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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF UNION COUNTY, ARKANSAS
CIVIL DIVISION 6

STATE OF ARKANSAS, *ex rel.*
TIM GRIFFIN, ATTORNEY
GENERAL

PLAINTIFF

v.

Case No. 70CV-23- 135

TIKTOK INC.; TIKTOK PTE.
LTD.; BYTEDANCE INC.; and
BYTEDANCE LTD.

DEFENDANTS

COMPLAINT

COMES NOW, the State of Arkansas, *ex rel.* Tim Griffin, Attorney General (“the State”), for its Complaint against TikTok Inc., TikTok Pte. Ltd., ByteDance Inc., and ByteDance Ltd. (“Defendants”) and states the following:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This is a consumer protection action brought to redress and restrain violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“ADTPA”), Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-101, *et seq.*, under which the State seeks an order for an injunction, imposing civil penalties, restitution, and other equitable relief the State is entitled to against Defendants.

2. TikTok says its platform is all about “making space for joy.”¹ But the more TikTok videos consumers view, and the more content that they share, the more highly sensitive data TikTok learns about them—their interests, their locations, the types of phones they have, the apps

¹ *What's Next 2023 Trend Report*, TIKTOK (Dec. 19, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3Jrppj9>.

on their phones, who their contacts are, the content they create, their facial features, their voice prints, and even “where [their] eyes are looking on [their] phone[s].”²

3. While TikTok vacuums up reams of this highly sensitive and personal information about Arkansas consumers, it deceives and misleads them about the risks the app routinely poses to their data.

4. TikTok and its algorithm are owned by ByteDance Ltd., a Chinese company subject to Chinese law, including laws that mandate secret cooperation with intelligence activities of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC” or “China”).

5. The Chinese Government and Communist Party have a demonstrated interest in “leveraging private sector data – including foreign data and that of firms like ByteDance – to grow its stores and become the world’s most data-rich power.”³ China can use TikTok user data to spy on, blackmail, and coerce TikTok users, serve them propaganda, further develop China’s artificial intelligence capabilities, or for any number of other purposes that serve China’s national security and economic interests, at the expense of Arkansas consumers.⁴ China applies its laws as the Chinese Communist Party sees fit—whenever and wherever it sees fit—and there is no meaningful recourse for any individual or any company to refuse its demands.

6. China’s data and cybersecurity regimes are not about privacy, they are about control. Thanks to a wave of recent Chinese national security, cybersecurity, and data security laws and regulations, “[t]here will be no secrets. No VPNs. No *private* or encrypted messages. No

² A. Thomas, *Cotton issues TikTok warning, cites national security concerns*, N.W. ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Nov. 22, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3H2o2qu>.

³ Rachel Lee, et al., *TikTok, ByteDance, and their ties to the Chinese Communist Party*, at 23, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTERFERENCE THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA (Mar. 14, 2023).

⁴ *Id.*; Marco Rubio & Mike Gallagher, Op-Ed: *TikTok, time’s up. The app should be banned in America*, THE WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2022), <https://wapo.st/3ugJyjq>; MEM. FROM JOHN K. COSTELLO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR INTEL. & SEC., OFF. OF INTEL. & SEC., THROUGH ROB BLAIR, DIRECTOR, OFF. OF POL’Y & STRATEGIC PLAN., TO THE SEC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PROPOSED PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO TIKTOK PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 13942, at 2 (Sept. 17, 2020), <https://bit.ly/3VJ1Vt9> (“Commerce Department Memorandum”).

anonymous online accounts. No trade secrets. No confidential data. Any and all data will be available and open to the Chinese government.”⁵

7. TikTok tells Arkansas consumers that their data is protected by comprehensive company protocols and practices, including rigid access controls managed by a U.S.-based security team. TikTok says it has never given the Chinese Government access to that data, and that it never would. TikTok says that none of this data is subject to Chinese law, and that Chinese law has nothing to do with TikTok. TikTok bends over backwards to downplay its involvement with its Chinese parent company and the “China association.”

8. TikTok’s public statements and omissions paint a picture for Arkansas consumers that there is minimal risk of the Chinese Government and/or Communist Party, which controls the government, accessing and exploiting their data.⁶ These statements are false, deceptive, and misleading.

9. The highly sensitive data that TikTok collects from Arkansas consumers is accessible by individuals and entities subject to Chinese law and China’s oppressive regime, including but not limited to laws requiring cooperation with China’s national intelligence institutions and cybersecurity regulators. Chinese State and Communist Party officials have interpreted Chinese law as applying to any data in which China has a national intelligence or security interest, no matter where the data is located.

⁵ The China Law Blog, *China Cybersecurity: No Place to Hide*, HARRIS BRICKEN (Oct. 11, 2020), <https://bit.ly/3E2Gzkm>.

⁶ *Chinese Communist Party*, BRITANNICA (Oct. 24, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3haNejG>; see also CONST. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, pmbl. (Nov. 20, 2019), <https://bit.ly/3FER8LD> (“We the Chinese people of all ethnic groups will continue, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, to uphold the people’s democratic dictatorship . . .”).

10. Further, recent and current versions of TikTok’s privacy policy state that it may share all the data it collects with its parent company, ByteDance, “or other affiliate of our corporate group,” and that “certain entities within our corporate group,”⁷ many of whom who are subject to Chinese law, have access to U.S. data.

11. TikTok has stored U.S. user data, including Arkansas consumers’ data, on servers owned and operated and/or hosted by Chinese companies subject to Chinese law.

12. TikTok also misleads Arkansas consumers by failing to disclose specifically in its U.S. privacy policy that its parent company, ByteDance, or certain other affiliates of its corporate group, are located in China.

13. This omission is unconscionable and deceptive to Arkansas consumers, who cannot know when they read and consent to the privacy policy the truth that their data may be shared with individuals and entities subject to Chinese laws.

14. TikTok’s omission of China in its U.S. privacy policy, the link to which is included in TikTok’s pages on the App Store and Google Play Store, is also unconscionable and deceptive to Arkansas consumers, because it does not comply with Apple’s or Google’s requirements for application developers to be transparent with how and where users’ data is used and accessed.

15. TikTok also deceives Arkansas consumers about the level of influence and control exercised by its parent company, ByteDance, over TikTok and its operations.

16. TikTok claims its independence from ByteDance through various means, but evidence shows that ByteDance exercises significant influence and control over TikTok.

17. ByteDance’s influence and control over TikTok is significant because ByteDance cooperates closely with, and is influenced by, the Chinese Government and Communist Party.

⁷ *TikTok Privacy Policy*, TIKTOK (last updated Mar. 21, 2023), <https://bit.ly/3fsbUnd>.

18. Thus, in addition to denying the application of Chinese law to TikTok's U.S. user data, including Arkansas consumers' data, TikTok also downplays the influence and pressure that the Chinese Communist Party may bring to bear on entities and individuals subject to Chinese law who have access to that data, further placing the data at risk.

19. TikTok thus routinely exposes Arkansas consumers' data, without their knowledge, to access and exploitation by the Chinese Government and Communist Party.

20. The Chinese Government and Communist Party have demonstrated the intent and willingness to deceive public institutions,⁸ and to investigate, surveil, harass, and intimidate individuals outside of China, including in the United States.⁹

21. TikTok's parent company, ByteDance, has admitted to using data gathered through TikTok to surveil Americans.¹⁰

22. Arkansas Governor Sarah Huckabee Sanders declared in the State's Executive Order 23-06 on January 10, 2023: "It is the position of this administration to undertake strong and prudent measures to protect the information and communications systems used by state entities, public primary and secondary schools, cities and counties, and public safety organizations from harm to prevent both unauthorized access and exploitation of the critical data stored within and traveling through those systems."¹¹

⁸ Compl., *United States v. Simon Saw-Teong Ang*, No. 5:20-MJ-5006 (W.D. Ark. May 8, 2020), ECF No. 1; Bill Bowden & Jaime Adame, *Ex-USA professor sentenced to year in prison for lying about Chinese patents*, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (June 17, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3FdGcyL>.

⁹ Compl., *United States v. Fan "Frank" Liu, et al.*, No. 22-MJ-257 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2022), ECF No. 1, <https://bit.ly/3ulEw5a>.

¹⁰ C. Duffy, *TikTok confirms that journalists' data was accessed by employees of its parent company*, CNN (Dec. 22, 2022), <https://cnn.it/3T7aY75>; C. Kang, *ByteDance Inquiry Finds Employees Obtained User Data of 2 Journalists*, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2022), <https://nyti.ms/4209Ful>; E. Baker-White, *Exclusive: TikTok Spied on Forbes Journalists*, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3T2DWoB>.

¹¹ Ark. Exec. Order No. 23-06, *Executive Order to Protect State Information and Communications Technology from the Influence of Adversarial Foreign Government*, GOV. SHS (Jan. 10, 2023), <https://bit.ly/3kWJIM5> ("AR EO 23-06").

23. As such, and in recognition of the clear threat posed by TikTok and ByteDance to the State of Arkansas, Governor Sarah Huckabee Sanders prohibited “the installation of, connection to, or use of TikTok on any state network or state-issued information or communications technology device.”¹²

24. The State of Arkansas likewise has a responsibility to protect *all* consumers in this State from TikTok’s and ByteDance’s deception. TikTok is a wolf in sheep’s clothing. As long as TikTok is permitted to deceive and mislead Arkansas consumers about the risks to their data, those consumers and their privacy are easy prey.

25. The State of Arkansas seeks a permanent injunction to compel TikTok to cease its false and deceptive statements and omissions about the risk of access to and exploitation of consumers’ content and data by the Chinese Government and/or Communist Party.

26. The State of Arkansas seeks an order compelling TikTok to remove and destroy all data and content collected from Arkansas consumers based on TikTok’s unconscionable, false, and deceptive acts and practices.

27. The State of Arkansas further seeks civil penalties in light of TikTok’s unconscionable, false, and deceptive conduct, which has harmed and continues to harm Arkansas consumers.

28. For compensation for services to investigate and prosecute Defendants’ violations of the ADTPA, the Attorney General is also entitled to all expenses reasonably incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this suit, including, but not limited to, expenses for expert witnesses, attorney’s fees, and costs. Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-113(e).

29. The State of Arkansas demands a jury trial.

¹² *Id.*

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

30. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-104 and the common law of the State of Arkansas.

31. Defendants operate a social media application and platform that has transacted business in the State of Arkansas within the applicable statute of limitations. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-4-101. Defendants have availed themselves of the benefit of transacting business in Arkansas by the marketing, sale, and operation of a well-known social media and advertising network.

32. Venue is proper under Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-88-104, 4-88-112, and the common law of the State of Arkansas.

33. Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-104 empowers the Attorney General “to file an action . . . for civil enforcement” of the ADTPA. *Id.*

34. Specifically, the Attorney General is authorized to seek “an injunction prohibiting any person from engaging in any deceptive or unlawful practice,” *id.*, or any “such orders or judgments as may be necessary to . . . [p]revent the use or employment . . . of any prohibited practices,” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-113(a)(1).

35. The Attorney General is also empowered to seek restitution, damages, and civil penalties, not to exceed \$10,000 for each violation of the ADTPA. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-88-104 and 4-88-113(a)(2)(A),(3).

36. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction to hear this dispute and is further authorized to award “all expenses reasonably incurred in the investigation and prosecution of [this] suit[], including, but not limited to, expenses for expert witnesses” and “attorney’s fees and costs.” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-113(e).

37. “Neither the State of Arkansas, its officers, nor its agencies are required to give security” for the payment of costs and damages for any party wrongfully enjoined. Ark. R. Civ. P. 65(c).

III. PARTIES

38. Plaintiff is the State of Arkansas, *ex rel.* Tim Griffin, Attorney General. Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-88-104 and 4-88-113, the State may seek civil enforcement of the ADTPA.

39. Defendant TikTok Inc. is a for-profit entity incorporated in the State of California, which operates a social media application and platform known as “TikTok.” TikTok Inc. is headquartered at 5800 Bristol Pkwy, Culver City, CA, 90230-6696. TikTok Inc. has a valuation of at least \$50–75 billion. TikTok Inc. made nearly \$4 billion in revenue in 2021 and an estimated \$10–12 billion in 2022.

40. Defendant TikTok Pte. Ltd is a related corporate entity, which is headquartered at 8 Marina View, #43–00, Asia Square Tower 1, Singapore 018960. This related corporate entity is nominally listed on the Apple App Store, Google Play Store, and Microsoft Store.

41. Defendant ByteDance Inc. is a for-profit entity incorporated in the State of Delaware. ByteDance is headquartered at 250 Bryant St, Mountain View, CA, 94041.

42. Defendant ByteDance Ltd. is a multinational internet technology holding company and is the parent company of TikTok Inc., TikTok Pte. Ltd., and ByteDance Inc. ByteDance Ltd. is headquartered in Room 503 5F, Building 2, 43 North Third Ring West Road, Beijing, 100086 China and registered in the Cayman Islands at C/O Vistra (Cayman) Limited, P. O. Box 31119, Grand Pavilion, Hibiscus Way, 802 West Bay Road, Grand Cayman, KY1 – 1205. ByteDance Ltd. is valued at more than \$400 billion. ByteDance Ltd. reported \$58 billion in revenue in 2021.

IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

a. What TikTok Is

43. TikTok is a social media platform that centers on short videos created and uploaded by users and often set to music. TikTok is available as an application to download on smartphones and tablets, and most TikTok users interact with the platform through an application. Users can download the TikTok application from the Apple App Store, the Google Play Store, or the Microsoft Store. TikTok was the most downloaded app globally in 2022.¹³

44. TikTok users register and create a profile to access the platform. In doing so, TikTok users answer a few questions about themselves and provide some user information, including their birthdays and contact information.

45. When Arkansas consumers use the TikTok platform, TikTok automatically collects their “IP address, geolocation-related data, unique device identifiers, browsing and search history . . . and Cookies.”¹⁴

46. TikTok also collects other information about users’ phones, including their “user agent, mobile carrier, time zone settings, identifiers for advertising purposes, model of [their] device, the device system, network type, device IDs, [their] screen resolution and operating system, app and file names and types, keystroke patterns or rhythms, battery state, audio settings and connected audio devices.”¹⁵

47. TikTok also collects users’ biometric information, including faceprints and voiceprints.

¹³ D. Curry, *Most Popular Apps (2023)*, BUSINESSOFAPPS (Feb. 28, 2023), <https://bit.ly/3ZVgGen>.

¹⁴ *TikTok Privacy Policy*, *supra* note 7, 8.

¹⁵ *Id.*

48. TikTok tracks Arkansas consumers across their devices and across the internet. Specifically, when users “log-in from multiple devices, [TikTok] will be able to use [their] profile information to identify [their] activity across devices. [TikTok] may also associate [them] with information collected from devices other than those [they] use to log-in to the Platform.” Further, TikTok collects information from third-party websites like Cerebral, which admits to sending health information of its patients to TikTok, and says that its,

service providers and business partners may link [users’] contact or account information with [their] activity on and off [the TikTok] Platform across all [their] devices, using [their] email or other log-in or device information. [TikTok’s] service providers and business partners may use this information to display advertisements on [the TikTok] Platform and elsewhere online and across [their] devices tailored to [their] interests, preferences, and characteristics.¹⁶

49. If Arkansas consumers consent, TikTok also collects their phone’s contacts, precise GPS location, and information from other social media accounts or login services if users link them to TikTok or use them to sign up for TikTok.

50. A report from privacy researcher Felix Krause found that TikTok can collect copious amounts of information about users who visit third-party websites through TikTok’s in-app browser. Specifically, his report finds that TikTok injects JavaScript into these third-party websites that allow TikTok to collect information about everything a user does on that website, including “every keystroke” entered.¹⁷ The code thus allows TikTok to capture additional highly personal information about consumers, including, but not limited to, passwords and credit card information.¹⁸

¹⁶ *Id.*; E. Roth, *Cerebral admits to sharing patient data with Meta, TikTok, and Google*, THE VERGE (Mar. 11, 2023), <https://bit.ly/3ZJbOJw>.

¹⁷ Felix Krause, *iOS Privacy: Announcing In.AppBrowser.com - see what JavaScript commands get injected through an in-app browser*, FELIX KRAUSE (Aug. 18, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3Uve3wJ>.

¹⁸ *Id.*

51. TikTok has been caught on more than one occasion evading statutes and rules designed to protect users' data. In 2019 TikTok, formerly known as Musical.ly, settled Federal Trade Commission allegations that it violated the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act.¹⁹ In 2020, the *Wall Street Journal* reported that TikTok violated Google policies by collecting Android users' unique device identifiers to track them online "without allowing them to opt out."²⁰

b. TikTok Misleads Arkansas Consumers about the Risk of the Chinese Government or Communist Party Accessing and Exploiting their Data

52. TikTok misleads Arkansas consumers about the risk of the Chinese Government, or the Chinese Communist Party which controls the Government, accessing and exploiting their data.

53. First, TikTok falsely states: "None of our data is subject to Chinese law."²¹

54. Second, TikTok downplays the influence and control exercised over it by its parent company, ByteDance, while ByteDance is significantly influenced by, and cooperates closely with, the Chinese Government and Communist Party.

55. The combined purpose and effect of these statements is to paint a picture for Arkansas consumers that their data is not at risk of access and exploitation by the Chinese Government or Communist Party.

56. On the contrary, and by TikTok's own admission, although currently stored in the United States and Singapore, U.S. user data, including Arkansas consumers' data, can be and is accessed by Chinese citizens, including individuals in China, working for a company based in China, and founded and led by Chinese citizens, all of whom are subject to Chinese law.

¹⁹ Press Release, *Video Social Networking App Musical.ly Agrees to Settle FTC Allegations That it Violated Children's Privacy Law*, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Feb. 27, 2019), <https://bit.ly/3BdNYeN>.

²⁰ K. Poulsen & R. McMillan, *TikTok Tracked User Data Using Tactic Banned by Google*, WSJ (Aug. 11, 2020), <https://on.wsj.com/3F5nVaR>.

²¹ *Statement on TikTok's content moderation and data security practices*, TIKTOK (Oct. 24, 2019), <https://bit.ly/3hm2QRe>.

57. TikTok’s recent and current versions of its privacy policy also permit TikTok to share U.S. user data, including Arkansas consumers’ data, with its parent company, ByteDance, or “other affiliate of our corporate group” or “certain entities within our corporate group.”²² ByteDance and certain other affiliates of TikTok are located in China, and led by Chinese citizens located in China, all of whom are subject to Chinese law. Further, at least one of those affiliates, Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited, is partly owned by a Chinese State-owned enterprise, which grants the Chinese Government and Communist Party significant influence over that entity. In order to downplay the role and importance of this entity, ByteDance renamed this company from “Beijing ByteDance Technology Limited,” its name since 2012, to its current name “Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited in 2022.”²³

58. Although TikTok states it is in the process of moving “protected” U.S. user data, which includes Arkansas consumers’ data, to an Oracle cloud in the United States, it is not clear what data will be deemed “protected.” TikTok also still currently and for some years has stored that data on other systems in the U.S. and Singapore. At least until October 2020, some U.S. data was stored on servers owned and operated by ByteDance, a company subject to Chinese law, and pursuant to a contract with Alibaba, a company also subject to Chinese law.

59. Chinese law requires Chinese citizens, and individuals and entities in China to cooperate with national intelligence work undertaken by the Chinese Government and/or Chinese Communist Party, and grants regulators broad authority to access private networks, communication systems, and facilities to conduct invasive inspections and reviews.

²²*Id.*

²³ Alexei Oreskovic, *ByteDance releases first public update to corporate structure since 2020, days before U.S. lawmakers grill TikTok CEO about China ties*, FORTUNE (Mar. 21, 2023), <https://bit.ly/3zadTm8>.

60. TikTok's privacy policy applicable to U.S. users also fails to disclose to Arkansas consumers that their data may be shared with entities and individuals in China who are subject to Chinese law.

61. TikTok's privacy policy previously informed consumers that the individuals and entities that it could share data with were located in China.

62. According to public reporting, TikTok eliminated any reference to China from its U.S. privacy policy sometime in 2019 or thereafter, even though the entities with which the policy stated it may share Arkansas users' data did not change location.²⁴

63. TikTok has updated its *European* privacy policy to clearly state that it permits individuals outside of Europe, including China, to access European user data.²⁵ TikTok has made no such update to its U.S. privacy policy, which applies to Arkansas consumers, explicitly informing them that their data is accessed by individuals and entities in China.

64. By omitting this reference to China, TikTok is painting a false picture for Arkansas consumers that, although their data could once be shared with individuals and entities in China who are subject to Chinese law, that is no longer the case.

65. By omitting this reference to China, TikTok is also painting a false picture for Arkansas consumers that it complies with Apple's and Google's requirements for application developers to be available on the App Store and the Google Play Store. Pursuant to those requirements, all application developers must provide consumers with complete and transparent information about how and where their data is accessed and used. TikTok's U.S. privacy policy does not.

²⁴ D. Carroll, *Is TikTok a Chinese Cambridge Analytica data bomb waiting to explode?*, QUARTZ (May 7, 2019), <https://bit.ly/3zDuAqO>.

²⁵ E. Fox, *Sharing an Update to Our Privacy Policy*, TIKTOK (Nov. 2, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3uivRAs>.

66. Further, contrary to TikTok’s public statements, TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, exerts significant influence and control over TikTok and its operations.

67. ByteDance is subject to significant influence by, and cooperates with, the Chinese Government and Communist Party.

68. Whether by the operation of law or the influence of the Chinese Government and Communist Party apparatus, or both, any data or information accessed by Chinese citizens or individuals or entities within China, is subject to Chinese law and is at risk of access and exploitation by the Government and/or Communist Party.

69. That risk is not speculative. It is based on straightforward readings of Chinese law, assessments by a bipartisan array of U.S. government officials and agencies, and analysis by experts familiar with, among other things, Chinese law and technology policy.

70. TikTok’s public statements ignore or obfuscate this risk, misleading Arkansas consumers about the ability of China’s Government and Communist Party to access and exploit their sensitive personal information.

c. Chinese Law Requires Chinese Nationals and Individuals and Entities in China to Cooperate with National Intelligence Activities and Grants the Chinese Government Broad Authority to Access Private Networks, Communications, and Facilities

71. Chinese law requires Chinese citizens, and individuals and organizations or entities in China to cooperate with “national intelligence work” and grants Chinese Government and Communist Party officials broad, invasive authority to, among other things, access private networks, communications systems, and facilities to conduct inspections and reviews. These laws are broad, open-ended, and inscrutably applied. Moreover, there is no independent judiciary in China that operates outside the control of the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, there is no meaningful mechanism in China to resist these demands.

72. Laws including, but not limited to, the National Security Law, Cybersecurity Law, and National Intelligence Law are part of “an interrelated package of national security, cyberspace, and law enforcement legislation” that “are aimed at strengthening the legal basis for China’s security activities and requiring Chinese and foreign citizens, enterprises, and organizations to cooperate with them.”²⁶

73. China’s National Security Law places “the responsibility and duty to safeguard national security” on all “[c]itizens of the People’s Republic of China, all State bodies and armed forces, all political parties and people’s organizations, *enterprises*, undertakings, organizations and all other social organizations.”²⁷

74. The National Intelligence Law expounds on this responsibility, requiring all organizations and Chinese citizens to “cooperate with national intelligence efforts,” and permitting national intelligence institutions to collect information, question organizations and individuals, and take control of facilities and “communication[] tools.”²⁸

75. Specifically, the National Intelligence Law provides that “[a]ll organizations and citizens shall support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts in accordance with law, and shall protect national intelligence work secrets they are aware of.”²⁹

²⁶ M. Scot Tanner, *Beijing’s New National Intelligence Law: From Defense to Offense*, LAWFARE (July 20, 2017), <https://bit.ly/3fXfB4A> (referring to laws addressing “Counterespionage (2014), National Security (2015), Counterterrorism (2015), Cybersecurity (2016), and Foreign NGO Management (2016), as well as the Ninth Amendment to the PRC Criminal Law (2015), the Management Methods for Lawyers and Law Firms (both 2016), and the pending draft Encryption Law and draft Standardization Law”); see also M. Haldane, *What China’s new data laws are and their impact on Big Tech*, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 1, 2021), <https://bit.ly/3zM0jX3> (describing later enacted Data Security Law and Personal Information Protection Law as being “built on the groundwork laid by the Cybersecurity Law”); W. Zheng, *Big data expert takes over as China’s new cybersecurity chief*, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 27, 2019), <https://bit.ly/3t03fLR>.

²⁷ NATIONAL SECURITY LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 11, STANFORD (2015), <https://stanford.io/3sScPjX> (“NAT’L SEC. LAW”) (emphasis added).

²⁸ NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, arts. 7, 17, STANFORD (2017), <https://stanford.io/3sScPjX> (“NAT’L INTEL. LAW”).

²⁹ NAT’L INTEL. LAW, art. 7.

76. Article 14 provides that “[n]ational intelligence work institutions lawfully carrying out intelligence efforts may request that relevant organs, organizations, and citizens provide necessary support, assistance, and cooperation.”³⁰

77. Article 16 provides that these institutions “may enter relevant restricted areas and venues; may learn from and question relevant institutions, organizations, and individuals; and may read or collect relevant files, materials or items.”³¹

78. Article 17 provides that “[a]s necessary for their work, the staff of national intelligence work institutions may, in accordance with relevant national provisions, have priority use of, or lawfully requisition, state organs’, organizations’ or individuals’ transportation or communications tools, premises and buildings”³²

79. Against this backdrop are numerous laws and regulations designed to form a comprehensive cybersecurity regime. The “chief engineer at the [Ministry of Public Security’s] Cybersecurity Bureau,” Guo Qiquan, described the scheme as intended to “cover every district, every ministry, every business and other institution, basically covering the whole society. It will also cover all targets that need [cybersecurity] protection, including all networks, information systems, cloud platforms, the internet of things, control systems, big data and mobile internet.”³³

80. In the words of one firm with experience working in China, under this plan:

No information contained on any server located within China will be exempted from this full coverage program. No communication from or to China will be exempted. There will be no secrets. No VPNs. No private or encrypted messages. No anonymous online accounts. No trade secrets. No confidential data. Any and all data will be available and open to the Chinese government.³⁴

³⁰ NAT’L INTEL. LAW, art. 14.

³¹ NAT’L INTEL. LAW, art. 16.

³² NAT’L INTEL. LAW, art. 17.

³³ Zheng, *supra* note 23.

³⁴ The China Law Blog, *supra* note 4.

81. These laws and regulations include, but are not limited to, China’s Cybersecurity Law and Data Security Law.

82. “China’s Cybersecurity Law lays the foundation for a cybersecurity review of network products and services, also known as the Cybersecurity Review Regime.”³⁵

83. The Cybersecurity Law applies broadly to, among others, “network operators,” which can encompass not only “telecommunications or internet service providers (ISPs)” but also “anyone who uses [information communication and technology] systems.”³⁶

84. Article 28 of China’s Cybersecurity Law requires these “network operators” to cooperate with national intelligence activities, as well as criminal investigations. Specifically, Article 28 provides that, “Network operators shall provide technical support and assistance to public security organs and national security organs that are safeguarding national security and investigating criminal activities in accordance with the law.”³⁷

85. Article 49 further provides that “network operators shall cooperate with cybersecurity and informatization departments and relevant departments in conducting implementation of supervision and inspections in accordance with the law.”³⁸

86. The Cybersecurity Law applies even more stringent requirements and oversight on organizations deemed “critical information infrastructure operators.”

87. For example, Article 35 provides that “[c]ritical information infrastructure operators purchasing network products and services that might impact national security shall

³⁵ CSIS Briefs, *How Chinese Cybersecurity Standards Impact Doing Business in China*, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Aug. 2, 2018), <https://bit.ly/3DupnTq>.

³⁶ *Id.*

³⁷ CYBERSECURITY LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 28, Stanford (2017) (“CYBERSECURITY LAW”), <https://stanford.io/3T5wes8>.

³⁸ CYBERSECURITY LAW, art. 49.

undergo a national security review organized by the State cybersecurity and informatization departments and relevant departments of the State Council.”³⁹

88. Article 37 further provides that:

[c]ritical information infrastructure operators that gather or produce personal information or important data during operations within the mainland territory of the People’s Republic of China, shall store it within mainland China. Where due to business requirements it is truly necessary to provide it outside the mainland, they shall follow the measures jointly formulated by the State cybersecurity and informatization departments and the relevant departments of the State Council to conduct a security assessment; where laws and administrative regulations provide otherwise, follow those provisions.⁴⁰

89. Since the law’s enactment, authorities have issued regulations expanding its scope.⁴¹

90. Exactly what type of organization may be designated a “critical information infrastructure operator” is not always clear. However, authorities’ use of the applicable procedures indicates that tech companies and platforms could be subject to an invasive cybersecurity review, and that authorities’ power to require a company to take any action pursuant to a cybersecurity review—even if justified only after the fact—could have significant consequences for its business.⁴²

91. For example, in July 2021, just a few days after the Chinese ride-hailing service Didi Global Inc. (NYSE: DIDI) raised billions of dollars in a June 30, 2021, New York Stock Exchange IPO, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), a “merged party-state institution

³⁹ CYBERSECURITY LAW, art. 35.

⁴⁰ CYBERSECURITY LAW, art. 37.

⁴¹ B. Guo & B. Li, *China Issued New Measures for Cybersecurity Review in 2022*, WHITE & CASE (Feb. 8, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3E2fRs8>; J. Gong & C. Yue, *China Updated its Cybersecurity Review Regime*, BIRD & BIRD (Jan. 13, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3fyWRrI>.

⁴² A. Huld, *Critical Information Infrastructure in China – New Cybersecurity Regulations*, THE CHINA BRIEFING (Aug. 30, 2021), <https://bit.ly/3T8SOjH>; Guo & Li, *supra* note 38; Gong & Yue, *supra* note 38; M. Shi, et al., *Forum: Unpacking the DiDi Decision*, DIGICHINA, STANFORD (July 22, 2022), <https://stanford.io/3T4ZAqM>

listed under the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,”⁴³ initiated a cybersecurity review of Didi. The CAC further “suspended new user registrations during the review” and ordered the removal of the company’s applications from app stores in China.⁴⁴ Although the law and related regulations did not explicitly apply to Didi in advance of the review, CAC published a list of proposed new rules applying the cybersecurity review requirements to Didi *after* it began its review.⁴⁵ CAC eventually imposed a \$1.2 billion fine on the company.⁴⁶

92. The Data Security Law applies in China as well as to “data handling activities outside the mainland territory of the PRC [that] harm the national security, the public interest, or the lawful rights and interests of citizens or organizations of the PRC.”⁴⁷

93. Article 24 provides that “[t]he State is to establish a data security review system and conduct national security reviews for data handling activities that affect or may affect national security.”⁴⁸

94. Further, Article 31 applies “[t]he provisions of the Cybersecurity Law . . . to the outbound security management of important data collected or produced by critical information infrastructure operators operating within the mainland territory of the PRC.”⁴⁹

95. Under the Data Security law, even “a company holding data belonging to a US citizen stored on a Chinese server may not be able to legally hand over that data to the US government without proper approval.”⁵⁰ More specifically, under Article 35, whether operating

⁴³ J. Horsley, *Behind the Façade of China's Cyber Super-Regulator*, DIGICHINA, STANFORD (Aug. 8, 2022), <https://stanford.io/3FPAOYy>.

⁴⁴ *Id.*; Guo & Li, *supra* note 38.

⁴⁵ J. Horsley, *Behind the Façade of China's Cyber Super-Regulator*, <https://stanford.io/3FPAOYy>.

⁴⁶ *Id.*

⁴⁷ DATA SECURITY LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 2, DIGICHINA STANFORD (2021) (“DATA SECURITY LAW”), <https://stanford.io/3U5ijjm>.

⁴⁸ DATA SECURITY LAW, art. 24.

⁴⁹ DATA SECURITY LAW, art. 31.

⁵⁰ Haldane, *supra* note 23.

critical information infrastructure or not, companies “are prohibited from providing any data *stored* in China, regardless of the data’s sensitivity level and whether or not the data was initially *collected* in China, to any foreign judicial or law enforcement agency without the prior approval of the relevant [Chinese Government] authorities.”⁵¹

96. Experts across a variety of fields, including law, national security, and technology agree that Chinese laws require any individuals or entities in China or otherwise subject to Chinese law to cooperate with the Chinese Government and/or Communist Party, including China’s intelligence and security services, and that there is no meaningful way to resist these requirements, or any pressure brought to bear by the Communist Party.⁵² TikTok and ByteDance leadership and employees who are Chinese citizens or who are located in China are no exception; they are subject to the oppressive Chinese regime, including to these laws and requirements.

97. China’s legal system also does not uphold American principles of a “rule of law” or individual rights, but rather a “rule by the Party” and State and Party interests. The rule by the Chinese Communist Party principle extends as far as its interests do, including to other countries.

⁵¹ R. Junck, et. al., *China's New Data Security and Personal Information Protection Laws: What they Mean for Multinational Companies*, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM (Nov. 3, 2021), <https://bit.ly/3NBc20c> (emphasis added); DATA SECURITY LAW, art. 35.

⁵² See, e.g., K. Kitchen, *The Chinese Threat to Privacy*, AM. FOREIGN POL’Y COUNCIL, Issue 30, at 23 (May 2021), <https://bit.ly/3A0bDyX>; W. Knight, *TikTok a Year After Trump’s Ban: No Change, but New Threats*, WIRED (July 26, 2021), <https://bit.ly/3FWu2QW>, (quoting K. Frederick, Director of the Tech Policy Center at the Heritage Foundation); K. Frederick, et al., *Beyond TikTok: Preparing for Future Digital Threats*, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Aug. 20, 2020), <https://bit.ly/3WFF3fg>; J. Barnes, *White House Official Says Huawei Has Secret Back Door to Extract Data*, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2020), <https://nyti.ms/3udZHpH> (quoting former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien); A. Kharpal, *Huawei says it would never hand data to China’s government. Experts say it wouldn’t have a choice*, CNBC (Mar. 4, 2019), <https://cnb.cx/3Gmno6T> (quoting NYU Professor of Law Emeritus and Director of the U.S.-Asia Law Institute J. Cohen and M. Thorley, postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Exeter with experience building a business in China); F. Ryan, et al., *TikTok and WeChat: Curating and controlling global information flows*, AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POL’Y INST., 36 (Sept. 1, 2020), <https://bit.ly/3hm26vq>; D. Harwell & T. Romm, *Inside TikTok: A culture clash where U.S. views about censorship often were overridden by the Chinese bosses*, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2019), <https://wapo.st/3WPMX5S> (quoting Alex Stamos, Director of the Stanford Internet Observatory).

98. The Chinese Government and Communist Party have a history and practice of seeking to apply these laws and others extraterritorially. China can use these laws and others to force TikTok or ByteDance employees, subject to Chinese law, to hand over consumers' data in secret.

99. China has also established more than one hundred (100) covert police stations around the world, including in the United States, and used extra-legal means to target and place pressure on Chinese citizens located abroad.⁵³

100. Further, Chinese law enforcement and intelligence services interpret Chinese law as applying to any data, wherever it is stored, if China has a national security interest in that data. Chinese authorities have forced even refugees from China to hand over data stored outside of China to Chinese authorities under such circumstances, citing Chinese law.

101. In sum, any data stored *or accessed* by individuals or entities subject to Chinese laws, as written and as interpreted and applied by Chinese Government and Communist Party officials, is not safe from access by the Chinese Government and/or Communist Party.

d. TikTok Misleads Arkansas Consumers about the Risk of the Chinese Government Accessing their Data by Claiming that U.S. User Data is Not Subject to Chinese Law

102. TikTok claims that U.S. user data, which includes Arkansas consumers' data, is not subject to Chinese law.

103. TikTok states on its website: "None of our data is subject to Chinese law."⁵⁴

104. TikTok representatives have made the same or similar public statements in multiple other forums. For example, in a 2020 interview, TikTok's former Global Security Officer Roland

⁵³ *110 Overseas: Chinese Transnational Policing Gone Wild*, SAFEGUARD DEFENDERS (Sept. 2022), <https://bit.ly/42HdwgD>.

⁵⁴ *Statement on TikTok's content moderation and data security practices*, TIKTOK (Oct. 24, 2019), <https://bit.ly/3hm2QRe>.

Cloutier stated, “Neither TikTok data, nor use, occurs in China, so therefore [the Chinese government] does not have jurisdiction over the platform. It’s pretty simple. The data doesn’t even exist in China.” When the interviewer asked, “So if I understand this 100% correctly, because TikTok user data is stored in the United States, none of that is subject to Chinese law, right?” Mr. Cloutier answered, “Correct.”⁵⁵

105. In response to questioning about the potential for the Chinese government to access U.S. user data, a common TikTok refrain has been to state that U.S. user data is stored in the United States and Singapore.⁵⁶ Now, it is to point to future plans to house U.S. data on an Oracle cloud in the United States.⁵⁷

106. In response to questioning about the potential for the Chinese government to access U.S. user data, TikTok also frequently refers to its data security practices⁵⁸ and access controls administered by a U.S.-based subsidiary.⁵⁹

107. TikTok also has repeatedly claimed it has not shared information with the Chinese government and would not do so if asked.⁶⁰

108. Each of these statements is deceptive. Neither TikTok’s data storage practices, nor its data security practices, negate the applicability of Chinese law to that data or to the individuals

⁵⁵ J. Stone, *TikTok’s security boss makes his case. Carefully.*, CYBERSCOOP (Aug. 27, 2020), <https://bit.ly/3WRU9OL>.

⁵⁶ See David Rubenstein, *Interview of TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew*, YouTube (Mar. 3, 2022) at 13:09-13:55, <https://bit.ly/3WRUJMr>; Stone, *supra* note 51; see also, e.g., *Statement on TikTok’s content moderation and data security practices*, TIKTOK (Oct. 24, 2019), <https://bit.ly/3hm2QRe> (“We store all TikTok US user data in the United States, with backup redundancy in Singapore. Our data centers are located entirely outside of China, and none of our data is subject to Chinese law.”).

⁵⁷ *Written Testimony of Shou Chew, Chief Executive Officer, TikTok, Inc., Before the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce*, 118th Cong., 1st Session (March 23, 2023), available at <https://bit.ly/3JNXNnd>.

⁵⁸ See, e.g., S. Rodriguez, *TikTok insiders say social media company is tightly controlled by Chinese parent ByteDance*, CNBC (June 25, 2021), <https://cnb.cx/3NYLiXS>.

⁵⁹ Chew Testimony

⁶⁰ See *Statement on the Administration’s Executive Order*, TIKTOK (Aug. 7, 2020), <https://bit.ly/3G5m2wZ>; D. McCabe, *Lawmakers Grill TikTok Executive About Ties to China*, New York Times (Sept. 14, 2022), <https://nyti.ms/3DP0kdW> (quoting TikTok’s “chief operating officer” Vanessa Pappas: “And we’ve also said under no circumstances would we give that data to China.”).

and entities who are subject to Chinese law and have access to that data, or the risk of access by the Chinese Government or Communist Party.

109. TikTok's assertions that it has not shared information with the Chinese government and would not do so if asked are also deceptive because they do not negate the applicability of Chinese law to that data or to the individuals and entities who are subject to Chinese law and have access to that data, or the risk of access by the Chinese Government or Communist Party.

110. As one expert told the *Washington Post*, the location of data *storage* is "pretty much irrelevant." Rather, "[t]he leverage the government has over the people who have access to that data, that's what's relevant."⁶¹

111. Chinese State and Communist Party officials also have interpreted Chinese law as applying to data no matter where it is located if China has a national security or intelligence interest in that data.

112. There is very real and serious bipartisan concern across the U.S. government and in many states that the Chinese Government and/or Communist Party may access TikTok's U.S. content and user data. That includes Arkansas content and user data.

113. Officials from across the political spectrum and branches of the government with knowledge and expertise in security matters have expressed alarm that because individuals and entities subject to Chinese law have access to U.S. user data, including ByteDance and its employees, if the Chinese Government or Communist Party asked for U.S. user data, the company has no meaningful way to refuse.⁶²

⁶¹ D. Harwell & T. Romm, *Inside TikTok: A culture clash where U.S. views about censorship often were overridden by the Chinese bosses*, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2019), <https://wapo.st/3WPMX5S> (quoting Alex Stamos, Director of the Stanford Internet Observatory) (cleaned up).

⁶² Letter from The Hons. Tom Cotton and Charles Schumer, U.S. Senate to J. Maguire, Acting Director of National Intelligence, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (Oct. 23, 2019), <https://bit.ly/3DP1rdC>;

114. The Chinese Government and Communist Party can use access to U.S. user data, including Arkansas consumers' data, to, among other things, develop artificial intelligence technologies and assist China in its espionage efforts.⁶³

115. The Chinese Government and Communist Party can also use access to TikTok's U.S. user data, including Arkansas consumers' data, to conduct surveillance on U.S. citizens and residents. In December 2022, ByteDance admitted that employees and leaders of its internal audit function in China and the U.S. had obtained TikTok user data of American journalists and used it to monitor them. The data included information about the journalists' locations, which ByteDance employees attempted to use to sniff out company whistleblowers who dared to speak out to the press. Statements from TikTok spokespersons confirmed that the internal audit employees had had the power to access U.S. user data, calling the episode an "egregious abuse" of their authority. ByteDance's confirmation of the surveillance activity followed public denials that such monitoring occurred or was even possible.⁶⁴

116. Bipartisan concerns about data security persist. As recently as November 2022, Senator Mark Warner (Democrat, Virginia) called TikTok "an enormous threat." He said, "[TikTok] is a massive collector of information, oftentimes of our children. They can visualize even down to your keystrokes. So, if you're a parent and you got a kid on TikTok, I would be very,

Commerce Department Memorandum, at 2; Letter from Mark R. Warner, Chairman, and Marco Rubio, Vice Chairman, U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Intel. to the Hon. Linda Khan, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm'n (July 5, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3WQB8fK>; L. Feiner, *FBI is 'extremely concerned' about China's influence through TikTok on U.S. users*, CNBC (Nov. 15, 2022), <https://cnb.cx/3Vk2nOw>.

⁶³ Commerce Department Memorandum, at 20.

⁶⁴ E. Baker-White, *TikTok Parent ByteDance Planned to Use TikTok to Monitor the Physical Location of Specific American Citizens*, FORBES (Oct. 20, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3UIRFR9>; Duffy, *supra* note 9; Kang, *supra* note 9; Baker-White, *Exclusive: TikTok Spied on Forbes Journalists*, *supra* note 9.

very concerned.”⁶⁵ Senator Tom Cotton (Republican, Arkansas) called the platform “one of the most massive surveillance programs ever, especially on America’s young people.”⁶⁶

117. Multiple U.S. government agencies and state governments have banned the use of TikTok on government and state-owned devices and networks over these very security concerns, and multiple whistleblowers have called into question Defendants’ claims about the security of U.S. user data.⁶⁷

118. On January 10, 2023, the State of Arkansas, recognizing the need to protect public information systems and “to prevent both unauthorized access and exploitation of the critical data stored within and traveling through those systems”⁶⁸ prohibited the use of TikTok “on any state network or state-issued information or communications technology device.”⁶⁹

⁶⁵ J. Mueller, *Warner: Parents should be ‘very concerned’ about TikTok*, THE HILL (Nov. 20, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3FIQ4Mp>.

⁶⁶ I. Fisher, *TikTok is a ‘massive surveillance’ tool for China, senators warn as Biden admin weighs proposal to spare app from U.S. ban*, FORTUNE (Nov. 20, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3EOLivs>.

⁶⁷ M. Meisenzahl, *US government agencies are banning TikTok, the social media app teens are obsessed with, over cybersecurity fears—here’s the full list*, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 25, 2020), <https://bit.ly/3G6nsaK>; AR EO 23-06; T. Gill, *Arkansas joins list of states to ban TikTok on state-owned devices*, FAYETTEVILLE FLYER (Dec. 20, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3YAPksX>; The Associated Press, *Wisconsin governor bans popular TikTok app on state phones*, CBS NEWS MINNESOTA (Jan. 12, 2023), <https://cbsn.ws/3ZYbnL8>; A. Malik, *New Jersey and Ohio are the latest states to ban TikTok on government devices*, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 10, 2023), <https://tcrn.ch/3ZR4YkW>; The Associated Press, *Maryland is the latest state to ban TikTok in government agencies*, NPR (Dec. 7, 2022), <https://n.pr/41YRaGV>; Letter from Sen. Josh Hawley to the Hon. Janet Yellen, Secretary of the U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (Mar. 7, 2023), <https://bit.ly/3l6XgV6>; D. Harwell, *A former TikTok employee tells Congress the app is lying about Chinese spying*, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2023), <https://wapo.st/3FjKERy>.

⁶⁸ AR EO 23-06, at 2.

⁶⁹ *Id.* at 2–3.

e. TikTok’s U.S. User Data, Including Arkansas Consumers’ Data, Is Accessible By, and May be Shared with, Individuals and Entities Subject to Chinese Law Requiring Cooperation with National Intelligence Institutions and Cybersecurity Regulators

119. The bipartisan concerns about the risk to TikTok users’ data are not speculative, because individuals and entities who are subject to Chinese law, including those working for ByteDance, may and do access TikTok’s U.S. user data, including Arkansas consumers’ data.⁷⁰

120. In litigation against the U.S. government, TikTok’s former Global Chief Security Officer Roland Cloutier declared,

TikTok relies on China-based ByteDance personnel for certain engineering functions that require them to access encrypted TikTok user data. According to our Data Access Approval Process, these China-based employees may access these encrypted data elements in decrypted form based on demonstrated need and only if they receive permission from our U.S.-based team.⁷¹

121. In April 2020, TikTok inferred that employees across the globe, “including [in] China” have “access to user data from the EU and US,” stating that its “goal” was “to minimize” that access.⁷²

122. In a June 2022 letter to multiple U.S. Senators, TikTok acknowledged that “[e]mployees outside the U.S., including China-based employees, can have access to TikTok U.S. user data subject to a series of robust cybersecurity controls and authorization approval protocols overseen by our U.S.-based security team.”⁷³

123. According to audio recordings of internal TikTok meetings reported by *Buzzfeed*, engineers in China had access to US data between September 2021 and January 2022, at the very least. Despite a TikTok executive’s sworn testimony in an October 2021 Senate hearing that a ‘world-renowned, US-based security team’ decides who gets access to this data, nine statements by eight different employees describe

⁷⁰ Letter from Shou Zi Chew, CEO, TikTok to the Hon. Marsha Blackburn, Roger Wicker, John Thune, Roy Blunt, Ted Cruz, Jerry Moran, Shelley Moore Capito, Cynthia Lummis, and Steve Daines, U.S. Senate (June 30, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3hqccLL> (“June 2022 Letter to U.S. Senators”); Cloutier Decl. ¶ 10, Doc. 15-2, *TikTok Inc. v. Trump*, No. 20-cv-02658 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2021).

⁷¹ Cloutier Decl. ¶ 10, Doc. 15-2, *TikTok Inc. v. Trump*, No. 20-cv-02658 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2020).

⁷² R. Cloutier, *Our approach to security*, TIKTOK (Apr. 28, 2020), <https://bit.ly/3A3AIOM>.

⁷³ June 2022 Letter to U.S. Senators, at 3.

situations where US employees had to turn to their colleagues in China to determine how US user data was flowing. US staff did not have permission or knowledge of how to access the data on their own, according to the tapes.⁷⁴

Further, “a member of TikTok’s Trust and Safety department in a September 2021 meeting” said, “‘Everything is seen in China,’” and in another meeting, another employee “referred to one Beijing-based engineer as a ‘Master Admin’ who ‘has access to everything.’”⁷⁵

124. TikTok has not committed to ending all data access by individuals or entities subject to Chinese law to U.S. user data, including Arkansas consumers’ data. For example, during a hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Senator Rob Portman (Republican, Ohio) asked TikTok’s Chief Operating Officer (“COO”) Vanessa Pappas: “Will TikTok commit to cutting off all data and data flows to China, China-based TikTok employees, ByteDance employees, or any other party in China that might have the capability to access information on US users?” Ms. Pappas did not make that commitment.⁷⁶

125. In June 2022, TikTok stated that “100% of US user traffic is now being routed to Oracle cloud infrastructure” in the United States.⁷⁷ Eventually, TikTok “expect[s] to delete US users’ protected data from our own systems and fully pivot to Oracle cloud services located in the US,” though TikTok continues to use its own “U.S. and Singapore data centers for backup.”⁷⁸

126. TikTok claims this arrangement with Oracle will resolve all security concerns. But U.S. user data is still stored on its systems—TikTok only began deleting legacy U.S. user data from those systems in March 2023 and does not expect to complete that process until later this

⁷⁴ E. Baker-White, *Leaked Audio From 80 Internal TikTok Meetings Shows that US User Data has been Repeatedly Accessed from China*, BUZZFEED NEWS (June 17, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3u8Eb5N>.

⁷⁵ *Id.*

⁷⁶ Full Committee Hearing, *Social Media’s Impact on Homeland Security*, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFS., at 2:38:55 (Sept. 14, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3P5kuWd> (“Senate Hearing”); B. Fung, *TikTok won’t commit to stopping US data flows to China*, CNN (Sept. 14, 2022) <https://cnn.it/3G5beis>; McCabe, *supra* note 54.

⁷⁷ June 2022 Letter to U.S. Senators, at 4.

⁷⁸ *Id.*

year.⁷⁹ CEO Shou Zi Chew also did not deny in a March 23, 2023 hearing before the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce that U.S. data can still be accessed by employees in China and admitted engineers in China have access to “global data”.⁸⁰

127. Additionally, according to Oracle, currently that company “is not providing anything ‘other than our own security’ for TikTok.”⁸¹ Oracle has “absolutely no insight one way or the other” into U.S. user data access, and whistleblowers allege flaws in TikTok’s data security plans with Oracle and its “superficial” access controls.⁸²

128. In addition to TikTok’s statements that some China-based employees may access unencrypted U.S. user data, which includes Arkansas consumers’ data, TikTok’s privacy policy permits “certain entities within our corporate group” to access U.S. data.⁸³ Similarly, prior to March 21, 2023, TikTok’s privacy policy stated it may share U.S. data with ByteDance “or other affiliate of our corporate group.”

129. ByteDance and any affiliates and their employees who are located in China or are Chinese citizens are subject to Chinese law and the oppressive Chinese regime, including but not limited to laws requiring cooperation with national intelligence institutions and cybersecurity regulators.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ *Written Testimony of Shou Chew, Chief Executive Officer, TikTok, Inc., Before the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 118th Cong., 1st Session (March 23, 2023), available at <https://bit.ly/3JNXNnd>.*

⁸⁰ *Video of Testimony of Shou Chew, Chief Executive Officer, TikTok, Inc., Before the U.S. Committee on Energy and Commerce, 118th Cong., 1st Session, (Mar. 23 2023), available at <https://bit.ly/40ncoNI> (“Testimony”)*

⁸¹ *Baker-White, TikTok Parent ByteDance Planned to Use TikTok to Monitor the Physical Location of Specific American Citizens, supra note 58.*

⁸² *Id.* (cleaned up); *Hawley Letter, supra note 61*; *D. Harwell, A former TikTok employee tells Congress the app is lying about Chinese spying, supra note 61.*

⁸³ *TikTok Privacy Policy, supra note 7.*

⁸⁴ *See, e.g., TikTok owner to ‘strictly’ obey China’s tech takeover law, BBC NEWS (Aug. 31, 2020), <https://bbc.in/3UqgfX8>; S. Hoffman, The U.S. and China Data Fight is Only Getting Started, FOREIGN POLICY (July 22, 2021), <https://bit.ly/3UwxI00> (“The Chinese Communist Party has absolute power over China-based companies, which its laws—like the 2021 Data Security Law, 2015 National Security Law, 2016 Cybersecurity Law, or 2017 National Intelligence Law—have reinforced.”); PATRICIA M. FIGLIOLA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46543, TIKTOK: TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW AND ISSUES, at Summary (Dec. 4, 2020), <https://bit.ly/3G8YGGX> (“ByteDance, like all*

130. Because ByteDance is subject to Chinese law, and TikTok’s privacy policy expressly permits TikTok to share data with ByteDance, TikTok’s statements that Chinese law does not apply to that data are false and deceptive.

131. Another affiliate of TikTok is Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited, formerly known as Beijing ByteDance Technology Co. Ltd., a China-based subsidiary of ByteDance.⁸⁵

132. Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited is subject to Chinese law, as well as to direct control and influence by the Chinese Government/Communist Party by virtue of state ownership.

133. Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited is 1% owned by a Chinese State-owned enterprise, specifically “Wangtou Zhongwen (Beijing) Technology, which is owned by the China Internet Investment Fund (controlled by the Cyberspace Administration of China and the Ministry of Finance), China Media Group, and Beijing Municipality Cultural Investment Development Group.”⁸⁶ The state entity also sits on the board of Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited.

134. In China, even a minority stake in a private company “makes any state-invested enterprise subject to Beijing’s influence and control, no matter how small its investment,” because “Chinese law already affords the state privileged status in the governance of any corporation for which it is a shareholder.”⁸⁷

technology companies doing business in China, is subject to Chinese laws that require companies operating in the country to turn over user data when asked by the government.”).

⁸⁵ June 2022 Letter to U.S. Senators, at 6.

⁸⁶ *Id.*; U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, 2021 REPORT TO CONGRESS, at 135-36, n. † (Nov. 2021) (“2021 Commission Report”), <https://bit.ly/3gOwYFf>.

⁸⁷ 2021 Commission Report, at 9.

135. TikTok states that employees of Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited “are restricted from U.S. user database access.”⁸⁸

136. However, when questioned directly about whether Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited is an “affiliate” of TikTok with whom TikTok may share user data under its privacy policy, TikTok has not provided clear answers.⁸⁹

137. Regardless of whether TikTok affirmatively states that the terms “affiliate” or “certain entities within our corporate group” applies to Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited, with which it is under common control by ByteDance, for purposes of its privacy policy, a reasonable Arkansas consumer would understand these references to include Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited.

138. Because Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited is subject to Chinese law, as well as to influence and control by the Chinese Government and Communist Party, to the extent TikTok’s privacy policy permits TikTok to share U.S. user data, including Arkansas consumers’ data, with Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited, TikTok’s statements that Chinese law does not apply to that data are false and deceptive.

139. TikTok’s assertions that U.S. user data are not subject to Chinese law are false and deceptive to Arkansas consumers because they create the false impression that consumers’ data is not at risk of access by the Chinese Government or Communist Party, when entities and individuals who do have access to that data, or with whom the data may be shared according to TikTok’s privacy policy, are subject to Chinese laws, including but not limited to laws requiring cooperation with national intelligence institutions and cybersecurity regulators, and at least in one case are

⁸⁸ June 2022 Letter to U.S. Senators, at 6.

⁸⁹ Press Release, Sen. Ted Cruz, Sen. Cruz to TikTok Official: ‘You Have Dodged the Questions More Than Any Witness I Have Seen in My Nine Years Serving in the Senate,’ (Oct. 26, 2021), <https://bit.ly/3Un3yLL>.

subject to direct influence and control by the Chinese Government and Communist Party. Further, Chinese State and Communist Party officials have interpreted Chinese law as applying to any data in which it has a national intelligence or security interest, no matter where the data is located.

f. TikTok's U.S. User Data Has been Stored on Servers Owned and Operated, and/or Hosted by Entities Subject to Chinese Law

140. As noted above, when questioned about whether the Chinese government may access U.S. user data, TikTok has often stated that U.S. user data, which includes Arkansas consumers' data, is stored in the U.S. and Singapore.⁹⁰

141. These statements are deceptive because they do not disclose that U.S. user data, which includes Arkansas consumers' data, is accessible to and may be shared with individuals and entities in China and otherwise subject to Chinese law. Further, Chinese State and Communist Party officials have interpreted Chinese law as applying to any data in which it has a national intelligence or security interest, no matter where the data is located. TikTok's statements are also deceptive because they do not disclose that at least some of this data is or was, at least as of 2020, located on servers owned and operated by ByteDance or stored with Alibaba cloud—both Chinese companies subject to Chinese laws, including but not limited to laws requiring cooperation with national intelligence institutions and cybersecurity regulators.

142. Specifically, certain data centers used by TikTok in the United States to store U.S. user data, which includes Arkansas consumers' data, at least as of October 2020, housed servers owned and operated by *ByteDance*.⁹¹

⁹⁰ *Statement on TikTok's content moderation and data security practices*, TIKTOK (Oct. 24, 2019), <https://bit.ly/3hm2QRc>; R. Zhong, *TikTok's Chief is on a Mission to Prove it's Not a Menace*, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2019), <https://nyti.ms/3WXmWl0>; C. Porterfield, *U.S. Army Bans Soldiers from Using TikTok*, FORBES (Jan. 2, 2020), <https://bit.ly/3WVOOGj>.

⁹¹ Commerce Department Memorandum, at 16; Cloutier Suppl. Decl. ¶ 8, Doc. 43-2, *TikTok Inc. v. Trump*, No. 20-cv-02658 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2020).

143. In litigation, Mr. Cloutier declared that “ByteDance owns and operates all servers that are stored within the . . . facility” provided by CUA, China Unicom (Americas) Operations Ltd., a company “wholly owned and controlled by a single Chinese entity that is directly owned by the PRC Government.”⁹² Mr. Cloutier also declared that ByteDance had its “own security team monitoring the technical access environment” for those servers.⁹³

144. ByteDance is subject to Chinese Law, including but not limited to laws requiring cooperation with national intelligence institutions and cybersecurity regulators. Chinese State and Communist Party officials also have interpreted Chinese law as applying to any data in which it has a national intelligence or security interest, no matter where the data is located.

145. Additionally, TikTok, at least as of October 2020, contracted with Alibaba cloud for its backup data storage in Singapore.⁹⁴

146. As the Commerce Department has noted, “Alibaba is a Chinese company and, like ByteDance, is similarly beholden to [Chinese] laws that require assistance in surveillance and intelligence operations. Additionally, any Chinese citizens with direct access to the data could be similarly compelled to assist [China’s intelligence and security services].”⁹⁵

147. In 2018, Alibaba was blocked by the U.S. from acquiring a U.S. money transfer company over national security concerns about “the safety of data that can be used to identify U.S. citizens”⁹⁶

148. To state widely to consumers that the data is stored in data centers located in the United States and Singapore, but omit the identity of the owners, operators and/or hosts of the

⁹² *Id.*

⁹³ *Id.*

⁹⁴ Commerce Department Memorandum, at 15; Cloutier Suppl. Decl., Doc. 43-2, at ¶ 8.

⁹⁵ Commerce Department Memorandum, at 15.

⁹⁶ G. Roumeliotis, *U.S. blocks MoneyGram sale to China’s Ant Financial on national security concerns*, REUTERS (Jan. 2, 2018), <https://reut.rs/3WXp2RU>.

servers, paints the false picture for Arkansas consumers that their data is not at risk of access by the Chinese Government or Communist Party, when their data is stored on servers owned and operated and/or hosted by Chinese entities, who are subject to Chinese law, including but not limited to laws requiring cooperation with national intelligence institutions and cybersecurity regulators.

149. TikTok also deceives Arkansas consumers about the storage of their data when it says that it does not store U.S. user data in China and that the data “does not exist” in China.

150. In reality, as shown by an internal document drafted by a member of ByteDance’s Internal Audit team as reported by *Forbes*, even when using data centers located outside China, “it is impossible to keep data that should not be stored in [China] from being retained in [China]-based servers.”⁹⁷

151. Any information stored or retained on servers in China is subject to Chinese law, including but not limited to laws requiring cooperation with national intelligence institutions and cybersecurity regulators.

g. TikTok’s Privacy Policy is Deceptive because it Does Not Disclose that User Data, which Includes Arkansas Consumers’ Data, May Be Shared with Individuals and Entities in China

152. Public reporting shows that prior to sometime in 2019, TikTok’s U.S. privacy policy stated: “We will also share your information with any member of our affiliate group, in China”⁹⁸

153. Until very recently, TikTok’s U.S. privacy policy stated: “We may share all of the information we collect with a parent, subsidiary, or other affiliate of our corporate group.”

⁹⁷ Baker-White, *TikTok Parent ByteDance Planned to Use TikTok to Monitor the Physical Location of Specific American Citizens*, *supra* note 58.

⁹⁸ D. Carroll, *Is TikTok a Chinese Cambridge Analytica data bomb waiting to explode?*, QUARTZ (May 7, 2019) <https://bit.ly/3zDuAqO>.

154. Similarly, as of March 21, 2023, TikTok’s U.S. privacy policy states: “As a global company, the Platform is supported by certain entities within our corporate group, which are given limited remote access to Information We Collect.”⁹⁹

155. TikTok’s U.S. privacy policy further states: “TikTok may transmit your data to its servers or data centers outside of the United States for storage and/or processing. Other entities with whom TikTok may share your data as described herein may be located outside of the United States.”¹⁰⁰

156. Just as in 2019, TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, and other affiliates, are still located in China.

157. However, the word “China” does not appear in the recent and current versions of TikTok’s current privacy policy applicable to U.S. users, including Arkansas consumers.

158. Neither of those versions of TikTok’s U.S. privacy policy have alerted Arkansas consumers to the ability of TikTok to share their data with individuals or entities located in China, or for individuals or entities located in China to access that data.

159. TikTok has updated its *European* privacy policy to clearly state that it permits individuals located in a list of countries outside of Europe, specifically including China, to access European user data.¹⁰¹ Disclosing the individual countries where user data may be accessed arms users with the information needed to fully understand what laws and practices may apply to their data. Without that information, users are left totally in the dark about the consequences of agreeing to a privacy policy, and of consenting to specific data collection practices such as allowing TikTok to collect consumers’ precise GPS location.

⁹⁹ *TikTok Privacy Policy*, *supra* note 7.

¹⁰⁰ *Id.*

¹⁰¹ Fox, *supra* note 22.

160. Although TikTok updated its U.S. privacy policy on March 21, 2023, to include a link to more information about TikTok’s arrangement with Oracle, it still makes no mention of China.

161. Removing the word “China” from these terms creates the deceptive and false impression that although Arkansas consumers’ data was once accessible in or could be shared with individuals in China subject to Chinese law, which is no longer the case. TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew further underlined this impression that individuals in China subject to Chinese law no longer have access in recent testimony. Under direct questioning about data sharing to entities and individuals in China, Chew said only that TikTok “have *cut off* access to U.S. data sets to” Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited.¹⁰² Not only is this an implicit admission that that entity previously had access to U.S. data, it says nothing about other Chinese entities’ access to data going forward.

162. TikTok’s experience in India is particularly instructive. In 2020, the government of India banned TikTok from operating in the country. Nevertheless, three years later, ByteDance and TikTok employees in China *still* have access to Indian users’ data that was previously collected and stored. In other words, despite allegedly no longer collecting additional data from Indian users, ByteDance and TikTok employees in China are still able to use that previously-acquired data.¹⁰³ There is no reason to think that the companies will treat already acquired U.S. data *any* differently. In other words, TikTok is deceiving users to the extent they imply that “cut[ting] off” future access also means preventing access to already acquired U.S. data—that is simply not what TikTok has done with Indian data; it is not what it is doing with U.S. data.

¹⁰² Testimony at 4:47:50–48:50 (emphasis added).

¹⁰³ Alexandra S. Levine, *India Banned TikTok In 2020. TikTok Still Has Access To Years Of Indians’ Data*, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2023), <https://bit.ly/40htBrL>.

163. TikTok also deceives Arkansas consumers because in omitting the word “China” from its privacy policy, which is accessible through its pages on the App Store and the Google Play Store, TikTok fails to comply with Apple’s and Google’s requirements for application developers to appear on the App Store and Google Play Store.

164. Apple makes publicly available the terms and conditions with which all application developers must comply in order to be made available on the App Store, including its developer license agreement.¹⁰⁴ Apple requires application developers to “provide *clear and complete information to users* regarding Your collection, use and disclosure of user or device data in the App Description on the App Store” and “provide a privacy policy . . . explaining Your collection, use, disclosure, sharing, retention, and deletion of user or device data.”¹⁰⁵ Application developers must also comply with the App Store Review Guidelines, which state that the developers “must provide access to information about how and *where* [user] data will be used” and that “[d]ata collected from apps may only be shared with third parties to improve the app or serve advertising.” Further, “[d]ata collected for one purpose may not be repurposed without further consent unless otherwise explicitly permitted by law.”¹⁰⁶

165. Similarly, Google’s Developer Policy Center requires application developers to, among other things, “be transparent in how you handle user data,” “disclos[e your app’s] access, collection, use, handling, and sharing of user data, . . . and limit[] the use of the data to the . . . purposes disclosed.”¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ APPLE DEVELOPER LICENSE AGREEMENT, at 18 (June 6, 2022), <https://apple.co/3H8JnP3>.

¹⁰⁵ *Id.* (emphasis added).

¹⁰⁶ APP STORE REVIEW GUIDELINES § 5.1.2, APPLE (last updated Oct. 24, 2022), <https://apple.co/3XSFIIdO> (emphasis added).

¹⁰⁷ USER DATA, GOOGLE, <https://bit.ly/3FjuR5D> (last visited Mar. 9, 2023).

166. TikTok’s availability on the App Store and Google Play Store signals to Arkansas consumers that TikTok complies with Apple’s and Google’s terms and policies for application developers. But, in its App Description on the App Store and the Google Play Store, TikTok links to its privacy policy, which for some years has made no mention of TikTok’s ability to share user data with individuals and entities in China or those individuals’ and entities’ access to that data, even though TikTok knows that certain affiliates of its corporate group with which it says it may share data are located in China and subject to Chinese law.

167. By omitting this information from its U.S. privacy policy, TikTok is not being “transparent” about what it is doing with Arkansas users’ data. It is not providing “clear and complete information to users” about its “collection, use and disclosure of [their] user or device data,” including but not limited to “how and where [their] data will be used.”

168. TikTok deceives Arkansas consumers who trust when they download the app from the App Store or the Google Play store that the app complies with all of Apple’s and Google’s requirements for application developers. The app does not comply with those requirements.

h. TikTok Deceives Arkansas Consumers about the Risk of the Chinese Government Accessing their Data by Downplaying the Control Exercised by its Parent Company in China, ByteDance, which is Significantly Influenced by, and Cooperates Closely with, the Chinese Government and Communist Party

169. TikTok also deceives Arkansas consumers about the risk of the Chinese Government’s and/or Communist Party’s access to their data by downplaying the significant influence and control that its parent company, ByteDance, has over TikTok. This is an intentional, strategic choice made by TikTok.

170. TikTok documents demonstrate that TikTok’s “messaging” strategy calls for company representatives to “Downplay the parent company ByteDance, downplay the China association, downplay AI.”¹⁰⁸

171. In line with these internal “messaging” documents, TikTok and its representatives are in fact downplaying its parent company in China, ByteDance, and downplaying “the China association.”

172. For example, in a public hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, COO Vanessa Pappas admitted that “ByteDance is founded in China.” but claimed “we do not have an official headquarters as a global company.”¹⁰⁹

173. TikTok’s public statements stress the independence of the company’s leadership from ByteDance. Those statements include, but are not limited to:

“TikTok’s CEO has full autonomy for all decisions about TikTok’s operations.”¹¹⁰

“TikTok is led by its own global CEO, Shou Zi Chew, a Singaporean based in Singapore.”¹¹¹

“TikTok is led by an American CEO, with hundreds of employees and key leaders across safety, security, product, and public policy here in the U.S.”¹¹²

“Since May 2020, TikTok management has reported into the CEO based in the U.S., and now Singapore, who is responsible for all long-term and strategic day-to-day decisions for the business.”¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ C. Stokel-Walker, *Inside TikTok’s Attempts to ‘Downplay the China Association’*, GIZMODO (July 27, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3EV8XnY>.

¹⁰⁹ McCabe, *supra* note 54.

¹¹⁰ E. Baker-White, *Inside Project Texas, TikTok’s Big Answer to US Lawmakers’ China Fears*, BUZZFEED (Mar. 11, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3AU26tD>.

¹¹¹ June 2022 Letter to U.S. Senators, at 5.

¹¹² A. Kharpal, *U.S. is ‘looking at’ banning TikTok and Chinese social media apps, Pompeo says*, CNBC (July 7, 2020), <https://cnb.cx/3Fc3XfL>.

¹¹³ Rodriguez, *supra* note 53.

174. TikTok also asserts its independence from ByteDance control in its content moderation and data security practices.

175. For example, TikTok states that access to U.S. user data, which includes Arkansas consumers' data, is controlled by a "U.S. based security team."¹¹⁴

176. TikTok also states that its "team" responsible for reviewing content "pursuant to our U.S. policies" "is led out of California," and further that "TikTok does not remove content based on sensitivities related to China."¹¹⁵

177. Tik Tok also downplays "the China association" by dismissing Chinese Communist Party presence and influence within ByteDance as unimportant or irrelevant.

178. For example, when asked during a public Senate hearing whether TikTok or ByteDance employ members of the Chinese Communist Party, TikTok's COO Vanessa Pappas did not directly answer the question, stating that no one who "makes a strategic decision at this platform" is a member of the Party.¹¹⁶ When asked whether anyone with access to TikTok's U.S. user data, which includes Arkansas consumers' data, is a member of the Chinese Communist Party, Ms. Pappas said merely that TikTok could not attest to employees' political affiliations.¹¹⁷

179. TikTok's efforts to "downplay the parent company ByteDance" and "downplay the China association" are designed to, and have the effect of, painting a picture for Arkansas consumers that the risk of their data being accessed and exploited by the Chinese Government or the Chinese Communist Party is minimal to nonexistent.

¹¹⁴ June 2022 Letter to U.S. Senators, at 3.

¹¹⁵ *Statement on TikTok's content moderation and data security practices*, TIKTOK (Oct. 24, 2019), <https://bit.ly/3hm2QRe>.

¹¹⁶ Senate Hearing, *supra* note 70, at 3:15:18; E. Baker-White, *No TikTok Leaders have Ties to the Chinese Communist Party, COO Says in Heated Senate Hearing*, FORBES (Sept. 14, 2022), <https://ibit.ly/BoEg>.

¹¹⁷ Senate Hearing, *supra* note 70, at 3:14:24; A. Smith, *GOP senator calls on Yellen to 'ensure' TikTok severs its connections to China*, NBC (Sept. 19, 2022), <https://nbcnews.to/3ixsYJH>.

180. These statements are deceptive, because TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, owns and exercises significant control over TikTok, and because ByteDance has significant connections to, has been significantly influenced by, and cooperates with, the Chinese Government and Communist Party, placing U.S. user data, including Arkansas consumers’ data, at significant risk.

i. ByteDance Exercises Significant Control over TikTok

181. Contrary to its public statements, ByteDance exercises significant control over TikTok.

182. TikTok’s algorithm was created by ByteDance and contains “some of the same underlying basic technology building blocks” as ByteDance’s Chinese version of the app operating in China, known as Douyin.¹¹⁸

183. TikTok’s algorithm still belongs to ByteDance, which declined to sell the technology to a U.S. company.¹¹⁹

184. ByteDance “plays a role in the hiring of key personnel at TikTok.”¹²⁰

185. High-level ByteDance employees have served in dual roles for ByteDance and for TikTok Inc., at least as recently as 2021.

186. In litigation, TikTok disclosed that the “Head of TikTok Inc.,” Vanessa Pappas, was also “the interim head of the global TikTok business for ByteDance Ltd. (‘ByteDance’), TikTok Inc.’s parent company.”¹²¹

¹¹⁸ June 2022 Letter to U.S. Senators, at 4.

¹¹⁹ Z. Xin & T. Qu, *TikTok’s algorithm not for sale, ByteDance tells US*, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 13, 2020), <https://bit.ly/3Uje9HQ>.

¹²⁰ June 2022 Letter to U.S. Senators, at 5; *see also* D. Harwell & E. Dvoskin, *As Washington Wavers on TikTok, Beijing Exerts Control*, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2022), <https://wapo.st/3VjMvLV> (noting that managers in Beijing are “even the final decision-makers on human resources matters, such as whether an American employee can work remotely”).

¹²¹ Pappas Decl. ¶ 1, Doc. 15-3, *TikTok Inc. v. Trump*, No. 20- cv-02658 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2020).

187. Similarly, TikTok’s then-Global Chief Security Officer, Roland Cloutier, also had “responsibilities” working for both TikTok and its corporate parent, ByteDance. Specifically, those “responsibilities include[d] providing cyber risk and data security support for both TikTok Inc. and its corporate parent, ByteDance Ltd.”¹²²

188. In April 2021, TikTok’s current CEO, Shou Zi Chew, was named as CEO of TikTok while also serving as CFO of ByteDance Ltd.¹²³ He reports to the CEO of ByteDance.¹²⁴

189. The LinkedIn profiles of multiple other TikTok employees with a variety of responsibilities, from human resources to engineering, show they simultaneously exercise dual or additional roles at ByteDance.

190. According to a report submitted to the Australian Senate, “reconstruction of the company’s management structure indicates that TikTok leadership report up to their department leads in ByteDance (in addition to or instead of reporting to local TikTok managers), sometimes through ‘dotted’ reporting lines. Through department-specific reporting lines, it appears that ByteDance may be able to exercise significant and granular control over TikTok operations.”¹²⁵

191. According to *Buzzfeed*, as of March 2022, TikTok’s U.S.-based personnel who will have access to TikTok data pursuant to its new arrangement with Oracle “report to middle managers in the United States, who report to a ByteDance executive in China.”¹²⁶

¹²² Cloutier Decl. ¶ 1–2, Doc. 15-2, *TikTok Inc. v. Trump*, No. 20-cv-02658 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2020).

¹²³ *TikTok Names CEO and COO*, TIKTOK (Apr. 30, 2021), <https://bit.ly/3OVyvWh>; R. Mac & C. Che, *TikTok’s CEO Navigates the Limits of His Power*, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2020), <https://nyti.ms/3OT6grk>.

¹²⁴ Video of Testimony of Shou Chew, Chief Executive Officer, TikTok, Inc., Before the U.S. Committee on Energy and Commerce, 118th Cong., 1st Session, (Mar. 23 2023), *available at* <https://bit.ly/40ncoNI>

¹²⁵ Rachel Lee, et al., *TikTok, ByteDance, and their ties to the Chinese Communist Party*, at 42, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTERFERENCE THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA (Mar. 14, 2023).

¹²⁶ Baker-White, *Inside Project Texas*, *supra* note 100.

192. TikTok’s Internal Audit team also reports to ByteDance’s Internal Audit and Risk Control Department, led by an executive located in Beijing.¹²⁷

193. ByteDance’s Internal Audit and Risk Control Department investigates TikTok employees, including those located outside of China.¹²⁸ For example, according to *Forbes*, ByteDance’s Internal Audit team conducted “multiple audits and investigations into [former Global Chief Security Officer Roland] Cloutier” for allegedly steering contracts to friends.¹²⁹ On information and belief, and according to current and former employees who reportedly spoke to *Forbes*, those investigations were “pretextual fishing expeditions designed to find a reason to push him out of the company.”¹³⁰

194. Public reporting demonstrates that multiple former TikTok employees have reported that ByteDance exercises significant control over TikTok’s decision making and operations.

195. According to the *New York Times*, twelve former TikTok and ByteDance employees and executives reported that TikTok’s CEO, Shou Zi Chew, has “limited” decision making power.¹³¹ Rather, they reported, major decisions related to TikTok are made by ByteDance founder Zhang Yiming and other ByteDance officials located in China.¹³²

¹²⁷ E. Baker-White, *A China-Based ByteDance Team Investigated TikTok’s Global Security Chief, Who Oversaw U.S. Data Concerns*, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3uoxblj>.

¹²⁸ *Id.*; Baker-White, *TikTok Parent ByteDance Planned to Use TikTok to Monitor the Physical Location of Specific American Citizens*, *supra* note 58.

¹²⁹ Baker-White, *A China-Based ByteDance Team Investigated TikTok’s Global Security Chief*, *supra* note 115.

¹³⁰ *Id.*

¹³¹ R. Mac & C. Che, *TikTok’s CEO Navigates the Limits of His Power*, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2020), <https://nyti.ms/3OT6grk>.

¹³² *Id.*

196. *Forbes* recently reported that “[a]t least five senior leaders hired to head departments at TikTok in the last two years have left the company after learning that they would not be able to significantly influence decision-making.”¹³³

197. *Forbes* further reported that senior leaders departed TikTok after learning they would be taking direction from ByteDance.

198. One former TikTok employee even reported to *Forbes* that their paycheck showed *ByteDance* as the drawer, not TikTok; another reported their tax returns listed *ByteDance* as their employer.

199. At least some TikTok employees also have ByteDance e-mail addresses and can switch back and forth between the two based on the recipient of their communications.

200. According to *Forbes*, even ByteDance’s own Internal Audit team prepared a “risk assessment . . . in late 2021 [that] found that numerous senior employees felt ‘that themselves and their teams are just ‘figureheads’ or ‘powerless ombudsmen’ who are ‘functionally subject to the control of [China]-based teams.’”¹³⁴

201. *Forbes* also reported that “[e]mployees who worked on product, engineering and strategy at TikTok into 2022—including those on teams handling sensitive U.S. user data—also told *Forbes* that they reported directly into ByteDance leadership in China, bypassing TikTok’s executive suite.”¹³⁵

202. CNBC also reported that former TikTok employees described ByteDance as being “heavily involved” in decision making and operations at TikTok, and that boundaries between the

¹³³ E. Baker-White, *TikTok is Bleeding U.S. Execs Because China is Still Calling the Shots*, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3XTSnNF>.

¹³⁴ Baker-White, *A China-Based ByteDance Team Investigated TikTok’s Global Security Chief*, *supra* note 115.

¹³⁵ Baker-White, *TikTok is Bleeding U.S. Execs Because China is Still Calling the Shots*, *supra* note 121.

two companies are “blurry”.¹³⁶ One employee reported working China’s business hours, in addition to U.S. business hours, in order to be responsive to ByteDance employees working in China.

203. According to current and former employees who reportedly spoke with the *Washington Post*:

China remains [TikTok’s] central hub for pretty much everything Beijing managers sign off on major decisions involving U.S. operations, *including from the teams responsible for protecting Americans’ data* and deciding which videos should be removed. They lead TikTok’s design and engineering teams and oversee the software that U.S. employees use to chat with colleagues and manage their work. They’re even the final decision-makers on human resources matters, such as whether an American employee can work remotely.¹³⁷

204. According to the *Washington Post*, one employee “who works in U.S. content moderation” said, “As I get more senior at the company, I realize China has more control.”¹³⁸

205. TikTok employees in the United States regularly communicate with counterparts in China using ByteDance communication apps.¹³⁹

206. Statements made by 24 former TikTok employees directly to an American journalist confirm that ByteDance is in full control of TikTok. Those statements include:¹⁴⁰

“‘The Chinese execs, they’re in control.’ . . . ‘The American execs are there to smile, look pretty, push away criticism. But ByteDance is still calling the shots behind the scenes.’”

“‘TikTok is an American company on paper. It’s a Chinese company underneath.’”

¹³⁶ Rodriguez, *supra* note 53.

¹³⁷ D. Harwell & E. Dwoskin, *As Washington Wavers on TikTok, Beijing Exerts Control*, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2022), <https://wapo.st/3VjMvLV> (emphasis added).

¹³⁸ *Id.*

¹³⁹ A. Brown & D. Chmielewski, *The Inside Story of TikTok’s Tumultuous Rise—and How it Defeated Trump*, FORBES (May 5, 2021), <https://bit.ly/3XMUov8>.

¹⁴⁰ G. Cain, *How China Got Our Kids Hooked on ‘Digital Fentanyl’*, COMMON SENSE (Nov. 16, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3VLbUhG>.

j. The Chinese Government and Communist Party Exercise Significant Influence over ByteDance

207. The Chinese Government and Communist Party have exerted significant influence over ByteDance, and ByteDance cooperates closely with the Chinese Government and Communist Party.

208. ByteDance has described itself as headquartered in China.¹⁴¹

209. The Chinese Government and/or Communist Party have influenced ByteDance's business decisions, including forcing the company to alter certain business practices, and shutter one business altogether.

210. In 2018, China's state media regulator, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television of the People's Republic of China, forced ByteDance to shut down one of its platforms for "having violated 'social morality.'"¹⁴² As a result of the action by the Chinese Government, ByteDance also hired thousands of moderators with qualifications including "'strong political sensitivity.'"¹⁴³

211. In response to the Chinese government's action, then CEO (and founder) of ByteDance Zhang Yiming issued a public apology, saying that ByteDance's "product took the wrong path" because "content appeared that was incommensurate with socialist core values." In this apology, Yiming traced "a deep-level cause of the recent problems in [ByteDance] [to]: "a weak [understanding and implementation of] 'the four consciousnesses' [of Xi Jinping]; deficiencies in education on the socialist core values; and deviation from public opinion guidance." He pledged, among other things, to "[s]trengthen the work of Party construction, carrying out

¹⁴¹ Rachel Lee, et al., *TikTok, ByteDance, and their ties to the Chinese Communist Party*, at 39, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTERFERENCE THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA (Mar. 14, 2023).

¹⁴² Commerce Department Memorandum, at 9.

¹⁴³ *Id.* at 9 (citing S. Pham, *Why China's Tech Giants are cozying up to the Communist Party*, CNN (Nov. 4, 2018), <https://cnn.it/3OXvAfK>).

education among our entire staff on the ‘four consciousnesses,’ socialist core values, [correct] guidance of public opinion, and laws and regulations, truly acting on the company’s social responsibility” and “[f]urther deepen cooperation with authoritative [official Party] media, elevating distribution of authoritative media content, [and] ensuring that authoritative [official Party] media voices are broadcast to strength.”¹⁴⁴

212. ByteDance soon made good on Zhang Yiming’s promise to cooperate further with “authoritative” media.

On April 25, 2019, ByteDance signed a strategic cooperation agreement with the Ministry of Public Security’s Press and Publicity Bureau in Beijing ‘aiming to give full play to the professional technology and platform advantages of Toutiao and Tiktok in big data analysis,’ strengthen the creation and production of ‘public security new media works,’ boost ‘network influence and online discourse power,’ and enhance ‘public security propaganda, guidance, influence, and credibility,’ among other aspects.”¹⁴⁵

213. The Chinese Government and Communist Party assert significant control over ByteDance’s, and TikTok’s, business decisions in other ways as well. In 2020, when TikTok reportedly was considering a purchase by a U.S. company, the Chinese government expanded its export control restrictions to cover TikTok’s algorithm, making it much more difficult to complete the sale.¹⁴⁶ ByteDance subsequently refused to sell the technology, and TikTok remains in ByteDance’s control.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ D. Bandurski, *Tech Shame in the ‘New Era,’* CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Apr. 11, 2018), <https://bit.ly/3Vidtnj>.

¹⁴⁵ Commerce Department Memorandum, at 11 (quoting K. Everington, *TikTok owners show true colors with communist flag*, TAIWAN NEWS (Aug. 6, 2020), <https://bit.ly/3H4QMP7>).

¹⁴⁶ P. Mozur, et al., *TikTok Deal Is Complicated By New Rules From China Over Tech Exports*, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2020), <https://nyti.ms/3XNyl7E>.

¹⁴⁷ Xin & Qu, *supra* note 109.

214. When news reports suggested that the U.S. government again pushed ByteDance to divest itself of TikTok, the Chinese government again asserted that TikTok’s algorithm is subject to Chinese export controls and said it would oppose the sale of TikTok by ByteDance.¹⁴⁸

215. Like other technology companies in China, pursuant to regulations enacted by the Cyberspace Administration of China, “a merged party-state institution listed under the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,”¹⁴⁹ ByteDance has shared details about its algorithm for Douyin—essentially the Chinese version of TikTok—with the internet regulator.¹⁵⁰

216. According to reporting cited by the Commerce Department, as of August 2020, at least 130 ByteDance employees, including “[m]any” in management positions, were members of the Chinese Communist Party.¹⁵¹

217. “According to September 2020 Chinese reporting, ByteDance established a party branch in October 2014. In April 2017, the Company then established a party committee consisting of party branches in the public affairs, technical support, and compliance operation department groups. According to Chinese press reporting, Bytedance has more party members and party organizations and is more ‘red,’ insiders pointed out, as compared with other Internet [C]ompanies.”¹⁵²

218. According to *Forbes*,

[t]hree hundred current employees at TikTok and its parent company ByteDance previously worked for Chinese state media publications, according to public employee LinkedIn profiles reviewed by *Forbes*. Twenty-three of these profiles

¹⁴⁸ Raffaele Huang, *China Says It Opposes Forced Sale of TikTok*, WSJ (Mar. 23, 2023), <https://on.wsj.com/3ISNEO2>.

¹⁴⁹ J. Horsley, *Behind the Façade of China’s Cyber Super-Regulator*, DIGICHINA, STANFORD (Aug. 8, 2022), <https://stanford.io/3FPAOYy>; A. Liang, *Chinese internet giants hand algorithm data to government*, BBC NEWS (AUG. 16, 2022), <https://bbc.in/3iwBsQZ>.

¹⁵⁰ A. Kharpal, *Chinese Tech Giants Share Details of their Prized Algorithms with Top Regulator in Unprecedented Move*, CNBC (Aug. 15, 2022), <https://cnb.cx/3FI3yI4>.

¹⁵¹ Commerce Department Memorandum, at 7–8 (citing N. Hao, *TikTok’s Parent Company Employs Chinese Communist Party Members in its Highest Ranks*, THE EPOCH TIMES (Aug. 7, 2020), <https://bit.ly/3OWXFfF>).

¹⁵² Commerce Department Memorandum, at 8 (citing Chinese language news sources).

appear to have been created by current ByteDance directors, who manage departments overseeing content partnerships, public affairs, corporate social responsibility and ‘media cooperation.’ Fifteen indicate that current ByteDance employees are also concurrently employed by Chinese state media entities.¹⁵³

219. ByteDance has stated it makes “[h]iring decisions based purely on an individual’s professional capability to do the job. For our China-market businesses, that *includes people who have previously worked in government or state media positions in China.*”¹⁵⁴

220. By downplaying ByteDance and the “China association,” TikTok ignores and dismisses the significance of Communist Party influence on ByteDance and the risk that it poses to consumer data. But the prevalence of the Party throughout private enterprise in China signifies its growing influence.¹⁵⁵ That growing presence and influence is a key feature of Chinese Government and Communist Party policy.¹⁵⁶

221. For example, the Commerce Department noted that internal Communist Party committees “are a mechanism through which Beijing expands its authority and supervision over nominally private or non-governmental organizations, creating different nuances of corporate governance with Chinese characteristics.”¹⁵⁷ Further:

Even if Chinese PRC Law regulates the establishment of Party Committees in foreign invested enterprises (both JVs and fully owned) without requiring governance roles for their members, recent trends in officials’ attitudes — which are oriented toward the demand for more power — indicate accelerating interference by the CCP in corporate activities in the PRC. That suggests that these

¹⁵³ E. Baker-White, *LinkedIn Profiles Indicate 300 Current TikTok and ByteDance Employees Used to Work for Chinese State Media—and Some Still Do*, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3ijFF47>.

¹⁵⁴ *Id.* (emphasis added).

¹⁵⁵ S. Livingston, *The Chinese Communist Party Targets the Private Sector*, CSIS (Oct. 8, 2020), <https://bit.ly/3uiMT1x>; 2021 Commission Report (generally); S. Livingston, *The New Challenge of Communist Corporate Governance*, CSIS (Jan. 15, 2021), <https://bit.ly/3gNPYNH>.

¹⁵⁶ D. Wakabayashi, et al., *In Xi’s China, the Business of Business is State-Controlled*, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2020), <https://nyti.ms/3OVMICB>; L. Wei, *China’s Xi Ramps Up Control of Private Sector: ‘We Have No Choice but to Follow the Party’*, WSJ (Dec. 10, 2020), <https://on.wsj.com/3P0YfAU>.

¹⁵⁷ Commerce Department Memorandum, at 7 (citing J. Laband, *Fact Sheet: Communist Party Groups in Foreign Companies in China*, CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW (May 31, 2018), <https://bit.ly/3HmDbmH>).

positions are not merely symbolic, but rather an eventual source of political pressure around the boardroom.¹⁵⁸

222. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Chinese leaders have called for increasing the role of party committees in private enterprises, to “include giving a company’s internal Party group control over the human resources decisions of the enterprise and allowing it to carry out company audits, including monitoring internal behavior.”¹⁵⁹

223. A September 15, 2020, Opinion issued by the General Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on “Strengthening the United Front Work of the Private Economy in the New Era,” also called for “further strengthen[ing] the Party’s leadership of, and cohesive effect on, private economy practitioners.”¹⁶⁰

224. There is growing evidence that these Communist Party goals are taking root, and that party committees are exerting greater influence over private enterprise in China.¹⁶¹

225. TikTok paints the picture of an independent U.S.-based company, with little to no risk of interference by its Chinese parent company or risk of access to its data by the Chinese Government or Communist Party. These efforts to downplay ByteDance’s control and influence over TikTok, and thereby the significance of the Communist Party’s influence over ByteDance, are deceptive and misleading.

226. ByteDance exercises significant control and influence over TikTok, and ByteDance in turn is under significant influence by, and cooperates closely with, the Chinese Government and Communist Party. This influence and cooperation provide the Chinese Government and

¹⁵⁸ Commerce Department Memorandum, at 7 (quoting F. Russo, *Politics in the Boardroom: The Role of Chinese Communist Party Committees*, THE DIPLOMAT (Dec. 24, 2019), <https://bit.ly/3XOH6hN>).

¹⁵⁹ S. Livingston, *The Chinese Communist Party Targets the Private Sector*, *supra* note 141 (citing Ye Qing, Vice Chairman of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce); S. Livingston, *The New Challenge of Communist Corporate Governance*, *supra* note 141.

¹⁶⁰ S. Livingston, *The Chinese Communist Party Targets the Private Sector*, *supra* note 141.

¹⁶¹ S. Livingston, *The New Challenge of Communist Corporate Governance*, *supra* note 141.

Communist Party with clear leverage over, and the ability to exert pressure on, ByteDance, its leadership, and its employees. It has already done so, in multiple ways. There is no barrier, legal or otherwise, to the Chinese Government or Communist Party applying the same pressure on ByteDance to access U.S. user data, including Arkansas consumers' data.

227. TikTok wants Arkansas consumers to believe that their data is safe. But TikTok knows that if the Chinese Government or Communist Party want access to TikTok's U.S. user data, which includes Arkansas consumers' data, they can get it.

k. TikTok and ByteDance Deceive Arkansas Consumers through their In-App Browser

228. When a user clicks on a link from within the TikTok app, the user is directed to the selected web page through TikTok's in-app browser.

229. When the selected page opens in TikTok's browser, it appears to the average user that he or she exited the TikTok app to view the page. In reality, the user never left TikTok.

230. When any link is clicked, the normal TikTok display screen is immediately replaced with the linked webpage.

231. TikTok does not notify consumers at any point, before or after they click on a link within TikTok, that the link is opened using the in-app browser, and not the consumer's default browser on their phone.

232. When the TikTok in-app browser is open, no information identifying its belonging to TikTok is visible. Instead, TikTok displays the generic phrase "Web Browser" across the top of the screen.

233. When a user clicks on a link within TikTok, TikTok does not offer the user the option to open that link in their default browser, rather than in TikTok's in-app browser.

234. There is no readily discernable way to disable the in-app browser.

235. When a user selects a link from TikTok's in-app browser, whatever privacy controls the user set on their default browser do not apply.

236. A report from privacy researcher Felix Krause found that TikTok has the ability to collect copious amounts of information about users who visit third-party websites through TikTok's in-app browser. Specifically, his report finds that TikTok injects JavaScript into these third-party websites that allows TikTok to collect information about everything a user does on that website, including "every keystroke" entered.¹⁶² The code thus allows TikTok to capture additional highly personal information about consumers, including but not limited to passwords, credit card information and health information.¹⁶³

237. TikTok claims that it does "not collect keystroke or text inputs" entered by users on websites accessed through its in-app browser, but according to the researcher's report, it has the capability to do so. TikTok has also admitted to collecting some information about keystrokes, including patterns.¹⁶⁴ Additionally, the researcher reported that TikTok can collect other information about the user's interaction with the third-party website, such as links the user clicked on or anything copied to a user's clipboard, which could be highly sensitive information from any other source on a user's phone.

238. Just as TikTok does not alert users to the fact they are using an in-app browser at all, TikTok also does not alert users to its capabilities to collect sensitive information through the user's use of the in-app browser.

¹⁶² Felix Krause, *iOS Privacy: Announcing InAppBrowser.com - see what JavaScript commands get injected through an in-app browser*, FELIX KRAUSE (Aug. 18, 2022), <https://bit.ly/3Uve3wJ>.

¹⁶³ *Id.*

¹⁶⁴ Paul Mozur, et al., *TikTok Browser Can Track Users' Keystrokes, According to New Research*, NY TIMES (updated Aug. 21, 2022), <https://nyti.ms/3INQ54D>.

239. TikTok does not disclose its use of an in-app browser in its Privacy Policy or Terms of Service and does not inform consumers of data collection capabilities or practices associated specifically with the in-app browser.¹⁶⁵

240. Because TikTok does not alert consumers to the fact that they remain in TikTok even though they are accessing another web page, those consumers do not know that when they access that page, TikTok's practices, policies and rules apply – not the choices the user has made regarding their default browser. TikTok gives users no meaningful choice to decide for themselves what kind of data they want exposed to TikTok through their web browsing activities.

241. TikTok's use of an in-app browser, its failure to disclose its in-app browser when TikTok users click on links within TikTok, its failure to disclose its data collection capabilities and practices through its in-app browser, and its failure to provide a clear, readily apparent and easily accessible option to choose another browser, TikTok deceives Arkansas consumers.

242. For all of the reasons set forth in this Complaint, TikTok also deceives Arkansas consumers about the risk of data collected through TikTok's in-app browser being accessed and exploited by the Chinese Government and Communist Party.

¹⁶⁵ *TikTok Privacy Policy*, *supra* note 7 (the words "in-app browser" appear nowhere in the privacy policy); *Terms of Service*, TIKTOK (last updated Feb. 2019), <https://bit.ly/31F2H5k>.

V. CLAIMS

COUNT I

Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-107, *et seq.*, 108

False, Deceptive, and Unconscionable Representations about the Safety and Privacy of Arkansas User Data, and the Risk of its Access and Exploitation by the Chinese Government and/or Communist Party

243. The State repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

244. The ADTPA prohibits, *inter alia*, “[e]ngaging in any . . . unconscionable, false, or deceptive act or practice in business, commerce, or trade,” or “[k]nowingly facilitating, assisting, intermediating, or in any way aiding the operation or continuance of an act or practice that is in violation of” the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-107(a)(10), (12).

245. The ADTPA further prohibits “[t]he concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression, or omission” “in connection with the sale or advertisement of any goods [or] services,” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-108(a)(2).

246. The ADTPA similarly prohibits “[t]he act, use, or employment by a person of any deception, fraud, or false presentence” when “utilized in connection with the sale or advertisement of any goods or services.” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-108(a)(1).

247. Defendants are “[p]erson[s]” and the TikTok app is a “[s]ervice[]” as defined by Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-102(5), (7), because the app is “an other thing[] purchased that do not have physical characteristics.” Additionally, by offering the TikTok app for general consumers on multiple platforms, Defendants are engaged “in business, commerce, or trade.” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-107(a)(10).

248. Defendants have and are engaged in “deceptive and unconscionable trade practices,” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-107(a)(10), by deceiving Arkansas consumers, namely individuals who download the TikTok application or who allow others to download the TikTok application, about the risk of the Chinese Government and Communist Party accessing and exploiting their data.

249. Defendants knowingly deceived Arkansas consumers, and continue to do so, because Chinese law reaches their data in all the ways described in this Complaint. If the Chinese Government or Communist Party want access to TikTok’s U.S. user data, they can get it.

250. This claim arises exclusively under Arkansas law and involves no issue of federal law. In any event, the State forswears any claim to relief in this action on any theoretical basis of federal law.

COUNT II

Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-107, *et seq.*

False and Deceptive Representations Regarding the Application of Chinese Law to Arkansas User Data

251. The State repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

252. Defendants have and are engaged in “deceptive and unconscionable trade practices,” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-107(a)(10), through their knowing deceptive statements and representations that U.S. user data, which includes Arkansas consumers’ data, is not subject to Chinese Law, when that data is accessible by and may be shared with individuals and entities who are subject to Chinese law and the oppressive Chinese regime, including but not limited to laws requiring cooperation with national intelligence institutions and cybersecurity regulators. Further,

Chinese State and Communist Party officials have interpreted Chinese law as applying to any data in which China has a national intelligence or security interest, no matter where the data is located.

253. TikTok's statements that its U.S. user data, which includes Arkansas consumers' data, is not subject to Chinese law are false, deceptive, and unconscionable. Through these statements, TikTok knowingly paints a false and deceptive picture for Arkansas consumers, namely that there is little to no risk of the Chinese Government or Communist Party, which controls the Government, accessing and exploiting their data.

254. This claim arises exclusively under Arkansas law and involves no issue of federal law. In any event, the State forswears any claim to relief in this action on any theoretical basis of federal law.

COUNT III

Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-107, *et seq.*

TikTok's Privacy Policy Misleads and Deceives Arkansas Consumers

255. The State repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

256. Defendants have and are engaged in "deceptive and unconscionable trade practices," Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-107(a)(10), because recent and current versions of TikTok's U.S. privacy policy have not alerted and do not alert Arkansas consumers to the fact that it may share their data with entities and individuals in China, who are subject to Chinese Law, including but not limited to laws requiring cooperation with national intelligence institutions and cybersecurity regulators.

257. This is deceptive to Arkansas consumers, who cannot know when they read and consent to the privacy policy the truth that their data may be shared with individuals and entities subject to Chinese laws.

258. This claim arises exclusively under Arkansas law and involves no issue of federal law. In any event, the State forswears any claim to relief in this action on any theoretical basis of federal law.

COUNT IV

Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-108

TikTok's Privacy Policy Deceives Arkansas Consumers

259. The State repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

260. Defendants have and are also engaged in “[t]he concealment, suppression, or omission of . . . material fact[s] with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression, or omission” “in connection with the sale or advertisement of any goods [or] services,” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-108(a)(2), by not disclosing to consumers in TikTok’s recent or current U.S. privacy policy, which it has linked to and does link to on its page in the App Store where consumers download the app, the fact that it may share their data with entities and individuals in China, who are subject to Chinese Law, including but not limited to laws requiring cooperation with national intelligence institutions and cybersecurity regulators.

261. This intentional omission is a material fact to Arkansas consumers, who cannot know when they read and consent to the privacy policy the truth that their data may be shared with individuals and entities subject to Chinese laws.

262. This claim arises exclusively under Arkansas law and involves no issue of federal law. In any event, the State forswears any claim to relief in this action on any theoretical basis of federal law.

COUNT V

Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-107

Failure to Comply with App Developer Requirements

263. The State repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

264. Defendants have and are engaged in “deceptive and unconscionable trade practices,” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-107(a)(10), because recent and current versions of TikTok’s U.S. privacy policy, which is accessible through its pages on the App Store and Google Play Store, has not alerted and do not alert Arkansas consumers to the fact that it may share their data with entities and individuals in China, who are subject to Chinese laws that expose their data to the Chinese government and Communist Party.

265. This is deceptive to Arkansas consumers, who expect that any app appearing on the App Store or Google Play Store complies with the minimal requirements for application developers, including requirements to be transparent with users about how their data is accessed and used. TikTok’s app does not.

266. This claim arises exclusively under Arkansas law and involves no issue of federal law. In any event, the State forswears any claim to relief in this action on any theoretical basis of federal law.

COUNT VI

Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-108

Failure to Comply with App Developer Requirements

267. The State repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

268. TikTok has and is also engaged in “[t]he concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression, or omission” “in connection with the sale or advertisement of any goods [or] services,” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-108(a)(2), by not disclosing to consumers in its recent or current U.S. privacy policy, which it has linked to and does link to on its page in the App Store where consumers download the app, that it may share their data with entities and individuals in China, who are subject to Chinese laws that expose their data to the Chinese government and Communist Party.

269. This intentional omission is a material fact to Arkansas consumers, who expect that any app appearing on the App Store or Google Play Store complies with the minimal requirements for application developers, including requirements to be transparent with users about how their data is accessed and used. TikTok’s app does not.

270. This claim arises exclusively under Arkansas law and involves no issue of federal law. In any event, the State forswears any claim to relief in this action on any theoretical basis of federal law.

COUNT VII

Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-107, *et seq.*

False, Deceptive, and Unconscionable Statements about the Influence and Control of the Chinese Government and Communist Party over Defendants

271. The State repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

272. Defendants have and are engaged in “deceptive and unconscionable trade practices,” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-107(a)(10), in their deliberate efforts to downplay ByteDance’s control and influence over TikTok, and thereby the Chinese Government and Communist Party’s influence over ByteDance.

273. Defendants deceive Arkansas consumers when they claim that TikTok is independent from ByteDance, when any reasonable person would understand that evidence of, among other things, ByteDance’s influence and direction over TikTok hiring, employees, and management shows that ByteDance exercises significant control over TikTok.

274. Defendants’ claims further deceive Arkansas consumers because they knowingly obscure TikTok’s “China association”—the influence that the Chinese Government and Communist Party have over ByteDance—and thus the risk that this influence poses to consumers’ data through ByteDance’s ownership and control of TikTok.

275. Defendants knowingly deceived Arkansas consumers, and continue to do so, because the influence and control ByteDance has over TikTok, and ByteDance’s influence by and cooperation with the Chinese Government and Communist Party, means that if the Chinese Government or Communist Party want access to TikTok’s U.S. user data, which includes Arkansas consumers’ data, they can get it.

276. This claim arises exclusively under Arkansas law and involves no issue of federal law. In any event, the State forswears any claim to relief in this action on any theoretical basis of federal law.

277. The State of Arkansas is entitled to a permanent injunction prohibiting TikTok from continuing to make misrepresentations about the security of its data to Arkansas consumers.

278. The State of Arkansas is entitled to civil penalties not to exceed \$10,000 for each violation of the ADTPA, in accord with Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-88-104 and 4-88-113(a)(3).

VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the State prays for judgment against Defendants for each of the causes of action raised herein. The State respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in its favor and that the Court:

A. Declare that TikTok's actions are deceptive and unconscionable to Arkansas consumers under the ADTPA, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-101, *et seq.*;

B. Permanently enjoin Defendants from continuing to treat Arkansas consumers unconscionably and deceptively in the ways described in these allegations in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-88-104 and 4-88-113(a)(1);

C. Award the State civil penalties of not more than ten thousand dollars per each violation of the ADTPA, in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-113(a)(3);

D. Award the State the costs incurred in investigating and pursuing this action, including the expenses for expert witnesses, reasonable attorneys' fees, reasonable and necessary costs of the suit, and prejudgment and post-judgment interest at the highest lawful rates in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-113(e);

E. The State demands a jury trial; and

F. Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems just and appropriate.

Date: March 28, 2023

Respectfully submitted.

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*Applications for admission *pro hac vice*
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