



1450 Empire Central Dr.
Suite 737
Dallas, TX 75247
800-969-7972
swapa.org


VIA EMAIL

To: Mr. Bob Jordan, Southwest Airlines CEO
Mr. Mike Van de Ven, Southwest Airlines President and COO
Capt. Alan Kasher, Southwest Airlines Vice President of Air Operations
Capt. Lee Kinnebrew, Southwest Airlines Vice President of Flight Operations

The Southwest Airlines Pilots Association (SWAPA) and its Board of Directors address this open letter regarding our Pilots' safety concerns to the Southwest Airlines CEO, President, Vice President of Air Operations, Vice President of Flight Operations, and its Board of Directors.

Since 2017, SWAPA has identified and offered solutions to address numerous systemic failures in our airline's network and scheduling processes that have now escalated out of control. Last summer saw a precipitous rise in Pilot reports to both the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and Southwest Airlines' Fatigue Safety Advisory Group (FSAG). This dramatic increase in safety reports is a direct result of operational mismanagement by the Company that has negatively impacted every front-line employee at Southwest Airlines as well as tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of our guests.

Fatigue numbers have been climbing exponentially since last summer with no meaningful attempts by management to mitigate them. A return to normal flying capacity in June 2021 (using comparative data from 2017-2019 and excluding 2020 due to COVID) saw more than a 200% increase in fatigue rates. The situation only grew worse from there, with rates up 350% in August and September and over 600% in October. Management took a "wait and hope" approach, but reality struck with January and February rates doubling and March hitting another staggering 330% increase. April is already setting fatigue records.



Fatigue, both acute and cumulative, has become Southwest Airlines' number-one safety threat.




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The many negative impacts of fatigue are well-documented — impaired judgement, lack of concentration, reduced in-flight attention, and heightened emotional activity leading to poor cognitive processing, along with decreased reaction time and slower hand-eye coordination, to name a few¹. Our primary job as Pilots is identifying and capturing errors in order to break the error chain, but our ability to do so is compromised when we are fatigued. SWAPA Pilots are tasked with, and pride themselves on, making safety their highest priority. Over the last 12 months, our Pilots have filed an ever-increasing number of ASAP reports showing errors that can be directly correlated to fatigue.


SWAPA Pilots are the most productive Pilots in the world and they go above and beyond to provide each of our guests a safe and efficient experience. Continued and deliberate deficiencies in the management of our network and Pilot scheduling have destroyed our efficiency, and now even safety is becoming untenable.

The consequences of management’s failure to invest in operational support of our crews are that our Pilots have been unable to obtain hotel rooms for proper rest following excessive reassignments and the resultant delays. Hold times with Crew Scheduling to obtain a reassignment regularly exceed an hour or more, further extending their duty days. Last year, SWAPA presented the VP of Flight Operations with more than 100 cases where Company records showed that Pilots were not provided with the federally mandated minimum rest opportunity, yet there has been no corrective action taken to date. The Company has failed to uphold its joint responsibility to comply with FAR 117 rest requirements.

Our antiquated scheduling processes and technology simply can’t handle the complexities of today’s network. CEO Bob Jordan and President Mike Van de Ven have both gone on record saying that our Pilots should be able to fly what they signed up for, yet reassignment rates have remained at record highs for months on end. During April 1-3, more than half of our Pilots didn’t fly their originally assigned schedule each day. Reassignment rates this year are routinely in the range of 30% to 50% after climbing as high as 85% late last year. Since last summer, our Pilots have lost more than 18,000 days off when the Company forced them to work on a day when they weren’t previously scheduled.



Southwest is selling flight schedules months out only to subsequently draw them down, adding further to our Pilots' schedule chaos and our guests' displeasure. The root cause is not the sheer number of flights, however, but instead the mismanagement of connecting crews to airplanes. This constant failure leads to delays, resulting in more reassignments. Duty limits are then exceeded, which beget further reassignments and the cycle spins beyond the control of our out-of-date scheduling systems. Our airline must stop using our Pilots inefficiently. Crew Scheduling's whipsaw methods during normal operations day-in and day-out have driven our Pilots to their limit.



The original “Midway Meltdown” in January 2014 shook our airline to its core, but earlier this year (February 2-4), Southwest had nearly twice as many cancellations per day and our leadership never even acknowledged that failure. We’re now experiencing a MDW Meltdown-type event almost monthly. Southwest Airlines management has accepted “normalization of drift” within its operation. What is accepted by our leadership as normal today would never have been acceptable five, 10, or 50 years ago.

How far will Southwest “normalize drift” and continue to allow unacceptable risk to enter the decision matrix? How long will fatigue rates and risk continue to rise? At what point will our Pilots be unable to break the error chain?

SWAPA Pilots will continue to do everything in their power to make sure our guests reach their destinations safely, but it is incumbent upon Southwest to support them with a safe work environment and efficient scheduling processes.

Immediate action to address Southwest’s scheduling failures is imperative.

The SWAPA Board of Directors

¹ *Bourgeois-Bougrine et al., 2003; Jackson and Earl, 2006; Petrilli et al., 2006; Drury et al., 2012; O'Hagan et al., 2018*