Фамилия	СОН
44	Имя	ОК СУН

45	ИНН	650101473918
46	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2166501138461 07.04.2016
47	Номинальная стоимость доли (в рублях)	10000
48	Размер доли (в процентах)	100
49	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2166501138461 07.04.2016
Сведения о видах экономической деятельности по Общероссийскому классификатору видов экономической деятельности (ОКВЭД ОК 029-2014 КДЕС. Ред. 2)		
<i>Сведения об основном виде деятельности</i>		
50	Код и наименование вида деятельности	49.41 Деятельность автомобильного грузового транспорта
51	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2176501073483 03.04.2017
<i>Сведения о дополнительных видах деятельности</i>		
1		
52	Код и наименование вида деятельности	41.2 Строительство жилых и нежилых зданий
53	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
2		
54	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.12 Подготовка строительной площадки
55	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2176501073483 03.04.2017
3		
56	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.2 Производство электромонтажных, санитарно-технических и прочих строительного-монтажных работ
57	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
4		
58	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.3 Работы строительные отделочные
59	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
5		
60	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.99 Работы строительные специализированные прочие, не включенные в другие группировки
61	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
6		
62	Код и наименование вида деятельности	45.20 Техническое обслуживание и ремонт автотранспортных средств
63	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2176501037667 23.01.2017

ЕДИНЫЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ РЕЕСТР ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ЛИЦ

Сведения о юридическом лице

ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "САКО КОНТРАКШН"

ОГРН 1046500617690

ИНН/КПП 6501149002/650101001

по состоянию на 01.11.2018

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
Наименование		
1	Полное наименование	ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "САКО КОНТРАКШН"
2	Сокращенное наименование	ООО "САКО КОНТРАКШН"
3	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1046500617690 29.04.2004
Адрес (место нахождения)		
4	Почтовый индекс	693000
5	Субъект Российской Федерации	ОБЛАСТЬ САХАЛИНСКАЯ
6	Город (волость и т.п.)	ГОРОД ЮЖНО-САХАЛИНСК
7	Улица (проспект, переулок и т.д.)	УЛИЦА ПОЛЕВАЯ
8	Дом (владение и т.п.)	10
9	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1046500617690 29.04.2004
Сведения о регистрации		
10	Способ образования	Создание юридического лица
11	ОГРН	1046500617690
12	Дата регистрации	29.04.2004
13	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1046500617690 29.04.2004
Сведения о регистрирующем органе по месту нахождения юридического лица		
14	Наименование регистрирующего органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области
15	Адрес регистрирующего органа	,693020,,Южно-Сахалинск г.,Ленина ул,105,А,
16	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1046500617690 29.04.2004
Сведения об учете в налоговом органе		
17	ИНН	6501149002
18	КПП	650101001
19	Дата постановки на учет	07.05.2004
20	Наименование налогового органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области

LLC "Sako
Kontrakshn"

693000,
Oblast
Sakhalinskaya,
City of Yuzhno-
Sakhalinsk,
Ulitsa Polevaya
10

21	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	07.05.2004
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в территориальном органе Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации		
22	Регистрационный номер	074001091194
23	Дата регистрации	21.07.2004
24	Наименование территориального органа Пенсионного фонда	Государственное учреждение - Управление Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации в г. Южно-Сахалинске Сахалинской области
25	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.10.2004
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в исполнительном органе Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации		
26	Регистрационный номер	650015078065001
27	Дата регистрации	19.07.2004
28	Наименование исполнительного органа Фонда социального страхования	Государственное учреждение - Сахалинское региональное отделение Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации
29	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.10.2004
Сведения об уставном капитале (складочном капитале, уставном фонде, паевых взносах)		
30	Вид	УСТАВНЫЙ КАПИТАЛ
31	Размер (в рублях)	10000
32	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1046500617690 29.04.2004
Сведения о лице, имеющем право без доверенности действовать от имени юридического лица		
33	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	2096501041041 27.03.2009
34	Фамилия	КИМ
35	Имя	ЕН Э
36	ИНН	650101131600
37	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2146501091273 17.10.2014
38	Должность	ДИРЕКТОР
39	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2146501091273 17.10.2014
Сведения об учредителях (участниках) юридического лица		
1		
40	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	1046500617690 29.04.2004
41	Фамилия	КИМ
42	Имя	ЕН Э
43	ИНН	650101131600
44	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2146501091273 17.10.2014

45	Номинальная стоимость доли (в рублях)	2000
46	Размер доли (в процентах)	20
47	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2146501091273 17.10.2014
2		
48	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	1046500617690 29.04.2004
49	Фамилия	СОН
50	Имя	ЧАН ДИН
51	ИНН	650109976889
52	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2186501096043 12.04.2018
53	Номинальная стоимость доли (в рублях)	8000
54	Размер доли (в процентах)	80
55	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2136501104023 18.10.2013
Сведения о видах экономической деятельности по Общероссийскому классификатору видов экономической деятельности (ОКВЭД ОК 029-2014 КДЕС. Ред. 2)		
<i>Сведения об основном виде деятельности</i>		
56	Код и наименование вида деятельности	42.11 Строительство автомобильных дорог и автомагистралей
57	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2176501068049 24.03.2017
<i>Сведения о дополнительных видах деятельности</i>		
1		
58	Код и наименование вида деятельности	41.20 Строительство жилых и нежилых зданий
59	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2176501068049 24.03.2017
2		
60	Код и наименование вида деятельности	42.21 Строительство инженерных коммуникаций для водоснабжения и водоотведения, газоснабжения
61	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2176501068049 24.03.2017
3		
62	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.12 Подготовка строительной площадки
63	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2176501068049 24.03.2017
4		
64	Код и наименование вида деятельности	46.73 Торговля оптовая лесоматериалами, строительными материалами и санитарно-техническим оборудованием
65	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1046500617690 29.04.2004

Surname: Son
Name: Chan Din
Tax ID: 650109976889

Annex 64 : Additional information linking LLC “SAKORENMA” to LLC “VITAL”, LLC “PRESTIZHSTROI”, and LLC “SAKO KONTRAKSHN”

The image is a screenshot of a job portal profile for LLC SakoRenma. The browser address bar shows the URL: <https://trudvsem.ru/company/1036500601642>. The page header includes a navigation menu, a logo for "Работа в России" (Work in Russia), and a "skillsnet" logo. The main content area features the company name "Общество с ограниченной ответственностью Строительная фирма СакоРенма" (Limited liability company Construction firm SakoRenma) in a red-bordered box. To the left of this box is a smaller red-bordered box containing the text "LLC Construction Company SakoRenma". To the right of the main company name is another red-bordered box containing the email address "sakorenma@yandex.ru". Below the company name, there is a section titled "Вакансии компании" (Company vacancies) with a link to "Посмотреть все вакансии компании" (View all company vacancies). Underneath, there are two categories of vacancies: "Производство (3)" (Manufacturing (3)) and "Строительство, ремонт, стройматериалы, недвижимость (6)" (Construction, repair, building materials, real estate (6)). At the bottom of the page, there is a footer with the Russian coat of arms and several links: "Роструд", "Минтруд России", "Федеральный портал управленческих кадров", "Онлайн-инспекция.рф", "Соотечественники", "Торгово-промышленная палата РФ", "Роспотребнадзор", and "Государственная служба занятости Республики Беларусь". The footer also includes copyright information for "© Федеральная служба по труду и занятости — rostrud.ru" and a note that "При копировании информации — ссылка на trudvsem.ru обязательна." (When copying information — a link to trudvsem.ru is mandatory). There are also links for "Меры безопасности" (Security measures) and "Техническая поддержка" (Technical support).

Source: Federal state information system of the Federal Service for Labor and Employment, <https://trudvsem.ru>

The screenshot shows the website <https://trudvsem.ru/company/1036500601213>. The header includes the logo 'Работа в России' and 'Общероссийская база вакансий TRUDVSEM.RU'. The main content area displays the company name 'Общество с ограниченной ответственностью "Витал"' in a red-bordered box, with 'LLC "Vital"' in a smaller red-bordered box to its left. An email address 'sakorenma@yandex.ru' is also highlighted in a red-bordered box. Below the company name, there are links for 'Вакансии компании' and 'Посмотреть все вакансии компании'. The footer contains logos for various government agencies and the text '© Федеральная служба по труду и занятости — rostrud.ru'.

Source: Federal state information system of the Federal Service for Labor and Employment, <https://trudvsem.ru>

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL <https://trudvsem.ru/company/1106501003730>. The page header includes a navigation menu, a search bar, and a 'skillsnet' logo. The main content area features the 'Работа в России' logo and the company name 'Общество с ограниченной ответственностью "ПрестижСтрой"'. A red box highlights the company name, and another red box highlights the email address 'sakorenma@yandex.ru'. Below the company name, there is a section titled 'Вакансии компании' with the text 'Вакансии компании не добавлены'.

The footer contains several logos and links: the Russian coat of arms, 'Роструд', 'Минтруд России', 'Федеральный портал управленческих кадров', 'Онлайн-спекция.рф', 'Соотечественники', 'Торгово-промышленная палата РФ', 'Роспотребнадзор', and 'Государственная служба занятости Республики Беларусь'. It also includes copyright information for '© Федеральная служба по труду и занятости — rostrud.ru' and a note that 'При копировании информации — ссылка на trudvsem.ru обязательна'. There are also links for 'Меры безопасности' and 'Техническая поддержка'.

Source: Federal state information system of the Federal Service for Labor and Employment, <https://trudvsem.ru>

The screenshot shows the website <https://trudvsem.ru/company/1046500617690>. The page features a dark blue header with a menu icon and the text 'Деловые люди в соцсети' and 'skillnet'. Below the header, the logo 'Работа в России' is displayed, along with the text 'Общероссийская база вакансий' and 'TRUDVSEM.RU'. A location pin for 'г. Москва' is visible, along with buttons for 'Соискатель' and 'Работодатель'. A 'Войти' button is also present. The main content area shows the company name 'Общество с ограниченной ответственностью "Сако Контракшн"' in a red box, with an arrow pointing to it from another red box containing 'LLC "Sako Kontrakshn"'. Below the company name, the email address 'sakorenma@yandex.ru' is shown in a red box. The page also includes a section for 'Вакансии компании' with a link to 'Посмотреть все вакансии компании' and a list of categories: 'Строительство, ремонт, стройматериалы, недвижимость (17)'.

The footer of the website features the Russian coat of arms logo on the left. To its right, there are several links to government agencies: 'Роструд', 'Минтруд России', 'Федеральный портал управленческих кадров', 'Оклайнинспекция рф', 'Сотечественники', 'Торгово-промышленная палата РФ', and 'Роспотребнадзор'. Below these links, there is a link to 'Государственная служба занятости Республики Беларусь'. At the bottom, there is a copyright notice: '© Федеральная служба по труду и занятости — rostrud.ru' and a disclaimer: 'При копировании информации — ссылка на trudvsem.ru обязательна.' On the right side of the footer, there are links for 'Меры безопасности' and 'Техническая поддержка'.

Source: Federal state information system of the Federal Service for Labor and Employment, <https://trudvsem.ru>

Annex 65 : Registry documents for two GENCO Representative Offices in the Russian Federation and relevant Court documents

1. Registry documents for GENCO Representative office in Vladivostok

**ВЫПИСКА
ИЗ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО РЕЕСТРА АККРЕДИТОВАННЫХ ФИЛИАЛОВ,
ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВ ИНОСТРАННЫХ ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ЛИЦ**

26.10.2018

№ 99651800036654

Настоящая выписка содержит сведения о филиале (представительстве)

ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО КОРЕЙСКОГО ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОГО ОБЩЕСТВА ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА
РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР), Г. ВЛАДИВОСТОК

(полное наименование филиала, представительства)

иностранного юридического лица

КОРЕЙСКОЕ ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО"
(КНДР)

(полное наименование иностранного юридического лица)

НЗА 20150022387

включенные в государственный реестр аккредитованных филиалов, представительств иностранных
юридических лиц по состоянию на 26.10.2018

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
Сведения об иностранном юридическом лице		
Наименование		
1	Полное наименование	КОРЕЙСКОЕ ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР)
2	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017
Адрес в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)		
3	Код и наименование страны регистрации (инкорпорации)	408, Корейская Народно- Демократическая Республика
4	Адрес в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)	КНДР, Г. ПХЕНЬЯН, Р-ОН ТЭДОНГАН, КВАРТАЛ РЫНРА
5	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017
Сведения о регистрации в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)		
6	Наименование регистрирующего органа	КОМИТЕТ ПО СОДЕЙСТВИЮ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ ТОРГОВЛЕ КНДР
7	Регистрационный номер	61-35

Korean General
Corporation for
Construction
Abroad "ZENKO"
(DPRK)

408, Democratic
People's
Republic of

DPRK, City of
Pyongyang,
Taedonggang
District, Rungra
Neighborhood

8	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017
Сведения о коде налогоплательщика в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)		
9	Код налогоплательщика или его аналог	S-022
10	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017
Сведения об уставном капитале		
11	Размер (код валюты)	1 263 782 895 000.00 (408 - Северокорейская вона)
12	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017
Сведения о филиале, представительстве иностранного юридического лица на территории Российской Федерации		
13	Вид обособленного подразделения	2, Представительство иностранного юридического лица
Наименование		
14	Полное наименование	ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО КОРЕЙСКОГО ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОГО ОБЩЕСТВА ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР), Г. ВЛАДИВОСТОК
15	Сокращенное наименование	ПКГО "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР), Г. ВЛАДИВОСТОК
16	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017
Адрес (место нахождения) на территории Российской Федерации		
17	Сведения об адресе (месте нахождения)	690910, ПРИМОРСКИЙ КРАЙ, ВЛАДИВОСТОК ГОРОД, ТРУДОВОЕ ПОСЕЛОК, ПОРТ-АРТУРСКАЯ УЛИЦА, ДОМ 76
18	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017
Сведения об аккредитации филиала, представительства		
19	Номер записи об аккредитации (НЗА)	20150022387
20	Дата аккредитации (внесения сведений об аккредитации в РАФП)	24.03.2015
21	Налоговый орган, уполномоченный на аккредитацию филиалов, представительств иностранных юридических лиц	7747, Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 47 по г.Москве

690910,
Primorski Krai,
Vladivostok
City, Trudovoe
Village, Port-
Arturskaya
ulitsa, house 76

22	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	24.03.2015
Сведения об учете в налоговом органе		
23	Идентификационный номер налогоплательщика (ИНН)	9909159891
24	Код причины постановки на учет (КПП)	254392001
25	Дата постановки на учет	02.06.2017
26	Наименование налогового органа	2543, Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 12 по Приморскому краю
27	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	07.06.2017
Сведения о руководителе филиала, представительства в Российской Федерации		
28	Фамилия	КО
29	Имя	ЫОНГИЛЬ
30	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017
Сведения о численности иностранных граждан, являющихся работниками филиала, представительства		
31	Численность иностранных работников	12
32	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	06.02.2018
Сведения о видах экономической деятельности филиала, представительства в Российской Федерации по Общероссийскому классификатору видов экономической деятельности (ОКВЭД ОК 029-2014 КДЕС. Ред. 2)		
Сведения об основном виде экономической деятельности		
33	Код и наименование вида деятельности	73.20 Исследование конъюнктуры рынка и изучение общественного мнения
34	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017

Surname: Ko
Name: Yongil

Number of foreign
workers: 12

Выписка сформирована с использованием интерактивного сервиса «Государственный реестр аккредитованных филиалов и представительств иностранных юридических лиц», размещенного на официальном сайте ФНС России в сети Интернет по адресу: <https://service.nalog.ru/rafp/>

2. Registry documents for GENCO Representative office in Khasan

**ВЫПИСКА
ИЗ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО РЕЕСТРА АККРЕДИТОВАННЫХ ФИЛИАЛОВ,
ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВ ИНОСТРАННЫХ ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ЛИЦ**

26.10.2018

№ 99651800036655

Настоящая выписка содержит сведения о филиале (представительстве)

**ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО КОРЕЙСКОГО ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОГО ОБЩЕСТВА ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА
РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР), П.ХАСАН, ПРИМОРСКИЙ КРАЙ**

(полное наименование филиала, представительства)

иностранного юридического лица

**КОРЕЙСКОЕ ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО"
(КНДР)**

(полное наименование иностранного юридического лица)

НЗА 20150028184

включенные в государственный реестр аккредитованных филиалов, представительств иностранных юридических лиц по состоянию на 26.10.2018

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
Сведения об иностранном юридическом лице		
Наименование		
1	Полное наименование	КОРЕЙСКОЕ ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР)
2	Сокращенное наименование	КГО "ЗЕНКО"
3	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	05.10.2016
Адрес в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)		
4	Код и наименование страны регистрации (инкорпорации)	408, Корейская Народно-Демократическая Республика
5	Адрес в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)	КНДР, Г. ПХЕНЬЯН, Р-ОН ТЭДОНГАН, КВАРТАЛ РЫНРА
6	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	05.10.2016
Сведения о регистрации в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)		
7	Наименование регистрирующего органа	КОМИТЕТ ПО СОДЕЙСТВИЮ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ ТОРГОВЛЕ КНДР
8	Регистрационный номер	61-35

Korean General
Corporation for
Construction
Abroad "ZENKO"
(DPRK)

408, Democratic
People's
Republic of
Korea

DPRK, City of
Pyongyang,
Taedonggang
District, Rungra
Neighborhood

Выписка из РАФП
26.10.2018 22:50

НЗА 20150028184

Страница 1 из 4

9	Особенности режима регистрации	НЕ ИМЕЕТСЯ
10	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	05.10.2016
Сведения о коде налогоплательщика в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)		
11	Код налогоплательщика или его аналог	S-022
12	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	05.10.2016
Сведения об уставном капитале		
13	Размер (код валюты)	1 263 782 895 000.00 (408 - Северокорейская вона)
14	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	05.10.2016
Сведения о филиале, представительстве иностранного юридического лица на территории Российской Федерации		
15	Вид обособленного подразделения	2, Представительство иностранного юридического лица
Наименование		
16	Полное наименование	ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО КОРЕЙСКОГО ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОГО ОБЩЕСТВА ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР), П.ХАСАН, ПРИМОРСКИЙ КРАЙ
17	Сокращенное наименование	ПКГО "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР), П. ХАСАН, ПРИМОРСКИЙ КРАЙ
18	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	05.10.2016
Адрес (место нахождения) на территории Российской Федерации		
19	Сведения об адресе (месте нахождения)	692730, ПРИМОРСКИЙ КРАЙ, ХАСАНСКИЙ РАЙОН, ХАСАН ПОСЕЛОК ГОРОДСКОГО ТИПА, ЛИНЕЙНАЯ УЛИЦА, ДОМ 2
20	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	22.08.2017
Сведения об аккредитации филиала, представительства		
21	Номер записи об аккредитации (НЗА)	20150028184
22	Дата аккредитации (внесения сведений об аккредитации в РАФП)	26.03.2015

692730,
Primorski Krai,
Khasanski
Region, Khasan
Village of the
urban type,
Lineinaya
ulitsa, house 2

23	Налоговый орган, уполномоченный на аккредитацию филиалов, представительств иностранных юридических лиц	7747, Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 47 по г.Москве
24	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	26.03.2015
Сведения об учете в налоговом органе		
25	Идентификационный номер налогоплательщика (ИНН)	9909159891
26	Код причины постановки на учет (КПП)	253151001
27	Дата постановки на учет	29.10.2007
28	Наименование налогового органа	2502, Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 10 по Приморскому краю
29	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	15.06.2016
Сведения о руководителе филиала, представительства в Российской Федерации		
30	Фамилия	ЧВЭ
31	Имя	СОН ИР
32	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	22.08.2017
Сведения о численности иностранных граждан, являющихся работниками филиала, представительства		
33	Численность иностранных работников	5
34	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	05.10.2016
Сведения о видах экономической деятельности филиала, представительства в Российской Федерации по Общероссийскому классификатору видов экономической деятельности (ОКВЭД ОК 029-2014 КДЕС. Ред. 2)		
Сведения об основном виде экономической деятельности		
35	Код и наименование вида деятельности	73.20 Исследование конъюнктуры рынка и изучение общественного мнения
36	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	05.10.2016
Сведения об иных видах экономической деятельности		
1		

Surname: Chve
Name: Son IrNumber of
foreign
workers: 5

3. Official court documents from the Russian Federation referencing the head of a representative office for GENCO in Russia by the initials K. Y. These correspond to those of Ko Yongil, the registered director of GENCO's representation in Vladivostok.

АРТЕМОВСКИЙ ГОРОДСКОЙ СУД
ПРИМОРСКОГО КРАЯ

Судоводство - Территориальная подсудность - Калькулятор госпошлины -

ДЕЛА В ПРОИЗВОДСТВЕ СУДА

Список дел, назначенных к слушанию на 14.01.2019 Показать

Получить информацию по делу

Вернуться к списку дел

Уголовные дела

ДЕЛО № 1-416/2018

...

- 42 402 (сорок две тысячи четыреста два) доллара США - передать главе представительства Корейского генерального общества по строительству за рубежом «<данные изъяты>» (КНДР) К.Ы. (для возвращения законным владельцам).

- 42402 (forty-two thousand four hundred and two) US dollars – transfer to head of the representative office of the Korean General Corporation for Construction Abroad <data removed> (DPRK) K.Y. (for return to the rightful owners).

2006-2018 «Государственная автоматизированная система Российской Федерации «Правосудие»

Source: Artemovski City Court of Primorski Krai, https://artemovskiy--prm.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&name_op=case&_id=148809085&_deloId=1540006&_caseType=0&_new=0&srv_num=1

Annex 66 : Company information for entities registered with the Russian translation for GENCO ('ZENKO') and are owned—in whole or in part—by DPRK nationals, and have received authorization to employ DPRK nationals

Company name	Tax identification number	Registered Address	Associated individuals	Contact information
LLC "ZENKO" (OOO "ЗЕНКО")	7204162965	24A ulitsa Svetlaya, Tyumen, Tyumenskaya Oblast, Russia	Pak Gvan Min (ПАК ГВАН МИН) - Role: director - Nationality: unknown - Tax identification number: 723020846617 Kim Gvan Ir (КИМ ГВАН ИР) - Role: owner - Nationality: DPRK - Tax identification number: unknown Kim Men Kho (КИМ МЕН ХО) - Role: contact on job posting - Nationality: unknown - Tax identification number: unknown	<u>Telephone numbers</u> +7 (345) 2757212 +7 (345) 2297166 +7 (345) 2699249 +7 (982) 9477543 <u>Email addresses</u> genco-37@list.ru 4bkb@bk.ru
LLC "ZENKO-15" (OOO "ЗЕНКО-15")	2536133013	Office 411, 1 ulitsa Pionerskaya, Vladivostok, Primorski Krai, Russia	Kim Sen Guk (КИМ СЕН ГУК) - Role: director - Nationality: unknown - Tax identification number: 253614442780 Kim Tong O (КИМ ТОНГ О) - Role: owner - Nationality: DPRK - Tax identification number: unknown Pak Chen Sik (ПАК ЧЕН СИК) - Role: contact on job posting - Nationality: unknown - Tax identification number unknown	<u>Telephone numbers</u> +7 (914) 7350156 +7 (423) 2762279 +7 (423) 2716707 <u>Email addresses</u> pa.stroy@mail.ru e.gutman@vdc.ru
LLC "ZENKO-39" (OOO "ЗЕНКО-39")	2308160794	2/1 ulitsa im Bogdana Khmelnitskogo, Krasndar, Krasnodarski Krai, Russia	Ryu Chkhun Ren (РЮ ЧХУН РЁН) - Role: director - Nationality: unknown - Tax identification number: 231133389520 Chan Chin Men (ЧАН ЧИН МЕН) - Role: co-owner - Nationality: DPRK - Tax identification number: unknown Chen Gen Cher (ЧЕН ГЕН ЧЕР) - Role: co-owner - Nationality: DPRK - Tax identification number: unknown	<u>Telephone numbers</u> +7 (861) 5866425 +7 (861) 8862992 +7 (905) 4953597 +7 (961) 5866425 +7 (918) 1383996 <u>Email addresses</u> genco39@mail.ru
LLC "ZENKO-21" (OOO "ЗЕНКО-21")	2508064689	13A ulitsa Malinovskogo, Nakhodka, Primorski Krai, Russia	Kan Sen Kho (КАН СЕН ХО) - Role: director - Nationality: unknown - Tax identification number: 250821723134 Kim Sen Khvan (КИМ СЕН ХВАН) - Role: co-owner - Nationality: DPRK	<u>Telephone numbers</u> +7 (423) 6642332 +7 (902) 0606907 +7 (4236) 712327 <u>Email addresses</u> zerou333@gmail.com

			<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Tax identification number: unknown Kim Cher Min (КИМ ЧЕР МИН) <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Role: co-owner- Nationality: DPRK <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Tax identification number: unknown Li Syn Ir (ЛИ СЫН ИР) <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Role: co-owner- Nationality: DPRK <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Tax identification number: unknown	
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Source: Unified State Register of Legal Entities; SPARK; Trudvsem

Annex 67 : Documents showing LLC “ZENKO”, LLC “ZENKO-15”, LLC “ZENKO-39”, and LLC “ZENKO-21” to be owned by DPRK nationals



ООО "ZENKO" (INN 7204162965 - OGRN T107232043490), 14/11/2016 23:25 MSK

Shareholders, EGRUL

EGRUL

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
Kim Gvan Ir	—	15 000	100.00	10.03.2016

History of changes

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
Kim Gvan Ir	—	10 000	66.67	04.04.2012
Pak Ton Gyun	—	5 000	33.33	04.04.2012
Kim Gvan Ir	—	10 000	66.67	12.10.2011
Kim Chkhun Ik	—	5 000	33.33	14.12.2010
Kim Gvan Ir	—	5 000	33.33	14.12.2010

Rosstat

Last updated on : 06.08.2018

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %
INOSTR.GRAZHDANIN (1)	—	15 000	100.00

History of changes

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Last updated on
Grazhdane Korei	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA	15 000	100.00	06.04.2012
Grazhdanin Korei	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA	10 000	100.00	26.03.2012
Kim Gvan Ir	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA	10 000	100.00	13.10.2011
Kim Chkhun Ik	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA	5 000	50.00	01.01.2011
Kim Gvan Ir	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA	5 000	50.00	01.01.2011



Shareholders, EGRUL

EGRUL

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
Kim Tong O	—	25 000	100.00	13.06.2018

History of changes

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
Pak Chen Sik	—	25 000	100.00	22.11.2016
Kim Yn Khek	—	12 500	50.00	17.06.2015
Pak Chen Sik	—	12 500	50.00	17.06.2015
Yu En Nam	—	10 000	50.00	27.04.2012
Kim Cher En	—	10 000	50.00	26.04.2011
Li San Cher	—	10 000	50.00	25.08.2009
Tsoi In Guk	—	10 000	50.00	25.08.2009
Khvan En Gi	—	10 000	50.00	09.04.2009
Kim Sen Nam	—	—	—	12.05.2006
Lim En Nam	—	—	—	12.05.2006
Kim Sen Nam	—	10 000	50.00	28.03.2003
Lim En Nam	—	10 000	50.00	28.03.2003

Rosstat

Last updated on : 29.10.2018

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %
GRAZHDANIN KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA^KOREISKAYA NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA (1)	—	25 000	100.00

History of changes

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Last updated on
Grazhdane KNDR (2)	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA	20 000	100.00	31.01.2013
Grazhdani KNDR (2)	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA	20 000	100.00	05.12.2011
LI SUN CHER	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA	10 000	50.00	30.06.2009



Shareholders, EGRUL

EGRUL

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
Chan Chin Men	—	5 000	50.00	14.04.2010
Chen Gen Cher	—	5 000	50.00	14.04.2010

Rosstat

Last updated on : 24.10.2018

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %
Citizens of Russia (1)	—	5 000	50.00
GRAZHDANIN KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA^KOREISKAYA NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA (1)	—	5 000	50.00

History of changes

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Last updated on
Citizens of Russia, имеющий постоянное местожительство за границей	—	5 000	50.00	16.09.2016
GRAZHDANIN ROSSII, IMEYUSHCHI POSTOYANNOE MESTOZHITELSTVO ZA GRANITSEI (1)	—	5 000	50.00	05.05.2016
Grazhdanin Korei	KNDR	5 000	50.00	16.04.2015
Grazhdanin Rossii, postoyanno prozhivayushchie za granitsej	—	5 000	50.00	16.04.2015
Grazhdane Korei (2)	KNDR	10 000	100.00	23.10.2013
Grazhdane (2) - KITAI	KITAI	10 000	100.00	30.11.2012
Chan Chin Men	KITAI	5 000	50.00	30.09.2009
Chen Gen Cher	KITAI	5 000	50.00	30.09.2009

Shareholders, EGRUL

EGRUL

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
Li Syn Ir	—	9 000	47.40	24.11.2009
Kim Cher Min	—	5 000	26.30	24.11.2009
Kim Sen Khvan	—	5 000	26.30	24.11.2009

History of changes

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
Kim Khun	—	9 000	47.37	12.09.2008
Tsoi Bon Chkhor	—	5 000	26.32	12.09.2008
Tsoi Chen Gir	—	5 000	26.32	12.09.2008
Kim Khun	—	19 000	100.00	20.07.2004

Rosstat

Last updated on : 06.08.2018

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %
GRAZHDANE KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA^KOREISKAYA NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA (3)	—	19 000	100.00

History of changes

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Last updated on
GRAZHDANE KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA^KOREISKAYA NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA (3)	—	19 000	50.00	29.03.2016
GRAZHDANIN KITAI^KITAISKAYA NARODNAYA RESPUBLIKA (1)	—	19 000	50.00	29.03.2016
Grazhdane Korei (5)	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA	29 000	100.00	19.11.2012
Grazhdane Korei (3)	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA	19 000	100.00	20.01.2012

Annex 68 : Authorizations to hire DPRK laborers awarded to LLC “ZENKO”, LLC “ZENKO-15”, LLC “ZENKO-39”, and LLC “ZENKO-21” in 2018

						Number of foreign workers		Country code	
ООО Зенко	625056, Тюменская область, г. Тюмень, ул. Светлая 24/а	7204162965	43.99	Бетонщик	11196	8	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408	Korea, Democratic People's Republic
ООО Зенко	625056, Тюменская область, г. Тюмень, ул. Светлая 24/а	7204162965	43.39	Каменщик	12680	5	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408	
ООО Зенко	625056, Тюменская область, г. Тюмень, ул. Светлая 24/а	7204162965	41.20	Штукатур	19727	28	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408	

Source: Russian Ministry of Labor, <https://rosmintrud.ru/docs/mintrud/orders/1330>

ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Арматурищик	11122	2	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Бетонщик	11196	4	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Каменщик	12680	2	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Облицовщик-плиточник	15220	1	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Плотник	16671	1	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Штукатур	19727	1	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Переводчик	25531	1	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Производитель работ (прораб) (в строительстве)	25865	1	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Руководитель группы (специализированной в прочих отраслях)	26151	1	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408

Source: Russian Ministry of Labor, <https://rosmintrud.ru/docs/mintrud/orders/1330>


ООО Зенко-39	350005, г. Краснодар, ул. Богдана Хмельницкого д.2 корпус 1	2308160794	41.20	Арматурищик	11121	26	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-39	350005, г. Краснодар, ул. Богдана Хмельницкого д.2 корпус 1	2308160794	41.20	Бетонщик	11196	23	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-39	350005, г. Краснодар, ул. Богдана Хмельницкого д.2 корпус 1	2308160794	41.20	Каменщик	12680	51	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-39	350005, г. Краснодар, ул. Богдана Хмельницкого д.2 корпус 1	2308160794	41.20	Мальр	13450	23	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-39	350005, г. Краснодар, ул. Богдана Хмельницкого д.2 корпус 1	2308160794	41.20	Облицовщик-плиточник	15220	11	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-39	350005, г. Краснодар, ул. Богдана Хмельницкого д.2 корпус 1	2308160794	41.20	Шпаклевщик	19690	15	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-39	350005, г. Краснодар, ул. Богдана Хмельницкого д.2 корпус 1	2308160794	41.20	Штукатур	19727	21	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-39	350005, г. Краснодар, ул. Богдана Хмельницкого д.2 корпус 1	2308160794	41.20	Начальник бригады	24432	2	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408

Source: Russian Ministry of Labor, <https://rosmintrud.ru/docs/mintrud/orders/1330>

ООО ЗЕНКО-21	Приморский край г. Находка, ул. Малиновского 13 а	2508064689	41	Арматуришк	11121	20	Корея, народно- демократическая республика	408
ООО ЗЕНКО-21	Приморский край г. Находка, ул. Малиновского 13 а	2508064689	41	Бетонщик	11196	20	Корея, народно- демократическая республика	408
ООО ЗЕНКО-21	Приморский край г. Находка, ул. Малиновского 13 а	2508064689	41	Каменщик	12680	10	Корея, народно- демократическая республика	408
ООО ЗЕНКО-21	Приморский край г. Находка, ул. Малиновского 13 а	2508064689	41	Облицовщик-плиточник	15220	10	Корея, народно- демократическая республика	408
ООО ЗЕНКО-21	Приморский край г. Находка, ул. Малиновского 13 а	2508064689	41	Плотник	16671	6	Корея, народно- демократическая республика	408
ООО ЗЕНКО-21	Приморский край г. Находка, ул. Малиновского 13 а	2508064689	41	Штукатур	19727	6	Корея, народно- демократическая республика	408
ООО ЗЕНКО-21	Приморский край г. Находка, ул. Малиновского 13 а	2508064689	41	Переводчик технической литературы	25535	1	Корея, народно- демократическая республика	408
ООО ЗЕНКО-21	Приморский край г. Находка, ул. Малиновского 13 а	2508064689	41	Производитель работ (прораб) (в строительстве)	25865	1	Корея, народно- демократическая республика	408

Source: Russian Ministry of Labor, <https://rosmintrud.ru/docs/mintrud/orders/1330>


Annex 69 : Online Glocom advertisements in 2018 (Twitter and Glocom website)



Tweet from 16 December 2018. Accessed on 10 January 2019 at <https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1074529145629986818>

Archived version available at:

<https://web.archive.org/save/https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1074529145629986818>




Tweet from 7 September 2018. Accessed at <https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1038305737338847237> on 10 January 2019.

Archived version available at


<https://web.archive.org/web/20190110205253/https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1038305737338847237>



Accessed at <http://www.glocom-corp.com/2018/> on 13 January 2019




Tweet from 6 June 2018. Accessed at <https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1004600845034389504> on 10 January 2019. Archived version at <https://web.archive.org/save/https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1004600845034389504>



Tweet from 6 June 2018. Accessed at <https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1007416970894028800> on 10 January 2019. Archived version at <https://web.archive.org/save/https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1007416970894028800>

Tweets **Tweets & replies** **Media**





Support@Glocom @GlocomSupport · May 24
[@GlocomSupport](#) GS-2200 C4I Mobile System, glocom-corp.com




Support@Glocom @GlocomSupport · Jun 7
The modernized soldier who is equipped with [@GlocomSupport](#) radios. The GS-2500 soldier system includes GR-150 HF Manpack Radio and GR-611 Secure Soldier Radio. More details at glocom-corp.com and any question at support@glocom-corp.com. Thanks.





Support@Glocom @GlocomSupport · Jul 8

[@GlocomSupport](#) The GS-930HQ-CS is a C2 Information System designed to support operational staff in planning and executing missions. glocom-corp.com



Support@Glocom @GlocomSupport · Jun 15

[@GlocomSupport](#) GD-200 Battlefield Surveillance Radar, Range 4~10Km. Man portable radio. Suitable for border control and battlefield surveillance. Refer to glocom-corp.com for more details.



Source: @GlocomSupport twitter feed

Annex 70 : Advertisement for “GR-611 Secure Personal Radio”, the “GR-8600M”



Pinterest



Search for easy dinners, fashion, etc.



Visit

GR-8600M Multiband Handheld Radio
More information



Saved by
Support

Source: Pinterest <https://www.pinterest.ca/pin/594404850793634523/>

Annex 71 : Information on shared addresses between Li Zhengang’s company, Dandong Zhongrui Petrochemical Co., Ltd., an individual and an entity previously identified in association to DPRK shipping activities which have violated the resolutions

On Chinese business registry filings, Dandong Zhongrui Petrochemical Co., Ltd. lists the same registered address as a second Chinese company Dandong Jingao Trading Co., Ltd. (丹东京奥贸易有限公司). Until 14 March 2017, a Hong Kong-registered company Jingao Dalin Trading Co., Ltd. (京奥達林貿易有限公司) used an identical English and Chinese name to Dandong Jingao Trading Co., Ltd. The Hong Kong-registered company lists one and the same director and shareholder, Sun Chengguo (孫成國; simplified 孙成国), whose name is identical to that of the legal representative of Dandong Jingao Trading Co., Ltd.

On Hong Kong registry documents of Jingao Dalin Trading Co., Ltd, Sun Chengguo lists a residential address at Room 916, DL1504, Youhao Building, 158 Youhao Road, Zhongshan District, Dalian, China. Sun Chengguo’s residential address is nearly identical to that of at least one other Chinese national whom the Panel has previously identified in association with illicit DPRK shipping operations:

PAN WEICHAO (潘衛朝) lists Room 916, DL, Youhao Building, 158 Youhao Road, Zhongshan District, Dalian, China, on the 2016 Annual Return for Pantech Shipping Limited (泛科海運有限公司). The Panel noted in S/2017/150 paragraph 67 footnote 74 that PAN WEICHAO acted as an emergency contact for K-Brothers—the Marshall Islands-based operator of the *Jie Shun* (IMO 8518780).

In addition, this same address: Room 916, DL1504, Youhao Building, 158 Youhao Road, Zhongshan District, Dalian, China is also the address listed for a United Nations designated entity, Chang An Shipping & Technology Ltd ((長安海運技術有限公司) in the Hong Kong business registry

Ship ownership records indicate that Chang An Shipping & Technology Limited was the ship manager, commercial manager, and registered owner of the *Hua Fu* (IMO 90200003). The director of the company is GU BAOFU (顧寶富). Both Chang An Shipping & Technology Limited and the *Hua Fu* were designated by the 1718 Committee on 30 March 2018.¹⁸⁵

Source: Corporate Registry documents of Hong Kong and China mainland

¹⁸⁵ Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee Adds 22 Entries to Its Sanctions List, Designates 27 Vessels, UN Press Release, 30 March 2018, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13272.doc.htm>
19-01704

Annex 72 : Panel findings in OCN / T Specialist case investigation since 2018 Panel final report (S/2018/171, paras 179-188)

OCN previously stated to the Panel that it stopped shipping products to the DPRK as of late 2012, shifting its business into China in 2013 through Wang Zhi Guo and his company, Pinnacle Offshore Trading. OCN also said that it shipped goods to Dalian as the destination port for distribution in China and had “no knowledge of the authenticity of the sale of goods in DPRK as included in your letter and no knowledge of how any such goods ended up in DPRK.” However, when pressed on the business justification for shifting its sales to China of the same goods previously sold in the DPRK (including Singapore-distributed items made by Yamaha, Seiko, Montblanc and the like, which all have distributors in China), OCN admitted prior knowledge that the DPRK was the ultimate destination of their goods, stating “ T Specialist International (S) Pte Ltd would sell the goods to China via the buyer of the goods, Longsheng Weida. The buyers in China at the Chinese customs will approve the goods before receiving them and allowing them to be transshipped to DPRK. Before the good were sent out, the Chinese parties will do the clearance of the goods. Our Client do not receive the receipts of the transactions between the Chinese parties to DPRK.”

The company provided the Panel with multiple invoices for sales to Tianjin Longshengweida Import & Export Co, Ltd and Changzhou Jesinson Trading Co., both of which appear to be international freight forwarding companies. The Panel also launched an investigation into the role of the German company Müller + Partner in the provision of logistics for the above-mentioned companies, but still has not received answers to its inquiries dating from December 2017.

With regard to the T Specialist-owned and distributed brands, Fresh F and Watari, which have been on sale in the DPRK Bugsae / Pothonggang Ryugyong stores through at least July 2017, T Specialist stated: “It is prudent to note that the said products were originally also intended to be shipped and sold to Cyprus. However, these products were not saleable in Cyprus, hence, our Chinese counterparty suggested that we sell the products in DPRK.”

OCN-Pyongyang manager simultaneously employed by OCN Singapore

OCN Singapore’s relationship with Ri Ik dates back to his first visit to Singapore in 1991, at which time he was employed as a trading manager by the original Bugsae Shop. According to OCN, around 2004, Ri Ik was made an employee of OCN Singapore to “assist in the sale of products to the DPRK”. OCN has not provided his full terms of reference as requested by the Panel, stating that they are under the custody of Singapore investigative agencies.¹⁸⁶ OCN did however admit that Ri Ik had remained employed throughout most of 2017, providing a copy of the revocation dated 29 January 2018 of his Singaporean employment pass. Regarding the Panel’s request for salary information, OCN stated: “Mr. Ri Ik did not draw a salary, and the value of his work done was used to off-set the sums that were due and payable to our Clients.” OCN/ T Specialist Singapore stated that it had no control or interests in OCN Pyongyang, despite the fact that it was under the full control of one of its long-term employees and to which it sold a substantial amount of goods. The way in which OCN Pyongyang operated

¹⁸⁶ OCN stated, “Our Clients also do not have in their power, custody and/or possession, any "contract" or "communications, contracts, agreements and other forms of documentation with Ri'. The said documents, if any, have been under the custody of the investigation agencies in Singapore since 6 December 2017, and our Clients do not have copies of it, and are not able to provide you of the same.”

relatively independently of OCN Singapore is common DPRK practice as already seen in the Panel's investigation of Pan Systems Singapore and Pan Systems Pyongyang.

The Panel notes, however, that Ri Ik would not have been able to set up a foreign currency account in Pyongyang without OCN Singapore's paperwork and tacit consent. Indeed, OCN Singapore ensured that the daily transactions of the account were fully managed by Ri Ik so that it could ensure plausible deniability. Ri Ik used that account to transfer payments back to OCN Singapore for items sold in the DPRK. Given the difficulty of any DPRK banks to engage in open global transactions, at least eight Hong Kong-based front companies transferred the payments into OCN Singapore's account in Singapore, including the following: Pan Ocean Investments, Hongdae International, Yun King International, Albion Commercial Ventures, Highweal Trading, Headsoon Trading, Sama Industrial, and Heping Industrial. The Panel notes that the use of multiple front companies to pay for the purchase of its goods and the break-down of payments into several series of *smaller* transactions, as done in this case, are well-known sanctions evasion tactic.

B. Li Ik (aka Ri Ik)

Date of Birth: 11 February 1963
DPRK Passport No. 745420357
Expiry: 11 November 2020



Current Address and Status in Singapore

- Li Ik departed Singapore on 8 June 2017 and has not returned since. Li Ik’s Employment Pass was revoked in January 2018. Li Ik is not a Singapore Permanent Resident.
- Before his pass was revoked, his job title had been “Regional Business Development Manager” for OCN (Singapore) Ltd
- Li Ik first obtained his Singapore Employment Pass on 12 April 2004.
- The Singaporean authorities informed the Panel that they do not have Li Ik’s employment contracts and/or assigned tasks.. His annual salary package from 2012 to 2015 was between S\$92,462.75 to S\$113,384.19.

Travel

- According to travel records, Li Ik traveled in and out of Singapore frequently over the past five years (in some years averaging one trip per month).
- Li Ik departed Singapore on 8 June 2017 and Singapore has not received any visa application from him to re-enter the country. All DPRK nationals require a visa to enter Singapore. Singapore informed the Panel that it does not have knowledge of Li Ik’s whereabouts since then.

Personal details for Mr. Li Ik provided to obtain his Singapore Employment Pass:

I. Education Certificates at all levels

- 1) Sep. 1969 -Aug 1973 Pyongyang Sanghung Primary School
- 2) Sep. 1973 - Aug 1979 Pyongyang Jangsan Senior Middle School

- 3) Sep 1979-Aug 1981 Serve in the Korean Peoples Army
- 4) Sep 1981-Nov 1986 Kim Il Song's University D.P.R. of Korea

2. Curriculum Vitae (CV) of working experiences from time after leaving school

- 1) Dec 1986 -Dec 1990. Manager of Daesong General Corporation D.P.R. of Korea
- 2) Jan 1991 -Apr 1992 Manager of Korea Asia Trading Company
- 3) May 1992-Jul 1994 Section Chief Manager of Korea Duty-free Company
- 4) Aug 1994 - Chief Manager of OCN (Singapore) PTE LTD Pyongyang Office

3. Home address

Potonggang-dong 27, 3-2, Potonggang District Pyongyang D.P.R. of Korea

4. Passport number: S 190220613

Date of Birth: 11-Feb-1963

Country of issue: D.P.R. of Korea

Place of issue: Ministry of Foreign Affairs D.P.R. of Korea

Date of issue: 28-Apr-2000

Expiry date: 5 years (28-Apr-2005)

5. Religion - Atheist

Married to: Ms Ju Myong Suk

Date of Birth: 7 Dec 1963

Source: Member State

Annex 74 Cooperative entities and joint ventures and other companies investigated by the Panel: Argentina, Australia, Cambodia, China, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Malta, Poland, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia

Argentina

Argentina indicated to the Panel that searches for the firm Sonbong-Promotra JV Co. yielded no positive data in their search of financial databases nor any additional data on any links between the firm and Argentina. Argentina also stated that no nationals of the DPRK have been registered since 2004 as migrant workers.

Source: Member State

Australia

In its reply to the Panel 's letter on Sonbong Kost J.V. Company (a.k.a Samhung Kost J.V. Company, Sam Hung KOAST Joint Venture Pyongyang, 선봉코스트합영회사 , Australia cooperated with the Panel by providing detailed information on the company's operational status, current officers, business activities, bank account information in an Asian country, ownership, and business history. Australia also informed the Panel that it was investigating the matter and provided the Panel with its detailed confidential initial findings. It further stated that it places the highest priority on implementing UNSC resolutions, and takes appropriate action to respond to potential breaches of sanctions. It further clarified that pursuant to UN Security Council sanctions, Australian law prohibits the establishment, maintenance, or operation of a joint venture or cooperative entity (however described) with a DPRK person or entity, a person or entity acting on behalf of or at the direction of a DPRK person or entity, or an entity owned or controlled by a DPRK person or entity. Australia also indicated that it was assessing whether available information suggests that any of the funds, financial assets and economic resources of Koast Group Pty Ltd are owned or controlled. directly or indirectly, by designated individuals or entities; or the Government of the DPRK or the Workers Party of Korea.

Source: Corporate registry, Member State

Cambodia

Business name (Eng)	Location
Pyongyang (Koryo) Restaurant / Pyongyang Traditional Restaurant	400 Preah Monivong Blvd (93), Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Pyongyang Arirang Restaurant	215, 32 Jawaharlal Nehru Blvd (215), Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Pyongyang Unhasu Restaurant	#10A, Street 315, Sangkat Beung Kok I, Khan Toulkork, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Phnom Penh 12000, Cambodia In addition to providing food services, this company is also registered as engaged in “other financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding activities,” in addition to various other activities that are unusual for a restaurant to be engaged in.

Source: Open source information

China

English Name	City	Eng Address
Dae Dong Gang North Korean Cuisine	Beijing	North Tucheng East Road, Yuan Dadu Heritage Park, No. 6
Pyongyang Hae Dang Hwa - Landao Branch	Beijing	Chaoyang Menwai Dajie 12, Kunming Mall 2 (Landao Building West)
Pyongyang Mo Ran Bong - Yizhuang Branch	Beijing	Yizhuang Economic and Technological Development Zone, Ronghua Road 10, Yicheng International Center Q102
Pyongyang Rungrado - Baofusi Branch	Beijing	Zhongguancun Baofusi Bridge 81 (opposite of the Institute of Computing and Technology)
Sin Dae Jong Kim Gang Won Restaurant and Performance Hall	Beijing	1st Floor, Xinzhai Hotel, No.58 Maidian Street
Pyongyang Restaurant	Changchun	Intersection of Liberty Road and Linhe Street
Mo Ran Bong North Korea Performance Hotel	Dalian	Xinghai Square, Area E, 46

Pyongyang Restaurant	Dalian	No.94 Xinglin Street, Zhongshan District, Dalian 116001, China
Pyongyang Jindal Chae Restaurant	Dandong	Building 2 198 Donggang S Rd, Donggang Shi, Dandong Shi, Liaoning Sheng, China, 118300
Pyongyang Koryo Restaurant	Dandong	Binjiang Middle Rd, Zhenxing Qu, Dandong Shi, Liaoning Sheng, China
Pyongyang Koryo Restaurant	Dandong	8th Latitude Rd, Zhenxing Qu, Dandong Shi, Liaoning Sheng, China, 118000
Liujing Hotel	Dandong	1-2F, Jiadi Plaza, Binjiang Middle Road
Xin'an Dongge Hotel	Dandong	No.98 Jinjiang Street
Pyongyang Koryo Restaurant	Harbin	202 Gogol Street, Harbin, China
Pyongyang Mo Ran Bong - Altay Branch	Hohhot	Xing'an North Road, Caoyuan City
Pyongyang Seol Kyung Restaurant	Hohhot	Olympic Hotel, Floor 2
Jindal North Korean Restaurant	Kunming	Luyou Dujia Qu, Xigong Matou 2 Dong
Pyongyang North Korean Restaurant	Nanchang	1515 Nanjing East Road, Aixi Lake
Myo Hyang San Restaurant	Qinhuangdao	Yingbin Road 298, Haigang District, Qinhuangdao, Hebei, China
Pyongyang Koryo Restaurant -- Gu North Road	Shanghai	GuBei Road 1088 2 Floor, Shanghai, China
Pyongyang Arirang	Shanghai	1050 Wuzhong Rd, Minhang Qu, Shanghai Shi, China, 201103
Pyongyang Koryo Restaurant - Tongmao Branch	Shanghai	First Floor 357 Songlin Rd, Pudong Xinqu, Shanghai Shi, China, 200000
Pyongyang Myo Hyang Restaurant - Putuo Branch	Shanghai	555 Caoyang Rd, Putuo Qu, Shanghai Shi, China, 200063
Pyongyang Oak Ryu Restaurant	Shanghai	439 Caoxi N Rd, XuJiaHui, Xuhui Qu, Shanghai Shi, China, 200000

Pyongyang Restaurant	Shanghai	3rd Floor, Western District, Binggu Cultural Leisure Plaza, 341 Tianshan Road
Chilbosan Hotel	Shenyang	No.79-81 Shiyiwei Road, Helping District, Shenyang 110003, China
Pyongyang Dong Myo Hyang San	Shenyang	85 Tumen Road, Shenyang, China
Pyongyang Friendship Dongmyung Restaurant	Shenyang	Antu St, XiTa HanGuo FengQing Jie, Heping Qu, Shenyang Shi, Liaoning Sheng, China, 110000
Pyongyang Mo Ran Bong Hotel	Shenyang	43 Harbin Road, Shenyang, China
Pyongyang Restaurant	Shenyang	106 Shifu Rd, XiTa HanGuo FengQing Jie, Heping Qu, Shenyang Shi, Liaoning Sheng, China, 110002
Moranbong	Shenyang	93 Xita Road
You Kyung Kim Dal Chae	Shijiazhuang	ChangAn District GuangAn Main Street 16, MeiDong International 2 Floor, Shijiazhuang, China
North Korea Pyongyang Eun Ban Restaurant	Taiyuan	Binhe Donglu and Xuefu Street, Shizi Southwest Corner, Luohe Park, No. 2 Parking Lot
Hongqing Hotel - Hongqiao Branch	Wuxi	889 Hongqiao Road (Shenzhou Building)
Liuqing Hotel	Yanji	124 Xinxing St, Yanji Shi, Yanbian Chaoxianzuzhizhou, Jilin Sheng, China, 133000

Source: The Panel, Member State, open source research

MINISO

The Panel also investigated a possible joint venture between a Hong Kong company and a DPRK company which operates a commodity chain in Pyongyang.¹⁸⁷ In May 2018, the company stated that Chinese Headquarters of MINISO was in charge of the international business partnership, and that the products sold to the DPRK were made in China. MINISO further stated that the international agency contract to open the Pyongyang branch was agreed between MINISO International Hong Kong Limited and “Korea Jinhwa joint corporation”¹⁸⁸ represented by a DPRK national Nam Song Il¹⁸⁹, but that contract was terminated on 15 August 2017. Supporting documents were provided. While MINISO claimed that products stopped being supplied in May 2017, the Panel obtained information that as of July 2018, the shop is still open with the

¹⁸⁷ See S/2018/171 para. 147

¹⁸⁸ Original name shown in the documents is “朝鲜进化合作会社”

¹⁸⁹ Chinese character: 南誠一, A.k.a Nan Chengyi. DPRK Passport Number: PO 836337346. DOB 22 January 1955.

original MINISO interior, but with the label “Jinhwa”, and products of several foreign brands have been sold. The Panel requested information but has yet to receive a reply from the companies (figure). The Panel recommends that the relevant Member State comply with paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017).

(Figure) MINISO brand displayed in Pyongyang branch in April 2018



Source: NK Pro

Source: The Panel, open source

Japan

Japan replied “So far [the Government of Japan] “could not confirm any information that indicates the joint ventures and cooperative entities pointed out by the Panel exist or currently operate in Japan, or information that shows relationships between the partner companies identified by the Panel and the North Korean joint ventures.” Japan also stated that it went further by prohibiting all exports to and imports from the DPRK and transactions with the DPRK.

Source: Member State

Laos

Business name (Eng.)	Owner	Manager	Business type
Representative Office of Korea Dongyang 5 Trading Corporation	Ms. SOWON SOOB	Mr. SOWON SOOB	Investment Analyst on road, bridge, irrigation construction and trade
Representative Office of SK Architect and Construction	Mr. CIIM CHAE JOON	Mr. CIIM CHAE JOON	Investment analyst on hydro power
Pyongyang Friendship Restaurant	Ms. WANG ANHULI	Ms WANG ANHULI	Restaurant
Korea K Choeng Bong Trading Corporation	Mr. CHANGSONG KIM	Mr. CHANSONG KIM	Program design consultant
Western Restaurant	Mr. BONGJO YUN	M R. BONGJO YUN	Restaurant
Better Life Tomorrow Lao Ltd. Co	Mr. Jaekook Sin		Pharmaceutical

Source: Member State, open source

Malaysia

Business Name	Number	Address	Directors	Shareholders	Start
MKP BUILDERS SDN. BHD	386207-P	2-3-11 (3rd Floor)Menara Klh Business Centre 2, Jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shahkuala Lumpurwilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11 cheras, selangor	Fang Chee Peng; Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il	Yong Kok Yeap	6 May 1996
MKP CAPITAL LLC BERHAD	980801-M	24-B Jalan Landakoff Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan	Han Hun Il; Yong Kok Yeap;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il	2 March 2012
MKP DYNAMIC ENGINEERING SDN. BHD	735910-W	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, wilayah Persekutuan	Karnail Singh Nijhar Tansri Dato'dr Amar Singh;	Karnail Singh Nijhar Amar Singh, Tansri Dato'dr;	31 May 2006

		Lot 5, Jalan 1 Kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor	Fang Chee Peng; Yong Kok Yeap; Muhammad Danial Bin Osman;	Yong Kok Yeap; Soh Pui Hoon; Han Hun Il; Ramanan Ramakrishnan	
MKP HOLDINGS SDN. BHD	464492-W	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1 kaw. Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11 batu 9 Cheras Selangor	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il	23 June 1998
Nekad Ziplen SDN. BHD	614359-U	52 a, Jalan Landak off Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan C/O Lot 5, Jalan 1 kawasan Perindustrian Cheras Jayabatu 11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor)	Han Hun Il; Yong Kok Yeap;	Jusoh Bin Awang; Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il; Sumairi Bin Hashim	7 May 2003

Source: Corporate registry, open source information

Malta

According to open source information, Kormal Import and Export Company was founded 17 November 2011. "C 54431" is its corporate registration number. Kormal does not appear to have a website or a public profile beyond its appearance in various corporate registry databases. It is an "active" corporation according to Open Corporates and Malta's Registry of Companies. According to Malta's Registry of Companies and it has filed documents as recently as 2 March 2018.

- In Malta's Registry of Companies the Director of the company is Song Hui Song, with the registered address in the DPRK. According to the registry she is the sole shareholder. Kormal's secretary, Kuk Chol Jo, has the same registered DPRK address as Song Hui Song. The company's corporate registry documents list its auditor as a non-DPRK foreign national, however it is unclear whether a Maltese auditor's involvement would qualify this entity as a JV.

- According to documents on Malta's Registry of Companies, Kormal has been filing documents regularly since its inception in 2011 except for a two-year period directly after its inception until 2013. Its most recent documents are from 2 March 2018.

Source: Corporate registry and open source information

Poland

Business name	Name (other languages)	Location in DPRK	Name of partner company	DPRK nationals involved & other info	Partner HQ location
Wonye Sp. Z o.o.			Ms. Cecylia Kowalska	Mr. Jo Chol Yong (DPRK national) is President of the Board, shareholder; Mr. Kang Hong Gu, Vice President of the Board	Ul. Marynarki Polskiej 96, 80-557 Gdańsk, Poland
Redshield Sp. Z o.o.				Mr. Pak Jong Ho, President of the Board	Ul. Stołczyńska 100 D, 71-869 Szczecin, Poland

Source: Corporate registry, Member State, open source information

Russian Federation

Russian Federation communication of 8 January 2019 stated the following

В связи с запросами группы экспертов относительно деятельности на территории России совместных с КНДР предприятий сообщаем следующее.

Пунктом 18 резолюции СБ 2375 устанавливается запрет на открытие новых и дальнейшее функционирование уже существующих совместных с КНДР предприятий и кооперативных организаций. При этом в нашем прочтении под данными организационными формами предпринимательской деятельности понимаются юрлица, создаваемые на основе совместно внесенной собственности участниками из разных стран (в данном случае — из России и КНДР) при их совместном управлении предприятием и совместном распределении прибыли и рисков (при том, что в российском законодательстве такие формы организации юрлиц, как СП или кооперативные предприятия, не существуют в принципе).

В этой связи исходим из того, что деятельность представительств северокорейских компаний не регулируется международным санкционным режимом в отношении КНДР, поскольку они являются обособленными подразделениями легально функционирующих северокорейских компаний, расположенными вне места нахождения последних и представляющими исключительно интересы данных юрлиц. Согласно статье 55 Гражданского кодекса Российской Федерации представительства иностранных компаний на территории России не признаются юридическими лицами в силу того, что они «наделяются имуществом созданными их юридическими лицами и действуют на основании утвержденных ими положений».

Более того, иностранные представительства в России проходят специальную процедуру регистрации при Торгово-промышленной палате Российской Федерации, не ведут коммерческой деятельности, не получают доходов и не платят налогов (кроме операционных - на недвижимость и т.п.). Поэтому они в принципе не могут служить источником финансирования запрещенных ракетно-ядерных программ КНДР, на пресечение которых,

собственно, и направлены действующие санкции СБ ООН в отношении КНДР.

С учетом вышеизложенного в случаях, когда на территории России функционируют официально зарегистрированные представительства не листированных по линии комитета СБ 1718 северокорейских компаний, нарушений пункта 18 резолюции 2375 мы не усматриваем.

Аналогичная ситуация наблюдается и применительно к ряду российских компаний, единственным учредителем которых является гражданин КНДР. Подобного рода предприятия зарегистрированы в качестве сугубо российских обществ с ограниченной ответственностью (а не совместных предприятий или кооперативов), что делает их российскими юридическими лицами со всеми вытекающими из этого правовыми последствиями. Ни по смыслу пункта 18 резолюции СБ 2375, ни по действующему российскому законодательству они не попадают под категорию предприятий, на которые могут распространяться рестрикции СБ ООН в отношении КНДР.

По мере дальнейшей межведомственной проработки обращения экспертов и поступления дополнительных сведений имеем в виду соответствующим образом информировать группу.

В будущем были бы также признательны экспертам Комитета за следование сложившейся практике и направление подобного рода запросов не напрямую частным компаниям, а через постпредство. Тем более что в большинстве случаев указанные в реестрах адреса предприятий являются их юридическим, а не фактическим адресом нахождения, вследствие чего направленные таким образом обращения до адресатов попросту не доходят.

Source: Member State

English Translation

We wish to inform you of the following in connection with the inquiry made by the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) concerning the activity in Russia of joint ventures involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2375 (2017) prohibits the operation of new, or the maintenance of existing, joint ventures or cooperative entities involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It is our understanding that under the resolution such organizational entities are legal persons established through the joint contribution of resources by participants from different countries, in this case Russia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, who jointly manage the venture, and share its profits and risks. Legal persons structured in this manner cannot exist under Russian law.

On that basis, we do not view the activities of the representative offices of North Korean companies as being covered by the international sanctions regime for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, since they are independent divisions of legally operating North Korean companies, situated in a different location and representing solely the interests of those legal persons. Under article 55 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, representative offices of foreign companies in Russia do not have the status of legal persons, because they are allocated assets by the legal persons establishing them and engage in activity as directed by those legal persons.

Furthermore, foreign representative offices in Russia are subject to special registration rules with the national Chamber of Commerce, may not engage in commercial activity, earn no revenue and pay no taxes, except on operating expenses, including for real estate. Therefore, they could not be a source of funding for the prohibited nuclear or ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which the Security Council has sought to halt by imposing sanctions against that country.

In view of the foregoing, we do not consider the activity in Russia of officially registered representative offices of North Korean companies that have not been placed on the United Nations Security Council sanctions list by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to be in violation of paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2375 (2017).

Similarly, in the case of Russian companies having a sole founder who is a citizen of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, such companies are registered strictly as Russian limited liability companies, rather than joint ventures or cooperative entities, making them Russian legal persons with all the legal consequences that follow therefrom. Such companies are not considered subject to the restrictions imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the Security Council under paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2375 (2017) or under current Russian law.

We shall keep the Panel of Experts informed as queries received from the Panel of Experts undergo the interagency review process and additional information becomes available.

In future, the Russian Federation would appreciate it if the Panel could follow established practice by directing its queries to the Russian Permanent Mission, rather than to the private companies. This is particularly important given that, in most cases, the company addresses indicated in the registries are that of their registered offices, rather than their actual physical address, and letters sent to the former address simply do not reach the addressees.

The Russian Federation provided the Panel with a list of companies which, after investigation, it found were closed as of January 2019. Those companies have not been included in the list below regardless of their current status in the corporate registry or whether they were in operation at some point in 2018. The list below does not include entities which corporate registration documents have listed as dissolved in 2018 including those that were in operation at some time in 2018. In the course of 2018, four companies changed their registration to being only Russian-owned.

There are no representative offices of DPRK entities in this list.

Name and Company Tax Id	Location Address	Names of DPRK Nationals and/or DPRK companies involved	Other Nationals Involved	Additional info	Type of Company
ООО "ПИОНЕР" (LLC "PIONER") Tax ID: 2502047408	12A ulitsa Nevskaya, Vladivosto k, Russia, 690018	Owner is DPRK national Kim Khe Son (Ким Хе Сон) with tax identification number 254300252564.	Director is Russian national [REDACTED] [REDACTED] with tax identification number [REDACTED].	Registered to the same address as the DPRK Consulate General in Vladivostok.	Renting and operating of real estate; construction; operation of restaurants and bars in railway cars and on ships
ООО "ПРИМАГРОСОЯ" (LLC "PRIMAGROSOYA") Tax ID: 2508110960	Office 3, 38V ulitsa Pogranichn aya, Nakhodka, Russia, 692922	Jointly owned by a Russian company, LLC "KNYAZHEVSKOE" (tax identification number 2506109736) and a DPRK entity, Korea Kumgang General Corporation.	Director is Russian national [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for it with tax identification number [REDACTED]		Growing of cereals (except rice), leguminous crops and oil seeds

<p>ООО "САКОРЕНМА" (LLC "SAKORENMA") Tax ID: 6501104474</p>	<p>8 ulitsa Plevaya, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Sakhalinska ya oblast, Russia</p>	<p>Co-owned by the Korea General Corporation for External Construction (GENCO).</p>	<p>Co-owner and director is Russian national [REDACTED] with tax identification number [REDACTED].</p>		<p>Construction</p>
<p>ООО "ПОНХВА" (LLC "PONKHVA") Tax ID: 7701356953</p>	<p>Room 10, Structure 3, 14 pl. Spartakovskaya, Moscow, Russia, 105082</p>	<p>Owner is DPRK national Zo Son Sim (Зо Сон Сим), for whom a tax identification number is not specified.</p>	<p>Director is Russian national [REDACTED] with tax identification number [REDACTED].</p>		<p>Construction</p>
<p>ООО "КОРУС БИО-МЕД КО.ЛТД" (LLC "KORUS BIO-MED KO. LTD") Tax ID: 7720737111</p>	<p>28 ulitsa Moldagulovoi, Moscow, Russia, 111538</p>	<p>This company is engaged in 'unspecified wholesale trade' and is co-owned by a DPRK company, Pugang Pharmaceutical Company, and three Russian nationals.</p>	<p>Co-owners: [REDACTED] Their tax identification numbers [REDACTED] are, respectively, [REDACTED].</p>		<p>Non-specialized wholesale trade</p>

			Note: [REDACTED] is also the company's director.		
ООО "ЗАБАЙКАЛИНВЕСТ СТРОЙ" (LLC "ZABAİKALINVESTS TROI") Tax ID: 0326028065	32 proezd Energostroi tei, Chita, Russia, 672022	Owner is DPRK Li Yn Sok (Ли Ын Сок) with tax identification number 753626113575.	Director is Russian national [REDACTED] with tax identification number [REDACTED].	The company was previously named LLC "Cholsan". The same director-owner team control LLC "Chkholsan" (ООО "ЧХОЛСАН"; Tax ID 7536112799) and LLC Construction Company "RAI" (ООО СК "РАЙ"; Tax ID 7536132178)	Construction
ООО "СК"РАЙ" (LLC Construction Company "RAI") Tax ID: 1328002427	43 shosse Aleksandro vskoe, Saransk, Russia, 430006	Co-owner is DPRK national Kim Tkhe En (Ким Тхэ Ен), for whom a tax identification number is not specified.	Director is Russian national [REDACTED] with tax identification number is [REDACTED].		Construction

<p>ООО с иностранными инвестициями СП "ТИСРИМОВ" (LLC JV "TISRIMOV") Tax ID: 2539069310</p>	<p>94 ulitsa Russkaya, Vladivostok, Russia</p>	<p>This company is a joint venture between the DPRK Ministry of Forestry and a Russian company, LLC "TIS", whose tax identification number is 2528004046.</p>	<p>Director is Russian national [REDACTED] [REDACTED] tax identification number [REDACTED].</p>		<p>Silviculture</p>
<p>ООО "ОРИОН" (LLC "ORYUN") Tax ID: 2540176852</p>	<p>10 ulitsa Krylova, Vladivostok, Russia, 690014</p>	<p>Owner is DPRK national Kim Khe Son (Ким Хе Сон), for whom a tax identification number is not specified.</p>	<p>Director is Russian national [REDACTED] with tax identification number [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]</p>	<p>A DPRK restaurant named Kymgansan (Russian: КЫМГАНСАН) operates at the address registered to this company (https://www.vl.ru/kymgansan). Open source information claims that its workers are DPRK nationals, from the chef to the waitresses to the restaurant owners (https://www.newsvl.ru/vlad/2017/09/22/163230/).</p>	<p>Restaurants and mobile food service activities</p>
<p>ООО "ПХЕНЬЯН-МОРАНБОН" (LLC "PKENYAN-MORANBON") Tax ID: 2703086887</p>	<p>Room 1009, 15 prospekt Pervostroitelei, Komsomolsk-Na-Amure,</p>	<p>This company's name is a russification of Pyongyang-Moranbong. It is jointly owned by a DPRK company ostensibly called Korean Trading Company "Eighth of March" and a</p>	<p>Director is Russian national [REDACTED], with tax identification number [REDACTED].</p>		<p>Restaurants and mobile food service activities</p>

	Russia, 681003	Russian company, LLC "FOLANG". The Russian company's tax identification number is 2726008652.			
ООО "МӨХЯН" (LLC "MEKHYAN") Tax ID: 4101167437	Apt. 58, 2 ulitsa Tushkanov a, Petrovavlov sk- Kamchatski , Russia, 683031	Owner is DPRK national Li San Cher (Ли Сан Чер) with the tax identification number 410126524634.	Director is Russian national [REDACTED] [REDACTED]) with tax identification number [REDACTED].	'MEKHYAN' is the Russian rendering of Myohyang.	Restaurants and mobile food service activities
ООО "АК-СТРОЙ" (LLC "AK-STROI") Tax ID: 4205255751	Room 6, Structure 6A, ulitsa Krasnoarm eiskaya, Kemerovo, Russia, 650021	Co-owner is DPRK national Kim Sen Bok (Ким Сен Бок) with tax identification number 420555220832. This construction company is also co- owned by a Russian company, LLC "ELEKTRON- MAGAZIN", with tax identification number 4205194474.	Director is Russian national [REDACTED] [REDACTED]) with tax identification number [REDACTED].		Plastering
ООО "КАНСОН- ТЕКСТИЛЬ" (LLC "KANSON-TEKSTIL") Tax ID: 5018186644	Office 9, Floor 3, 34 prospekt Zavodskoi, Golitsyno, raion Odintsovski	Owner is DPRK national Sim Li Khyan (Сим Ли Хян) with tax identification number 502730623502.	Director is Kim Son Khi (Ким Сон Хи) of an unspecified nationality with tax identification number [REDACTED].		Manufacture of outerwear

	, oblast Moskovskaya, Russia, 143041				
ООО "СК "ДЭСОН" (LLC Construction Company "DESON") Tax ID: 5027185855	8 ulitsa Initsiativnaya, Lyubertsy, Russia, 140000	Co-owner is DPRK national Kim Li Sen (Ким Ли Сен).	Co-owner and director is Russian national [REDACTED] with tax identification number [REDACTED].		Site preparation
ООО "ЭМА" (LLC "EMA") Tax ID: 6501196130	57 ulitsa Kryukova D.N., Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Russia, 693020	Jointly owned by a DPRK entity, Korea Aprokgang Technical Development Corporation and a Russian company, LLC Private Security Company "FINEKO-ROSA-2" with the tax identification number 6501160630.	Director is Russian national [REDACTED] with tax identification number [REDACTED].		Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment
ООО СП "РОСАЮМА" (LLC "ROSAYUMA") Tax ID: 6501253740	104 ulitsa Tikhaya, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Russia, 693005	Jointly owned by the Russian company, LLC "YUVESTA KOMPANI" with the tax identification number 6501151347 and a DPRK entity, Korea Paekma Trading Corporation.	Director is Russian national [REDACTED] with tax identification number [REDACTED].		Sawmilling and planing of wood

<p>ООО СП "ФИТОН" (LLC JV "FITON") Tax ID: 7536033674</p>	<p>7 ulitsa Ugdanskay a, Chita, Russia, 672000</p>	<p>This company is formally registered as a joint venture. Its DPRK shareholder's name, translated from Russian, is roughly 'Management for the Manufacturing of Cortex Preparations' (Russian: УПРАВЛЕНИЕ ПО ПРОИЗВОДСТВУ КОРЕПРЕПАРАТОВ МИНИСТЕРСТВА ЗДРАВООХРАНЕНИЯ КНДР).</p>	<p>Director is Russian national [REDACTED] with tax identification number [REDACTED].</p> <p>The Russian shareholders are the Zabaikalskaya Kraya Department of State Property and Land Issues (tax identification number [REDACTED] and Russian national [REDACTED] with tax identification number [REDACTED].</p>		<p>Pharmaceutical company</p>
<p>ООО "ЧХОЛСАН" (LLC "CHKHOLSAN") Tax ID: 7536112799</p>	<p>32 proezd Energostroi telei, Chita, Russia, 672022</p>	<p>Owner is DPRK Li Yn Sok (Ли Ын СоК) with tax identification number 753626113575.</p>	<p>Director is Russian national [REDACTED] with tax identification number [REDACTED].</p>		<p>Construction</p>

<p>ООО СК "РАЙ" (LLC Construction Company "RAI") Tax ID: 7536132178</p>	<p>Room 4, 132 ulitsa Chkalova, Chita, Russia, 672039</p>	<p>Owner is DPRK Li Yn Sok (Ли Ын Сок) with tax identification number 753626113575.</p>	<p>Director is Russian national [REDACTED] with tax identification number [REDACTED].</p>		<p>Construction</p>
<p>ООО "РКК ФАРТ" (LLC "RKK FART") Tax ID: 3808221510</p>	<p>17 Aleksandra Nevskogo ulitsa, Irkutsk, Russia, 664047</p>	<p>Owner is DPRK national Lee Chong Nam (Ли Чен Нам), for whom a tax identification number is not specified.</p>	<p>Director is Russian national [REDACTED] with tax identification number [REDACTED].</p>	<p>According to open source reporting, RKK Fart" LLC " owns Korean restaurant "Pyongyang" at the same address in Irkutsk.</p>	<p>Restaurants and mobile food service activities</p>

On 21 January 2019, the Russian Federation requested the Panel not to publish information about companies still being investigated on the basis of the requests from the Panel, as this could violate the confidentiality of the ongoing investigations and adversely affect their outcome.

Name (Eng)	Name (Korean and/or original script)	Location in DPRK/Russia	Name of Partner Company where applicable	Partner HQ /Restaurant location
Koryo Restaurant	Ресторан «Корё»	Moscow	-	Ordzhonikidze Ulitsa, 11, bld.-9, Moscow, Russia, 115419
Pyongyang Restaurant	Ресторан «Пхеньян»	Vladivostok	-	Ulitsa Verkhneportovaya, 68 B, Vladivostok, Primorsky kray, Russia, 690003
Pyongyang Restaurant	Ресторан «Пхеньян»	Irkutsk	ООО «РКК ФАРТ» (LLC "RKK FART"), Учредитель (owner) – Ли Чен Нам (see Annex 1 and 3)	17 Aleksandra Nevskogo ul., Irkutsk, Irkutskaya oblast, Russia, 664047
Rungrado Restaurant	Ресторан «Рыgrado»	Moscow	-	29/1 Lomonosovsky Prospekt, Moscow, Russia, 119192
Koryo Restaurant	Ресторан «Корё»	Vladivostok	-	20 A Prospekt Ocean, District "Center," Vladivostok, Primorsky kray, Russia, 690091
Rus'-Moran Restaurant	Ресторан «Русь-Моран»	Blagoveshchensk	-	Ulitsa Lenina, 108A, Blagoveshchensk, Amurskaya oblast, Russia, 675000

Source: Official State Registration Data according to SPARK system, <http://www.spark-interfax.ru/en>;
Unified State Register of Legal Entities, <https://egrul.nalog.ru>

Singapore

Singapore informed the Panel that a Singapore company, Lucky Greenbird Pte. Ltd's joint venture with Ryugyong Corporation "Taesong BAT" JV, the JV was terminated on 1 January 2018 and provided the termination notice to the Panel.¹⁹⁰ Singapore further stated, "Our checks have not uncovered any evidence that its funds, financial assets, and economic resources are owned or controlled by designated individuals or entities, the DPRK Government, the Worker's Party of Korea, individuals or entities acting on behalf or at their direction, and/or entities owned or controlled by them. If we find any evidence that Lucky Greenbird Pte Ltd, or any other entity, has contravened the UNSCRs and/or our laws, we will not hesitate to take the necessary action. As stated in our National Implementation Report for UNSCR 2397, there are no DPRK nationals with work passes in Singapore. Singapore has revoked the work passes of all DPRK nationals earning income in Singapore and will not grant new work passes to DPRK nationals.

Source: open source, Member State

Thailand

With regard to **Star Joint Venture Company** (aka Star JV a.k.a. Northeast Asia Telephone and Telecommunications Co., Ltd. (NEAT &T)) it informed the Panel that Loxley Pacific Co., Ltd. changed its name into Loxpac (Thailand) Co., Ltd. in 2013, that it had withdrawn its investment in Loxpac (Thailand) Co., Ltd. in 2015 and that it had connection with NEAT&T. It stated that Loxpac (Thailand) Co., Ltd ceased all of its business in the DPRK, including its operation via NEAT&T, since January 2018.

Source: Member State, open source

Name	Name (Korean or in original script)	Name of Partner Company where applicable	Partner HQ/Restaurant location
Pyongyang Okryu Restaurant	ร้านเพียงของ อ็อกริว	-	Between Sukhumvit Soi 25-27, next to Radisson Blu hotel, Ekkamai Rd., Bangkok, Thailand

¹⁹⁰ The termination notice dated 22 November 2017, a copy of which was provided to the Panel, cited paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2375 (2017) adopted on 11 September 2017.

Pyongyang Haemaji Restaurant	-	-	83, Soi 26 Sukumvit, Khlongtoi, Bangkok 10110, Thailand
Mokran Korean Restaurant		Magnolias Pattaya Boutique Resort	4/6 M.9 Maprachan Reservoir, Tambon Pong, Amphoe Banglamung, 20150 Chonburi, Thailand

Uganda

The Ugandan Government replied on 6 July 2018 to the Panel's request for further information on MKP's operations in Uganda. It acknowledged having formed a joint venture between the National Housing and Construction Company (NHCC) and MKP Builders SDN BHD, called NH-MKP Builders Limited. As part of one project, the NHCC paid out \$3,627,762 as an advanced payment to MKP Builders. Uganda claims this business relationship ceased at the beginning of 2014, when it became clear that MKP Builders SDN BHD was unable to complete the construction contract. The Ugandan Government has since been involved in a series of ongoing lawsuits with MKP and its insurance companies to recover the payment, and insists that it cannot dissolve MKP Builders SDN BHD or MKP Capital Berhad while litigation continues.

Uganda's reply also included information about Vidas Engineering Services Limited, which it acknowledged having contracted to for several government-funded projects. However, it firmly denied any relationship between the firm and MKP, citing Vidas' company incorporation documents. Uganda and Vidas did not provide an explanation for the appearance of the firm's mailing address, registered office address, email address and trading name on the corporate registry documents for MKP Capital and MKP Builders in Uganda. The Panel notes that in order to mask DPRK connections, DPRK companies commonly use foreign national facilitators to avoid putting its own nationals on incorporation paperwork, leverages business contacts to facilitate the establishment of in-country presences, and embeds within foreign firms. Uganda did not respond to the Panel's inquiries pertaining to its recent promotion of foreign investment opportunities in a high-value MKP Holdings project at the Moroto Marble Mine.

No	Business name (Eng.)	Other names	Name of partner company (where applicable)	DPRK & Uganda nationals involved & other info
1.	NH MKP Builders Ltd	MKP Builders SDN	Ugandan National Housing & Construction Company Ltd.	Choi Da Hwan (identified as Korean), Ms Jane Bilek Langoya, Mhanmed A. Benomran (likely an alternate spelling of Muhamed A. Banomaran) and Henry Majoh Mukisa.
2.	MKP Builders San BHD	Vidas Engineering Services Co. Limited	Uganda's Ministry of Water and Environment ; National Housing and Construction Company (NHCC)	Yong Kyong Kin, Ms Jane Lukonga Bilan and Mr. Muhamed A. Banomaran, listed as Directors.
3.	MKP Capital Bernard Co. Limited	Vidas Engineering Services Co. Limited	National Housing and Construction Company (NHCC)	Yong Kyong and Edward Han are both listed as directors and shareholders, with nationalities as Korean. Henry Mukisa and Asa Mugenyi (both Ugandans), are also listed as directors and shareholders.

Source: Corporate registry, open source

Vietnam

Koryo restaurant / formerly Ryu Gyong Restaurant (Nhà Hàng Ryu Gyong Triều Tiên; 조선 류경 식당)	Ho Chi Minh City Registered As Công Ty TNHH Thương Mại Phan Minh Fmc-V.N.	30 Le Quy Don, Ward 7, District 3, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
Koryo restaurant	Hanoi	No.61 Trung Hoa City, Trung Yen Urban Area, Phuong Trung Hoa, Cau Giang Paper, Hanoi Previous Address: No.7, Lot 13b, Trung Hoa City, Trung Yen Urban Area, Phuong Trung Hoa, Cau Giang Paper, Hanoi
Binh Nhuong (Pyongyang) restaurant	Hanoi	No. 28, Nguyen Thi Dinh Street, Tung Hoa Commune, Cau Giay District, Ha Noi

Source: Member State, Corporate registry and open source

Zambia

See Annex 46 on MKP companies in Zambia. Zambia replied to the Panel that it had undertaken a full investigation into the companies listed by the Panel and that it had confirmed that several DPRK and Malaysian nationals were acting as directors in MKP Holdings, and that one of the recommendations from Zambia's investigation of the network was that authorities consider repatriating DPRK nationals working in the country, in accordance with resolution 2397 (2017), including a list of 13 DPRK nationals. It is unclear to the Panel whether this covers all of DPRK nationals working in Zambia.¹⁹¹

Source : Corporate registry, Member State

¹⁹¹ Yazid Merzouk informed the Panel that as of January 2018, there were seven DPRK nationals employed in MKP TMS Hospital alone, with appropriate work permits duly issued by the Zambian Immigration authorities.

Annex 75 Information on economic activities being undertaken by OOO "ПИОНЕР" (LLC "PIONER"), a JV owned by a DPRK national registered to the same address as the DPRK consulate in Vladivostok, Russian Federation

Name (Eng)	OBSHCHESTVO S OGRANICHENNOI OTVETSTVENNOSTYU "PIONER"
Name in Russian	ООО "ПИОНЕР"
Legal address	690018, Primorski kr, g. Vladivostok, ul. Nevskaya, d. 12 korp. A
Phone no	+7 (953) 2197535
Registration date	20.06.2013
OGRN	1132502001664
INN	2502047408
OKOPF	Limited liability companies
Main type of activity	Renting and operating of own or leased non-residential real estate
Manager	[REDACTED] a generalny direktor

Economic Activities

Sector affiliation by OKVED (KDES Ed. 2)

Name, description	OKVED
Renting and operating of own or leased non-residential real estate (Main - EGRPO GMC Rosstat, EGRUL)	68.20.2
Construction of residential and non-residential buildings	41.20
Demolition	43.11
Performance of excavation works	43.12.3
Restaurants and mobile food service activities	56.10
Restaurants and cafes with full restaurant service, cafeterias, fast food restaurants and buffet restaurants	56.10.1
Operation of restaurants and bars in railway cars and on ships	56.10.3

Sector affiliation by OKVED

Name, description	OKVED
Restaurants and caf?s (Main - Financial Statements GMC Rosstat)	55.30
Letting of own nonresidential real estate (Main - EGRPO GMC Rosstat, EGRUL)	70.20.2
Demolition and wrecking of buildings; earth moving	45.11
General construction of buildings and civil engineering works	45.21
Restaurants	55.3

Source: Official State Registration Data according to SPARK system, <http://www.spark-interfax.ru/en>

Name changes

Change history

Changes to names and legal status

Address	Relevance date
Primorski krai, g. Artem, ul. Kirova, d. 64 A	14.09.2015

Registration procedures in the Federal Tax Service (FNS)

Registration date	Deregistration date	Registering authority
11.09.2015		Mezhraionnaya inspektsiya Federalnoi nalogovoi sluzhby N 12 po Primorskemu krayu
20.06.2013		Mezhraionnaya inspektsiya Federalnoi nalogovoi sluzhby N 10 po Primorskemu krayu

Registering authority

Date of changes	Registering authority
20.02.2017	Inspektsiya Federalnoi nalogovoi sluzhby po Leninskomu raionu g. Vladivostoka
17.09.2015	Mezhraionnaya inspektsiya Federalnoi nalogovoi sluzhby N 12 po Primorskemu krayu
11.09.2015	Mezhraionnaya inspektsiya Federalnoi nalogovoi sluzhby N 10 po Primorskemu krayu

Source: Official State Registration Data according to SPARK system, <http://www.spark-interfax.ru/en>

Registry document for "ПИОНЕР" (LLC "PIONER") dated 13 August 2018

ЕДИНЫЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ РЕЕСТР ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ЛИЦ

Сведения о юридическом лице

ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ПИОНЕР"

ОГРН 1132502001664

ИНН/КПП 2502047408/254301001

по состоянию на 13.08.2018

As of 13 August 2018

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
Наименование		
1	Полное наименование	ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ПИОНЕР"
2	Сокращенное наименование	ООО "ПИОНЕР"
3	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1132502001664 20.06.2013
Адрес (место нахождения)		
4	Почтовый индекс	690018
5	Субъект Российской Федерации	КРАЙ ПРИМОРСКИЙ
6	Город (волость и т.п.)	ГОРОД ВЛАДИВОСТОК
7	Улица (проспект, переулок и т.д.)	УЛИЦА НЕВСКАЯ
8	Дом (владение и т.п.)	ДОМ 12
9	Корпус (строение и т.п.)	КОРПУС А
10	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502055594 11.09.2015
Сведения о регистрации		
11	Способ образования	Создание юридического лица
12	ОГРН	1132502001664
13	Дата регистрации	20.06.2013
14	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1132502001664 20.06.2013
Сведения о регистрирующем органе по месту нахождения юридического лица		
15	Наименование регистрирующего органа	Инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы по Ленинскому району г. Владивостока
16	Адрес регистрирующего органа	,690091,,Владивосток г.,Океанский пр-кт,40,,
17	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2162543312149 07.02.2016
Сведения об учете в налоговом органе		
18	ИНН	2502047408
19	КПП	254301001
20	Дата постановки на учет	11.09.2015
21	Наименование налогового органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 12 по Приморскому краю
22	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502055671 11.09.2015

LLC "PIONER"

690018
Krai Primorski
City of Vladivostok
Ulitsa Nevskaya
House 12
Building A

Tax ID: 2502047408

Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в территориальном органе Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации		
23	Регистрационный номер	035006064000
24	Дата регистрации	14.09.2015
25	Наименование территориального органа Пенсионного фонда	Государственное учреждение-Управление Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации по Первореченскому району г.Владивостока Приморского края
26	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152543281196 17.09.2015
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в исполнительном органе Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации		
27	Регистрационный номер	250241015925031
28	Дата регистрации	12.09.2015
29	Наименование исполнительного органа Фонда социального страхования	Филиал №3 г. Владивосток Государственное учреждение - Приморское региональное отделение Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации
30	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152543280822 17.09.2015
Сведения об уставном капитале (складочном капитале, уставном фонде, паевых взносах)		
31	Вид	УСТАВНЫЙ КАПИТАЛ
32	Размер (в рублях)	10000
33	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1132502001664 20.06.2013
Сведения о лице, имеющем право без доверенности действовать от имени юридического лица		
34	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	1132502001664 20.06.2013
35	Фамилия	ДАНИЛЯК
36	Имя	ЕЛЕНА
37	Отчество	НИКОЛАЕВНА
38	ИНН	650102300001
39	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1132502001664 20.06.2013
40	Должность	Генеральный директор
41	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1132502001664 20.06.2013
Сведения об учредителях (участниках) юридического лица		
42	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	1132502001664 20.06.2013
43	Фамилия	КИМ
44	Имя	ХЕ СОН
45	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1132502001664 20.06.2013
46	Номинальная стоимость доли (в рублях)	10000

Surname: Danilyak
Name: Elena
Patronymic: Nikolaevna
Tax ID: 650102300001

Surname: Kim
Name: Khe Son


47	Размер доли (в процентах)	100
48	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1132502001664 20.06.2013
Сведения о видах экономической деятельности по Общероссийскому классификатору видов экономической деятельности (ОКВЭД ОК 029-2014 КДЕС. Ред. 2)		
<i>Сведения об основном виде деятельности</i>		
49	Код и наименование вида деятельности	68.20.2 Аренда и управление собственным или арендованным нежилым недвижимым имуществом
50	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502039149 05.05.2015
<i>Сведения о дополнительных видах деятельности</i>		
1		
51	Код и наименование вида деятельности	41.20 Строительство жилых и нежилых зданий
52	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502039149 05.05.2015
2		
53	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.11 Разборка и снос зданий
54	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502039149 05.05.2015
3		
55	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.12.3 Производство земляных работ
56	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502039149 05.05.2015
4		
57	Код и наименование вида деятельности	56.10 Деятельность ресторанов и услуги по доставке продуктов питания
58	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502039149 05.05.2015
5		
59	Код и наименование вида деятельности	56.10.1 Деятельность ресторанов и кафе с полным ресторанным обслуживанием, кафетериев, ресторанов быстрого питания и самообслуживания
60	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502039149 05.05.2015
6		
61	Код и наименование вида деятельности	56.10.3 Деятельность ресторанов и баров по обеспечению питанием в железнодорожных вагонах, ресторанах и на судах
62	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502039149 05.05.2015
Сведения о записях, внесенных в Единый государственный реестр юридических лиц		
1		
63	ГРН и дата внесения записи в ЕГРЮЛ	1132502001664 20.06.2013
64	Причина внесения записи в ЕГРЮЛ	(P11001) Создание ЮЛ

Source: Unified State Register of Legal Entities, <https://egrul.nalog.ru>

Map data showing LLC PIONER address and DPRK Embassy in Vladivostock address


The below screenshot from the corporate registry document places PIONER's location as the same as the DPRK consulate in Vladivostok, shown on screenshots from Yandex maps. In all instances, the divide between the consulate and the surrounding buildings is either noted on the map or visible from satellite imagery.

PIONER screenshot with location map from SPARK:



Source: SPARK, <http://spark-interfax.ru>

Screenshot from Yandex maps for 12A ulitsa Nevskaya, Vladivostok:



Source: Yandex maps, <https://yandex.com/maps/>

Address of the DPRK consulate in Vladivostok

<https://vladivostok.mid.ru/predstavitelstva-inostrannyh-gosudarstv>



General Consulate of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea


ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОЕ КОНСУЛЬСТВО
КОРЕЙСКОЙ НАРОДНО - ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ

Address: City of Vladivostok, ulitsa Nevskaya, House 12 A

Адрес: г.Владивосток, ул.Невская, д.12 «А»

Тел./факс: 8(423)233-34-30, 236-25-94

E-mail: gcdprk@mail.ru



Консульский округ: Приморский край, Хабаровский край, Республика Саха (Якутия), Камчатский край, Забайкальский край, Республика Бурятия, Амурская, Сахалинская, Иркутская, Магаданская области, Еврейская автономная область, Чукотский автономный округ.

Source: Representation of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vladivostok, <https://vladivostok.mid.ru/>

Annex 76 : Documents showing GENCO's partial ownership of LLC "SAKORENMA"

ЕДИНЫЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ РЕЕСТР ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ЛИЦ

Сведения о юридическом лице

ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "СТРОИТЕЛЬНАЯ ФИРМА
САКОРЕНМА"

ОГРН 1036500601642

ИНН/КПП 6501104474/650101001

по состоянию на 01.11.2018

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
Наименование		
1	Полное наименование	ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "СТРОИТЕЛЬНАЯ ФИРМА САКОРЕНМА"
2	Сокращенное наименование	ООО "САКОРЕНМА"
3	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2186501135159 29.06.2018
Адрес (место нахождения)		
4	Субъект Российской Федерации	ОБЛАСТЬ САХАЛИНСКАЯ
5	Город (волость и т.п.)	ГОРОД ЮЖНО-САХАЛИНСК
6	Улица (проспект, переулок и т.д.)	УЛИЦА ПОЛЕВАЯ
7	Дом (владение и т.п.)	8
8	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2036500609066 24.04.2003
Сведения о регистрации		
9	Способ образования	Создание юридического лица до 01.07.2002
10	ОГРН	1036500601642
11	Дата присвоения ОГРН	05.01.2003
12	Регистрационный номер, присвоенный до 1 июля 2002 года	408
13	Дата регистрации до 1 июля 2002 года	11.01.2000
14	Наименование органа, зарегистрировавшего юридическое лицо до 1 июля 2002 года	Администрация г.Южно-Сахалинска
15	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1036500601642 05.01.2003
Сведения о регистрирующем органе по месту нахождения юридического лица		
16	Наименование регистрирующего органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области
17	Адрес регистрирующего органа	,693020,,Южно-Сахалинск г.,Ленина ул,105,А,
18	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1036500601642 05.01.2003
Сведения об учете в налоговом органе		
19	ИНН	6501104474

Oblast Sakhalinskaya
City of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk
Ulitsa Polevaya
8

20	КПП	650101001
21	Дата постановки на учет	21.01.2000
22	Наименование налогового органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области
23	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2056500686251 26.09.2005
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в территориальном органе Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации		
24	Регистрационный номер	074001013749
25	Дата регистрации	26.01.2000
26	Наименование территориального органа Пенсионного фонда	Государственное учреждение - Управление Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации в г. Южно-Сахалинске Сахалинской области
27	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2056500780081 13.12.2005
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в исполнительном органе Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации		
28	Регистрационный номер	650021014565001
29	Дата регистрации	30.03.2000
30	Наименование исполнительного органа Фонда социального страхования	Государственное учреждение - Сахалинское региональное отделение Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации
31	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	01.10.2004
Сведения о лице, имеющем право без доверенности действовать от имени юридического лица		
32	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	2066501083757 05.06.2006
33	Фамилия	СОН
34	Имя	ЧАН ДИН
35	ИНН	650109976889
36	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2186501096054 12.04.2018
37	Должность	ГЕНЕРАЛЬНЫЙ ДИРЕКТОР
38	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2186501096054 12.04.2018
Сведения об учредителях (участниках) юридического лица		
1		
39	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	2036500609066 24.04.2003
40	Полное наименование	ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО" КНДР
41	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2106501002012 13.01.2010
42	Страна происхождения	КОРЕЯ (КНДР)

Surname: Son
Name: Chan Din
Tax ID: 650109975889

General Corporation for
Construction Abroad
"ZENKO" of the DPRK

43	Дата регистрации	22.06.1962
44	Регистрационный номер	61-35
45	Наименование регистрирующего органа	КНДР КОМИТЕТ ВНЕШНЕЙ ЭКОНОМИКИ
46	Адрес (место нахождения) в стране происхождения	Г.ПХЕНЬЯН, ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ РАЙОН, УЛ.СЫНРИ, 25
47	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2106501002012 13.01.2010
2		
48	Номинальная стоимость доли (в рублях)	16800
49	Размер доли (в процентах)	20
50	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2106501002012 13.01.2010
2		
51	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	2036500609066 24.04.2003
52	Фамилия	СОН
53	Имя	ЧАН ДИН
54	ИНН	650109976889
55	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2186501096054 12.04.2018
56	Номинальная стоимость доли (в рублях)	67200
57	Размер доли (в процентах)	80
58	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2136501104090 18.10.2013
Сведения о видах экономической деятельности по Общероссийскому классификатору видов экономической деятельности (ОКВЭД ОК 029-2014 КДЕС. Ред. 2)		
<i>Сведения об основном виде деятельности</i>		
59	Код и наименование вида деятельности	41.20 Строительство жилых и нежилых зданий
60	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2066501083757 05.06.2006
<i>Сведения о дополнительных видах деятельности</i>		
1		
61	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.21 Производство электромонтажных работ
62	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2086501077287 28.05.2008
2		
63	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.31 Производство штукатурных работ
64	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2086501077287 28.05.2008
3		
65	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.32 Работы столярные и плотничные
66	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2086501077287 28.05.2008

Surname: Son
Name: Chan Din
Tax ID: 650109975889

Registry documents of LLC "SAKORENMA", partially owned by DPRK company GENCO (Korea General Company for External Construction)



LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY "JOINT VENTURE SAKO RYONMA", 14/02/2018 21:59 MSK

Shareholders

EGRUL

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
[REDACTED]		67 200	80.00	13.01.2010
GENERALNOE OBSHCHESTVO PO STROITELSTVU ZA RUBEZHOM "ZENKO"	G.PKHENYAN, TSENTRALNY RAION, KNDR	16 800	20.00	13.01.2010
	UL.SYNRI, 25			

History of changes

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
[REDACTED]		42 840	51.00	17.01.2003
GENERALNOE OBSHCHESTVO PO STROITELSTVU ZA RUBEZHOM "ZENKO" KNDR		41 160	49.00	04.01.2003

Rosstat

Last updated on : 18.09.2017

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %
Citizens of Russia(1)		67 200	80.00
Gen, obshchestvo po stroitelstvu za rubezhom "Zenko"	Koreiskaya narodno-demokraticeskaya respublika	16 800	20.00

History of changes

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Last updated on
GEN. OBSHCHESTVO PO STROITELSTVU ZA RUBEZHOM "Z"		16 800	20.00	01.02.2006
KOREISKOE GENERALNOE OBSHCHESTVO "ZENKO"		16 800	20.00	31.08.2005

Source: OKVED / SPARK

Document showing nationality for Director of Sakorenma

ЕДИНЫЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ РЕЕСТР ИНДИВИДУАЛЬНЫХ ПРЕДПРИНИМАТЕЛЕЙ

Сведения об индивидуальном предпринимателе

СОН ЧАН ДИН

Tax ID:
650109975889

ОГРНИП 314650120400028

ИНН 650109976889

по состоянию на 14.11.2018

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
Фамилия, имя, отчество (при наличии) индивидуального предпринимателя		
1	Фамилия	СОН
2	Имя	ЧАН ДИН
3	Пол	мужской
4	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРИП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	314650120400028 23.07.2014
Сведения о гражданстве		
5	Гражданство	гражданин Российской Федерации
6	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРИП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	314650120400028 23.07.2014
Сведения о регистрации индивидуального предпринимателя		
7	ОГРНИП	314650120400028
8	Дата регистрации	23.07.2014
Сведения о регистрирующем органе по месту жительства индивидуального предпринимателя		
9	Наименование регистрирующего органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области
10	Адрес регистрирующего органа	,693020,,Южно-Сахалинск г.,Ленина ул,105,А,
11	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРИП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	314650120400028 23.07.2014
Сведения об учете в налоговом органе		
12	Идентификационный номер налогоплательщика (ИНН)	650109976889
13	Дата постановки на учет	23.07.2014
14	Наименование налогового органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области
15	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРИП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	414650120400025 23.07.2014
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в территориальном органе Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации		
16	Регистрационный номер	074001065807
17	Дата регистрации	23.07.2014

Surname: Son
Name: Chan DinCitizen of the
Russian
FederationSource: Unified State Register of Legal Entities, <https://egrul.nalog.ru>

Annex 77 : Documents Information on LLC “SAKORENMA” name change

SPARK

Search on card X

General Information
Company Card
Registration Data
Economic Activities
History of changes
EGRUL transcript
Phones
Addresses
Comments
Company Structure
Shareholders
Branches, affiliates
Company's links
Management Bodies
Persons entitled to act without a warrant
Company Activities
Counterparts
Competitors
Licenses
Vacancies
Contracts (contractor)
Bank guarantees
Legal cases
Inspections
News reports
Financial Information
Taxes
Balance Sheet
Financial Statement
Book-keeping report
Financial Analysis

Information for internal use

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY "JOIN...

Current section

Change history

+ Add to report

Changes to names and legal status

Name, description	INN	OGRN	Legal form	Date of changes
ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "СОВМЕСТНОЕ РОССИЙСКО-КОРЕЙСКОЕ ПРЕДПРИЯТИЕ САКО РЕНМА"	6501104474	1036500601642	Limited liability companies	12.04.2018

LLC "Joint Russian-Korean Enterprise Sako Renma"

History of address changes

Address	Relevance date
Sakhalinskaya obl., g. Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, ul. Sakhalinskaya, d. 48	05.01.2003

Registering authority

Change date	Registering authority
29.06.2018	MEZHRAIONNAYA INSPEKTSIYA FEDERALNOI NALOGOVOI SLUZHBY N 1 PO SAKHALINSKOI OBLASTI
02.12.2014	Mezhraionnaya Inspeksiya Ministerstva Rossijskoj Federatsii po nalogam i sboram N 1 po Sakhalinskoj oblasti

Registration actions with Federal Tax Service (FNS)

GRN	Change date	Change type	Additional information
2186501135159	29.06.2018	Alteration of legal entity data, contained in EGRUL, related to the alteration of constituent documents, on an application	Company name - OBSHCHESTVO S OGRANICHENNOI OTVETSTVENNOSTYU "STROITELNAYA FIRMA SAKORENMA"
2186501096054	12.04.2018	Entry to the Unified state register of legal entities (EGRUL) of the information, provided by the bodies, implementing issuing and replacement of identity documents of Russian citizen in Russia	A person entitled to act without a warrant - Son Chan Din, Generalny direktor, Shareholder - Son Chan Din, nominalnaya stoimost 67200 rub., dolya 80%
2146501103351	02.12.2014	Concession of license data entry to EGRUL	License - N 65-B/00039 ot 20.11.2014
2136501103990	18.10.2013	Entry to the Unified state register of legal entities (EGRUL) of the information, provided by the bodies, implementing issuing and replacement of identity documents of Russian citizen in Russia	
2136501104090	18.10.2013	Entry to the Unified state register of legal entities (EGRUL) of the information, provided by the bodies, implementing issuing and replacement of identity documents of Russian citizen in Russia	Shareholder - Son Chan Din, nominalnaya stoimost 67200 rub., dolya 80%
2116501021591	18.03.2011	Alteration of legal entity data, contained in EGRUL, related to the alteration of constituent documents, on an application	
2106501096073	30.06.2010	Legal entity bank accounts data entry to EGRUL	
2106501002012	13.01.2010	Alteration of legal entity data, contained in EGRUL, related to the adjustment of a limited liability company statute in accordance with the Federal Law as of 30.12.2008 № 312-FZ	Shareholder - GENERALNOE OBSHCHESTVO PO STROITELSTVU ZA RUBEZHOM "ZENKO" KNDR, nominalnaya stoimost 16800 rub., dolya 20%
2086501156278	10.11.2008	Concession of license data entry to EGRUL	
2086501139228	28.10.2008	Concession of license data entry to EGRUL	
2086501099441	28.07.2008	Legal entity bank accounts data entry to EGRUL	
2086501077287	28.05.2008	Alteration of legal entity data, contained in EGRUL, related to the alteration of constituent documents, on an application	
2076501110343	25.09.2007	Concession of license data entry to EGRUL	
2066501083757	05.06.2006	Alteration of legal entity data, contained in EGRUL, not related to the alteration of constituent documents, on an application	A person entitled to act without a warrant - Son Chan Din, Generalny direktor
2066501083537	02.06.2006	Alteration of legal entity data, contained in EGRUL, related to errors made by the applicant in documents presented during the state registration of a legal entity earlier	
2056500780081	13.12.2005	Registration of a legal entity as an insured in	

Source: SPARK, <https://spark-interfax.ru/>

Annex 78 : Government contracts awarded to LLC “SAKORENMA”

Not secure | zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html?reestrNumber=365012945...

Версия для слабовидящих



ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О КОНТРАКТЕ № 3650129452118000008

Размещено 17.10.2018 14:21 (МСК+8 (UTC+11) GMT+11:00)
По местному времени заказчика

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О КОНТРАКТЕ	ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ПЛАТЕЖАХ И ОБЪЕКТЕ ЗАКУПКИ	ИНФОРМАЦИЯ ОБ ИСПОЛНЕНИИ (РАСТОРЖЕНИИ) КОНТРАКТА	ДОКУМЕНТЫ	ЖУРНАЛ СОБЫТИЙ
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ОБЩАЯ ИНФОРМАЦИЯ

Регистровый номер контракта	3650129452118000008
Статус контракта	Исполнение
Номер извещения об осуществлении закупки	0161300000118000305
Идентификационный код закупки (ИКЗ)	1836501294521650100010002001421243
Уникальный номер позиции плана-графика	20180861600001002000922001
Способ определения поставщика (подраздчика, исполнителя)	Электронный аукцион
Дата подведения результатов определения поставщика (подраздчика, исполнителя)	10.04.2018
Дата размещения (по местному времени)	17.10.2018 14:21 (МСК+8)
Основание заключения контракта с единственным поставщиком	Закупка вследствие признания несостоявшимся электронного аукциона в соответствии с частями 1 - 31 статьи 71 Федерального закона решения об осуществлении закупки у единственного поставщика (подраздчика, исполнителя)
реквизиты документа, подтверждающего основание заключения контракта	Протокол рассмотрения единственной заявки на участие в электронном аукционе № 0161300000118000305-4 от 10.04.2018.0161300000118000305-4

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ ОБ ИЗМЕНЕНИИ КОНТРАКТА

Основание для изменения	В связи с перераспределением объема субсидии из бюджета Сахалинской области изменены денежные ассигнования в водах бюджетной классификации
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ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ЗАКАЗЧИКЕ

Полное наименование заказчика	МУНИЦИПАЛЬНОЕ КАЗЕННОЕ УЧРЕЖДЕНИЕ ГОРОДСКОГО ОКРУГА "ГОРОД ЮЖНО-САХАЛИНСК" УПРАВЛЕНИЕ ПОСРЕДСТВОМ КОМПЬЮТЕРНОЙ И НЕМАТЕРИАЛЬНОЙ ИНФОРМАЦИИ
Сокращенное наименование заказчика	МКУ "УДХИБ"
Дата поставки на учет в налоговом органе	10.10.2017
Идентификационный код заказчика	3650129452165010001
ИНН	6501294521
КПП	650101001
Код организационно-правовой формы	75404
Код ОКПО	19797165
Код территории муниципального образования	64701000001 - г Южно-Сахалинск
Наименование бюджета	Бюджет городского округа "Город Южно-Сахалинск"
Уровень бюджета	30 - местный бюджет

ОБЩИЕ ДАННЫЕ

Дата заключения контракта	03.05.2018
Номер контракта	027-003-18
Способ указания цены контракта	Цена контракта
Цена контракта	98 489 397,00
Валюта контракта	Российский рубль (RUB)
Объем привлечения к исполнению контракта субподрядчиков	2% что составляет 24622349,25 в российских рублях
Дата начала исполнения контракта	05.05.2018
Дата окончания исполнения контракта	01.09.2018
Номер реестровой записи реестра банковских гарантий (исполнение контракта)	В соответствии с ч. 8.1 ст. 45 Федерального закона № 44-ФЗ информация о банковских гарантиях, предоставляемых в качестве обеспечения заявок и исполнения контрактов, с 01.07.2018 не размещается на официальном сайте ЭИС.
Размер обеспечения исполнения контракта	9 848 939,70 в российских рублях
В том числе НДС	15 023 807,00 в российских рублях
Срок, на который предоставляется гарантия	

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ПОСТАВЩИКАХ

ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ	СТРАНА, КОД СТРАНЫ РЕГИСТРАЦИИ	АДРЕС В СТРАНЕ РЕГИСТРАЦИИ	АДРЕС, МЕСТА НАХОЖДЕНИЯ	ПОЧТОВЫЙ АДРЕС	ТЕЛЕФОН, ЭЛЕКТРОННАЯ ПОЧТА	СТАТУС
12300 Общества с ограниченной ответственностью ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "СТРОИТЕЛЬНАЯ ФИРМА САКОРЕНМА" Код по ОКПО: 52997801 ИНН: 6501104474			693000, Российская Федерация, Сахалинская область, Южно-Сахалинск, Полевая, 8	693000, Российская Федерация, Сахалинская область, Южно-Сахалинск, Полевая, 8	7-4242-776539 zakops@yandex.ru	субъект малого предприятия
КПП, дата поставки на учет:	650101001	04.01.2003				

Organization: LLC Construction Company "SAKORENMA"
OKPO Code: 52997801
Tax ID: 6501104474

Address, locations: 693000, Russian Federation, Sakhalinskaya Oblast, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Poelvaya, 8

Postal Address: 693000, Russian Federation, Sakhalinskaya, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Poelvaya, 8

Telephone, Email: 7-4242-776539, sakorenma@yandex.ru

Source: Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement, <http://zakupki.gov.ru/>



ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О КОНТРАКТЕ № 3650128177018000025

ISS

Размещено 10.07.2018 14:24 (МСК+8 (UTC+11) GMT+11:00)
По местному времени заказчика

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О КОНТРАКТЕ	ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ПЛАТЕЖАХ И ОБЪЕКТЕ ЗАКУПКИ	ДОКУМЕНТЫ	ЖУРНАЛ СОБЫТИЙ
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ОБЩАЯ ИНФОРМАЦИЯ	
Реестровый номер контракта	3650128177018000025
Статус контракта	Исполнение
Номер извещения об осуществлении закупки	0161300000118000812
Идентификационный код закупки (ИКЗ)	183650128177065010100100440014221000
Уникальный номер позиции плана-графика	2018206160000010000000510001
Способ определения поставщика (подрядчика, исполнителя)	Электронный аукцион
Дата подведения результатов определения поставщика (подрядчика, исполнителя)	26.06.2018
Дата размещения (по местному времени)	10.07.2018 14:24 (МСК+8)
Реквизиты документа, подтверждающего основные условия заключения контракта	Протокол подведения итогов электронного аукциона № 0161300000118000812-3 от 26.06.2018.0161300000118000812-3

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ЗАКАЗЧИКЕ	
Полное наименование заказчика	МУНИЦИПАЛЬНОЕ КАЗЕННОЕ ПРЕДПРИЯТИЕ "ГОРОДСКОЙ ВОДОКАНАЛ"
Сокращенное наименование заказчика	МКП "ГОРОДСКОЙ ВОДОКАНАЛ"
Дата постановки на учет в налоговом органе	29.02.2016
Идентификационный код заказчика	36501281770650101001
ИНН	6501281770
КПП	650101001
Код организационно-правовой формы	65143
Код ОКПО	00324524
Наименование внебюджетных средств	80 - Средства государственных (муниципальных) унитарных предприятий

ОБЩИЕ ДАННЫЕ	
Дата заключения контракта	09.07.2018
Номер контракта	351/МКП-2018
Способ указания цены контракта	Цена контракта
Цена контракта	3 054 730,96
Валюта контракта	Российский рубль (RUB)
Дата начала исполнения контракта	09.07.2018
Дата окончания исполнения контракта	07.09.2018
Размер обеспечения исполнения контракта	164 232,85 в российских рублях
В том числе НДС	465 975,91 в российских рублях
Срок, на который предоставляется гарантия	

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ПОСТАВЩИКАХ						
ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ	СТРАНА, КОД	АДРЕС В СТРАНЕ РЕГИСТРАЦИИ	АДРЕС, МЕСТА НАХОЖДЕНИЯ	ПОЧТОВЫЙ АДРЕС	ТЕЛЕФОН, ЭЛЕКТРОННАЯ ПОЧТА	СТАТУС
12300 Общества с ограниченной ответственностью Общество с ограниченной ответственностью "Совместное российско-корейское предприятие Сако Ренма" Код по ОКПО: 52997801 ИНН: 6501104474			693000, Российская Федерация, Сахалинская область, Южно-Сахалинск, Полевая, 8	693000, Российская Федерация, Сахалинская область, Южно-Сахалинск, Полевая, 8	7-4242-776539 sakorenma@yandex.ru	субъект малого предпринимательства
КПП, дата постановки на учет:	650101001	04.01.2003				

Organization:
LLC Construction
Company
"SAKORENMA"
OKPO Code:
52997801
Tax ID:
6501104474

Address, locations: 693000, Russian Federation, Sakhalinskaya Oblast, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Poelvaya, 8

Postal Address: 693000, Russian Federation, Sakhalinskaya, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Poelvaya, 8

Telephone, Email: 7-4242-776539, sakorenma@yandex.ru

Source: Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement, <http://zakupki.gov.ru/>

ВЕРСИЯ ДЛЯ СПЛОВАЙДИЦЫ



ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О КОНТРАКТЕ № 3650128177018000023

ISS

Размещено 10.07.2018 14:12 (МСК+8 (UTC+11) GMT+11:00)
По местному времени заказчика

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О КОНТРАКТЕ	ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ПЛАТЕЖАХ И ОБЪЕКТЕ ЗАКУПКИ	ДОКУМЕНТЫ	ЖУРНАЛ СОБЫТИЙ			
ОБЩАЯ ИНФОРМАЦИЯ						
Реестровый номер контракта	3650128177018000023					
Статус контракта	Исполнение					
Номер извещения об осуществлении закупки	0161300000118000808					
Идентификационный код закупки (ИКЗ)	18365012817706501010010042001422000					
Уникальный номер позиции плана-графика	2018206160000010020000490001					
Способ определения поставщика (подраздочка, исполнитель)	Электронный аукцион					
Дата подведения результатов определения поставщика (подраздочка, исполнитель)	27.06.2018					
Дата размещения (по местному времени)	10.07.2018 14:12 (МСК+8)					
Основание заключения контракта с единственным поставщиком	Закупка вследствие признания несостоявшимся электронного аукциона в соответствии частями 1 – 31 статьи 71 Федерального закона решения об осуществлении закупки у единственного поставщика (подраздочка, исполнитель)					
Реквизиты документа, подтверждающего основание заключения контракта	Протокол подведения итогов электронного аукциона № 0161300000118000808-3 от 27.06.2018.0161300000118000808-3					
ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ЗАКАЗЧИКЕ						
Полное наименование заказчика	МУНИЦИПАЛЬНОЕ КАЗЕННОЕ ПРЕДПРИЯТИЕ 'ГОРОДСКОЙ ВОДОКАНАЛ'					
Сокращенное наименование заказчика	МКП 'ГОРОДСКОЙ ВОДОКАНАЛ'					
Дата постановки на учет в налоговом органе	29.02.2016					
Идентификационный код заказчика	36501281770650101001					
ИНН	6501281770					
КПП	650101001					
Код организационно-правовой формы	65143					
Код ОКПО	00324524					
Наименование внебюджетных средств	80 - Средства государственных (муниципальных) унитарных предприятий					
ОБЩИЕ ДАННЫЕ						
Дата заключения контракта	09.07.2018					
Номер контракта	382/МКП-2018					
Способ указания цены контракта	Цена контракта					
Цена контракта	8 455 626,01					
Валюта контракта	Российский рубль (RUB)					
Дата начала исполнения контракта	09.07.2018					
Дата окончания исполнения контракта	07.09.2018					
Размер обеспечения исполнения контракта	500 332,90 в российских рублях					
В том числе НДС	1 289 841,26 в российских рублях					
Срок, на который предоставляется гарантия						
ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ПОСТАВЩИКАХ						
ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ	СТРАНА, КОД	АДРЕС В СТРАНЕ РЕГИСТРАЦИИ	АДРЕС, МЕСТА НАХОЖДЕНИЯ	ПОЧТОВЫЙ АДРЕС	ТЕЛЕФОН, ЭЛЕКТРОННАЯ ПОЧТА	СТАТУС
12300 Общества с ограниченной ответственностью Общество с ограниченной ответственностью 'Совместное российско-корейское предприятие СаКо Ренма' Код по ОКПО: 52997801 ИНН: 6501104474 КПП, дата постановки на учет: 650101001 04.01.2003			693000, Российская Федерация, Сахалинская область, Южно-Сахалинск, Полевая, 8	693000, Российская Федерация, Сахалинская область, Южно-Сахалинск, Полевая, 8	7-4242-776539 sakorenma@yandex.ru	субъект малого предпринимательства

Organization: LLC
Construction
Company
"SAKORENMA"
OKPO Code:
52997801
Tax ID:
6501104474

Address, locations: 693000, Russian
Federation, Sakhalinskaya Oblast,
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Poelvaya, 8

Postal Address: 693000, Russian
Federation, Sakhalinskaya, Yuzhno-
Sakhalinsk, Poelvaya, 8

Telephone, Email: 7-4242-776539,
sakorenma@yandex.ru

Source: Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement, <http://zakupki.gov.ru/>

2018 Government contracts awarded to Russian JV owned by the DPRK company, GENCO (Google translated into English)

(Each contract has an embedded link to the official procurement website of the Russian Federation on which the contracts are listed)



Поиск по названию, адресу, руководителю, учредителям, ОГРН и ИНН

The Organization Entrepreneurs About us Data sources

Home > LLC "Sakorenma" > Government Procurement

ООО "Sakorenma"

Date from 05.10.2012 before 27.07.2018 OK Status All Amount All

Role Provider Counterparty All

Information about the concluded contracts

07/09/2018 3650128177018000023 44-FZ

Amount: 8,455,626.01 p

Status: Execution

Role: Supplier

Counterparty: MCP "Urban Vodokanal"

The subject of procurement:

- Execution of works on the project: "Overhaul of water supply networks of Mira Ave. - ul. Frontier »

[on the website of the State procurement](#)

3650128177018000025 44-FZ

Amount: 3,054,730.96 p

Status: Execution

Role: Supplier

Counterparty: MCP "Urban Vodokanal"

The subject of procurement:

- Execution of works on the object: "Overhaul of water supply networks of Pobedy Ave."

[on the website of the State procurement](#)

05/03/2018 3650129452118000008 44-FZ

Amount: 98,489,397.00 p

Status: Execution

Role: Supplier

Counterparty: MKU "UDHIB"

The subject of procurement:

- Performance of works on the object "Major repairs and repair of yard territories and driveways to the courtyards of MKD"

[on the website of the State procurement](#)

01/09/2018 3650123897517000113 44-FZ

Amount: 186 000 000.00 p

Status: Discontinued

Role: Supplier

Counterparty: MKU "UKS" Cities of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk

The subject of procurement:

- performance of works on the objects: "Major repairs and repair of yard territories and driveways to the courtyards of MKD"

[on the website of the State procurement](#)

Source: <https://www.rusprofile.ru/gz/2893948>

Information on Government contracts from a Russian official business registry aggregator

The screenshot shows the website **kartoteka.ru** with a navigation bar and a search bar. Below the navigation bar, there is a yellow banner with the text: "Внимание! Полная информация будет доступна после оформления подписки. [Заказать](#)".

The main content area is divided into two columns. The left column is titled "Основная информация" (Basic Information) and contains a large blacked-out area. Below this, there are buttons for "Выписка из ЕГРЮЛ" and "Выписка из РМСП", both with "Загрузить" (Load) buttons. There is also a section for "Виды деятельности (ОКВЭД)" (Types of Activity) with "Код ОКВЭД: 41.2" (Code OKVED: 41.2) and "Строительство жилых и нежилых зданий" (Construction of residential and non-residential buildings).

The right column is titled "Существенные факты" (Significant Facts) and contains a list of various facts with counts and status indicators. The list includes:

- Вносимые изменения в ЕГРЮЛ (23)
- Наличие связи с адресом (местом нахождения) указанным в ЕГРЮЛ (0)
- Лицензии (1)
- Интеллектуальная собственность (патенты, изобретения и прочее) (0)
- Адрес массовой регистрации (8)
- Отсутствует в реестре ЮЛ, не предоставляющих отчетность более года (0)
- Отсутствует в реестре ЮЛ, имеющих задолженность по уплате налогов (0)
- Сообщения о ликвидации, реорганизации (0)
- Сообщения о банкротстве (0)
- Сообщения об отмене доверенностей (0)
- Арбитражная практика (38)
 - Истец: xxxx на сумму xxxx
 - Ответчик: xxxx на сумму xxxx
 - Третье лицо: xxxx на сумму xxxx
- Исполнительные производства (0)
- Плановые и проведенные проверки юридического лица гос. органами (1)
- Информация о залогах (0)
- Информация о лизинге (финансовой аренде) (0)
- Сообщения эмитента (0)
- Банковские гарантии (5)
 - Обеспечение xxxx контрактов на сумму xxxx руб.
- Участие в государственных закупках (61)
 - Допущен: xxxx на сумму xxxx руб.
 - Не допущен: xxxx на сумму xxxx руб.
- Реестр опубликованных заказов (тендеры) (0)
- Государственные контракты (39)**
 - В качестве заказчика: xxxx на сумму xxxx руб.
 - В качестве исполнителя: xxxx на сумму xxxx руб.
- Сообщения компании (0)
- Реестр недобросовестных поставщиков (0)
- Реестр операторов, осуществляющих обработку персональных данных (0)
- Реестр административной ответственности за незаконное вознаграждение (0)
- Реестр надёжных партнёров (0)
- Реестр микрофинансовых организаций (0)
- Участник ВЭД с признаками незаконного вывода денежных средств (0)
- Адреса мест осуществления деятельности (0)
- Разрешение на перевозки такси (0)
- Единый реестр субъектов малого и среднего предпринимательства (1)
- Экспресс-анализ (0)
- Сводная отчетность (0)
- Бухгалтерская отчетность (0)

Source: https://www.kartoteka.ru/card/6503378623b837e00e8ff4b9bc1f9b27/#path_Main_Html

Annex 79 : Bank details for LLC “SAKORENMA”

МК на выполнение работ по объекту «Капитальный ремонт и ремонт дворовых территорий и проездов к дворовым территориям МКД»

Контракта сообщения Сторона, получившая его, обязана направить ответ на это сообщение.

14.4. В случае если ответ на сообщение не будет получен направившей сообщение Стороной по истечении срока, указанного в п. 14.3. Контракта либо если Стороны не придут к соглашению по возникшим разногласиям, спор подлежит передаче на рассмотрение в арбитражный суд Сахалинской области.

15. ПРОЧИЕ УСЛОВИЯ.

15.1. Во всем остальном, не предусмотренном настоящим Контрактом, стороны руководствуются действующим законодательством РФ.

15.2. В качестве неотъемлемой части к настоящему контракту прилагаются:

1. Техническое задание (Приложение № 1);

2. Смета (Приложение № 2);

3. Документ, предусмотренный законодательством РФ для обеспечения исполнения контракта (Приложение № 3).

16. АДРЕСА И БАНКОВСКИЕ РЕКВИЗИТЫ СТОРОН

16.1 ЗАКАЗЧИК:

Муниципальное казенное учреждение городского округа «Город Южно-Сахалинск» «Управление дорожного хозяйства и благоустройства» юридический адрес: 693000, Сахалинская область, г. Южно-Сахалинск, ул. Хабаровская 49; почтовый адрес: 693000, Сахалинская область, г. Южно-Сахалинск, пр. Победы, 62 А; тел. 8 (4242) 300-971 (доб.13), факс 8 (4242) 300-831; e-mail udhib@yuzhno-sakh.ru; ИНН/КПП: 6501294521/650101001; УФК по Сахалинской области (ДФ администрации г.Ю.-Сахалинска, МКУ «Управление дорожного хозяйства и благоустройства» л/с 03902000140); Отделение Южно-Сахалинск г.Южно-Сахалинск; БИК 046401001; р/с: 40204810200010000021; ОГРН 1176501008254

16.2. ПОДРЯДЧИК:

Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Совместное российско-корейское предприятие СаКо Ренма» юридический/почтовый адрес: 693000, Российская Федерация, Сахалинская область, Южно-Сахалинск, Полевая, 8; Телефон: 7 (4242) 776-539, факс: 7 (4242) 771-949, E-Mail: sakorenma@yandex.ru; ИНН/КПП: 6501104474/650101001; Банковские реквизиты: ██████████ БИК: 040813713; Рас/с: 40702810908560002335; Кор/с: 30101810708130000713.

Limited Liability Corporation
“Joint Russian-Korean
Enterprise SaKo Renma”,
Legal Address: 693000,
Russian Federation,
Sakhalinskaya Oblast, Yuzhno-
Sakhalinsk, Polevaya, 8;
Telephone: 7 (4242) 776-539,
fax: 7 (4242) 771-949, E-Mail:
sakorenma@yandex.ru; Tax
ID/KPP:
6501104474/650101001; Bank
details: BIK: 040813713;
Checking account:
40702810908560002335;
Correspondent account:
30101810708130000713.

ПОДПИСИ СТОРОН

Настоящий контракт подписан электронной цифровой подписью:

Лица, имеющего право подписи от
имени ЗАКАЗЧИКА

Лица, имеющего право подписи от
имени ПОДРЯДЧИКА

Начальник

Е.С.Кулик

Генеральный директор

Сон Чап Дин

Source: Municipal Contract No. 027-003-18, accessed via Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement, <http://zakupki.gov.ru/>

Annex 80 : Yongbyon 5MW (e) Reactor and Light Water Reactor



Map No. 4592.1 UNITED NATIONS
January 2019

Office of Information and Communications Technology (OICT)
Geospatial Information Section


Annex 81 : Yongbyon Steam Plant



Map No. 4589.2 United Nations
August 2018

Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)


Annex 82 : Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site



Map No. 4592.2 UNITED NATIONS
January 2019

Office of Information and Communications Technology
Geospatial Information Section

Annex 83 : Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Concentration Plant




Map No. 4592.3 UNITED NATIONS
January 2019

Office of Information and Communications Technology
Geospatial Information Section

Annex 84 : Ballistic missile infrastructure and parade imagery

1. The Panel identified a then newly-constructed concrete launch pad¹⁹² used for the 29 August intermediate range Hwasong-12 launch at Pyongyang Sunan International Airport (see figure I) It was built sometime after the last available Planet Lab image of 12 August 2017 (left). Planet Lab imagery dated 2 September shows vegetation burnt as a result of the 29 August launch (centre).

Figure I



Source: Images courtesy of Planet Labs, Inc

Figure II: Images showing the newly constructed launch pad at Pyongyang Sunan International Airport on 29 August 2017



Source: Korea Central News Agency

¹⁹² Location of the launch pad: (39°15'40.96"N 125°40'32.79"E)

2. A Member State confirmed the imagery analysis of the Panel concerning the partial dismantlement of Sohae (Tongchang-ri) satellite rocket launch site¹⁹³ and of the vertical missile-engine test stand¹⁹⁴ (figure III). Dismantlement may be reversed as only light or moveable parts, such as the metal superstructure, were dismantled.

Figure III



Map No. 4592.7 UNITED NATIONS
January 2019

Office of Information and Communications Technology
Geospatial Information Section

¹⁹³ Location of the rocket launch pad: 39°39'36.22"N 124°42'19.27"E;

¹⁹⁴ Location of the engine test stand: 39°39'11.32"N 124°42'51.30"E;

3. The Panel monitored developments at the Hoejung-ni Missile Operating base and the railway station¹⁹⁵

Figure IV



Map No. 4592.6 UNITED NATIONS
January 2019

Office of Information and Communications Technology
Geospatial Information Section

¹⁹⁵ Location of the underground facility: 41°21'56.17"N 126°55'42.32"E and rail station, 41°23'6.65"N 126°54'28.58"E

4. A new type of short-range ballistic missile¹⁹⁶ was unveiled at the military parade of 8 February 2018 celebrating the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army. Furthermore, the parading of four Hwasong-15 missiles mounted on transporter erector launchers demonstrated the intercontinental strike capability and the mobility of the weapon system (see figure V) as well as the three ICBM Hwasong-14. The 12 ballistic missile systems, consisting of six Pukguksong-2 and six Hwasong-12, were also displayed.

Figure V: New type of short-range ballistic missile (top left and right); Hwasong-15 (bottom)




Source: Korean Central Television screengrab, courtesy of Martyn Williams.

¹⁹⁶ On 15 April 2017, military parade of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

5. A Member State informed the Panel that the Pukguksong-2 casing is built from a new composite casing which was exhibited during a military parade and during a test launch of Pukguksong-2, as well as during the 23 August 2017 visit of Chairman Kim Jong Un to the Chemical Material Institute (CMI) at Hamhung¹⁹⁷ :

Figure VI



Source: Member State - KCNA

¹⁹⁷ Located at 39°57'27.01" N 127°33'22.88"E, in new building, 250 m to the east of the older CMI structures. The materials are wound from composite fibers.

Annex 85 : The Panel’s assessment of humanitarian consequences of UN Security Council sanctions for the civilian population of the DPRK

1. Impartial humanitarian operations are a critical lifeline for millions of civilians in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Severe humanitarian needs persist including high levels of food insecurity and malnutrition, and lack of access to essential health services, clean water and sanitation. More than 40 per cent of the population (10.3 million people) is undernourished¹⁹⁸ and one in five children is stunted.¹⁹⁹ Over nine million people have limited access to essential health services.²⁰⁰ A severe shortage of basic drugs persists. Over one-third of household drinking water is contaminated. One in ten children suffers from diarrhea.²⁰¹

2. According to paragraph 25 of resolution 2397 (2017), sanctions measures are “not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK” or “to affect negatively the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK”. To assess the situation, the Panel gathered information from various sources including close to 20 non-governmental organizations and all UN agencies operating in the country on how humanitarian operations have been affected by the process for applying for humanitarian exemptions, the sectoral sanctions and the lack of a viable banking channel (annexes 86 and 87). The Panel notes that the implementation of sectoral sanctions in particular has had an impact on the activities of international humanitarian agencies working to address chronic humanitarian needs in the country.

3. Pursuant to paragraph 25 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Committee has broad authority to grant exemptions on a case-by-case basis, *inter alia*, to facilitate humanitarian assistance in the DPRK. To strengthen the mechanism for humanitarian exemptions, in August 2018 the Committee adopted Implementation Assistance Notice (IAN) No. 7: “Guidelines for Obtaining Exemptions to Deliver Humanitarian Assistance to the DPRK”, offering recommendations to Member States and international and non-governmental organizations regarding the exemption request procedures. While the Committee received and reviewed exemption requests for humanitarian assistance before the adoption of the IAN No. 7, its adoption was a welcome step towards streamlining and expediting the processing of exemption requests, and raising expectations that this would significantly improve the Committee’s review and approval process for exemption requests.

4. Based on an initial assessment of the practice for the first five months since the adoption of the IAN No. 7, humanitarian agencies have experienced various challenges. Among others, the process requires a very generous lead time in planning shipments of humanitarian goods, including locating suppliers and financial agents willing to bid or contract for the provision of goods and services before an exemption is obtained. Any changes to planned suppliers, shipping routes, item specifications, or quantities between those indicated in the approved exemption request and at the time of the actual shipment may render the exemption invalid. The long lead time perceived to be necessary for the exemption approval process could also make it difficult for humanitarian agencies to respond effectively to contingencies such as a natural disaster or an outbreak of disease.

5. The Committee has received 25 humanitarian exemption requests during the reporting period. Two requests were withdrawn, 16 requests were approved, while seven requests remain under consideration by the Committee.²⁰²

6. Expediting the review and approval by the Committee of exemption requests for humanitarian programs, starting with requests currently before the Committee, will help to alleviate the suffering of hundreds of thousands of civilians. Furthermore, the Committee should consider ways to allow more flexibility with regard to the requirement of exemption requests being submitted every six months, which causes additional delays and prolongs the already lengthy six to eight months’ lead time required for offshore procurement.

¹⁹⁸ 2018 Needs and Priorities Plan

¹⁹⁹ 2017 DPR Korea Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) Findings Report; <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/better-indicators-children-dpr-korea-challenges-persist-new-data-situation-children>

²⁰⁰ 2018 Needs and Priorities Plan

<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/DPRK%20NP%202018%20110418%20FINAL.pdf>

²⁰¹ 2017 DPR Korea Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) Findings Report; <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/better-indicators-children-dpr-korea-challenges-persist-new-data-situation-children>

²⁰² Information about the exemptions approved by the Committee are posted on the website:

<https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/humanitarian-exemption-requests>.

Sectoral sanctions

7. The sectoral sanctions imposed pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017) include prohibition of the transfer to the DPRK of “all industrial machinery (HS codes 84 and 85), transportation vehicles (HS codes 86 through 89), and iron, steel, and other metals (HS codes 72 through 83)”, also affecting a number of humanitarian-sensitive items (see annex 87). This paragraph does not include any direct mention of humanitarian exceptions, other than civilian passenger aircraft spare parts. The Committee must, therefore, consider requests for humanitarian exemptions to these sanctions, based on paragraph 25 of resolution 2397 (2017), which allows the Committee to “on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions.”

8. Paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017) covers several goods which are vital to agriculture or public health programs, including a variety of agricultural machinery and medical equipment (annex 87). Prohibited goods include machinery and parts for food processing factories; pumps, filters, pipes, and drilling equipment necessary to address critical humanitarian needs, such as providing clean water to prevent diarrhea, one of the main killers of children in the DPRK, and food security to reduce high malnutrition rates.

9. It should be noted that obtaining exemption requests from the Committee is but one stage of the process of importing relief items into the DPRK. For example, non-governmental organizations’ submissions can be subject to delays with Member States before they reach the Committee. Non-governmental organizations have little visibility and no control over when the Member State submits their request to the Committee. The continued risk adverse approach taken by suppliers and some transit countries’ authorities also continues to cause delays to the delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance.

Breakdown of the Banking Channel

10. Paragraph 33 of resolution 2270 (2016) prohibits the establishment or maintenance of correspondent accounts with DPRK financial institutions unless approved by the Committee. In August 2016, the Committee approved an exemption for Russia-based Bank Sputnik CJSC to maintain a correspondent relationship with the DPRK’s Foreign Trade Bank (FTB) in order to facilitate transactions for United Nations agencies in the country.²⁰³ Given that most of the operational transactions occur outside the DPRK when procuring materials and paying expatriate staff salaries, only 10 per cent of program funds are used within the country to cover on-site operational expenses such as fuel and local staff salaries.²⁰⁴

11. The Committee’s action of 11 August 2016²⁰⁵ enabled a mechanism whereby the UN Secretariat in New York could transfer U.S. Dollars to Commerzbank AG in Germany, which would convert the Dollars to Euros and remit payment in Rubles to Bank Sputnik in the Russian Federation. Bank Sputnik would then hold the payment in the FTB correspondent account, and – lacking an electronic payment clearing system with the FTB – remit cash to Pyongyang for deposit and use by United Nations agencies. However, since September 2017, when Commerzbank cancelled its participation in DPRK-related transactions no alternative arrangements have been found, effectively closing the humanitarian banking channel.²⁰⁶ This collapse of the banking channel resulted in a shortage of cash in-country, and will make it difficult for United Nations agencies to implement activities. United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations have increasingly had to rely on staff carrying large amounts of cash on their person when traveling to the DPRK.²⁰⁷

²⁰³ See: <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/correspondent-account-approvals>.

²⁰⁴ Letter from the UN Country team to the Panel on the Impact of Sanctions on Humanitarian Operations in DPRK, 14 December 2018.

²⁰⁵ Information about the correspondent accounts approved by the Committee are posted on the website:

<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/correspondent-account-approvals>

²⁰⁶ Section 208(d) of the DPRK Policy and Sanctions Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 USC 9228) delegates authority to the executive branch to facilitate a humanitarian banking channel to the DPRK; however, it does not appear that this authority has been used. Additionally, the U.S. government cannot compel a financial institution to service any particular market as banks make their own compliance and risk-related decisions.

²⁰⁷ Letter from the UN Country team to the Panel of Experts on the Impact of Sanctions on Humanitarian Operations in DPRK, 14 December 2018.

12. The challenges to aid agencies posed by UN financial sanctions have been compounded by de-risking – the phenomenon by which financial institutions and other private-sector actors categorically reject all transactions tied to a high-risk jurisdiction. This has been spurred by the threat of secondary sanctions by various Member States. Disaggregating the specific impact of UN financial sanctions on humanitarian organizations operating in the DPRK from that of unilateral sanctions measures and regulations can be difficult.

Annex 86 : Examples of impact of sanctions on the implementation of humanitarian activities in the DPRK

	Sector	UN agency or NGO or both	Items impacted	Status	Impact of delay/denial
1	Water and Sanitation	Both			For the WASH sector as a whole, from the planned 367,618 people to receive clean water in 2018, at least 229,235 people, including an estimated 16,000 under-five children will not receive clean drinking water due to delays resulting from need to obtain exemptions and funding shortfalls. This places children at risk of diarrhoea, one of the main killers of children, which is caused by consumption of unsafe drinking water, poor hygiene practices and inadequate health services.
2	Water and Sanitation	UN	This included some essential supplies required for four gravity-fed water systems (which were part of a larger procurement).	Exemption request approved by the Committee with significant delay on 18 January 2019. The exemption request was submitted to the Committee on 31 August 2018.	Significant delay in agency being able to complete four gravity-fed water systems, placing 61,284 people, including an estimated 4,300 under-five children, at risk of diarrheal death associated with drinking contaminated water.
3	Water and Sanitation	NGO	Spare parts for mobile drilling rig, drill bits (6" and 8"), sludge pump, and others.	Exemption request submitted to Member State 17 May 2018; still pending.	Unable to complete installation of 35 wells with handpumps, to provide communities with access to safe water. The majority of these wells were due to supply rural kindergartens, schools and health centres with clean water.
4	Health	UN	Emergency Reproductive Health kits 6A & 12	Exemption request pending submission to the Committee.	Delay in implementation of emergency response project, as a result 150,000 pregnant women who are due to deliver during the project period will not have access to safe delivery, and about 22,000 of the pregnancies who are likely to face complications during delivery will not have access to blood transfusions if required. These may result in a negative impact on the maternal mortality ratio that now stands at 58 per 100,000 live births.
5	Health	UN	Heaters for immunization clinics	Exemption request submitted to the Committee on 24 January 2019. Under consideration.	Fast tracking exemptions to facilitate the humanitarian response to DPRK's harsh winter impact is critical. Delays may inadvertently contribute to children undressing for immunization in temperatures that go as low as minus 20 degrees Celsius. Moreover, vaccines are rendered ineffective when they freeze due to the lack of heaters.
6	Health	UN	9 units of ambulance vehicles. Spare parts of vehicles used to distribute TB and malaria supplies, and to conduct monitoring and supervision visits	Exemption request approved with significant delay on 18 January 2019. The exemption request was submitted to the Committee on 31 August 2018.	9 units of ambulance vehicles. Spare parts are required to ensure regular maintenance of the five vehicles previously allocated to MoPH for the implementation of the tuberculosis (TB) and malaria programs. These vehicles have been used exclusively for the distribution by MoPH of TB and malaria program supplies from central to lower level health facilities, and for supervision and

					<p>monitoring of activities in the field. Without these vehicles there will be serious challenges to implement the programs.</p> <p>DPRK is one of the 30 TB high burden countries in the world. In 2017, there were a total of 100,553 TB cases (5,211 children under 15, i.e. 5% of all cases).</p> <p>Only 14 % of TB cases are tested for drug resistance due to lack of diagnostic resources in-country. Multi-drug-resistant (MDR) TB is a very severe type of TB with substantial risk to transform curable TB into incurable (with increased mortality and massive public transmission of the disease by non-cured patients) and the affordable TB treatment into unaffordable in resource-limited settings. The likelihood of ongoing MDR transmission is very high.</p>
7	Health	UN	Refrigerators	<p>Exemption request approved by the Committee with significant delay on 19 October 2018. The exemption request was submitted to the Committee on 31 August 2018.</p>	<p>The delays caused by the exemption process is resulting in additional financial burdens for agencies.</p> <p>For example, purchase orders cannot be issued before the Committee's approval and sometimes grants may expire before such approval is granted.</p> <p>In May 2018, an agency placed an offshore procurement through its supply division for refrigerators using grants expiring in December 2018. The exemption for these items was received on 19 October 2018. By this time the cost had increased from \$2,400 per unit to \$2,994 per unit, and the agency had to reduce the number of refrigerators purchased for its health program from 20 to 16.</p>

8	Health	UN	Medical equipment for maternal and neonatal emergencies	Exemption request approved by the Committee with significant delay on 19 October 2018. The exemption request was submitted to the Committee on 31 August 2018.	Non-availability of program supplies resulting in delays for the referral of emergency cases to health facilities. This will result in increased mortality. Because requests for exemptions can only be submitted once every 6 months, offshore procurement can only be initiated then and not before. Considering that lead time for offshore procurement is 6-8 months, it can take up to 9 to fully equip the maternity wards.
9	Health	NGO	Assistive and mobility devices (wheelchairs, crutches, walking stick, walker, hearing aid and glasses)	Exemption request approved by the Committee on 30 January 2019. The exemption request was submitted to a Member State on 12 October 2018 and to the Committee with significant delay on 3 January 2019.	People living with disabilities identified as requiring assistive and mobility devices have been waiting more than 10 months for these items.
10	Food security and agriculture	UN	Irrigation equipment	Exemption request pending submission to the Committee.	As agricultural activities are time-bound, the implementation will be delayed by at least one cropping season with impacts on the food security and food diversity of the affected population, raising the risk of increased rates of undernutrition, especially amongst the most vulnerable people.
11	Food security and agriculture	UN	Agricultural equipment (2-WT, corn thresher, mini rice mill)	Exemption request pending submission to the Committee.	As agricultural activities are time-bound, the implementation will be delayed by at least one cropping season. This will affect the ability to achieve the increase in food production which is needed to address need for food security and food diversity. Without access to suitable amounts and diversity of food, vulnerable people are at increased risk of malnutrition.

12	Food security and agriculture	UN	Sea buckthorn processing equipment	Exemption request pending submission to the Committee.	As agricultural activities are time-bound, the implementation will be delayed by at least one cropping season. This will affect the ability to achieve the increase in food production which is needed to address need for food security and food diversity. Without access to suitable amounts and diversity of food, vulnerable people are at increased risk of malnutrition.
13	Food security and agriculture	NGO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Plastic round arc type greenhouses • Potato storage systems • Ventilation system • Diesel generator 	Exemption request submitted to Member State in May 2018; still pending.	<p>This will result in an inability to produce vegetable seeds during the winter period to be used during the 2019 early vegetable production in 2019 season. This will result in farmers being unable to produce thousands of kilograms of vegetables which are vital for people's food security and dietary diversity to prevent higher rates of malnutrition.</p> <p>Lack of appropriate storage for seed potatoes, or for vegetable, legume and grass seeds.</p> <p>Lack of electricity means unable to run the seed machinery that has been installed.</p>
14	Food security and agriculture	NGO	Six bio-digester sets	Exemption request submitted to Member State in May 2018; still pending.	<p>Unable to complete energy production project without bio-digester.</p> <p>The biogas digesters properly treat animal and human waste generated in the facilities. A benefit of the digesters is the production of methane-rich biogas, which is to be used for cooking especially during the winter. They are used to produce food for people and animals; negative impacts on the health of livestock will have serious consequences on the nutritional status of the most vulnerable people, further limiting their dietary intake and diversity.</p>
15	Food security and agriculture	NGO	Iron bar, Gabion wire (3t), Electrical Welder and others	Exemption request submitted to Member State in May 2018; still pending.	<p>Unable to complete project that would protect 2,140 square meters of agricultural land against flooding. During past five years, 95 people died, 4,054 houses were destroyed, 450 buildings demolished, 20,000 ha arable land damaged due to flooding in these areas. Without these activities the lives of thousands of people are at risk, as well as their ability to produce sufficient food due to the negative impacts of floods on agricultural land.</p>
16	Food security and agriculture	NGO	Veterinarian kits	Exemption request approved by Committee on 29 January 2019. The exemption request was initially submitted to a Member State on 20 October 2018 and was submitted to the Committee with significant delay on 15 January 2019.	<p>Due to delays in receiving the kits, veterinarians will lack essential medicine and equipment for spring 2019, which is a particularly sensitive period for goats' health (parasites, diarrhea...)</p> <p>Livestock morbidity and mortality has severe impacts on the nutritional status of vulnerable people, especially children. Without this source of essential protein they risk increased levels of malnutrition and other health concerns.</p>

17	Food security and agriculture	NGO	Distribution and consumption equipment, including bowls, cups, tricycles, stainless steel churns, hygiene tools, water tanks	Exemption request approved by Committee on 29 January 2019. The exemption request was initially submitted to a Member State on 20 October 2018 and was submitted to the Committee with significant delay on 15 January 2019.	Without this equipment, children will not have access to yoghurt and other milk products that is essential for their dietary diversity. The lack of dietary diversity in DPRK, including lack of protein and essential vitamins and minerals, contributes to high rates of malnutrition. Projects such as this that provide children with supplementary foods are essential to prevent more children becoming malnourished.
18	Food security and agriculture	NGO	Greenhouses and gardening equipment, including tunnel greenhouses, gardening tools, sprayers, seeds	Exemption request submitted to a Member State on 20 October 2018; still pending.	Without these items, kindergartens will not be able to grow and harvest vegetables, which are essential to provide children with an adequate diet during the lean season. Young children rely on food provided at kindergarten; without this they risk not receiving adequate nutrition and face the risk of malnutrition due to lack of adequate, nutritious food.
19	Food security and agriculture	NGO	Equipment and tools for the micro-scale project for people living with disabilities.	Exemption request approved by the Committee on 30 January 2019. The exemption request was submitted to Member State on 12 October 2018 and to the Committee with significant delay on 3 January 2019.	The activity is delayed by more than nine months. Self-help group of people living with disabilities are waiting to start their livelihood activities.
20	Nutrition	NGO	Milk processing equipment including pasteurizer, cream separator, butter machine, storage tank, lactoscan, lab equipment, stainless steel tools and churns, detergent, gloves and clothes.	Exemption request approved by the Committee on 24 July 2018. The exemption request was initially submitted to a Member State on 20 April 2018 and submitted to the Committee on 12 June 2018.	Materials delivered end of November 2018, a delay of six months. Milk processing activities will not begin until 2019, with impacts on the nutrition status of affected children who rely on the supplementary milk to increase their dietary diversity and prevent malnutrition.

21	Disaster Risk Reduction	NGO	Raw material (cement, doors, iron rod, sanitary ware, poly propylene pipe, Hollow iron rod for hand rail, water tap and window etc.) for the refurbishment of community building (safe shelter)	Exemption request approved by the Committee on 30 January 2019. The exemption request was submitted to Member State on 12 October 2018 and to the Committee with significant delay on 3 January 2019.	The activity is delayed by more than nine months. Community is not well equipped to mitigate impacts of future disasters as do not have access to community safe shelter
22	Disaster Risk Reduction	NGO	Raw material (cement and gabions) for the rehabilitation of canal embankment	Request for exemption submitted to Member State on 12 October 2018; application is under review.	The proposed canal embankment rehabilitation would mitigate the impact of future natural hazards (flood) and save the life of persons with disabilities and community. Without this project, vulnerable people are at risk of future floods.

Source: Letter from the UN Country team to the Panel of Experts on the Impact of Sanctions on Humanitarian Operations in DPRK, 14 December 2018; updated on 31 January 2019.

Annex 87 : Humanitarian-sensitive items prohibited under sectoral sanctions in resolution 2397 (2017)

Category	HS Code	Comment
Hand-tools for agriculture (shovels, hoes, spades, etc...) ²⁰⁸	HS 8201	
Blades for agricultural, horticultural or forestry machines	HS 820840	
Dryers for agricultural products	HS 841931	
Agricultural spraying machines	HS 842449	
Irrigation equipment	HS 842482	
Agricultural machinery for soil preparation (ploughs, seeders, etc...)	HS 8432	
Harvesting and threshing machinery	HS 8433	
Presses, crushers for fruit juices etc...	HS 8435	
Miscellaneous agricultural equipment	HS 8436	
Machines for cleaning and sorting grains and legumes	HS 8437	
Misc. machines for industrial processing of food and drink	HS 8438, excluding HS 843840 (brewery machinery)	This category includes machinery and spare parts for NGO-supported food processing factories.
Tractors & spare tractor parts	HS 8701 for tractors, multiple categories for spare parts	Tractors and spare parts are not only needed for general agricultural support activities, but also for food security efforts at medical clinics and schools.
Agricultural trailers, farm wagons, and carts	HS 8716, multiple subheadings	
Prefabricated greenhouses, animal sheds	HS 940690	Several NGOs have supported the use of greenhouses in the DPRK for private crop cultivation and for food security/nutritional enhancement at medical facilities and schools serving vulnerable populations.

²⁰⁸ Agriculture helps with diversifying diet and thus contributes to alleviating food insecurity, high malnutrition and stunting rates.

Category	HS Code	Comment
Nail clippers	HS 821420	A U.S. NGO shipment of hygiene kits to DPRK medical facilities was seized at customs in transit due to the presence of nail clippers in the kits; it was released after six weeks.
Sterilizers for medical use	HS 841920	
Portable sprayers	HS 842441	Used for malaria control.
UV lamps for disinfection	HS 853939	Used for infection control.
Ambulances	HS 8703, not separately categorized from other vehicles	Needed by many medical care centers due to very poor transportation networks and infrastructure.
Carriages for disabled persons	HS 8713	Several NGOs have worked to provide support for persons with disabilities in the DPRK.
Medical appliances, including ultrasound and cardiograph machines, syringes, needles, catheters, dental and ophthalmic equipment, etc...	HS 9018	Essential to the delivery of medical care.
Mechano-therapy appliances, such as artificial respiration machines	HS 9019	
Orthopedic appliances for persons with disabilities	HS 9021	Several NGOs have worked to provide support for persons with disabilities in the DPRK.
X-ray machines	HS 9022	Essential for TB diagnosis and general medical support. Accessories supporting digitization of images is essential to affordability/sustainability.
Medical, surgical, dental, or veterinary furniture (ie operating tables, hospital beds)	HS 9402	Critical to providing basic care for patients.

Category	HS Code	Comment
Metal water tanks	HS 7309, HS 7310, HS 7611	
Pumps for liquids, including pumps for household water systems	HS 8413	Necessary for providing clean water to households, clinics, etc..., as well as for agricultural purposes.
Water heaters	HS 841911 (gas), 841919 (solar), HS 851610 (electric)	

Machinery for filtering or purifying water	HS 842121, HS 842199 (for parts)	Lack of clean water is a major contributing factor to persistent high rates of diarrhea and malnutrition among vulnerable populations.
Machinery for water well drilling	HS 843049	Critical to long-term sustainable clean-water interventions.

Category	HS Code	Comment
Metal tubes, pipes, pipe fittings, etc...	HS 7303-7307 (iron and steel); separate HS codes for copper, aluminum, lead etc...	Used for the provision of clean water.
Roofing, siding, flooring, roof drainage equipment	Included in HS 730890 (sheet metal) and HS 761090 (aluminum)	After Typhoon Lionrock hit the DPRK in 2016, several NGOs responded by providing roofing materials to help rebuild schools, clinics, etc...
Screws, bolts, nails, staples, etc...	HS 7317-7318	These are common items which are often components of humanitarian-sensitive goods, or part of the packaging thereof
Stoves, ranges, grates, cookers, barbecues, etc...	HS 7321, HS 851660	Clean cook stoves provide significant health and environmental benefits, compared to cooking over open fires.
Iron, steel, or aluminum wire	HS 732620, HS 7605	Has numerous agricultural applications.
Aluminum foil	HS 7607	Has medical/laboratory uses.
Refrigerating and Freezing Equipment	HS 8418, as well as other categories for refrigerated trucks.	Refrigeration and refrigerated trucks are essential for the storage and transportation of certain health-related goods such as vaccines, diagnostic reagents, etc....
Generators	HS 8502	Generators are important as a primary or back-up power supply to medical clinics, etc... which require a steady energy supply.
Electric transformers and inductors	HS 8504	Necessary for the steady supply of electricity to medical and laboratory equipment, as well as for agricultural functions.
Electric storage batteries	HS 8507	Necessary component to storing energy from solar panels and other off-grid energy sources, and used in many humanitarian applications.
Centrifuges and centrifugal dryers	HS 8421	Items in this category are used for medical laboratory diagnostics (including for TB and MDR-TB) as well as water purification. This category also includes biosafety cabinets and HEPA filters, which have important medical applications.

Electrical apparatus (ie switches, relays, fuses, surge protectors)	HS 8536	Necessary for the steady supply of electricity to medical and laboratory equipment.
Solar panels	HS 854140	Important source for off-grid or backup energy supply, including in medical clinics etc...
Insulated wires, cables	HS 8544	Necessary for the steady supply of electricity to medical and laboratory equipment.
Microscopes	HS 9011-9012	Important for medical laboratory diagnostics.
Miscellaneous office supplies (printers and print cartridges, flash drives, barcode scanners, staplers, scissors, binders, paper clips, etc...)	Multiple HS categories	Humanitarian agencies have previously supplied local partners with basic office supplies and equipment to assist with administration, data collection, and patient record-keeping.

Sources: Humanitarian organizations

Note on methodology: The above tables identify humanitarian goods which are prohibited for export to the DPRK under paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017) including those strictly humanitarian in nature, as well as those serving a broader array of purposes including humanitarian (such as electrical equipment necessary for hospitals and clinics). The tables are not intended to be comprehensive.

While these items align with certain categories of goods with the Harmonized System (HS) codes administered by the World Customs Organization, which are referenced in Resolution 2397, there is not always a straightforward correlation between the lay categorization of certain goods and the HS code system. In some cases, even the most specific (six digit) HS codes may still be so broad as to lump humanitarian-sensitive goods together with other types of goods. For example, machinery for water well drilling is included in the same general category as all “boring and sinking machinery.” In other cases, a certain category of humanitarian-sensitive good – spare parts for tractors, for example – may be spread across multiple HS categories.

Additionally, although resolution 2397 (2017) only refers to goods categorized under HS chapters 72-89, a number of humanitarian-sensitive goods that are categorized outside of this range nonetheless contain prohibited components. For example, X-ray machines are categorized under HS 9022, but also incorporate various types of metal and electronic components which could be categorized under HS chapters 72-89. In October 2018, the Committee provided an exemption allowing UNICEF to ship X-ray machines into the DPRK, implying that the Committee would otherwise consider shipment of such devices as prohibited.

Finally, it is noteworthy that some of the IT and communications equipment prohibited for export to the DPRK by paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017) may also have humanitarian uses, including such as USB flash drives, portable media players, mobile phones, radios, etc.

Annex 88 : Member States yet to submit implementation reports pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 2397 (2017)

<p><u>Africa</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Algeria 2. Angola 3. Benin 4. Botswana 5. Burkina Faso 6. Burundi 7. Cabo Verde 8. Cameroon 9. Central African Republic 10. Chad 11. Comoros 12. Congo 13. Côte d'Ivoire (<i>UNSC non-permanent member 2018-2019</i>) 14. Democratic Republic of the Congo 15. Djibouti 16. Kingdom of Eswatini 17. Ethiopia (<i>UNSC non-permanent member 2017-2018</i>) 18. Gabon 19. Gambia 20. Ghana 21. Guinea 22. Guinea-Bissau 23. Kenya 24. Lesotho 25. Liberia 26. Libya 27. Madagascar 28. Malawi 29. Mali 30. Mauritania 31. Mauritius 32. Morocco 33. Mozambique 34. Namibia 35. Niger 36. Nigeria 37. Rwanda 38. Sao Tome and Principe 39. Senegal 40. Seychelles 41. Sierra Leone 42. Somalia 43. South Africa (<i>UNSC non-permanent member 2019-2020</i>) 44. South Sudan 45. Tanzania 	<p><u>Americas</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 50. Antigua and Barbuda 51. Bahamas 52. Barbados 53. Belize 54. Bolivia (<i>UNSC non-permanent member 2017-2018</i>) 55. Brazil 56. Costa Rica 57. Cuba 58. Dominica 59. Ecuador 60. El Salvador 61. Grenada 62. Guyana 63. Haiti 64. Honduras 65. Jamaica 66. Nicaragua 67. Paraguay 68. Peru (<i>UNSC non-permanent member 2018-2019</i>) 69. Saint Kitts and Nevis 70. Saint Lucia 71. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 72. Suriname 73. Trinidad and Tobago 74. Uruguay 75. Venezuela <p><u>Asia</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 76. Afghanistan 77. Bahrain 78. Bangladesh 79. Bhutan 80. Brunei Darussalam 81. Cambodia 82. Indonesia (<i>UNSC non-permanent member 2019-2020</i>) 83. Iran 84. Jordan 85. Kazakhstan (<i>UNSC non-permanent member 2017-2018</i>) 86. Kuwait (<i>UNSC non-permanent member 2018-2019</i>) 87. Kyrgyzstan 88. Lebanon 89. Malaysia 90. Maldives 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 94. Saudi Arabia 95. Syria 96. Timor-Leste 97. Turkmenistan 98. Uzbekistan 99. Yemen <p><u>Europe</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 100. Andorra 101. Azerbaijan 102. Bosnia and Herzegovina 103. Croatia 104. Iceland 105. Ireland 106. Luxembourg 107. Republic of Moldova 108. San Marino 109. Slovenia 110. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia <p><u>Oceania</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 111. Australia 112. Fiji 113. Kiribati 114. Marshall Islands 115. Micronesia 116. Nauru 117. Palau 118. Papua New Guinea 119. Samoa 120. Solomon Islands 121. Tonga 122. Tuvalu 123. Vanuatu
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46. Tunisia 47. Uganda 48. Zambia 49. Zimbabwe	91. Myanmar 92. Nepal 93. Oman	
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Source: The Panel

Annex 89 : Recommendations

To the Security Council:

1. The Panel recommends that future Security Council resolutions stipulate the unit of measurement to be used by Member States in their reporting to the Committee.
2. The Panel recommends that the Security Council, when drafting future financial sanctions measures, take account of DPRK cyberattacks to circumvent the resolutions by illegally generating revenue for the DPRK.
3. The United Nations Secretary-General should request the Secretariat to carry out an assessment of the humanitarian impact of sanctions in the DPRK.

To the 1718 Committee:

4. The Panel recommends that the Committee designate the following vessels for illicit transfers of petroleum products in violation of paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017):

Myong Ryu 1 (IMO number: 8532413), DPRK flag

Song Won (IMO number: 8613360), DPRK flag

Jin Yang 36 (金洋 36), flag unknown

Xing Ming Yang 888 (IMO number 8410847), Sierra Leone

5. The Panel reiterates its recommendation for the designation of Han Hun Il (Edward Han) and also recommends the designation of Yong Kok Yeap and Yazid Merzouk of MKP Malaysia and MKP Zambia.
6. The Panel reiterates its previous recommendations for the designation of Pan Systems²⁰⁹ to be accompanied by the names of all of its front companies (including Glocom, International Golden Services, International Global System) as aliases, for involvement in the financing and sales of arms and related materiel.

Name:	Pan Systems Pte. Ltd. (Pyongyang branch)
A.k.a.:	Wonbang Trading Co., Glocom, International Golden Services, International Global System
Address:	Room 818, Pothonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon district, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Director:	Ryang Su Nyo
Employees:	Pyon Won Gun, Pae Won Chol, Ri Sin Song, Kim Sung Su, Kim Chang Hyok and Kim Pyong Chol
Telephone:	+850-218-111 (ext. 8636)

7. The Panel reiterates its previous recommendation to designate: Ri Ik (Li Ik), Wang Zhi Guo and Ri Ho Nam
8. Information about cyberattacks conducted by RGB as a means to evade financial sanctions and to gain foreign currency should be added to the RGB's entry on the 1718 Sanctions List.

²⁰⁹ See S/2017/742, para. 62 and S/2018/171, page 77 (Recommendation 1).

9. The Panel recommends that the Committee clarify the definition of joint ventures and cooperative entities contained within paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017).

10. The Panel recommends that the Committee include the provision in paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017) to the vessel designation criteria and incorporate it into the existing lists of designated vessels as appropriate.

11. The Panel recommends that the Committee amend the delisting procedure to allow Member States to request delisting on behalf of a vessel owner (for the Panel's proposal for amended procedure for delisting for vessels, see annex 20).

12. In order to allow more effective due diligence by flag States, other Member States and the maritime-related industries, the Committee should consider consolidating the designated vessels in one document. Information provided on the vessels should include the measures obligated under the relevant resolutions such as asset freeze, denial of port entry, and cancellation of registration or vessel services. Incidents of deregistration reported to the Committee should also be reflected to prevent inadvertent re-registration.

13. The Panel recommends that discussions in the Committee on humanitarian exemption requests be time-bound and that focus groups within the Committee meet on a regular basis to examine humanitarian issues with a view to expediting the processing of such requests.

14. In order to alleviate unnecessary burdens on Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations, the Committee should publish a whitelist of certain non-sensitive items used in humanitarian operations that fall under the broad categories of items subject to the sectoral sanctions in paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017) requiring an exemption for humanitarian shipment into the DPRK.

15. The Committee should continue to seek feedback from Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations applying for exemptions under the terms of the IAN No. 7 guidelines and work to streamline and simplify the application process to the extent possible, including by providing greater flexibility regarding the technical specifications of planned shipments, the parties involved, and the frequency of requests/submissions.

To Member States:

16. Flag States should inform the Committee and the Panel of vessels that they deregister.

17. Flag States should monitor the AIS of their vessels and those illegally sailing under their flag to better ensure implementation of the resolutions.

18. Member States should consider introducing a regulatory requirement for P&I insurance and re-insurance companies to include AIS screening and an "AIS switch off" clause in their contracts for at-risk vessels operating in the relevant regions.

19. Member States should consider introducing a regulatory requirement for petroleum product trading, refining and producing companies to include end-use delivery verification measures and AIS screening clause as well as an "AIS switch-off" clause in their contracts.

20. Member States of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) should consider measures to improve information-sharing and maritime regulation enforcement by flag States and other interested parties.
21. Member States should consider introducing legislation to ensure that global and regional banks operating in their jurisdiction introduce AIS screening and vessel due diligence risk assessment clauses into letters of credit, loans and other financial instruments for global and regional commodity traders and brokers trading in oil and petroleum products in higher risk Free on Board (FoB) markets in the affected areas.
22. Member States and relevant international organizations should ensure that the global and regional commodity trading companies and tanker fleets operating under their jurisdictions and in those at-risk segments of the Free on Board (FoB) market and/or engaging in ship-to-ship transfer in the affected international waters adopt contractual language that includes an effective end use delivery verification mechanism.
23. Member States and relevant international organizations should ensure that the global and regional commodity trading companies and tanker fleets operating under their jurisdictions and those segments of the affected Free on Board (FoB) markets assess the AIS history of all vessels they intend to supply with products banned under the resolutions.
24. Member States should ensure that the provisions on financial sanctions in the resolutions take account of DPRK cyberattacks to circumvent the resolutions by illegally generating revenue for the DPRK.
25. Member States should enhance their ability to facilitate robust information exchange on the DPRK's cyberattacks with other governments and with their own financial institutions, to detect and prevent attempts by the DPRK to employ its cyber capabilities for sanctions evasion.
26. Given the pervasive use of accounts in the names of family members to evade sanctions, the Panel recommends that governments provide their financial institutions with a list not only of accredited diplomats, but of their family members to ensure that diplomats do not establish additional bank accounts in their names.
27. The Panel recommends that Member States issue guidance for a single bank to be identified as the only bank that can hold accounts for the DPRK embassy and diplomats and that all others are advised not to hold accounts for DPRK diplomats or their family members.
28. The Panel recommends that Member States advise their financial institutions not to open accounts for DPRK diplomats not accredited to their country and to share information on the financial activities of DPRK diplomats with other Member States where records show there has been financial activity to avoid cross-border circumvention of sanctions.
29. Member States should advise their financial institutions that only closing bank accounts (as opposed to freezing) does not meet the requirements of the resolutions, which stipulate that they must freeze all assets controlled by designated individuals or entities, those operating on their behalf, as well as of any members of the DPRK Government that are engaged in violating or evading of any of the provisions of the resolutions.
30. Member States should offer technical assistance to other Member States to help them strengthen their legal frameworks and related mechanisms to implement the financial provisions in the resolutions, as appropriate and in line with Article 49 of the UN Charter.

31. As part of their implementation of paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017), Member States should request their corporate registries to extract the details of all companies with DPRK national director or shareholders (which de facto violates the ban).

32. Given that joint ventures have violated other provisions of the resolution in addition to paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017), the names of those directors and shareholders should be shared with investigation agencies, financial intelligence units and financial institutions.

33. The Panel recommends that Member States clarify with their national agencies that insurance providers are financial institutions and therefore subject to all of the relevant financial provisions in the resolutions, including the need to freeze assets under the resolutions.
